Trump Says He Is Seriously Considering Annexing Venezuela for Its Oil Reserves

On May 11, 2026, President Donald Trump told Fox News he was "seriously considering" making Venezuela the 51st American state, months after U.S. special forces captured Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro in a January 3 raid on Caracas [1]. "Venezuela loves Trump," the president added [2]. The statement, first reported by Fox News correspondent John Roberts, extends a pattern of territorial ambitions that previously targeted Canada and Greenland — but with a critical difference. The United States already has boots on the ground in Venezuela and has declared it will control the country's oil industry "indefinitely" [3].

Venezuela's acting President Delcy Rodriguez immediately rejected the idea, telling journalists her country "has no plans to become the 51st U.S. state" [4].

The Oil Prize: How Much Is It Actually Worth?

The economic case rests on one central claim: Venezuela sits atop roughly 303 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves, the largest in the world, edging out Saudi Arabia's 297 billion barrels [5].

Source: EIA

Data as of Dec 1, 2025CSV

Trump cited a figure of "$40 trillion" in oil wealth [2]. That number assumes all 303 billion barrels could be extracted and sold at roughly $130 per barrel. But geological reality complicates that math considerably.

The U.S. Geological Survey estimated 513 billion barrels of technically recoverable heavy oil in Venezuela's Orinoco Oil Belt alone [6]. However, "technically recoverable" does not mean economically viable. More than two-thirds of Venezuela's reserves are extra-heavy crude that requires prices above $100 per barrel to be worth extracting [7]. Independent analysts have argued a more conservative estimate of economically recoverable reserves sits closer to 100–110 billion barrels [7].

Even at current WTI crude prices — which have surged to $109.76 per barrel in May 2026, up 87.6% year-over-year [8] — turning those reserves into revenue would require rebuilding an oil industry that has been in freefall for over a decade.

Source: EIA / OPEC

Data as of Jan 1, 2026CSV

Venezuela produced 3,480 thousand barrels per day in 1998. By 2020, output had collapsed to 569 thousand bpd. It has since partially recovered to roughly 1,020 thousand bpd in 2025, but remains a fraction of its historical peak [9]. PDVSA, the state oil company, says its pipelines haven't been updated in 50 years [10]. Upgraders have operated at 20–30% capacity for years due to lack of spare parts, a skilled labor exodus, and deferred maintenance [10].

Rystad Energy estimates approximately $110 billion in upstream investment would be needed to lift production from 1 million bpd to 2 million bpd by 2030 [11]. Getting back to late-1990s levels of 3 million bpd could take 15 years [11]. The infrastructure deficit alone undercuts any suggestion that annexation would produce quick economic returns.

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of May 4, 2026CSV

The Legal Void

No mechanism exists under U.S. constitutional law or international law for the United States to annex a sovereign nation against its will.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires all member states to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" [12]. The prohibition on forcible annexation is considered a jus cogens norm — a fundamental principle of customary international law from which no derogation is permitted [13].

Within U.S. law, the Constitution grants Congress — not the president — the exclusive power to declare war under Article I, Section 8 [14]. The Brennan Center for Justice has argued that the January Venezuela operation itself was unconstitutional, as it lacked prior congressional authorization [14]. The New York City Bar Association issued a formal statement calling on Congress to "act to halt the President's violations of U.S. and international law in Venezuela" [15].

Matthew Waxman, a Columbia University law professor, has noted that the executive branch maintains broad claims to inherent Article II authority for military action, but these claims remain contested by most legal scholars and courts have been reluctant to adjudicate them [16]. Stanford Law School's analysis framed the situation as "flexing U.S. power" in ways that test the outer boundaries of executive authority [17].

The question of annexation goes further still. The Constitution Center's historical review of U.S. territorial acquisitions notes that every historical annexation — from Texas to Hawaii — involved either purchase, treaty, or at minimum a claimed invitation from the territory's government [18]. No precedent exists for annexing a country whose acting government explicitly opposes it.

Who Are the Venezuelans?

Any discussion of annexation must grapple with the 28 million people who live in Venezuela and the nearly 8 million who have fled.

More than 7.9 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2014, constituting the largest exodus in Latin American history [19]. Of those, 6.9 million reside in Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia hosting nearly 3 million [19]. The 2026 Regional Response Plan coordinates 152 organizations including UN agencies, NGOs, and 34 migrant- and refugee-led groups [20].

The Venezuelan population is deeply divided. Maduro loyalists within the military and the ruling PSUV party still hold institutional power in parts of the country. The opposition, led historically by figures like Juan Guaidó and María Corina Machado, has broadly sought free elections and democratic transition — not U.S. occupation [21]. The International Crisis Group noted that the U.S. raid created uncertainty about "long-term U.S. plans for Venezuela and its population" even among Venezuelans who opposed Maduro [22].

The Niskanen Center modeled potential refugee flows from continued U.S. intervention, identifying three scenarios: mass returns if stability is restored, partial returns under limited political change, or a significant new displacement wave driven by violence and power struggles [23].

The Historical Track Record: Puerto Rico and Iraq

Proponents of U.S. control over Venezuelan resources might point to historical precedents. The record is not encouraging.

Puerto Rico, acquired from Spain in 1898, offers the most direct comparison among U.S. territories. Congress governed the island through statutes that enabled resource extraction and strategic exploitation while, as the Center for Constitutional Rights documented, "paying little attention to the economic, cultural, and political realities on the island" [24]. The first U.S. civilian governor, Charles H. Allen, installed himself as president of the largest sugar-refining company in the world, using his governorship to gain controlling interest over the Puerto Rican economy [25]. More than 120 years later, Puerto Rico remains a territory in fiscal crisis, with a debt restructuring process that has cost the island billions [26].

Post-invasion Iraq offers another case study. While not formally annexed, the U.S. occupation from 2003 to 2011 aimed in part to stabilize Iraqi oil production. Iraq's oil output did eventually increase, but at a cost that Brown University's Costs of War project estimated at over $2 trillion in direct federal spending — not counting long-term veterans' care and interest payments [27].

The Stimson Center's February 2026 report, "Was Venezuela Worth It?", concluded that "the capture of Maduro does not meaningfully advance U.S. security and risks undermining the United States' position in Latin America and the international system more broadly" [28].

What the World Has Said

International reaction to the January intervention was divided along largely predictable lines. The reaction to the 51st-state proposal has been more uniformly critical.

Brazil, Spain, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay issued a joint statement expressing "profound concern and firm rejection of the military actions carried out unilaterally in Venezuelan territory" [29]. France's UN envoy warned that violations of international law by permanent Security Council members erode "the very foundation of the international order" [30]. Norway's Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide stated the operation was "not in accordance with international law" while acknowledging Norway did not recognize Maduro's legitimacy [30].

On the other side, Argentina's President Javier Milei welcomed the January raid as "a victory for good over evil," and Ecuador's Daniel Noboa celebrated it as a defeat for "narco-chavista criminals" [31]. Several NATO member states offered cautious support for removing Maduro while remaining silent on the question of long-term territorial control [30].

The United Kingdom's Keir Starmer took a middle path, saying he wanted to "establish the facts" before making firm statements, while noting that "I always say and believe we should uphold international law" [30].

The Military Reality

The January operation succeeded in capturing Maduro, but the broader military picture is more complex.

Venezuela's armed forces number approximately 123,000 active personnel — 63,000 army, 25,500 navy, 11,500 air force, and 23,000 national guard — plus 8,000 reservists [32]. The force was equipped with Russian hardware including Su-30 fighter jets, T-72 tanks, and S-300 air defense systems, though analysts assess the equipment's operational readiness as poor after years of economic hardship and deferred maintenance [32].

Russia had signed military cooperation agreements with Venezuela extending through 2030 [33]. China supplied radars, communications gear, and dual-use technologies, and maintained a "comprehensive strategic partnership" [34]. Neither country intervened militarily during the January operation, but both condemned it.

The financial costs are mounting. CSIS estimated operational costs at approximately $31 million per day [35]. Brown University's Costs of War project calculated at least $4.7 billion spent from August 2025 through March 2026 on Operation Southern Spear and Operation Absolute Resolve [36]. Bloomberg reported that naval deployment costs peaked at over $20 million per day during the most intensive phase [37]. These figures do not include long-term costs such as veterans' benefits.

CSIS analysts also flagged the strategic trade-off: forces committed to the Caribbean limit assets available for the Indo-Pacific and Middle East [35].

Steelmanning the Annexation Argument

The strongest version of the annexation case runs roughly as follows: the United States depends on oil imports while sitting next to the world's largest proven reserves. Controlling those reserves could reduce energy prices domestically, shrink the trade deficit, and deny a strategic foothold to Russia and China in the Western Hemisphere.

At current prices above $100/barrel, Venezuelan heavy crude is at least marginally profitable to extract. U.S. oil companies have expertise in heavy oil extraction, and Chevron was already operating in Venezuela before the intervention [10]. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has indicated U.S. management of Venezuelan oil sales will continue "indefinitely" [3].

For this case to hold, several conditions would need to be true simultaneously: oil prices would need to remain elevated for the 10–15 years required to rebuild production capacity; the $110 billion investment would need to generate returns exceeding the ongoing military and governance costs; no significant international economic retaliation (sanctions, trade restrictions) would materialize; and the Venezuelan population would need to be governed without generating an insurgency that made extraction impossible.

Each of these assumptions faces substantial headwinds. The historical pattern — from Puerto Rico to Iraq — suggests that occupation creates long-term fiscal obligations that outpace resource revenues.

The Precedent Problem

Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of a U.S. annexation of Venezuela would be the precedent it sets for resource-driven territorial claims globally.

China has pressed expansive claims in the South China Sea, building artificial islands and ignoring a 2016 international arbitration ruling against its positions [38]. Russia has staked claims to Arctic shelf resources. Historical European colonial powers justified centuries of territorial expansion on access to raw materials.

The United States has historically positioned itself as the guarantor of a rules-based international order that prohibits territorial conquest. A formal annexation of Venezuela — or even the serious pursuit of one — would undermine Washington's standing to oppose similar moves by other powers.

The TRT World Research Centre's analysis, titled "America First, Law Last," argued the Venezuela intervention represents "the terminal unravelling of international law" — a characterization that, while pointed, reflects a real concern shared by legal scholars across the political spectrum [39]. JURIST's legal commentary described the situation as "sliding toward aggression" and the "unraveling of international law" [40].

What Comes Next

The gap between Trump's statement and any actual annexation remains enormous. Statehood requires an act of Congress. The Constitution provides no mechanism for incorporating a foreign nation as a state without its consent. International law prohibits it categorically.

But the statement itself has consequences. It signals to the Venezuelan population, to Latin American governments, and to the broader international community that the United States may view its military presence in Venezuela as permanent rather than transitional. It reshapes the calculus for every actor — from Venezuelan civil society groups seeking democratic transition to Chinese and Russian strategists assessing whether their partnerships in the region are threatened.

The $4.7 billion already spent, the $110 billion needed to restore oil production, and the incalculable cost to international norms all raise a question the Stimson Center posed in its report title: Was Venezuela worth it [28]? The answer depends on whether "it" means a successful special forces raid or an open-ended commitment to governing a nation of 28 million people who did not ask to be governed.