Trump Tells Incoming Fed Chair Warsh to Operate Independently of White House Influence

At a White House ceremony on May 22, 2026, President Donald Trump swore in Kevin Warsh as the 11th chair of the Federal Reserve in the modern banking era. Then Trump said something that would have been unremarkable from any other president: "I want Kevin to be totally independent. Don't look at me, don't look at anybody. Just do your own thing and do a great job" [1].

The words landed differently because of who said them. Over the preceding 18 months, Trump had called the outgoing Fed chair Jerome Powell "a real dummy," "a stupid man," "incompetent," and "that jerk" [2]. He had threatened to fire Powell, and his Department of Justice had opened a criminal investigation into Powell over statements about the Fed's headquarters renovation — a probe Powell publicly called a "pretext" for Trump's real goal of forcing rate cuts [3]. The distance between the president who waged that campaign and the president who urged his new appointee to "be independent" is where this story lives.

The Pressure Campaign Against Powell: A Timeline

Trump's public friction with the Fed began during his first term. In October 2018, he called the central bank his "greatest threat" and complained about "a very strong dollar and virtually no inflation" as justification for opposing rate hikes [4]. When the Fed raised rates in December 2018 despite his objections, stocks fell sharply [5]. He continued pressing through 2019, arguing that GDP growth would have been "at least a point and a half higher" without the rate increases [4].

The second term escalated dramatically. Trump called Powell either "incompetent" or "crooked" and said "that jerk will be gone soon" [6]. On April 15, 2026, Trump said he would fire Powell if the Fed chair stayed in his role past his term's official end on May 15 — though under the Federal Reserve Act, Powell was legally entitled to remain until his successor was confirmed [7].

Most extraordinary was the DOJ criminal probe. Powell announced he was under investigation over statements made in a congressional hearing about the Fed's renovation project. In an unprecedented video response, Powell called the investigation and other actions "pretexts" for Trump's goal of getting the Fed to lower interest rates [3]. The announcement triggered immediate market reactions: 10-year Treasury yields rose two basis points to 4.19%, 30-year yields climbed three basis points to 4.84%, and U.S. equity futures fell [8].

Warsh: The Man, the Mandate, the Contradiction

The Senate confirmed Warsh on May 13, 2026, in a 54-45 vote. Only one Democrat — John Fetterman of Pennsylvania — crossed the aisle [9]. At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Banking Committee, Warsh vowed to preserve the Fed's independence, saying he would "absolutely not" be the president's puppet. He told senators he did not promise Trump rate cuts in exchange for his nomination [10].

Warsh's policy positions, however, create an ambiguous picture. Before his nomination, he argued that advances in artificial intelligence would boost productivity, push down inflation, and allow the Fed to cut interest rates. He also viewed tariffs as one-time price drivers rather than persistent inflationary forces [9]. Both positions would, if acted upon, lead to the rate cuts Trump has demanded.

At the same time, Warsh has called for what he terms "regime change" in Fed policymaking: scrapping forward guidance, encouraging more internal dissent at meetings, shrinking the Fed's balance sheet, and using interest rates as the primary policy tool rather than asset purchases [10]. He has also proposed replacing the Fed's preferred inflation gauge with "trimmed averages" that strip outlier data [9].

The question is whether Warsh's intellectual framework conveniently aligns with Trump's preferences or whether his positions are independently held convictions that happen to overlap. During his confirmation, Warsh emphasized the distinction: "The central bank must make decisions unharnessed to politics" [10].

The Legal Architecture of Fed Independence

The Federal Reserve Act states that Fed governors can be removed by the president before the end of their terms only "for cause" — a standard that has been interpreted to mean malfeasance or neglect of duty, not policy disagreements [7]. No president has fired a sitting Fed governor in the agency's 112-year history [11].

Trump tested this boundary directly. His attempt to remove Fed Governor Lisa Cook — based on allegations of mortgage fraud, which Cook denies — reached the Supreme Court. In January 2026, justices heard arguments in Trump v. Cook and skeptically questioned the administration's lawyers about the grounds for Cook's removal and its implications for Fed independence [11]. A ruling is expected later this year.

The case's stakes extend well beyond Cook. If the Court were to narrow the "for cause" protection, it could open the door for presidents to remove Fed governors — and by extension, chairs — who refuse to follow White House policy preferences. As Harvard Law School analysis noted, the ruling will define whether the structural independence that has governed the Fed since its founding remains intact [12].

A May 2025 Supreme Court order involving the president's power to fire members of other independent agencies reinforced expectations that the Fed would remain a special case. But the legal landscape has been shifting: recent decisions on executive power have created uncertainty about the durability of protections for all independent agencies [7].

What the Bond Market Is Saying

Bond traders are not waiting for the Supreme Court. The 30-year Treasury yield topped 5% on May 14 — its highest level in nearly a year — as Warsh officially took the reins [13]. Wall Street expects the Federal Open Market Committee to abandon its bias toward easing and shift toward tighter policy at its next meeting [14].

Source: FRED / Federal Reserve Board

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

The federal funds rate stands at 3.5% to 3.75%, down from the 5.33% peak reached in mid-2023 [15]. But inflation is running above the Fed's 2% target: the Consumer Price Index rose 3.8% year-over-year as of April 2026 [16].

Source: FRED / Bureau of Labor Statistics

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

Market veteran Ed Yardeni has argued that the Fed may need to raise rates as early as July to appease "bond vigilantes" — investors who sell government debt when they lose confidence in inflation management [17]. If Warsh fails to signal that policymakers are focused on inflation, Yardeni and others warn, it could provoke further selling in Treasuries, pushing yields even higher.

Source: FRED / Federal Reserve Board

Data as of May 21, 2026CSV

The 10-year Treasury yield, which heavily influences mortgage rates, stood at roughly 4.57% as of May 21 [15]. That has kept the 30-year fixed mortgage rate at approximately 6.5%, well above the sub-6% levels briefly touched in early 2026 [18].

Source: FRED / Freddie Mac

Data as of May 21, 2026CSV

For homebuyers and small businesses, the practical consequences of Fed credibility are immediate. Analysts do not expect meaningful mortgage rate relief until late 2026 or 2027 at the earliest [19]. And Warsh's stated preference for shrinking the Fed's balance sheet — reducing its holdings of mortgage-backed securities — could push mortgage rates higher even if the federal funds rate comes down [19].

How the U.S. Stacks Up Globally

The Fed's independence framework is often treated as a global standard, but it differs meaningfully from peer institutions. The European Central Bank's independence is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, an international agreement that can only be changed by unanimous consent of its signatories — a far higher barrier than amending U.S. domestic statute [20]. The Bank of England, by contrast, has less goal independence: its 2% inflation target is set by the British government rather than by the Bank itself [20].

Japan offers the most instructive cautionary example. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appointed Haruhiko Kuroda to lead the Bank of Japan specifically to implement an aggressive stimulus strategy aligned with the government's economic agenda [20]. The Japanese government's pressure on the BOJ is widely cited as one of the most blatant examples of political interference with a central bank in a major economy [21].

Research published by The Conversation found that central bankers worldwide are "increasingly finding themselves under open pressure from elected leaders, forcing them into a defensive stance" [21]. The pattern is not unique to the United States, but the scale and public nature of Trump's campaigns against Powell were without precedent among major democracies.

The Historical Record: Do Fed Chairs Break Free?

The post-Volcker track record suggests Fed chairs frequently diverge from their appointing presidents' preferences — but the evidence is more nuanced than the independence myth implies.

Paul Volcker, appointed by Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1979, raised the federal funds rate to 20% in June 1981 — a decision that triggered a severe recession and deep political unpopularity. Ronald Reagan, who inherited Volcker, did not reappoint him; Volcker left in 1987 [22]. Alan Greenspan, appointed by Reagan, was reappointed by Democrat Bill Clinton. Ben Bernanke, appointed by Republican George W. Bush, was reappointed by Democrat Barack Obama [22].

This cross-party reappointment pattern is often cited as proof that Fed independence works. But it also reflects a period — roughly 1987 to 2017 — in which the dominant economic consensus on inflation targeting was shared across both parties. The question today is whether that consensus has broken down, and if so, whether the institutional norms built on top of it will hold.

Trump is the first president in the post-Volcker era to mount a sustained, public campaign against a sitting Fed chair. The precedent this sets — even if Warsh operates independently — is that the political cost of pressuring the Fed has dropped.

The Democratic Accountability Argument

Not everyone agrees that Fed independence, as currently practiced, is a good thing. Scholars across the political spectrum have argued that concentrating monetary policy decisions in an unelected body raises legitimate democratic concerns.

Research from the Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas at UNAM found a "negative correlation between central bank independence and democratic accountability," arguing that high independence renders elected governments unable to control monetary policy, even when doing so would serve the public interest [23]. James Forder of Oxford, writing in the journal Economic Affairs, described the case for central bank independence as resting on "fallacies" that overstate the inflationary bias of democratic governments [24].

From the right, the National Affairs journal has published arguments that the Fed has accumulated too much power without adequate oversight, particularly through its expanded balance sheet operations and its post-2008 foray into areas like climate risk and financial stability — domains that go well beyond the traditional monetary policy mandate [25].

During Warsh's confirmation, some Republican senators echoed these concerns, praising Warsh's pledge to end the Fed's engagement with climate and DEI-related policies — initiatives they characterized as political overreach by an unaccountable institution [1].

The strongest version of the counter-argument holds that some degree of coordination between fiscal and monetary policy is not corruption but democratic governance. When the government runs large deficits during a pandemic or war, the argument goes, the central bank's refusal to accommodate those deficits through lower rates can itself be a political act — one that imposes austerity without electoral authorization.

What Comes Next

Warsh inherits an economy that is, by multiple measures, at a crossroads. Inflation at 3.8% remains well above the Fed's 2% target [16]. The federal funds rate sits at 3.5-3.75% after a series of cuts from the 2023 peak [15]. Bond markets are pricing in the possibility of rate hikes, not cuts [17]. And the Supreme Court's forthcoming ruling in Trump v. Cook will determine whether the legal foundation of Fed independence remains as solid as its defenders assume [11].

Trump's instruction to Warsh — "don't look at me" — could be read as a genuine commitment to non-interference, a calculated move to calm markets, or an acknowledgment that the political cost of openly pressuring the Fed had become too high. The answer depends less on what Trump said on May 22 and more on what happens the first time Warsh makes a decision Trump does not like.

The bond market is already keeping score. The 30-year yield above 5% is a signal that investors are watching for any sign that political pressure will compromise the Fed's inflation-fighting credibility [13]. If that yield keeps climbing, the consequences will be felt by every American who borrows money — whether for a home, a car, or a small business.

Warsh, for his part, has the credentials and stated commitments to operate independently. Whether the political environment will let him is the question that only time can answer — and one that markets, in the meantime, are pricing in real time.