Bystander Left in Serious Condition After Shooting at White House Security Checkpoint

Shortly after 6 p.m. on Saturday, May 23, 2026, a 21-year-old man approached the U.S. Secret Service checkpoint at 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW in Washington, D.C., pulled a handgun from a bag, and began firing at uniformed officers [1]. Officers returned fire. The gunman, later identified as Nasire Best of Dundalk, Maryland, was transported to a hospital and pronounced dead [2]. President Donald Trump was inside the White House at the time but was unharmed [3].

A bystander — whose identity has not been publicly released — was also struck by gunfire. That person remained hospitalized in serious but stable condition as of May 25, with the Secret Service describing the wound as not life-threatening [4]. The question that has so far gone unanswered: whose bullet hit the bystander?

What Happened at the Checkpoint

The incident unfolded at one of the busiest pedestrian access points near the White House, where tourists, commuters, and government workers routinely pass. An NBC News team at the White House reported hearing between 20 and 30 gunshots at approximately 6:04 p.m. [5]. The preliminary investigation indicates Best concealed a weapon in a bag before drawing it at the checkpoint [3].

Secret Service Director Sean Curran confirmed in a statement that no officers were injured in the exchange [4]. The Metropolitan Police Department is conducting a parallel investigation into the officer-involved shooting, standard procedure for any incident in which law enforcement discharges firearms in the District of Columbia [5].

The volume of fire — potentially 15 to 30 rounds in an area frequented by civilians — makes the question of the bystander's wound more than academic. A law enforcement official told NBC News it remained unclear whether the bystander was struck by rounds from the suspect's initial volley or during the return fire that followed [5].

Who Was Nasire Best?

Best, 21, was not unknown to the Secret Service. Records show at least two prior encounters at the White House complex in the summer of 2025 [6].

On June 26, 2025, Best approached officers at the White House and made threats. He was involuntarily committed to the Psychiatric Institute of Washington for a mental health evaluation, where he spent 18 months [7]. On July 10, 2025, he entered a restricted area at a White House pedestrian access control post, ignored commands to stop, and, according to court filings, "claimed he was Jesus Christ and that he wanted to get arrested" [6].

A bench warrant was issued in August 2025 after Best failed to appear for a hearing following a notice of noncompliance [7]. Social media posts attributed to Best included one that appeared to threaten violence against President Trump and another in which he described himself as the son of God [6].

The pattern is consistent with what mental health professionals describe as grandiose delusions, a symptom associated with several psychiatric conditions. That Best was previously involuntarily committed, issued a stay-away order from the White House complex, and had an outstanding bench warrant — yet was still able to approach the checkpoint armed — raises questions about the gaps between the mental health system, the courts, and law enforcement intelligence [7].

The Third Shooting in a Month

The May 23 incident did not occur in isolation. It was the third time in roughly four weeks that shots were fired near the president or senior administration officials [8].

On April 25, 2026, 31-year-old Cole Tomas Allen opened fire near the main security screening area of the White House Correspondents' Association Dinner at the Washington Hilton. Allen was armed with a shotgun, a handgun, and multiple knives. He was subsequently charged with the attempted assassination of the president [9]. One Secret Service officer was struck in his bullet-resistant vest but released from the hospital [9].

Earlier in May, Secret Service agents shot a man near the Washington Monument along the path of Vice President JD Vance's motorcade after the man allegedly opened fire when confronted by authorities [8].

Source: NBC News / CNN / Wikipedia

Data as of May 25, 2026CSV

These events sit within a broader surge in political violence that has included two prior assassination attempts against Trump, an arson attack at the Pennsylvania governor's mansion, the killing of a Minnesota lawmaker, and the assassination of conservative commentator Charlie Kirk [8].

Use-of-Force Protocols and the Bystander Problem

The Department of Homeland Security's use-of-force policy, which governs Secret Service operations, authorizes deadly force only when an officer has a "reasonable belief of an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury" [10]. The policy requires officers to use the minimum force necessary and mandates de-escalation when possible [10].

One notable exception applies specifically to the Secret Service: DHS policy generally prohibits warning shots but allows them for Secret Service personnel exercising protective responsibilities [10]. Officers are also instructed to "avoid intentionally placing themselves in positions where they have no alternative but to use deadly force" [10].

None of these policies, however, contain publicly available provisions that specifically address protocols for returning fire in areas with high pedestrian density — the precise scenario that unfolded on May 23. The checkpoint at 17th and Pennsylvania is not a sterile zone; it sits along a public sidewalk in one of the most visited areas of the nation's capital.

The steelman case for the officers' response is straightforward: they faced an active shooter at close range who was firing on them from within a crowd. Federal law enforcement training emphasizes that failing to neutralize an active threat quickly can result in greater casualties — both among officers and the public. A delayed or more restrained response, in this framework, risks giving the shooter time to fire more rounds into the crowd or advance toward the White House itself.

Whether that calculus played out optimally on May 23 is precisely what the investigation must determine.

A History of Perimeter Breaches and Reforms

The White House perimeter has been tested repeatedly over the past several decades.

Source: CNN / Wikipedia compiled data

Data as of May 25, 2026CSV

The 2010s saw a pronounced spike in security incidents. The most consequential was the September 2014 breach by Omar J. Gonzalez, who scaled the iron perimeter fence, sprinted across the North Lawn, entered the White House through unlocked North Portico doors, and overpowered a security officer before being subdued [11]. The incident led to the resignation of Secret Service Director Julia Pierson and a comprehensive security review.

Immediate changes after 2014 included the addition of a second, shorter portable fence in front of the existing barrier, removable steel spikes atop the main fence, and the closure of the sidewalk bordering the South Lawn [12]. A long-term fence redesign — featuring taller barriers with a curved anti-climb lip — was approved in 2017 and construction began in July 2019 [13].

But these changes were principally designed to prevent unauthorized physical entry onto White House grounds. The May 23 shooting occurred at a checkpoint — a point where the public is expected to be present. The security question is different: not how to keep people out, but how to protect those who are lawfully nearby when a threat materializes.

How Other Countries Handle the Same Problem

A comparison with other high-security government sites offers partial context. At 10 Downing Street in London, metal barriers were placed across the entrance in 1973, and the Metropolitan Police proposed a semi-permanent barrier between the pavement and carriageway in 1974 [14]. The entire street is now gated and inaccessible to pedestrian traffic without authorization.

Security around the Élysée Palace in Paris is more restrictive still. Pedestrians are not permitted to walk on the pavement nearest the building; the closest public access is the opposite side of the street, with barriers and police enforcing the buffer [15].

The White House, by contrast, maintains a deliberately more open posture. The National Mall, Pennsylvania Avenue, and surrounding sidewalks remain public spaces. This accessibility is by design — a reflection of the democratic principle that the executive residence belongs to the people — but it creates an inherent tension with the security demands of protecting the president and, crucially, the safety of bystanders in the event of an attack.

Neither Downing Street nor the Élysée Palace has experienced an analogous checkpoint shooting in recent memory, though both have faced vehicle attacks and other threats that their more restrictive perimeters were designed to mitigate.

Legal Rights of the Injured Bystander

The legal framework governing the bystander's potential claims runs through the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the principal statute allowing private individuals to sue the U.S. government for injuries caused by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment [16].

The FTCA generally bars claims for intentional torts — assault, battery, false imprisonment — but includes a critical exception: the "law enforcement proviso" permits such claims when the conduct involves federal "investigative or law enforcement officers" [16]. If the investigation determines the bystander was struck by a round fired by Secret Service officers, this proviso would likely be the legal pathway for any claim.

Compensatory damages are available under the FTCA, but punitive damages are not [17]. The injured party must first file an administrative claim with the relevant federal agency before pursuing litigation, and the statute of limitations is two years from the date of injury [17].

Historical compensation in federal shooting cases varies widely. Published data on settlement amounts in Secret Service-specific incidents is sparse, but FTCA claims arising from law enforcement shootings have resulted in settlements ranging from tens of thousands to several million dollars, depending on the severity of injury and the circumstances of the shooting [16].

Whether the bystander or their family has been formally notified of these rights is not publicly known.

The Oversight Gap

Multiple bodies have formal jurisdiction over an incident like the May 23 shooting. The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) has oversight authority over the Secret Service. The Metropolitan Police Department investigates all officer-involved shootings in D.C. Congressional committees — including the House Committee on Oversight and the Senate Homeland Security Committee — can convene hearings.

The track record of these mechanisms, however, is uneven. A 2017 DHS OIG report found that the department lacked adequate oversight of component use-of-force data, concluding that "without proper oversight and action, DHS cannot be assured it is tracking and using the right data" or "ensuring transparency and accountability necessary for public trust" [18]. A 2023 Government Accountability Office report echoed this finding, stating that DHS should strengthen its use-of-force data collection and analysis [19].

The DHS Inspector General's office has itself faced credibility questions. Inspector General Joseph Cuffari declined to review the Secret Service's use of force against Black Lives Matter protesters at Lafayette Square in June 2020 and delayed notifying Congress about the mass deletion of Secret Service text messages from January 6, 2021 [20].

In response to earlier criticism, DHS established a Use of Force Steering Committee chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement Policy [18]. But whether that committee's work has produced measurable improvements in accountability for incidents like the May 23 shooting remains an open question.

The Questions That Remain

The most immediate factual question — whose bullet struck the bystander — will likely be answered by ballistic analysis during the Metropolitan Police investigation. But the broader questions are structural.

A man with a documented psychiatric history, prior Secret Service detentions, an involuntary commitment, a stay-away order, and an outstanding bench warrant was able to approach one of the most surveilled security checkpoints in the world carrying a concealed weapon. The system had multiple points at which intervention could have occurred: the courts, the mental health system, the firearms background check process, law enforcement intelligence sharing. Each appears to have failed.

The bystander, meanwhile, was simply in the wrong place — a public sidewalk near the White House — at the wrong time. Whether the bullet that struck them came from the suspect or from the officers tasked with protecting the public, the outcome is the same: a person who posed no threat to anyone is in a hospital bed.

Three shootings near the president in 30 days is not a trend line that permits complacency. The investigation into the May 23 incident will test whether the oversight apparatus — the OIG, the MPD, Congressional committees — can produce transparent findings and, if warranted, accountability. Recent history suggests that test will not be easy to pass.