Young Men's Support for Trump Declines, New Polling Shows

In November 2024, Donald Trump rode a wave of young male support to the White House. Data firm Catalyst estimated that 54% of male voters aged 18–29 chose Trump over Kamala Harris [1]. Podcasters, influencers, and crypto-friendly messaging had helped Republicans crack a demographic that Democrats had held for a generation.

Eighteen months later, that coalition is fracturing. According to an Economist/YouGov tracking poll conducted in early February 2026, Trump's approval among Americans under 30 had fallen to 25%, down from roughly 50% just a year earlier — a collapse of more than 20 points [2]. The Harvard Institute of Politics Spring 2026 Youth Poll pegged Trump's overall approval among 18–29-year-olds at just 25%, down from 29% in fall 2025 [3]. And the Yale Youth Poll, surveying 3,429 registered voters in March 2026, found 68% of 18–22-year-olds and 72% of 23–29-year-olds disapprove of the president's job performance [4].

The question now is whether this represents a durable realignment or a midterm-cycle mood swing — and which party, if either, can capture the voters walking away.

Source: Economist/YouGov, Harvard IOP, Third Way

Data as of Apr 23, 2026CSV

The Numbers: From Victory Lap to Free Fall

The trajectory is steep. In the weeks after Trump's inauguration in January 2025, his approval among under-30 voters hovered near 48%, according to the Economist/YouGov weekly tracker [2]. By May 2025, it had dipped to about 42%. By fall 2025, the Harvard IOP poll recorded Trump's approval among young men specifically at 32%, with young women at 26% [5]. By early 2026, the Economist/YouGov figure for all under-30 voters had bottomed out at 25% [2].

CBS News quantified the shift differently: net job approval among Gen Z swung from +10 percentage points shortly after inauguration to -32 points by early 2026, a 42-point reversal [6]. A Wall Street Journal poll from late January 2026 found 58% of voters under 30 disapproving of Trump's performance [1].

These findings come from different methodologies. The Economist/YouGov polls are weekly online panels. The Harvard IOP is a large-sample survey of 18–29-year-olds conducted biannually. The Yale Youth Poll uses an online sample weighted by age, gender, education, race, and party ID [4]. The convergence across multiple polling firms and methods strengthens the signal.

What's Driving the Decline

Tariffs and Economic Anxiety

The economy tops the list. In the Yale Youth Poll, cost of living and affordability ranked as the most important issue for voters 18–34, cited by 84% as a priority [4]. The Third Way, a center-left think tank, found that 58% of young men reported Trump had negatively impacted their personal finances, against just 23% who experienced a positive impact [7]. A CNN/SSRS poll from March 2025 found 72% of young adults disapproving of Trump's handling of tariffs [8].

Trump's tariff policies — particularly the broad import levies announced in early 2025 — have become a specific flashpoint. Pew Research Center found in February 2026 that Americans largely disapprove of Trump's tariff increases, with younger voters among the most skeptical [9]. The Brookings Institution noted that the tariffs "are not going over well with his base," with affordability concerns directly eroding support among the very voters who expected Trump to lower prices [10].

Healthcare Concerns

Healthcare emerged as a surprisingly potent issue among young men. Time reported that 66% of young men surveyed were worried about cuts to healthcare funding — a concern that crosses ideological lines [1]. Trump's net approval on healthcare among 18–29-year-olds dropped to -32 points, with projections of approximately 10 million additional people becoming uninsured amplifying anxiety [1].

Immigration Enforcement Backlash

Immigration, the issue that arguably powered Trump's 2024 campaign among young men, has partially reversed direction. PBS/NPR/Marist polling found 69% of under-30 respondents disapproving of immigration crackdowns, while 60% felt deportation efforts had been excessive [1]. The gap between the campaign-trail rhetoric about border security and the reality of expanded enforcement appears to have alienated a segment of the coalition.

Who's Moving: Subgroup Breakdowns

The decline is not uniform across all young men. The Yale Youth Poll found that Trump lost the most ground between fall 2025 and spring 2026 among men under 30 and women under 35 [4]. But the picture differs by age, race, and education.

Age splits: Men aged 23–29 and 30–34 shifted 14 points toward Democrats between the fall 2025 and spring 2026 Yale polls [4]. Among 18–22-year-old men, however, the Democratic margin actually fell by 1 point, even as this group's evaluation of Trump grew more negative [4]. This suggests the youngest men are souring on Trump without necessarily embracing Democrats.

Racial and ethnic variation: Third Way's analysis found a 16-point improvement for Democrats among young white men compared to the 2024 election, but only a 4-point gain among young Latino men [7]. Young Black men showed no recovery toward Democrats at all [7]. The financial strain data reflects a similar pattern: 71% of young Black men reported a negative financial impact from Trump's presidency, compared to 59% of young white men and 48% of young Latino men [1].

Education: While complete education cross-tabs from the spring 2026 polls are not yet publicly available at granular levels, the broader trend shows non-college young men were more likely to have supported Trump in 2024 and remain the most electorally volatile subgroup. Third Way's focus groups specifically targeted soft-Trump-supporting young non-college white, Black, and Latino men in battleground states, finding consistent frustration with affordability and economic opportunity [7].

One subgroup moving counter to the trend: men aged 34–44 swung 13 points in Trump's favor between fall 2025 and spring 2026, the only gender-age group where Trump gained ground [4]. This older cohort may have different economic circumstances or political motivations than their younger counterparts.

The Economic Reality Behind the Frustration

Young men's stated reasons for souring on Trump align with measurable economic conditions. The overall unemployment rate stood at 4.3% in March 2026, up from 3.5% in July 2023, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics [11]. Youth unemployment (ages 16–24) reached 8.5% in March 2026 [12]. The adult male jobless rate was 3.8% [12].

Source: FRED / Bureau of Labor Statistics

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

Housing remains a persistent pressure point. The 30-year fixed mortgage rate averaged 6.3% in April 2026 — lower than the 7.8% peak of October 2023, but still prohibitively high for many first-time buyers [13]. The Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies has documented that young adults face elevated cost burdens, struggle to form new households, and are less likely to receive housing assistance despite lower incomes [14].

Source: FRED / Freddie Mac

Data as of Apr 30, 2026CSV

In Third Way's focus groups, young men described "an economic burden that has not been meaningfully addressed — affording everyday life, getting a good-paying job to provide for their family, and being able to do better than their parents" [7]. These aren't abstract complaints. They map directly onto the affordability and cost-of-living concerns dominating the polls.

Where Are the Defectors Going?

This is the central strategic question for both parties — and the answer is messy.

On the generic congressional ballot, Democrats hold a commanding lead among likely young male voters heading into the 2026 midterms: 61% to 31%, a 30-point margin, according to Third Way [7]. The Harvard IOP found Democrats leading 45% to 26% among registered young voters overall, with double-digit advantages across nearly every subgroup [3].

Source: Third Way / Harvard IOP

Data as of Apr 23, 2026CSV

But these headline numbers obscure important nuances. Among all registered young men (not just likely voters), 38% remain undecided [7]. Republican and Independent young men say they are significantly more likely to skip the 2026 midterms entirely, planning instead to vote in the 2028 presidential election [7]. Only 35% of young people say they will "definitely" vote in 2026, with a stark partisan gap: 55% of Democrats versus 35% of Republicans and 25% of independents [3].

Third-party interest also hovers in the background. When asked about a generic congressional ballot, roughly 3 in 10 young voters rejected both parties or indicated a third-party preference [15]. Young Americans are registering as independents at historically high rates [16].

The Cook Political Report summarized the dynamic: "Young Americans hate both parties. They may still pick Democrats in 2026" [17]. The question is whether disaffected young Trump voters will show up at all.

The Steelman Case for Skepticism

Not everyone is convinced the polling collapse is as severe as the toplines suggest. Several methodological considerations warrant attention.

First, online panels — the basis for the Economist/YouGov weekly tracker — may over-represent politically engaged or digitally active respondents. Young men who are checked out of politics are harder to reach and may not respond to surveys, potentially skewing results toward those with stronger opinions.

Second, sample sizes for the young male subgroup within broader polls can be small. While the Yale Youth Poll's total sample of 3,429 is robust, and it oversampled 2,008 under-35 respondents [4], not all polls achieve that level of granularity. Individual weekly YouGov readings for men 18–29 should be treated as directional rather than precise.

Third, midterm polling this far out has limited predictive power. The 2026 midterms are still months away, and youth voter enthusiasm is notoriously volatile. Young men who say they'll skip the midterms may yet be mobilized — or may simply revert to a low-engagement default that benefits neither party.

That said, the convergence of the Harvard IOP, Yale, Third Way, CBS News, Pew, and Economist/YouGov data — all showing similar directional movement — makes it difficult to dismiss the trend as noise. The decline appears across probability and non-probability samples, across different question wordings, and across different time periods throughout 2025 and 2026.

Historical Parallels: Has This Happened Before?

Young male voters have shifted before, though the speed of this reversal is unusual.

Ronald Reagan attracted significant youth support in 1984, winning young voters broadly. But that enthusiasm cooled during his second term, particularly as the Iran-Contra scandal unfolded and economic recession fears grew [18]. The timeline was slower — a gradual drift rather than a cliff.

Barack Obama won 62% of the 18–29 vote in 2008, but his support among young men specifically dropped by about 9 points by 2012 — from 62% to 53% among men under 30. The decline was concentrated among white men and independents [19]. Obama's arc followed a more conventional pattern: high initial enthusiasm tapering into disappointment over economic recovery and political gridlock.

Trump's trajectory is steeper. A 26-point drop among young men in roughly 16 months — from a 54% vote share to approximately 28% approval — exceeds the pace of decline for any modern president among this demographic. The closest parallel may be George W. Bush's second-term collapse among young voters after Hurricane Katrina and the Iraq War's escalating costs, though that unfolded over two to three years rather than one.

Electoral Implications: Does It Matter?

Gen Z and millennial voters are projected to comprise roughly half of all eligible voters by 2026 [20]. Even small shifts within this cohort carry weight in close races.

The immediate electoral impact centers on the 2026 midterms. Democrats' 30-point lead among likely young male voters, if it holds, would represent a dramatic improvement over their 2024 performance with this group [7]. In competitive House districts — particularly in suburban and exurban areas of Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Georgia — even a 3–5 point shift among young men could alter outcomes.

But the enthusiasm gap cuts both ways. Young men who backed Trump in 2024 may simply not vote in 2026, reducing Republican turnout without adding to Democratic totals. Third Way found that among young men who didn't vote in 2024, 50% would support Democrats and 37% Republicans [7] — but getting non-voters to the polls in a midterm remains one of the hardest tasks in American politics.

The longer-term question is whether this defection sticks through 2028. Young men place themselves at 4.8 on a 0–10 ideological scale, essentially dead center [7]. They see the Democratic Party at 3.6 and the Republican Party at 7.5 [7]. Neither party closely matches their self-image. The biggest dealbreakers against voting Democratic are that the party is "out of touch with working people" (39%) and "inauthentic" (29%) [7]. Against voting Republican: "corrupt and in the pocket of billionaires" (44%) and allowing Trump expanded federal powers (27%) [7].

What Comes Next

Both parties are adjusting their strategies. Democrats are emphasizing affordability, housing, and healthcare — the issues young men rank highest. Republicans are banking on cultural appeals and the possibility that economic conditions improve before November.

The Third Way data reveals a demographic that wants moderation from both sides: 55% want Democrats to become more moderate rather than more liberal, and 67% want Republicans to become more moderate rather than more conservative [7]. Young men's top personal goals — providing for a family (88%), financial independence (82%), a fulfilling job (74%) — are fundamentally pragmatic [7].

For now, the polling is clear: the young male coalition that helped elect Trump has eroded substantially. Whether that erosion represents a permanent fracture or a temporary protest will depend on the economy, on how both parties respond, and on whether the millions of young men currently signaling disengagement can be persuaded to show up in November.