Artemis II Crew Splashes Down, Completing First Crewed Lunar Mission in Over 50 Years

At 5:07 p.m. Pacific time on April 10, 2026, the Orion capsule carrying NASA astronauts Reid Wiseman, Victor Glover, and Christina Koch, along with Canadian Space Agency astronaut Jeremy Hansen, punched through Earth's atmosphere at over 24,000 mph and splashed down in the Pacific Ocean southwest of San Diego [1]. The moment marked the first crewed return from lunar distance since the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project recovery in 1975 and the first crewed lunar flyby since Apollo 17 in December 1972 [2].

The crew had traveled 694,481 miles over roughly 10 days, reaching a maximum distance of 252,760 miles from Earth — about 4,105 miles farther than the Apollo 13 crew, setting a new record for the greatest distance any humans have traveled from their home planet [3]. Their closest approach to the lunar surface came on April 6, when Orion passed within 4,070 miles of the Moon [4].

The triumph was real. So were the problems.

A $93 Billion Flyby

The Artemis program's price tag has become a defining feature of the endeavor. A 2021 NASA Office of Inspector General audit estimated total program costs at approximately $93 billion through fiscal year 2025, covering the Space Launch System rocket, the Orion spacecraft, and Exploration Ground Systems [5]. The NASA OIG pegged the cost of each SLS/Orion launch at roughly $4.1 billion for the program's first four missions [6].

Source: NASA OIG / GAO Reports

Data as of Apr 11, 2026CSV

Breaking down the components: the SLS rocket consumed nearly $24 billion from inception through the uncrewed Artemis I test flight in November 2022, while the Orion capsule cost more than $20 billion between its initial development phase in 2006 and 2022 [7]. In NASA's fiscal year 2026 budget request, the agency allocated $2 billion for SLS, $1.37 billion for Orion, and $658 million for Exploration Ground Systems [6].

For comparison, SpaceX charges NASA approximately $55 million per astronaut seat on Crew Dragon flights to the International Space Station [8]. Dividing the $4.1 billion Artemis II launch cost among four crew members yields roughly $1 billion per astronaut — more than 18,000 times the per-seat cost of a commercial crew flight to low Earth orbit. Even adjusting Apollo-era mission costs to 2026 dollars — each Apollo mission cost an estimated $1.5 billion to $2 billion in today's money — Artemis remains significantly more expensive per flight [7].

Casey Dreier of the Planetary Society summarized the trajectory: "This rocket was originally supposed to launch in 2016 and cost $5 billion. It costs something like $20 billion now, 10 years after that" [7].

Eight Years Behind Schedule

The Artemis program's delays have been as conspicuous as its costs. When Congress authorized the SLS in 2010, the vehicle was projected to fly by December 2016. The SLS program slipped its first launch date more than 26 times across its development history before Artemis I finally lifted off in November 2022 [7][9].

Artemis II was originally scheduled for November 2024. That target moved to September 2025, then to early 2026. Even in its final stretch, the mission suffered two scrubs — in February and March 2026 — caused by a hydrogen leak in the rocket and an upper stage helium flow issue, before successfully launching on April 1 [10][11]. The hydrogen leak was a recurring problem: the same type of issue had also delayed Artemis I in 2022 [7].

The Trump administration's own fiscal year 2026 budget proposal described the SLS as "grossly expensive" and noted the program was 140% over its original budget [7]. A 2018 NASA OIG report found that Boeing, the SLS core stage prime contractor, received approximately $234 million of a possible $262 million in available award fees between fiscal years 2013 and 2017 — a period during which the program was accumulating years of schedule delay and hundreds of millions in cost overruns [9].

The Crew That Flew — and Those Who Didn't

NASA announced the Artemis II crew in April 2023, selecting from a pool of 18 astronauts named to the broader "Artemis Team" in December 2020 [12]. That pool was deliberately diverse: nine men and nine women, with 10 people of color and three women of color among them [13].

The four who flew brought a mix of experience and firsts. Commander Reid Wiseman, a Navy test pilot, had previously spent 165 days aboard the ISS. Pilot Victor Glover, also a Navy aviator, became the first Black astronaut to fly beyond low Earth orbit. Mission specialist Christina Koch, who holds the record for the longest single spaceflight by a woman (328 days), became the first woman to fly to lunar distance. Jeremy Hansen, a Canadian Forces fighter pilot, became the first non-American to fly on a lunar mission [14][2].

NASA has not publicly disclosed detailed selection criteria beyond broad categories — military test piloting, scientific expertise, spaceflight experience, and the ability to serve as effective crew in a small capsule for extended periods [12]. The remaining 14 Artemis Team members, including astronauts like Jessica Meir, Stephanie Wilson, Kate Rubins, and Joe Acaba, remain candidates for future Artemis flights. NASA has said it expects to announce the Artemis III crew soon [15].

Close Calls and Known Risks

The flight was not without incident. Approximately 50 minutes after launch, NASA reported a temporary loss of communication with the Orion capsule — quickly resolved but unsettling to flight controllers [10]. Both the drinking water and propellant systems experienced valve malfunctions, and the toilet repeatedly failed, requiring troubleshooting by the crew and ground teams [16][10].

More consequential was a leak in the service module's propulsion system that affected pressurization of propellant tanks. NASA engineers managed the issue through workarounds, but the anomaly narrowed operational margins [10].

The most significant risk, however, was known before launch. After the uncrewed Artemis I mission in 2022, engineers discovered over 100 locations on Orion's Avcoat heat shield that had cracked and broken off during reentry. The root cause: internal pressure buildup during the capsule's "skip" reentry maneuver, where the spacecraft briefly exits and re-enters the atmosphere. When the outer char layer cooled and hardened during the skip phase, trapped gases burst through on the second descent, ejecting fragments of the shield [17].

Rather than redesign the heat shield — which would have delayed the mission by over a year — NASA opted for a different approach. Engineers instructed the crew to follow a "loft" reentry trajectory instead of a skip, applying more consistent heat to prevent the char layer from cooling and trapping gas. The Artemis II heat shield was actually less permeable than its predecessor, making the original failure mode more likely had they used the same trajectory [17].

Flight Director Jeff Radigan described reentry as "13 minutes of things that have to go right" [17]. Former NASA engineer Dr. Charles Camarda publicly warned that the approach amounted to "playing Russian roulette," though NASA leadership defended the decision as data-driven [17]. The heat shield performed as expected, and the capsule splashed down intact.

A post-splashdown communications issue between Orion and recovery teams initially prevented the Navy from approaching the capsule, adding a final tense note to the mission before the crew was safely recovered [1].

The Jobs Program Debate

Source: NASA OIG / SpaceX estimates

Data as of Apr 11, 2026CSV

The cost disparity between SLS and commercial alternatives has fueled longstanding criticism that the program functions primarily as a federal employment vehicle. Each SLS launch costs an estimated $4.1 billion. SpaceX's Starship — still in development but already flying test missions — has an estimated launch cost of roughly $100 million, while SpaceX's operational Falcon Heavy costs approximately $150 million per flight [8][18].

The SLS was designed using Space Shuttle-era hardware and contractors, a deliberate choice driven by Congressional politics. Utah's delegation ensured the rocket used the Shuttle's solid rocket boosters, manufactured in the state. Alabama's Senator Richard Shelby directed that the Marshall Space Flight Center design and test the rocket. Florida's delegation secured billions to modernize Kennedy Space Center launch facilities [18]. The program counts suppliers in all 50 states — a distribution that has helped it survive repeated efforts at cancellation [18].

Eli Dourado of the Center for Growth and Opportunity wrote in 2011 that "jobs — and not actual progress in space — seem to be the driving force of the program. Even if it never actually flies, SLS may still meet its primary mission requirement: delivering federal funding to the states and districts of those in Congress with a particular interest in NASA's budget" [18].

Defenders counter that SLS is the only operational rocket capable of sending a crewed capsule to lunar distance, that its development sustained a skilled aerospace workforce, and that commercial alternatives like Starship have yet to demonstrate human-rated lunar capability. NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman, however, has signaled a shift. He told reporters after splashdown that SLS is "not the vehicle that you are going to take to and from the moon a couple of times a year as you build out a moon base the way the president wants" [19]. In February 2026, the administration announced plans to cancel Boeing's contract for the SLS Exploration Upper Stage, requesting that Congress evaluate commercial replacements [19].

What Comes Next: Artemis III and the Lunar Landing Question

The original Artemis plan called for Artemis III to land astronauts on the Moon. That has changed. In February 2026, NASA Administrator Isaacman confirmed a revised mission plan: Artemis III will now be a crewed test in Earth orbit, with astronauts practicing docking the Orion capsule with one or both commercial lunar landers from SpaceX and Blue Origin [15][20].

NASA expects Artemis III to launch in mid-2027, though production of the Artemis III Orion spacecraft has an internal readiness date of January 2028 [20]. The crew has not yet been announced. The first crewed lunar landing has been pushed to Artemis IV, tentatively scheduled for 2028 [20].

Several technical dependencies remain unresolved. Neither SpaceX's Starship Human Landing System nor Blue Origin's Blue Moon lander has completed NASA's human-rating certification. SpaceX faces ongoing challenges with propellant transfer testing — a critical capability for the Starship HLS, which requires orbital refueling before it can reach the lunar surface. As of March 2026, neither the required demonstration nor the design certification review had occurred [20].

NASA has also budgeted $20 billion to $30 billion for a lunar south pole base, targeting ice deposits believed to contain water that could provide fuel and sustain a long-term human presence [15].

The Race with China

Artemis II's success lands against the backdrop of an intensifying U.S.-China competition for lunar primacy. China plans to land astronauts on the Moon before 2030, using a two-launch architecture with its Long March 10 rocket [21]. In February 2026 — just weeks before Artemis II launched — China successfully tested the Long March 10 with its Mengzhou crew capsule, including in-flight abort procedures [21].

China's lunar lander, Lanyue, has already been tested in simulated lunar gravity conditions. New launch facilities at Wenchang are nearing completion. The mission architecture calls for two Long March 10 rockets to launch separately — one carrying the crewed Mengzhou capsule, one carrying Lanyue — with rendezvous and docking in lunar orbit before two astronauts descend to the surface [21].

If both nations meet their stated timelines, the U.S. could achieve a crewed lunar landing with Artemis IV in 2028, roughly two years before China's target of 2030. But those timelines are aspirational.

Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation said she sees "the United States getting there first but just barely," while adding that China has "a better chance" at establishing a permanent crewed lunar station first [21]. Bleddyn Bowen of Durham University noted that China's centralized program structure provides "an advantage" because "the U.S. is splitting its resources" across competing commercial providers [21].

NASA Administrator Isaacman has framed the timeline in competitive terms: "The clock is running in this great-power competition, and success or failure will be measured in months, not years" [7].

What Artemis II Proved — and What It Didn't

The mission demonstrated that the SLS and Orion can carry a crew to lunar distance and return them safely. It validated the modified reentry trajectory, confirmed life support systems for extended deep-space operations, and provided critical data on radiation exposure beyond Earth's magnetosphere.

What it did not do is prove that the broader Artemis architecture — with its dependence on yet-unbuilt landers, unproven orbital refueling, and per-launch costs that strain even NASA's budget — can deliver on the program's ultimate promise: sustained human presence on and around the Moon. The splashdown off San Diego was an ending and a beginning. Whether what follows justifies the $93 billion spent to reach this point will depend on decisions yet to be made — about budgets, contractors, and whether the political will that kept SLS alive for a decade can be redirected toward whatever comes next.