Artemis II Crew Enters Lunar Trajectory After Reaching Orbit

At 6:35 p.m. EDT on April 1, 2026, NASA's Space Launch System rocket lifted off from Kennedy Space Center carrying commander Reid Wiseman, pilot Victor Glover, and mission specialists Christina Koch and Jeremy Hansen — the first humans to leave low Earth orbit in more than half a century [1]. Within hours, the Orion spacecraft had separated from the rocket's upper stage, unfurled its solar arrays, and completed a 43-second perigee raise burn to settle into a high Earth orbit with a roughly 24-hour period [2]. Now, as the crew prepares for the Trans-Lunar Injection maneuver scheduled for 7:49 p.m. EDT on April 2, the mission enters its most consequential phase: a five-minute, 51-second engine firing that will send them toward the Moon — or, if anything goes wrong, back to Earth [3].

The crew makes history on multiple fronts. Glover will become the first person of color, Koch the first woman, and Hansen the first non-American to travel in the vicinity of the Moon [4].

The Trans-Lunar Injection: Orion's Proving Ground

The TLI burn is the single event that transforms Artemis II from an orbital shakedown into a lunar mission. The Orion service module's AJ10 engine — built by Aerojet Rocketdyne and derived from the engine that powered the Space Shuttle's orbital maneuvering system — must produce a delta-v of approximately 1,272 feet per second (roughly 388 m/s) over five minutes and 51 seconds [3].

This is a fundamentally different approach than Apollo used. During Apollo missions, the Saturn V's S-IVB third stage performed TLI with its powerful J-2 engine in a single 350-second burn roughly two hours and 44 minutes after launch [5]. On Artemis I in 2022, the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) — a modified Delta IV upper stage — handled TLI. For Artemis II, the service module itself must do the job, proving that it can push the 57,000-pound crewed capsule out of Earth's gravitational well [5].

The Orion service module, supplied by the European Space Agency, carries about 8,600 kilograms of propellant. Its AJ10 engine produces roughly 6,000 pounds of thrust — far less than the 200,000-plus pounds the J-2 could deliver. That lower thrust explains why the TLI burn lasts nearly six minutes rather than six [5]. The margin is tighter, and the operational stakes are higher: this is the first time a crewed spacecraft's service module has performed its own TLI since the Apollo program.

A $4 Billion Ticket to the Moon

The price of this mission is staggering by any measure. NASA's Office of Inspector General estimated in 2021 that the per-launch production and operating cost for the first four Artemis flights would be $2.2 billion for SLS and $568 million for Orion — roughly $2.8 billion in hardware alone, before ground operations and mission support push the total past $4 billion [6][7].

Source: NASA OIG / Commercial Crew estimates

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

With four crew members aboard, Artemis II costs approximately $1 billion per astronaut seat. Compare that to SpaceX's Crew Dragon, which currently charges NASA about $72 million per seat for ISS crew rotation missions — a figure that has risen from $55 million in 2019 due to inflation and SpaceX's increased bargaining position [8]. Even Boeing's troubled Starliner, priced at roughly $115 million per seat, is an order of magnitude cheaper [8].

The broader Artemis program has consumed approximately $93 billion between fiscal years 2012 and 2025, according to the Inspector General's office [9]. The "One Big Beautiful Bill Act," passed in July 2025, allocated an additional $2.6 billion distributed through FY 2032 [10]. The Trump administration's FY 2026 budget proposal called SLS "grossly expensive" and "140% over budget" [11].

The Heat Shield Question

No single technical issue has drawn more scrutiny than Orion's heat shield. During Artemis I's reentry in December 2022, engineers discovered more than 100 locations where the Avcoat ablative material wore away differently than predicted [12]. Gases trapped within the heat shield could not properly vent, leading to pressure buildup, cracking, and ejection of charred material in multiple spots [12].

More alarming: three of the four separation bolts embedded in the heat shield melted through their thermal barriers — a flaw traced to an incorrect heating model NASA had used in their design [12]. If bolt melt extends beyond the thermal barrier during reentry, hot gas can penetrate behind the heat shield, potentially exceeding Orion's structural limits and resulting in vehicle breakup [12].

NASA's Inspector General stated in a May 2024 report that the heat shield anomalies, separation bolt erosion, and power distribution issues identified during Artemis I "pose significant risks to crew safety" [13]. As of February 2024, action items from the Post-Flight Assessment Review remained open and in work [13].

Rather than replacing the heat shield — which would have delayed the mission further — NASA chose to fly Artemis II with a modified reentry trajectory. The agency added thermal protective material around the separation bolt gaps and adopted a gentler "skip reentry" profile designed to reduce peak heating [14]. In March 2026, a Flight Readiness Review board voted unanimously to proceed [15].

The decision drew sharp external criticism. An essay published on Idle Words in March 2026, titled "Artemis II Is Not Safe to Fly," argued that NASA had not adequately demonstrated the heat shield fix and was accepting residual risk beyond what the evidence justified [16]. CNN reported in January 2026 that "not everyone thinks [Orion] is safe to fly," citing concerns from outside engineers and former NASA officials [17]. Scientific American described the heat shield as the subject of an ongoing "debate" within the aerospace community [18].

NASA's position, stated at the FRR, is that internal consensus supports the safety case and that the modified trajectory keeps heating loads within acceptable margins [15].

Radiation: Flying Through the Storm

Artemis II launches during or near solar maximum — the peak of the Sun's roughly 11-year activity cycle — raising the stakes on radiation exposure [19]. Once the spacecraft passes beyond Earth's magnetosphere after TLI, the crew will be exposed to galactic cosmic rays and, potentially, solar energetic particle events with no planetary magnetic field for protection [20].

Source: NASA / SWSC Journal

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

NASA estimates the crew will receive approximately 30 millisieverts (mSv) of total effective dose over the 10-day mission under normal conditions [21]. For comparison, ISS astronauts receive about 0.5 mSv per day, accumulating roughly 90 mSv over a standard six-month rotation [21]. The Artemis II dose rate is higher on a per-day basis because the crew will spend roughly 30% of the mission outside Earth's magnetosphere in cislunar space [21].

The more serious concern is a large solar particle event. In the shielded interior of Orion, such an event could deliver doses below 150 mSv, according to measurements extrapolated from Artemis I data [21]. NASA's current career dose limit for astronauts is 600 mSv [22]. While a single solar event would not breach that limit, it would consume a significant fraction of it, and the short-notice nature of solar storms — sometimes just 15 to 30 minutes of warning — puts a premium on the crew's ability to reach Orion's improvised storm shelter, which uses onboard consumables and water to add shielding mass [20].

The crew will carry personal dosimeters, supplemented by six radiation sensors installed throughout the cabin, capable of detecting sudden dose-rate spikes and triggering shelter alerts [20].

Abort Options After TLI

The free-return trajectory is Artemis II's primary safety feature. Unlike a direct lunar orbit insertion, a free-return profile uses the Moon's gravity to slingshot the spacecraft back toward Earth without requiring a major engine burn [23]. If the service module engine fails entirely after TLI, the crew should still return home — a design choice directly informed by the experience of Apollo 13, which used its free-return trajectory to survive a catastrophic oxygen tank explosion in 1970 [23].

Orion will pass approximately 4,600 miles (7,400 km) above the lunar far side — far higher than Apollo 8's 69-mile altitude — on a hybrid free-return arc [5]. At that distance, the abort options are constrained. Between TLI and the lunar flyby, the crew can perform trajectory correction burns using the service module engine to adjust their return path, but a major maneuver to reverse course and return directly to Earth is not feasible — the fuel budget does not permit it [24]. The geometry of the free-return trajectory means the crew is committed to going around the Moon once TLI is complete.

During the early ascent phase, the Launch Abort System — a tower-mounted set of solid rockets atop the Orion capsule — can pull the crew module away from a failing rocket [25]. That system is jettisoned after the first two minutes of flight. Between abort tower jettison and TLI, the crew can separate Orion from the upper stage and use the service module to maneuver into an orbit from which reentry is possible. After TLI, they ride the free-return trajectory home, with the ability to fine-tune their path but not fundamentally alter it [24].

The Cost Debate: Jobs Program or Strategic Necessity?

The SLS rocket stands at the center of an argument that has persisted since the program's authorization in 2010. Critics contend that SLS is a "Senate Launch System" — a politically motivated jobs program designed to preserve Space Shuttle-era supply chains across key congressional districts, duplicating capabilities that SpaceX's Starship could provide at a fraction of the cost [26].

The numbers support at least part of that argument. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk has estimated Starship's total development cost at $2.5 to $5 billion — compared to SLS development costs that have exceeded $23 billion [26]. Starship offers higher payload capacity, higher payload volume, and full reusability, while SLS is expended after each flight [26]. The GAO found that NASA had obscured $782 million in SLS cost growth by shifting projections to future missions without adjusting baselines — a practice GAO said "misrepresents the cost performance of the program" [27].

Source: NASA / SpacePolicyOnline

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

Defenders of SLS and the broader Artemis architecture point to several factors. SLS is the only operational super-heavy-lift vehicle rated to carry crew to the Moon today — Starship has not yet completed an orbital flight with crew [28]. Congressional supporters argue that SLS sustains a skilled aerospace workforce and preserves institutional knowledge that would be difficult to rebuild [28]. The Artemis program also serves diplomatic functions: the Orion service module is built by the European Space Agency, and Canada contributed the crew member Jeremy Hansen and robotics technology, binding allied nations into the lunar exploration framework [4].

The Reason Foundation, a libertarian think tank, argued in a 2026 analysis that NASA should transition away from SLS to commercially provided launch services after Artemis II, noting that the per-launch cost gap will only widen as SpaceX achieves reusability milestones [29]. NASA administrator Jared Isaacman, himself a former SpaceX commercial crew customer, has acknowledged the cost disparity but has maintained that the existing Artemis hardware pipeline should be flown rather than wasted [30].

What Comes After Artemis II

If the mission succeeds, the path forward is less certain than the public narrative suggests. In February 2026, NASA restructured the Artemis sequence. Artemis III, originally planned as a crewed lunar landing in 2024, has slipped to 2027 — and will no longer land on the Moon. Instead, it will conduct rendezvous and docking tests in low Earth orbit with one or both commercially developed lunar landers: SpaceX's Starship HLS and Blue Origin's Blue Moon [30].

Administrator Isaacman confirmed at a February 27, 2026 press conference that the first potential crewed lunar landing has been pushed to Artemis IV, tentatively scheduled for 2028 [30]. NASA also announced in March 2026 that it would pause plans for the Lunar Gateway orbital station and instead focus on a lunar surface base to be developed between 2029 and 2036 [10].

The schedule history speaks for itself. Artemis I was originally targeted for 2017 and flew in 2022. Artemis II was planned for 2023 and launched in 2026. Artemis III was supposed to land astronauts on the Moon in 2024; the current plan does not include a landing until 2028 at the earliest [10][30]. Each milestone has slipped by three or more years.

Congressional funding provides some binding commitment: the One Big Beautiful Bill Act's $2.6 billion allocation through FY 2032 signals legislative intent to continue the program [10]. But annual appropriations can change with each Congress, and the program's dependency on multiple unproven systems — Starship HLS, Blue Moon, the AxEMU spacesuit — introduces schedule risk that no amount of political commitment can eliminate.

Accepting Residual Risk

NASA's pre-flight risk assessment process for Artemis II involved a formal Flight Readiness Review in which senior managers from across the agency and its contractors evaluated whether to proceed [15]. The review examined findings from the Artemis I Post-Flight Assessment, including the heat shield anomalies, separation bolt damage, and power distribution issues flagged by the Inspector General [13].

The agency's framework for accepting residual risk on crewed missions requires demonstrating that identified hazards have been either eliminated, controlled to acceptable levels, or accepted with documented rationale. For Artemis II, the heat shield risk was accepted based on the modified reentry trajectory and additional thermal protection — not on a redesigned shield [14]. The separation bolt fix involved added thermal barrier material, not a new bolt design [14].

Whether that threshold is appropriate is a matter of ongoing debate. NASA points to its decades of institutional experience managing risk on the Space Shuttle and ISS programs. Critics note that the Space Shuttle program's track record included two catastrophic losses of crew — Challenger and Columbia — and that institutional confidence in accepted risk was a contributing factor in both disasters [16].

The four astronauts aboard Orion have accepted those risks. As the TLI burn approaches on April 2, 2026, the question is not whether the mission is risky — it is, by definition. The question is whether NASA's mitigation measures are sufficient, whether the political and strategic value of returning humans to the Moon justifies the expenditure, and whether the Artemis architecture can deliver on promises that have been deferred for more than a decade.