Xi Jinping Arrives in North Korea for Summit with Kim Jong Un

On the morning of June 8, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping stepped off his plane at Pyongyang International Airport to a 21-gun salute, massed flags, and the waiting embrace of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and first lady Ri Sol Ju [1]. The two-day state visit — Xi's first foreign trip of 2026 and his first to North Korea in seven years — is far more than diplomatic pageantry. It is an attempt by Beijing to reclaim its position as Pyongyang's indispensable partner at a moment when North Korea has found new friends in Moscow, and when the architecture of international sanctions that once constrained the Kim regime is fracturing [2].

A Diplomatic History in Seven Meetings

Xi and Kim have now met at least seven times since 2018, when Kim made a surprise train journey to Beijing ahead of his summits with then-US President Donald Trump [3]. That first meeting in March 2018 was followed by two more that year — in Dalian and again in Beijing — as the two leaders coordinated ahead of the Singapore and Hanoi summits with Washington. In January 2019, Kim returned to Beijing for a fourth meeting on his birthday, and Xi reciprocated in June 2019 with a state visit to Pyongyang — the first by a Chinese leader since Hu Jintao in 2005 [3].

Then came a six-year gap. COVID-19 border closures, North Korea's extreme isolation, and the gravitational pull of the Russia-North Korea relationship pushed Beijing to the margins. The ice broke in September 2025 when Kim traveled to Beijing by special train for the 80th anniversary of China's Victory Day Parade [3]. Now, with Xi in Pyongyang, the relationship has entered what China's state media calls a "new start" [4].

Concrete outcomes from prior summits have been thin. Joint statements have emphasized "strategic communication," "traditional friendship," and mutual support on core issues, but verifiable, binding agreements have been few. Xi's 2019 visit produced pledges of economic cooperation and Chinese support for denuclearization talks, but neither materialized in measurable form [5]. The pattern — warm rhetoric, limited follow-through — is one analysts expect to see repeated [6].

China's Economic Lifeline: By the Numbers

Whatever the diplomatic ambiguity, the economic relationship is measurable. China accounts for over 90% of North Korea's known trade [7]. After plummeting during the pandemic — from $2.67 billion in 2019 to just $540 million in 2020 — bilateral trade has slowly recovered, reaching $2.29 billion in 2023, dipping slightly to $2.18 billion in 2024, and rebounding 25% to $2.73 billion in 2025 [7][8].

Source: NK News / US News / KOTRA

Data as of Jan 20, 2026CSV

The composition of that trade reflects North Korea's peculiar economy. China's top exports to the DPRK in 2025 included processed hair and wool for wig-making ($208 million), soybean oil, fabrics, and granulated sugar [8]. North Korea's exports to China remain dominated by minerals, seafood, and textiles — categories technically restricted under UN sanctions but facilitated through front companies, falsified shipping documents, and shell corporations often registered in Hong Kong [9].

Fuel transfers are harder to track. The UN Panel of Experts, before its mandate was terminated in 2024, estimated that North Korea received refined petroleum far exceeding the 500,000-barrel annual cap imposed by Security Council Resolution 2397 [10]. Chinese entities in the border city of Dandong have long served as intermediaries, and a November 2025 report from the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission detailed how Chinese nationals manage front companies and launder funds through Chinese banks to facilitate North Korean sanctions evasion [9].

Direct food aid figures are less transparent. Analysts at the National Committee on North Korea note that China has historically provided hundreds of thousands of tons of grain annually, though official reporting has become increasingly opaque since 2020 [10]. Ahead of this summit, analysts expected Xi to offer economic aid packages including rice and fertilizer shipments, a resumption of Chinese group tourism to North Korea, and joint economic projects [6].

The Sanctions Regime: Cracking at the Foundations

The UN sanctions architecture that has constrained North Korea since 2006 is in its weakest state in two decades. In May 2022, China and Russia jointly vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have strengthened sanctions following North Korea's ICBM launches — the first veto on a North Korea resolution in 64 years, ending nearly two decades of P5 consensus [11]. The resolution had the support of 13 of the 15 Council members [11].

More consequentially, in March 2024, Russia vetoed the renewal of the UN Panel of Experts — the body responsible for monitoring and reporting on sanctions compliance — while China abstained [12]. Without the Panel, the international community lost its primary independent mechanism for tracking sanctions evasion. Russia's ambassador argued that "fifteen years of sanctions pressure on North Korea had not worked" [12].

China's official position has been to support sanctions while opposing new ones. In practice, this has meant blocking tighter measures while tolerating — and in some cases enabling — widespread evasion. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission's 2025 report was blunt: China "remains the largest facilitator of Pyongyang's efforts to obtain foreign currency in violation of international law" [9].

Deeper China-North Korea cooperation, of the kind this summit could catalyze, directly undermines multiple sanctions provisions: Resolution 2321's restrictions on coal and mineral exports, Resolution 2375's cap on textile exports, Resolution 2397's petroleum ceiling, and the broad prohibition on joint ventures established across multiple resolutions [10][11].

Military and Technology Questions: What's on the Table?

The military dimension of the China-North Korea relationship is the subject of intense speculation and limited evidence. Unlike the Russia-North Korea relationship — where the June 2024 mutual defense treaty and the deployment of North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine are well-documented [13] — China has been more cautious about formalizing military cooperation with Pyongyang.

North Korea's weapons programs have advanced rapidly regardless. A January 2026 assessment by 38 North cataloged progress across 13 new nuclear and missile systems outlined in Kim's five-year plan, including tests of a Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle and a new type of hypersonic missile launched to a range of 1,000 km [14][15].

The question of whether China has directly contributed to these advances is contested. There is no publicly available evidence of direct Chinese transfers of nuclear, hypersonic, or satellite technology to North Korea. However, China's own rapid advances in these domains — including a September 2025 hypersonic ICBM test and the ongoing deployment of the Guowang broadband mega-constellation with dual-use military applications [16] — create a technology ecosystem from which North Korea could benefit indirectly through personnel exchanges, academic cooperation, or third-party intermediaries.

Russia, by contrast, is more openly expanding technology sharing. The Stimson Center and Chatham House have documented Russian transfers of space, nuclear, and missile-applicable technology and materials to North Korea in exchange for ammunition and troops for the Ukraine war [13][17]. For Beijing, this creates a dilemma: allowing Russia to arm North Korea increases regional instability, but confronting Moscow about it risks the broader Sino-Russian partnership.

Analysts at CSIS note that expectations for specific military agreements from this summit are low. China's strategic interest lies in restraining, not accelerating, North Korea's most provocative capabilities — but its willingness to enforce that preference has diminished as the sanctions framework has eroded [6].

Regional Fallout: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan

The ripple effects of deepening China-North Korea ties are measured in defense budgets.

Japan approved a record defense budget of ¥8.81 trillion ($56 billion) for fiscal year 2026, a 9.4% increase over the previous year and the fourth consecutive year of growth under a five-year plan to double annual military spending to 2% of GDP [18][19]. The budget prioritizes standoff missile capability (¥970 billion), integrated air and missile defense (¥509 billion), and unmanned systems (¥100 billion) [18].

Source: Al Jazeera / Army Recognition

Data as of Dec 26, 2025CSV

Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy identifies China as the country's "most serious strategic challenge" [18]. The ongoing China-Japan diplomatic crisis, triggered by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's November 2025 statement that a Chinese attack on Taiwan "could constitute an existential crisis for Japan," has further strained relations [20]. Japan's acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles, structural overhaul of its maritime self-defense forces for amphibious operations, and planned deployment of Type 03 anti-air missiles to Yonaguni Island all reflect a defense posture oriented toward potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait and the first island chain [18].

South Korea occupies a more constrained position. President Lee Jae-myung visited Beijing in January 2026 for a summit with Xi, seeking to balance Seoul's economic dependence on China against its security alliance with the United States and Japan [21]. South Korea reaffirmed its "one China" policy while maintaining informal ties with Taiwan, and engaged in security dialogue with China for the first time in nine years [22]. But the Xi-Kim summit complicates this balancing act: any perception that Beijing is underwriting the North Korean threat directly undermines the basis for Seoul's engagement with China.

Taiwan's concern is more indirect but no less real. If China seeks — and obtains — North Korean alignment on Taiwan, it gains a partner willing to create diversionary crises on the Korean Peninsula during any Taiwan contingency. The Atlantic Council has noted that Taiwan remains "a strategic blind spot for South Korea," and that Seoul's reluctance to plan for Taiwan scenarios limits trilateral coordination with Washington and Tokyo [23].

The Case for Engagement: North Korea's Security Calculus

Western analysis tends to frame any China-North Korea summit as a threat-multiplier. But there is a counterargument, grounded in the history of how North Korea arrived at its current posture.

North Korea's nuclear program emerged from genuine security fears. During the Korean War, the country was subjected to US nuclear threats, and its leaders concluded that nuclear weapons were essential for regime survival [24]. The end of the Cold War made things worse: Moscow and Beijing both recognized Seoul in the early 1990s, ending the subsidized trade on which Pyongyang depended. By the mid-1990s, North Korea faced economic collapse, conventional military inferiority relative to South Korea, and growing international isolation [24].

The Agreed Framework of 1994 briefly offered a diplomatic path — North Korea would freeze its plutonium program in exchange for light-water reactors and normalized relations with the United States. The deal collapsed in the early 2000s amid mutual accusations of bad faith [25]. The Six-Party Talks produced a joint statement in 2005 but no lasting framework. Trump's engagement in 2018-2019 generated dramatic summits but no binding agreement, and after the Hanoi summit collapsed in February 2019, North Korea entered a period of accelerating weapons development and deepening isolation [25].

The uncomfortable question is whether thirty years of sanctions and isolation have achieved their stated purpose. North Korea had a rudimentary nuclear capability in the mid-2000s; today it has an estimated 50-70 warheads and a diverse missile arsenal including ICBMs capable of reaching the US mainland [14]. Each diplomatic collapse was followed by an acceleration in weapons development, not a pause.

China's engagement — including this summit — can be read as an alternative approach: maintaining a communication channel with a nuclear-armed state that the rest of the world has largely given up on. Whether that engagement actually restrains Pyongyang or merely provides it diplomatic cover is the central unresolved question.

What Xi Gets: Domestic and Geopolitical Returns

Xi's decision to make North Korea his first foreign destination of 2026 is a calculated signal, both domestically and internationally.

At home, the visit projects influence at a time when China faces economic headwinds — slowing growth, a property sector crisis, and escalating trade tensions with the United States [6]. Demonstrating that Beijing remains a diplomatic hub that even isolated states cannot do without reinforces Xi's image as a leader of global stature.

Geopolitically, the visit serves at least three purposes. First, it reasserts China's primacy over North Korea at a moment when the Russia-DPRK relationship has encroached on what Beijing considers its sphere of influence [2]. Putin's 2024 visit to Pyongyang and the mutual defense treaty that followed represented a direct challenge to China's traditional role as North Korea's patron and guarantor [13]. Xi's visit is a response.

Second, China is seeking North Korean alignment on Taiwan and opposition to Japan's defense buildup — issues central to Beijing's regional security architecture [1][6]. If Kim offers public support on Taiwan, it expands the coalition Beijing can point to in any future confrontation.

Third, the visit reinforces China's self-presentation as a responsible power committed to "peace and stability" on the Korean Peninsula — a narrative that plays well in the Global South even as it frustrates Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo [6].

Whether North Korea is a genuine strategic asset or a liability Beijing tolerates is a matter of perspective. Pyongyang provides a buffer state on China's northeastern border, a source of pressure on US allies, and a vote (however symbolic) in international forums. But it also creates perpetual instability, generates sanctions-evasion headaches, and draws China into conflicts — like the Ukraine war, via North Korean troop deployments — that Beijing would prefer to avoid [17][22].

The 2019 Precedent: What Happened Next

History offers a cautionary tale. Xi's last visit to Pyongyang in June 2019 came at a pivotal moment in US-North Korea diplomacy. Trump and Kim had held their dramatic Singapore summit a year earlier, and the Hanoi summit had collapsed just four months before Xi's visit. Xi told Kim he was "dedicated" to supporting denuclearization talks [5].

Within twelve months of that visit, the diplomatic landscape had deteriorated sharply. Kim declared an end to his moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests at a December 2019 party plenum. North Korea fired multiple short-range missiles throughout the summer and fall of 2019. Denuclearization working-level talks in Stockholm in October 2019 broke down after a single day. By early 2020, the combination of diplomatic failure and COVID-19 had sealed North Korea into complete isolation [25].

The 2019 visit produced no observable restraining effect on North Korea's behavior. Whether the 2026 summit will be different depends on whether Beijing is willing to condition its economic support on North Korean restraint — and whether Kim, now more confident with Russian backing, sees any reason to accept such conditions.

What to Watch

The joint statement — if one is issued — will be scrutinized for specific language. Does it mention denuclearization, or has that word disappeared entirely from the China-DPRK diplomatic lexicon, as it did during Kim's September 2025 Beijing visit [5]? Does it reference Taiwan, signaling North Korean alignment with Beijing's position? Does it announce specific economic agreements — tourism, joint ventures, infrastructure — that would signal a deepening of ties beyond rhetoric?

The broader question is structural. The international framework for constraining North Korea — UN sanctions, multilateral monitoring, great-power consensus — has largely collapsed. What replaces it will be shaped by summits like this one, conducted behind closed doors in Pyongyang, with consequences that extend from the Korean Peninsula to the Taiwan Strait to the floors of the United Nations Security Council.