Ukraine Expands Covert Domestic Factories Mass-Producing Combat Drones

On a recent visit to one of Fire Point's covert manufacturing sites near Lviv, Associated Press reporters watched workers assemble FP-1 kamikaze drones — aircraft capable of flying 1,600 kilometers to strike targets deep inside Russia — in an unmarked building designed to avoid detection [1]. The facility is one of dozens operated by a single company, in a national ecosystem that has expanded from seven drone manufacturers before Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 to approximately 500 by mid-2025 [2][3].

That expansion — from a cottage industry to a wartime manufacturing complex producing millions of drones per year — represents one of the most rapid military-industrial mobilizations in modern history. It has reshaped how the war is fought, how it is funded, and how both sides calculate the path to its end.

The Production Numbers

Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine's drone output was negligible. The country produced an estimated 50,000 units in 2022, its first year of wartime mobilization. By 2024, that figure had reached approximately 2.2 million UAVs of all types, with more than 1.5 million of those being FPV (first-person view) combat drones — small, fast quadcopters piloted via a video headset directly into targets [3][4].

Source: Kyiv Post, OSW, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense

Data as of Dec 1, 2025CSV

Monthly FPV production jumped from 20,000 units at the start of 2024 to 200,000 by January 2025 [5]. Ukraine's Deputy Defense Minister stated in early 2025 that the country's drone industry had reached capacity to produce up to 10 million UAVs annually [6]. President Zelensky set a target of more than seven million drones for 2026 [3].

The number of registered drone-related companies tells a parallel story: 41 new entities in 2022, 132 in 2023, 183 in 2024, and 107 in just the first four months of 2025 [3].

Source: OSW Centre for Eastern Studies

Data as of Oct 14, 2025CSV

What They Build

Ukraine's domestic fleet spans several categories. The workhorse is the FPV drone: a lightweight quadcopter with a carbon-fiber frame, typically weighing under one kilogram, carrying 0.9 to 1.8 kilograms of explosives, and flying at speeds up to 97 km/h [7]. Companies like TAF produce about 40,000 FPV units per month, while Vyriy's Molfar drone is built with components sourced entirely within Ukraine [7][8].

At the heavier end, Wild Hornets' "Queen of the Hornets" can carry up to 9.5 kg of payload and serve as a bomber, reconnaissance platform, or logistics drone [7]. Fiber-optic FPV drones — which trail a thin fiber-optic cable behind them, making them resistant to electronic jamming — have reached ranges of 20 to 41 km, with Ukrainian company 3DTech producing the first serially manufactured 30-km fiber-optic spool domestically [9].

For deep-strike missions, Fire Point's FP-1 reaches 1,600 km at a production rate of 3,000 units per month [10]. Antonov, the state aircraft manufacturer, introduced the AN-196 "Lutyi," a long-range UAV with a 750-km range, costing up to $200,000 per unit [7].

The cost differential between Ukrainian-made drones and Western-supplied alternatives is stark. A standard Ukrainian FPV drone costs $300 to $500 to manufacture. The U.S.-made Switchblade 300 costs $60,000 to $80,000; the Switchblade 600 runs $170,000 per unit [11][12]. For the price of a single Switchblade 600, Ukraine can produce roughly 340 FPV drones.

Source: DroneXL, Bolt Flight

Data as of Oct 23, 2025CSV

Despite the price gap, the cheaper Ukrainian drones have often proven more effective in high-intensity combat. Ukrainian FPV drones are piloted manually through a live video feed, making them more resistant to the GPS jamming and electronic warfare that has degraded the accuracy of more expensive precision-guided systems [11].

Funding: State Budget, Venture Capital, and Crowdsourcing

Ukraine's drone buildup draws on a hybrid of public money, private capital, diaspora donations, and foreign government grants [13].

The Ukrainian government's "Army of Drones" program, run through the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the General Staff, channels public procurement funds to private manufacturers. The Brave1 defense-tech accelerator has operated for four years, with publicly disclosed investment in Ukrainian defense-tech companies rising from $1.1 million in 2023 to over $105 million in 2025 [14].

Private and foreign investment has accelerated. In September 2025, the Kyiv-based drone company Swarmer raised $15 million in a round led by American investors — the largest single investment in the Ukrainian defense sector since the war began [14]. The American fund Ondas Capital announced plans to invest at least $150 million in Ukrainian defense technologies, while four European venture capital firms committed a combined $100 million [14].

Crowdfunding has also played a significant role. State procurement mechanisms have been supplemented by campaigns enabling ordinary Ukrainians and diaspora communities to donate directly to drone production lines. Ukrainian communities in North America and Western Europe have financed entire production runs through charitable partnerships [13]. European governments, including Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, and the United Kingdom, have funded co-production of Ukrainian drone systems in allied factories [13].

Oversight of these funds remains a concern. Many early-stage companies were initially funded through donations and angel investors with limited formal accountability structures. The blurring of boundaries between taxpayer support, voluntary contributions, and private investment creates transparency challenges that Ukrainian authorities have not fully addressed [13].

Workers in Covert Factories

The workforce inside these facilities operates under conditions shaped by martial law and wartime labor legislation that has drawn international criticism.

In 2022, Ukraine's president ratified Law 5371, which removed labor protections for workers at small and medium-sized companies — defined as those with up to 250 employees — for the duration of martial law [15]. Under this law, approximately 70% of Ukrainian workers are now governed by individual contracts with employers rather than the national labor code [15]. The law was criticized by openDemocracy and labor rights organizations as stripping workers of collective bargaining rights, limits on working hours, and protections against arbitrary dismissal [15].

For workers in covert defense facilities, additional constraints apply. The classified nature of the sites means that standard workplace safety inspections may not occur, and workers may be subject to security restrictions on communications and movement. Specific reporting on conditions inside these factories is scarce — a gap in public accountability that stems directly from the operational security requirements of wartime production.

The China Problem

Ukraine's drone industry faces a structural vulnerability: deep dependence on Chinese-manufactured components. Nearly 97% of Ukrainian drone producers identify China as their primary source for imported parts [16]. The most critical dependencies are in brushless motors, which rely on rare-earth magnets that China dominates in processing; thermal imaging cameras, with approximately 90% of FPV drone thermal cameras sourced from China; and flight controllers, programmable chips, and affordable night-vision devices [16][17].

Some progress toward localization has been made. Vyriy Drone, which initially sourced all components from China, reported that by 2024, around 70% of the parts for its FPV drones were produced in Ukraine [8][17]. Ukrainian companies have begun domestic production of motors, electronics, and other subsystems [17]. But in 2024 and 2025, China imposed export restrictions on drone components including flight controllers, motors, and navigation cameras, threatening to constrict Ukraine's supply chain at the moment of its greatest expansion [16][18].

The Kyiv Independent reported that the shift away from Chinese parts is happening "little by little," but full supply-chain independence remains years away, particularly for high-precision components like thermal sensors and rare-earth-dependent magnets [17].

Battlefield Impact

Ukrainian drone units claimed approximately 820,000 confirmed strikes in 2025, all verified by drone video footage [19]. These strikes reportedly killed or seriously injured 240,000 Russian soldiers and destroyed or severely damaged 29,000 heavy weapons systems and 62,000 vehicles and ammunition storage sites [19][20].

Long-range strikes have targeted Russian military infrastructure at greater depth. Ukraine's SBU intelligence service confirmed drone strikes on five Russian military airbases in 2025, destroying 15 aircraft and causing an estimated $1 billion in damage [21]. A sustained campaign against Russian air defenses, missile complexes, and radar systems degraded Russia's defensive coverage — Ukrainian forces destroyed 37 such systems between March and May 2025 alone [22].

The Atlantic Council assessed that Ukraine's drone campaign behind Russian lines is "winning the drone war" by turning Russia's geographic depth into a liability, forcing Russia to defend infrastructure across a vast territory [23]. The increasing intensity of Ukrainian drone operations has coincided with a reported slowdown in Russian battlefield advances since late 2025 [22].

However, independent military analysis cautions against overstating tactical gains. A GIS Reports analysis noted that while drones have made positional warfare deadlier — creating kill zones 10 to 20 kilometers wide where anything visible and moving can be destroyed — the resulting small-scale infiltrations "are too limited to translate tactical successes into operational or strategic gains sufficient to achieve broader war objectives" [24].

Russia's Response

Russia has mounted a countermeasure effort across multiple domains. Electronic warfare systems now blanket front-line areas with jamming dense enough to suppress GPS signals within a 24-kilometer radius, degrade drone video feeds, and push precision-guided munitions off course by hundreds of meters [25]. Russian forces have deployed man-portable and vehicle-mounted jammers described as "cheap, numerous, and difficult to locate and destroy" [25].

Beyond electronic warfare, Russia has developed layered defenses combining short-range air defense units, infantry counter-drone training programs, physical hardening of positions, and dedicated "drone hunter" teams — both human and technological [25].

Russia is also scaling its own drone production. Russian factories increased Shahed-type drone output to approximately 2,700 units per month by September 2025, with plans to reach 1,000 units per day [26][27]. By September 2025, Russia was also producing an estimated 50,000 fiber-optic FPV drones per month [25]. Moscow has tripled overall drone production with Chinese assistance [28].

The resulting dynamic is an escalating production race. Ukraine's monthly FPV output of 200,000 units dwarfs Russia's estimated FPV production, but Russia's Shahed-type long-range drones — used for strategic bombardment of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure — are being produced at rates that strain Ukraine's air defenses.

Does Drone Capability Prolong the War?

The strongest version of the argument that Ukraine's drone expansion prolongs the conflict rests on several claims.

First, deep-strike capability may harden Russian domestic resolve rather than eroding it. NPR reported that Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian airbases preceded a round of talks in Istanbul, with a Moscow-based analyst observing that "the Ukrainian delegation is headed to Istanbul clearly not feeling itself the 'losing side of the war'" [29]. During negotiations, Russian negotiators have repeatedly demanded limits on the range of weapons Ukraine is allowed to possess — suggesting that Ukraine's strike capability is a friction point in diplomacy rather than a catalyst for concessions [29].

Second, the West Point Modern War Institute published analysis titled "Drones Won't Save Us," arguing that learning the wrong lessons from Ukraine's drone war could cost the U.S. Army its edge in maneuver warfare — a broader caution that drone-centric strategies may create an illusion of progress without delivering decisive outcomes [30].

Third, the GIS Reports analysis argued that drones are "tactically revolutionary, strategically bounded, but cognitively destabilizing" — meaning they change the experience and perception of war without necessarily changing its trajectory [24]. The analysis concluded that drone warfare transforms how wars are fought without transforming their outcomes.

Against this, proponents of Ukraine's drone strategy argue that the alternative — fighting without domestically produced drones — would leave Ukraine dependent on increasingly uncertain Western arms deliveries and unable to impose costs on Russian military infrastructure. The Atlantic Council's assessment is that Ukraine's deep-strike campaign, while not decisive on its own, shapes the war by degrading Russian capacity and complicating Russian planning across its entire territory [23]. Strategic airpower, analysts at Missile Matters noted, "need not be decisive to matter" — the relevant question is whether it produces "latent, war-shaping effects" that improve Ukraine's negotiating position over time [31].

The Arms-Race Calculus

The central strategic question is whether Ukraine can sustain a production advantage against a larger industrial power. Ukraine's current output advantage in FPV drones is substantial — roughly 200,000 per month versus Russia's estimated 50,000 — but Russia's overall industrial base is larger, it has access to Chinese supply chains without the export-control complications Ukraine faces, and its Shahed production is scaling rapidly [25][26].

Military analysts are divided. Those who see Ukraine maintaining an edge point to the country's faster innovation cycle, battle-tested feedback loops between front-line operators and manufacturers, and the growing ecosystem of private investment. Those who see an arms-race dynamic favoring Russia note Moscow's larger economy, its deeper partnership with Chinese suppliers, and the historical pattern in which attrition warfare ultimately rewards the side with greater industrial depth.

What is clear is that Ukraine has built, in three years, a military-industrial capability that did not exist before 2022. Whether that capability shortens the war, prolongs it, or simply changes its character is a question that depends less on production numbers than on the diplomatic and strategic frameworks within which those drones are used.