Court Documents Reveal White House Gunman's Prior Secret Service Encounters

On the evening of May 23, 2026, gunfire erupted near 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW when a 21-year-old man pulled a revolver from a messenger bag and opened fire at a U.S. Secret Service checkpoint outside the White House [1]. Uniformed officers returned fire, killing the gunman, later identified as Nasire Best of Dundalk, Maryland [2]. President Donald Trump was inside the White House at the time [3]. A bystander was wounded — authorities have not confirmed whether the injury came from Best's revolver or from officers' return fire — and underwent surgery, remaining in serious but stable condition [1].

The shooting would have been alarming on its own. But court documents unsealed in the following days revealed something more troubling: Best was already well known to the Secret Service. He had been stopped, evaluated, arrested, and ordered by a judge to stay away from the White House — all within the preceding year [1][2].

The Paper Trail: Three Encounters in Eleven Months

Best's documented history with the Secret Service began on June 26, 2025, when he blocked a vehicle entry lane at the White House complex. He told agents he was Jesus Christ and that he wanted to be arrested [2][4]. Agents arranged for his involuntary commitment to the Psychiatric Institute of Washington for a mental health evaluation [4].

Approximately two weeks later, on July 10, 2025, Best returned. He walked through a restricted area outside a White House pedestrian access control post, again ignoring commands to stop and repeating his claim that he was Jesus Christ and wanted to be arrested [2][4].

This second encounter led to a federal charge. Best was arrested by Secret Service agents and charged with unlawfully entering a federally controlled property under federal law. A judge ordered him to stay away from the White House grounds [1].

Best then failed to appear for an August 7, 2025 status hearing in D.C. Superior Court, prompting the issuance of a no-bond bench warrant — but one limited to D.C. jurisdiction only, meaning law enforcement outside the District had no authority to execute it [1][2]. For more than nine months, that warrant sat unserved. Best, living in Baltimore County, was outside its reach.

The Legal Threshold Question

The Secret Service's approach to threat assessment was pioneered by the agency itself. Its National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC), established in 1998, developed the field's foundational methodology: investigating the "thinking and behavior" of individuals who have attacked or come close to attacking public officials [5]. The agency's Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) integrates information from law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and concerned citizens on a daily basis [6].

Under federal law, the relevant statutory threshold for Secret Service action centers on Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 871 and 879, which criminalize threats against the president and other protected persons [6]. A "threat" is defined as any communication — written, electronic, verbal, or non-verbal — that meets the elements of those statutes [6]. The key distinction: Best's behavior in 2025, while disturbing and escalating, may not have constituted a prosecutable "threat" under these narrow statutory definitions. Blocking an entry lane and claiming to be Jesus Christ, while grounds for trespass charges and psychiatric evaluation, does not necessarily meet the legal threshold of a credible threat to harm a protected person.

This is the steelman case for the Secret Service's handling of Best's prior encounters. Each interaction was logged. He was evaluated. He was charged. He was ordered to stay away. At each step, agents followed existing protocols. The failure, if there was one, may lie less in enforcement than in the legal architecture itself — in a system where a bench warrant limited to one jurisdiction cannot reach a subject living 40 miles away in another state.

A Pattern Repeating

Best's case is not the first time a person with documented prior Secret Service contact has later carried out or attempted an attack on the White House. The pattern is older than most of the current security infrastructure.

Source: CNN, Wikipedia compilations

Data as of May 25, 2026CSV

In September 2014, Omar Gonzalez — an Iraq War veteran armed with a pocket knife — scaled the White House fence, sprinted across the North Lawn, entered through an unlocked front door, and penetrated all the way to the East Room before being tackled [7]. The Obamas had departed minutes earlier. What emerged in congressional hearings was that Gonzalez, too, had prior contact with Secret Service. On August 25, 2014, agents had approached him at the White House fence after noticing a hatchet in his waistband. They searched his car and found two more hatchets, camping equipment, and empty gun cases. They interviewed him — aware he had been interviewed by other agents the previous month — and still deemed him not to be a threat [7].

The Gonzalez breach led to the resignation of Secret Service Director Julia Pierson after she testified before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on September 30, 2014, accepting responsibility for the security failure [7]. Congress subsequently approved additional funding for White House perimeter security, including a taller fence with anti-climb features.

In November 2011, a gunman fired an assault rifle at the White House residential wing, hitting it at least seven times. Secret Service supervisors initially dismissed the gunfire as a gang-related shootout and failed to recognize the danger [8].

The Second Attack in a Month

The Best shooting came less than a month after the April 25, 2026 attack at the White House Correspondents' Dinner at the Washington Hilton. In that incident, Cole Tomas Allen, 31, of Torrance, California, ran through a magnetometer holding a long gun and fired at a Secret Service officer, who was wearing a ballistic vest and survived with non-life-threatening injuries [9][10]. Allen has been charged with attempting to assassinate the president [10].

Two attacks targeting presidential security in 28 days has intensified pressure on the agency and on Congress to act. Secret Service Director Sean M. Curran acknowledged the strain in a statement following the Best shooting: "Our officers continue to operate heroically in a heightened political threat environment" [1].

The Ballroom Gambit

Within 48 hours of Best's death, Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche filed a court motion to resume construction on a controversial 90,000-square-foot, 999-person-capacity ballroom attached to the White House East Wing [11][12]. In the filing, Blanche — who previously served as Trump's personal criminal defense attorney — wrote that the shooting "underscores the critical need for top level, state of the art security at the White House, including the Ballroom" [3].

The ballroom project has a tangled legal and fiscal history. Its estimated cost has escalated from an initial figure to $200 million, then $300 million, $400 million, and most recently $1 billion when security enhancements are included [13][14]. Trump has claimed that private donations fund the construction itself, with public money covering bunker and security upgrades [12].

A federal district court judge temporarily halted construction last month, ruling that the administration needed congressional approval to proceed [3]. The Senate parliamentarian struck down a proposal to earmark $1 billion for ballroom-related security in a reconciliation bill [14]. Senate Republican leaders subsequently moved to abandon the funding proposal amid bipartisan backlash [14]. An appellate court allowed construction to continue temporarily, with full oral argument scheduled for June 5, 2026 [3].

The legal basis for connecting the ballroom to the shooting is thin. Assistant Attorney General Brett Shumate argued in the filing that the Washington Hilton, where the Correspondents' Dinner shooting occurred, is "demonstrably unsafe" for presidential events, and that the new ballroom would "prevent future assassination attempts on the President at the Washington Hilton" [12]. Critics have called this reasoning circular — the ballroom is being justified as an alternative to a venue that was attacked, but the latest shooting occurred at the White House itself, precisely where the ballroom is being built.

The National Trust for Historic Preservation, which filed the original lawsuit challenging the construction in December 2025, said it would review the DOJ letter with legal counsel [12].

Who Is Accountable?

The question of institutional accountability when a known individual carries out an attack runs through multiple layers of the federal security apparatus. The field agents who encountered Best in June and July 2025 logged the encounters and initiated charges — their documentation is the reason the paper trail exists at all. The D.C. Superior Court judge who set the bench warrant's jurisdiction to D.C. only limited its practical reach. The broader intelligence-sharing system between the Secret Service, the FBI, and Maryland law enforcement did not, based on available reporting, flag Best as a continuing threat after his failure to appear in court.

The Metropolitan Police Department's Internal Affairs Bureau will lead the use-of-force investigation into the shooting itself. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia will review the incident for any additional federal implications [1].

The Scale of the Watch

The Secret Service maintains its Protective Threat Management System (PTMS), a database containing personally identifiable information on individuals who have exhibited "threatening or inappropriate behavior" toward protected persons or facilities [6]. The agency also operates a Counter Surveillance Unit Reporting (CSUR) database that tracks suspicious activity near protected sites [15]. The exact number of individuals in these systems is not publicly disclosed.

What is known is that the Secret Service receives and evaluates thousands of potential threats each year. Its NTAC has published research spanning 83 individuals who attacked or nearly attacked public officials over a 50-year period [5]. The agency's 2024 guidance to state and local law enforcement emphasized a "behavioral threat assessment" model — looking at patterns of conduct rather than specific verbal threats — as the most effective approach to preventing targeted violence [16].

The civil liberties tension is real. Expanding pre-crime surveillance in response to incidents like the Best shooting risks sweeping large numbers of individuals with mental health crises into a security database, with limited due-process protections governing how long their information is retained or how it is shared. The Privacy Impact Assessment for PTMS, published by DHS, notes that records may include information from "concerned citizens" and other law enforcement entities — a broad intake that raises questions about accuracy and proportionality [6].

Budget and Reform

Source: CRS, DHS Budget Justifications

Data as of May 25, 2026CSV

The FY2026 budget allocated $3.5 billion and 8,826 positions to the Secret Service, a $192 million increase over FY2025 [17]. The FY2027 request, released April 3, 2026, asks for $3.55 billion in discretionary spending [17]. The agency plans to add roughly 850 special agent positions and 256 uniformed division positions in FY2027 [18].

A separate $220 million allocation has been proposed for "hardening" the East Wing Modernization Project with bulletproof glass, drone detection, and chemical filtration systems [19]. But this funding is entangled with the broader ballroom dispute, and DHS appropriations lapsed after February 13, 2026 — a funding gap that remains unresolved [17].

Compared to the post-Gonzalez reforms of 2014-2015, which focused on physical barriers (a taller, spikier fence) and personnel changes (Pierson's resignation, a new director), the current reform discussion is broader but more politically fraught. The two 2026 attacks have occurred against the backdrop of an ongoing government shutdown affecting DHS, a contested billion-dollar construction project, and heightened political polarization around presidential security.

What the Case Reveals

The Nasire Best case exposes a specific and recurring vulnerability: the gap between identifying a person of concern and maintaining continuous awareness of that person. Best was identified, evaluated, charged, and warned. He was then effectively lost to the system for nine months — living in an adjacent jurisdiction, with an outstanding warrant that could not reach him, until he returned to the White House with a loaded revolver.

Whether the answer lies in expanding the geographic reach of bench warrants, improving inter-jurisdictional data sharing, increasing funding for mental health intervention programs, or some combination of all three remains an open question. What the court documents make clear is that the information existed. The system had the data. The mechanisms to act on it did not keep pace.