US and Shield of the Americas Condemn Alleged Plot to Overthrow Bolivia's Government

On June 5, 2026, thirteen governments issued a joint statement through the Shield of the Americas coalition denouncing "ongoing efforts to overthrow the legitimately and overwhelmingly elected government of President Rodrigo Paz in Bolivia" [1]. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth followed with a post declaring that the U.S. military would "reject all attempts to overthrow the legitimate government" and warning that "Bolivia must not allow itself to fall prey to the old status quo of narco-terrorist dominance" [2].

The statement landed while Bolivia's capital, La Paz, remained under siege from roadblocks that have strangled the country's economy for more than five weeks. The protesters on those barricades — miners detonating sticks of dynamite, teachers marching with union banners, Indigenous farmers demanding Paz's resignation — bear little resemblance to the narco-terrorists described in Washington's talking points [3].

The gap between the official framing and the visible reality on the ground raises a question with deep roots in Bolivian and hemispheric history: when a government labels mass protest a coup, who benefits from that label?

The Crisis on the Ground

Bolivia's unrest began in early May 2026 with opposition to Law 1720, a land reform measure that allowed titled small agricultural property to be converted into medium-sized holdings. Indigenous communities and rural organizations said the law put smallholders at risk of eviction. Paz repealed the law on May 13, but by then the protests had already expanded far beyond a single piece of legislation [4].

The deeper drivers are economic. Paz took office in November 2025 after winning a runoff election that ended nearly two decades of governance by the Movement for Socialism (MAS). One of his first acts was to scrap fuel subsidies, sending prices surging by nearly 90% [1]. Inflation, which the World Bank recorded at 5.1% for 2024, has since accelerated sharply — reaching an estimated 19.5% in 2025, with more recent reports placing it above 22% [5][6].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Bolivia's foreign exchange reserves have been nearly depleted, down from a peak of $15 billion in 2014, and the country faces significant debt obligations in 2026 [6]. GDP fell for six consecutive quarters through Q4 2025, with the economy shrinking 1.1% as an unsustainable fiscal deficit — 11.6% of GDP — forced austerity measures [6].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

Ongoing road blockades are draining more than $50 million per day from the economy and have stranded roughly 5,000 vehicles on highways [4]. Supplies of food, fuel, and medicine have been cut off from major population centers. As of late May, at least seven people had been killed — three when supplies failed to reach a blockaded hospital, and others in clashes with police [4].

On May 27, the Bolivian Congress passed legislation restoring the executive branch's authority to deploy the military against civil unrest and simplifying procedures to declare a state of emergency [7]. Paz signed the bill and warned protesters that "the time is running out" [4].

What Evidence Supports the "Coup" Label?

The Shield of the Americas statement accused unnamed actors of "funding these protests with dirty money from drug trafficking and transnational crime" [1]. Hegseth described the protesters as aligned with "narco-terrorists" [2]. But neither the joint statement nor any U.S. official has presented intercepted communications, financial transfers, named military conspirators, or any other specific evidence substantiating a coordinated coup plot.

The Bolivian government's own framing has been broad. Paz has accused former President Evo Morales of orchestrating the unrest from his hideout in the Chapare coca-growing region, where Morales has been sheltered by Indigenous supporters since late 2024, evading an arrest warrant on charges of trafficking a minor [8]. Morales denies the charges and has responded by accusing the government and the DEA of plotting to capture or kill him, though he too has provided no verifiable evidence for those claims [9].

The cartel connection is circumstantial at best. Bolivia is the world's third-largest cocaine producer, and Paz's decision in February 2026 to invite the DEA back into the country after an 18-year absence did threaten established trafficking networks [10]. In March, Bolivian forces captured Sebastián Marset, a Uruguayan trafficker on the DEA's most-wanted list [10]. But no government has produced public, verifiable proof that rank-and-file protesters manning the blockades are being paid by cartels [10].

No independent body — not the Organization of American States, not the United Nations, not any international election monitoring organization — has verified the coup allegations or issued its own assessment.

What Is the Shield of the Americas?

The Shield of the Americas, officially the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (ACCC or A3C), is a multinational military and political coalition established by President Donald Trump on March 7, 2026, at a summit with leaders from across the Western Hemisphere [11]. Its stated purpose is to coordinate military and security efforts against transnational criminal organizations, particularly drug cartels.

The coalition includes 17 member states: the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and others [11]. Members skew toward right-leaning governments in the hemisphere. Notable absences include Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.

The coalition operates outside the traditional OAS framework. As the Wilson Center noted, no multilateral representatives attended the founding summit, signaling a deliberate bypass of the OAS in favor of ideologically aligned partners [12]. The Shield of the Americas is not a treaty-based organization with binding legal authority. It functions as a political coordination platform; member states act through their own domestic laws and institutions [12]. Its condemnations carry no legal weight comparable to an OAS resolution invoking the Inter-American Democratic Charter, let alone a UN Security Council statement.

On May 29, defense and foreign affairs ministers from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru signed the Santiago Regional Commitment Against Transnational Organized Crime, deepening operational cooperation within the coalition [11].

Bolivia's Coup History and U.S. Involvement

Bolivia has experienced more coups d'état than any other country in the Western Hemisphere. Since independence in 1825, the country has seen more than 190 coups and revolutions; between 1946 and its democratic transition in 1982 alone, there were 28 coup attempts [13].

U.S. involvement in several of those coups is documented. Between 1963 and 1964, the CIA used covert funding to influence Bolivian politics and backed the November 1964 military coup led by General René Barrientos against elected President Víctor Paz Estenssoro [14]. The U.S. increased aid to Bolivia by 600% under the Alliance for Progress in the years preceding the coup [14]. In 1971, Hugo Banzer overthrew the left-leaning Juan José Torres government with U.S. support, and Washington continued to fund Banzer's repressive regime through 1978 [14].

The most recent comparable crisis was the 2019 political upheaval, when the military command "suggested" Morales resign after contested elections. Morales fled the country and was replaced by interim President Jeanine Áñez, whose government was later accused by human rights organizations of "systematic torture" and "summary executions" during the suppression of pro-Morales protests [15]. Whether 2019 constituted a coup or a democratic correction remains bitterly contested. The MAS-aligned judiciary has since prosecuted those involved under broadly defined terrorism charges, which human rights groups have criticized as disproportionate [15].

In June 2024, General Juan José Zúñiga led an attempted military coup that was put down within hours [16].

This history means that U.S. condemnation of a coup in Bolivia carries a particular burden of credibility. Washington has, on multiple occasions, publicly supported democratic governance while covertly undermining it.

The Morales Factor

Evo Morales looms over the crisis. The former president governed Bolivia from 2006 to 2019 and retains deep support among Indigenous communities, coca growers, and the labor movement. He has been hiding from authorities in the Chapare region since late 2024, protected by supporters who blocked roads for 24 days in October 2024 to prevent police from reaching him [8].

Morales faces trial on charges of trafficking a minor — accusations he calls politically motivated. A Bolivian judge reissued his arrest warrant in May 2026 after he failed to appear in court [8]. President Paz has publicly warned Morales that "justice is coming" [17].

Morales has described the current protests as a legitimate popular response to fuel shortages, inflation, and food scarcity. "As long as structural demands remain unaddressed, the uprising will not be quelled," he wrote on social media [17]. His critics counter that he is using the unrest to destabilize a government that threatens both his political relevance and his legal impunity.

The opposition has floated the idea of a recall referendum — a constitutional mechanism that would let Bolivians vote on whether Paz should remain in office [3]. The proposal has gained momentum as the crisis drags on, though the government has not endorsed it.

Regional Response

The regional reaction has split along predictable ideological lines.

Chile's José Antonio Kast, Argentina's Javier Milei, and the governments of Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru have all expressed solidarity with Paz [4]. Argentina sent a military aircraft carrying food supplies and established a one-week humanitarian air bridge to alleviate shortages in La Paz [4]. Bolivia's Foreign Minister Fernando Aramayo thanked Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador for humanitarian assistance [4].

Colombia broke ranks. President Gustavo Petro backed the protesters, calling the unrest a "popular insurrection" and offering to mediate — an offer Bolivia rejected before expelling the Colombian ambassador on May 20 [4].

Brazil, the region's largest power, has been notably quiet. This contrasts with its active role during the 2019 crisis, when it helped broker Morales's departure and asylum in Mexico.

The response differs markedly from 2019, when the region was divided over whether Morales's removal was legitimate. This time, the governments backing Paz are largely members of the Shield of the Americas, and their statements echo the coalition's framing of the protests as externally financed destabilization rather than domestic political opposition.

U.S. Stakes in Bolivia

U.S.-Bolivia relations were frozen for nearly two decades. Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador in 2008 and the DEA shortly after, accusing both of conspiring against his government [18]. The two countries did not exchange ambassadors again until Paz took office.

U.S. foreign aid to Bolivia has been minimal in recent years — roughly $2.1 million in fiscal year 2024 and $774,400 in FY 2025, all economic rather than military assistance [19]. But the relationship has shifted dramatically under Paz. In February 2026, Bolivia invited the DEA back into the country [10]. In March, Paz attended the founding summit of the Shield of the Americas [11]. The capture and transfer of Marset to U.S. authorities was a direct product of that renewed cooperation [10].

Washington's stake in Paz's survival is therefore not primarily financial — it is strategic. Paz represents the first Bolivian government in nearly two decades willing to cooperate with U.S. anti-narcotics operations and align with Washington's hemispheric security framework. His fall would remove a key partner from the Shield of the Americas and could return Bolivia to the orbit of governments less sympathetic to U.S. interests.

The Emergency Powers Question

The legal changes enacted during the crisis have drawn scrutiny from human rights organizations and left-wing critics.

Law 1341, passed after the Áñez government's crackdown in 2019, had placed limits on how far a president could go in suspending civil liberties and deploying military force against civilians [20]. Congress has now stripped those restraints, and Paz signed the revocation into law [20]. The government has filed terrorism charges against protest leaders and used the military to break blockades [20].

Two cabinet ministers resigned in early June as the crisis deepened [21]. The government's strategy — using Congress to remove legal limits, prosecutors to file terrorism charges, police to make arrests, and the army to break blockades — follows a pattern that scholars of Latin American authoritarianism have documented repeatedly.

The precedents are instructive. In 1992, Peru's Alberto Fujimori dissolved Congress and suspended the constitution, citing terrorist threats. In 2019, the Áñez government used emergency powers to suppress pro-Morales protests with lethal force [15]. In both cases, coup accusations — whether directed at insurgents or at the government itself — served as justification for the concentration of executive power.

Whether Paz's government is heading down a similar path remains an open question. He has not dissolved Congress or suspended elections. But the combination of military deployment authority, terrorism charges against protest leaders, and the revocation of legal safeguards against emergency overreach represents a significant expansion of executive power in a country where such expansions have historically not been reversed voluntarily.

What's Missing from the Narrative

The Shield of the Americas statement and Hegseth's comments frame the Bolivia crisis as a binary: a legitimate democratic government versus narco-terrorist coup plotters. The reality is messier.

The protesters have real grievances. A 90% increase in fuel prices, double-digit inflation, food shortages, and a contracting economy are not manufactured crises [1][6]. The recall referendum proposal advanced by opposition figures is a constitutional mechanism, not an insurrection [3].

At the same time, it is plausible that drug trafficking networks have an interest in destabilizing a government that invited the DEA back and handed over a major trafficker [10]. Morales's role — sheltered in the Chapare, facing criminal charges, with an organized base capable of blocking roads for weeks — adds another layer of complexity that resists simple characterization.

What is clear is that the "coup" label serves multiple purposes. For the Paz government, it justifies emergency measures and military deployment. For the Trump administration, it validates the Shield of the Americas as a functioning security alliance. For both, it transforms an economic crisis driven by unpopular policies into a national security threat requiring a military response rather than a political one.

The people on the barricades — the miners, the teachers, the farmers — have not been asked whether they consider themselves coup plotters. Their answer, if anyone were listening, would likely complicate the story that Washington and La Paz are telling.