Tornadoes Kill at Least 2 and Destroy Homes Across Northern Texas

A supercell thunderstorm that tracked across North Texas on the evening of April 25, 2026, produced two confirmed tornadoes in Wise and Parker counties, killing two people, injuring six others, and displacing at least 20 families [1][2]. The National Weather Service office in Fort Worth confirmed the findings after survey teams assessed damage on April 26, cataloging an EF-2 tornado in the lake community of Runaway Bay and an EF-1 tornado near Springtown, roughly 30 to 45 miles northwest of Fort Worth [3][4].

The Tornadoes: Path, Intensity, and an Unusual Track

The first and stronger tornado touched down in the Runaway Bay area of Wise County at approximately 9:03 p.m. CDT and remained on the ground for about four minutes, lifting at 9:07 p.m. [5]. NWS survey teams rated it EF-2 with peak winds of 135 mph (217 km/h). It carved a path roughly 1.4 miles long and exceeded half a mile in width at its peak intensity [5]. Meteorologists noted embedded vortices — smaller, intense rotations within the main tornado — that produced localized areas of concentrated destruction [5].

One detail stood out to forecasters: the storm moved westward, an atypical track for tornadoes in the region, which more commonly travel to the northeast [5]. The slow-moving supercell complicated real-time tracking and may have contributed to the severity of localized damage, as the tornado lingered over a relatively small area.

The second tornado developed roughly 35 minutes later, touching down at 9:38 p.m. about three miles west-northwest of Springtown in Parker County [6]. It tracked southeast for 9.8 miles over 32 minutes before dissipating near 10:10 p.m. [6]. NWS rated this tornado EF-1, with peak winds estimated at 105 mph (169 km/h) and a damage path approximately two-thirds of a mile wide [5][6].

Casualties and Damage

In Wise County, Wise County Judge J.D. Clark confirmed one person was killed and six others were treated by Wise County EMS for injuries [7][8]. Homes along Overland Trail, Cumberland Trail, Cactus Canyon Drive, and Brookview Drive on the west side of Runaway Bay sustained significant damage, with first responders reporting "debris everywhere" along with downed power lines and trees [7].

The most intense damage in the Runaway Bay area centered on manufactured housing. Two single-wide manufactured homes were completely destroyed, and a double-wide manufactured home was found approximately 100 yards downwind of its original site, with estimated wind speeds at that location reaching 130 mph [4][9]. A two-story conventional home lost roofing and exterior walls on its second floor [1].

In Parker County, a 69-year-old woman was found dead in a badly damaged mobile home south of Springtown, outside the city limits [6][10]. Parker County officials said the fatality was associated with strong rear-flank downdraft (RFD) winds rather than the tornado itself, though the distinction is largely academic for the victim's family [3]. Along the EF-1 path, most damage consisted of metal building and roof failures, broken windows, failed garage doors, and uprooted trees, though two conventional homes sustained partial loss of second-story walls [4][9].

Runaway Bay Mayor Herman White said the storm also brought unusually large hail and significant infrastructure damage [7]. As of 11 p.m. on April 25, Oncor reported 1,690 customers in the Runaway Bay area without power [7]. Parker County officials estimated more than 200 people were displaced due to power outages alone [6]. A gas tank in Springtown was struck by lightning during the storm, causing it to ignite [6].

Source: NOAA Storm Events Database

Data as of Apr 27, 2026CSV

Warning Time and Alert Systems

The NWS Fort Worth office issued a Tornado Warning at 9:10 p.m. CDT on April 25 for southwestern Wise County, east-central Jack County, and north-central Parker County [11]. At that time, a severe thunderstorm capable of producing a tornado was located seven miles northeast of Poolville, with an additional area of rotation identified in Runaway Bay [11].

The warning came approximately seven minutes after the EF-2 tornado touched down in Runaway Bay at 9:03 p.m. [5][11]. For residents in the direct path of the first tornado, the official warning arrived after the damage had already begun. The EF-1 tornado near Springtown, which touched down at 9:38 p.m., had roughly 28 minutes of lead time from the initial warning [6][11].

The national average lead time for tornado warnings is approximately 13 minutes, according to NOAA performance data [12]. For EF3 and stronger tornadoes, the average rises to about 16 minutes, and 97% of such tornadoes are preceded by a warning [12]. The Runaway Bay tornado's atypical westward movement may have complicated detection, as radar algorithms are optimized to identify rotation in storms moving along more conventional northeast tracks.

Whether Runaway Bay had functioning outdoor warning sirens at the time of the tornado is not confirmed in available reporting. Many small Texas communities — Runaway Bay has a population of roughly 1,500 — rely on Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) pushed to cell phones and local television broadcasts rather than outdoor sirens. Residents recounted huddling and praying as the tornado struck, suggesting that for some, the warning came too late or not at all [8].

Manufactured Housing and the Building Code Gap

Both fatalities in this outbreak occurred in manufactured homes, a pattern consistent with decades of tornado casualty data. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has long identified manufactured housing as the highest-risk residential structure type during tornadoes, and studies consistently show that occupants of manufactured homes are 15 to 20 times more likely to die in a tornado than those in permanent structures [13].

Texas does not enforce a statewide residential building code. While the state mandates baseline compliance with the International Building Code (IBC) and International Residential Code (IRC), local governments have significant authority to modify, weaken, or decline to enforce these standards within their jurisdictions [14][15]. The 2006 International Residential Code serves as a nominal statewide standard, but Texas law allows municipalities to adopt weaker provisions [15].

In rural areas like those around Runaway Bay and Springtown, building code enforcement is often minimal or nonexistent. Wise County and Parker County both have significant concentrations of manufactured housing, which is governed by federal HUD standards rather than local building codes. Those HUD standards require manufactured homes to withstand 70 mph wind zones in most of Texas — far below the 135 mph winds the EF-2 tornado delivered [14].

FEMA's P-361 standard for residential safe rooms requires resistance to winds of 250 mph and the ability to stop a 15-pound 2×4 board traveling at high speed [13][16]. Installing a FEMA-compliant residential safe room costs between $3,000 and $9,500 for a prefabricated unit, though retrofitting into an existing home can push costs to $25,000 depending on site conditions [16]. FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program can cover up to 75% of eligible costs, but the program is competitive, slow, and typically only available after a presidential disaster declaration [16].

The Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) administers a safe room program, but uptake remains limited in rural areas where awareness is low and upfront costs are prohibitive for lower-income homeowners [16].

Insurance and the Recovery Gap

Standard homeowner's insurance policies in Texas generally cover wind and hail damage, including tornado damage, for site-built homes [17]. However, the coverage landscape is more complicated for manufactured homes, renters, and uninsured homeowners.

Parker County has experienced at least 68 tornadoes since the mid-1950s, with up to seven in a single year, making tornado risk well-established in the area [17]. Yet tornado insurance is not mandatory in Texas, and a significant share of manufactured home residents — who skew lower-income — carry minimal or no coverage [17].

For residents who fall through standard insurance, the path to recovery runs through FEMA's Individual Assistance program and Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans. But those programs require a presidential disaster declaration, and as of April 27, no such declaration had been requested for this event [18]. Recent Texas disaster declarations — including DR-4879-TX for severe storms in July 2025 — have taken days to weeks to process, and the threshold for a presidential declaration typically requires damage beyond state and local capacity [18].

SBA disaster loans, the most common form of federal aid after tornadoes, are loans, not grants. Applicants must demonstrate creditworthiness, and many low-income residents in manufactured housing cannot qualify. FEMA's Individual and Households Program (IHP) provides grants of up to approximately $43,000, but these are capped well below the cost of replacing a home and are only available after a declaration [18].

The American Red Cross deployed to the area on April 26 to assist with sheltering and immediate needs [2]. Texas Task Force Two and the Texas Division of Emergency Management coordinated relief, and a reunification center was established at 513 Port O' Call Drive in Runaway Bay [2]. County officials urged homeowners to report damage through TDEM's online portal to build the case for a potential disaster declaration [2].

Northern Texas Tornado Climatology: Where This Outbreak Fits

April is peak tornado season in North Texas. Between 1951 and 2011, nearly 63% of all Texas tornadoes occurred during April, May, and June, with May producing the highest monthly average [19]. The NWS Fort Worth office's tornado climatology shows that the region averaging several tornado events per spring season, making an EF-2 in late April notable but not unprecedented [20].

Source: NOAA Storm Prediction Center

Data as of Apr 27, 2026CSV

The outbreak's two confirmed tornadoes are modest by the standards of major North Texas events. The May 2019 tornado outbreak, for instance, produced multiple EF-3 and EF-4 tornadoes and caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage. The December 2015 Garland-Rowlett EF-4 tornado killed 11 people and caused an estimated $1.2 billion in damage [19]. By comparison, the April 25 event, while deadly, appears limited in geographic scope and total damage — though official cost estimates have not yet been released.

What makes this event operationally significant is the combination of nighttime occurrence, atypical westward storm motion, and disproportionate impact on manufactured housing. Nighttime tornadoes are statistically deadlier because residents are less likely to be awake and monitoring weather conditions, and visual confirmation of the tornado by spotters is impossible [12].

The Shifting Geography of Tornado Risk

Climate scientists have documented a gradual eastward shift of the region historically known as Tornado Alley. Research by Victor Gensini at Northern Illinois University, published in 2018, found that tornado activity has migrated 400 to 500 miles eastward from the traditional corridor centered on northeastern Texas and south-central Oklahoma toward the Mississippi and Tennessee valleys [21][22].

Several mechanisms drive this shift. Persistent drought in the southwestern United States has reduced the low-level moisture that fuels supercell formation across the western Plains [21]. Simultaneously, Gulf of Mexico water temperatures have risen by an average of one to two degrees, increasing the moisture content of air masses feeding into storm systems further east [22]. Changes in the jet stream — specifically, a dome of high pressure over the drying Southwest forcing storm tracks eastward — compound the effect [22].

A 2021 geographical analysis by Naresh Devineni at City University of New York found evidence of fewer days with isolated tornadoes but more days producing multiple tornadoes — suggesting that when conditions do align, outbreaks may be more intense [21].

However, attributing any single tornado event to long-term climate trends remains scientifically contested. Tornado records are noisy: improvements in radar technology, population growth, and the proliferation of cell phone cameras have increased detection rates over time, making direct comparisons between decades unreliable [21]. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has consistently rated confidence in tornado projections as "low" due to the small spatial scale of tornadoes and the limitations of current climate models in resolving convective-scale processes [22].

For North Texas specifically, the eastward shift does not mean reduced risk. The region remains squarely within the zone of highest tornado frequency in the United States, and individual years can deviate sharply from long-term trends. Texas recorded 175 confirmed tornadoes in 2024 and 167 in 2019, both well above the 10-year average [20].

Storm Chasing and Media Coverage: A Recurring Debate

The April 25 tornadoes renewed a familiar debate about the role of storm chasers and media coverage during active tornado events. Critics argue that real-time social media broadcasts of approaching tornadoes can drive curious residents outdoors, delay shelter-seeking behavior, or create dangerous traffic congestion on rural roads near active supercells [23].

Peer-reviewed evidence on this question is limited. The VORTEX field campaigns (VORTEX, VORTEX2, and TORUS) have demonstrated that coordinated storm-chasing produces measurable improvements in understanding tornadogenesis and forecasting accuracy [23][24]. Data collected by chase teams has been instrumental in extending warning lead times from roughly five minutes in the 1980s to the current 13-minute average [12][24].

The proliferation of non-scientific chasers — hobbyists, tour operators, and media crews — is a separate concern. No peer-reviewed study has directly established a causal link between storm-chaser presence and increased civilian injuries or deaths during a specific tornado event. Anecdotal reports from the April 25 storms do not indicate that media or chaser activity interfered with emergency response in Wise or Parker counties [2].

The more established risk is informational: social media posts from chasers can spread faster than official NWS warnings, sometimes carrying inaccurate location or intensity information. During a nighttime tornado with an atypical track, as on April 25, this kind of misinformation could be particularly dangerous. NWS and emergency management officials continue to recommend that residents rely on official channels — Weather Radio, WEA alerts, and local broadcast meteorologists — rather than social media during active events [12].

What Comes Next

The immediate priority for Wise and Parker counties is damage assessment, debris clearance, and restoration of utilities. County officials have asked residents to document property damage and report it to TDEM, a necessary step in building the case for a gubernatorial or presidential disaster declaration [2]. Whether the scale of damage from two relatively brief tornadoes meets the threshold for a federal declaration remains uncertain.

For the families who lost homes — particularly those in manufactured housing without adequate insurance — the gap between the damage and available aid is likely to be wide. The two deaths and six injuries underscore a persistent reality of tornado safety in Texas: the people most exposed to tornado risk are often the least equipped to survive it, sheltered in structures that cannot withstand moderate tornado winds, in areas where building code enforcement is minimal, and without the financial resources to rebuild.

The NWS has noted that its survey findings for both tornadoes are preliminary and may be refined with additional analysis [5]. As the affected communities begin recovery, the structural questions raised by this event — about building codes, warning systems, manufactured housing standards, and the adequacy of federal aid — are the same ones raised after nearly every deadly tornado in rural Texas. Whether they produce policy changes, or simply recede until the next outbreak, remains an open question.