Taiwan Test-Fires US-Supplied Missile Launcher in Exercise Directed Toward China

On June 10, 2026, Taiwan launched 36 rockets from truck-mounted High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems — HIMARS — into the Taiwan Strait, marking the first time the island has live-fired American-made missile launchers in waters directly facing mainland China [1]. The launchers were positioned along Taiwan's western coast near Taichung, close to sites military planners have identified as probable invasion landing zones [1]. The exercise demonstrated the system's "shoot-and-scoot" capability: fire precision-guided munitions, then relocate before the enemy can return fire [2].

The test was not merely technical. At 300 kilometers, the HIMARS system's reach puts targets in China's Fujian Province — home to PLA bases, naval facilities, and the staging areas most likely to be used in any cross-strait assault — squarely within striking distance [3]. The 110-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, in other words, is no longer a buffer. It is a firing range.

The Weapon: What HIMARS Can and Cannot Do

HIMARS — the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, manufactured by Lockheed Martin — is a wheeled rocket launcher that became globally prominent through its extensive use by Ukraine against Russian forces beginning in 2022 [3]. The system fires two categories of munitions: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets with a range exceeding 70 kilometers and 200-pound warheads, and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles with a range of approximately 300 kilometers and 500-pound warheads [4].

Taiwan has procured 29 HIMARS launchers in total. The first batch of 11 was delivered and test-fired at Jiupeng Base in Pingtung County in May 2025 [4]. An additional 18 systems are scheduled for delivery in coming months [3]. In April 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense issued procurement contracts worth $3.92 billion for additional HIMARS systems [5].

The June 10 test was qualitatively different from the May 2025 exercise, which was conducted off Taiwan's southern coast. Firing westward into the Strait, toward China, carries obvious symbolic weight. But it also raises practical questions. The earlier Jiupeng test revealed two instances of "signal anomalies" that temporarily halted the firing process, with only one vehicle completing its launch in the first volley [6]. Chinese military analysts have seized on these malfunctions, arguing that HIMARS faces "serious survivability challenges under the PLA's comprehensive suppression during wartime" [6].

A $29.7 Billion Arms Pipeline

The HIMARS test is one piece of a much larger military procurement effort. As of April 2026, the backlog of approved but undelivered U.S. arms sales to Taiwan stood at $29.72 billion across 33 distinct Foreign Military Sales cases [5].

Source: Taiwan Security Monitor / GMU Schar School

Data as of Apr 30, 2026CSV

The backlog peaked at $33.8 billion in January 2025, following a record $11.1 billion weapons package approved by Washington in December 2024 [7]. It has since declined modestly, driven by completed deliveries: all 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks arrived by April 2026, and the first batch of ALTIUS-600M drones was delivered in August 2025 [5][8].

Several major items remain significantly delayed. The $8 billion F-16C/D Block 70 fighter program experienced flight test issues, though production is reportedly back on track [5]. AGM-84H SLAM-ER missiles, valued at over $1 billion, face multi-year delays with no finalized purchase agreement [5]. Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes, split across two cases worth $430 million, have also been flagged as delayed [5].

Taiwan has also contracted 450 Boeing Harpoon anti-ship missiles, with an additional 400 units in the delivery pipeline [1]. Combined with indigenous production targets of over 1,000 Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missiles by the end of 2026, Taiwan aims to field an anti-ship missile inventory exceeding 1,800 units by 2029 [1][9].

The Legal Ambiguity: What Does the U.S. Owe Taiwan?

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 governs the U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship. It does not obligate the United States to defend Taiwan militarily. Instead, it states that it is U.S. policy to "make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability" [10]. It further directs the president to "maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan" [10].

This formulation — sometimes called "strategic ambiguity" — leaves the decision to intervene militarily to the president and Congress, to be determined "in accordance with constitutional processes" [10][11]. The Act requires the president to inform Congress "promptly" of any threat to Taiwan's security, but stops short of a mutual defense treaty [11].

Former President Biden stated on multiple occasions that the U.S. would defend Taiwan, only to have the White House walk back those statements as inconsistent with official policy [11]. The current legal framework, in short, provides for arms sales and maintains the option of military intervention without committing to it.

Beijing's Response: From Blockade Drills to Coast Guard Posters

China's reaction to Taiwan's growing HIMARS capability has been layered across military, diplomatic, and information channels.

In late December 2025, the PLA conducted "Justice Mission 2025" exercises — the largest Taiwan-focused drills on record — simulating a full naval and air blockade of the island [12]. Eleven PLA Navy vessels and eight China Coast Guard ships crossed into Taiwan's contiguous zone, a first in terms of scale [12]. The exercises came less than two weeks after the $11.1 billion U.S. arms package, with Beijing calling the sale a path toward turning Taiwan into a "powder keg" [7].

During those drills, the China Coast Guard released a propaganda poster depicting a CCG vessel intercepting a cargo ship carrying HIMARS launchers to Taiwan [7]. The Chinese Defense Ministry stated: "Several pieces of U.S. weaponry won't be the magic straw that can save a drowning man; they are nothing but easy targets on the battlefields" [4].

Compared to the 2022 response to then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit — when China launched 11 DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles into waters around Taiwan and sent nearly 450 aircraft into Taiwan's air defense identification zone in a single month [13] — the December 2025 exercises were broader in scope. They involved coast guard operations, contiguous zone incursions, and simulated blockade formations, suggesting a shift from punitive signaling toward operational rehearsal [12][14].

The U.S. State Department responded to the December drills by urging Beijing to "exercise restraint and cease its military pressure against Taiwan" [15].

The Escalation Debate: Deterrence or Provocation?

Not all defense analysts view Taiwan's publicized exercises as stabilizing.

Chinese mainland military experts argue that HIMARS' survivability in wartime is "highly questionable" given the PLA's surveillance and rapid-strike capabilities [6]. The system's reliance on mobility — the "shoot-and-scoot" doctrine — becomes less effective against adversaries with advanced detection systems, satellite reconnaissance, and layered counter-battery fire, conditions the PLA is specifically building to meet [6].

Defense Priorities, a Washington think tank advocating restraint in U.S. military commitments, has separately argued that a U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan contingency would face severe operational challenges, including the distance from U.S. bases, China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities, and the risk of rapid escalation [16].

The counterargument, advanced by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and other institutions, holds that credible deterrence requires visible capability and willingness to use it [17]. Under this logic, the HIMARS test is precisely the kind of signal Beijing needs to see: Taiwan can hit back, and the costs of invasion are calculable. Lockheed Martin itself has described HIMARS as "a strategic capability, improving homeland and important asset defense while reducing overall mission costs" [4].

The tension between these positions is not academic. Each additional publicized exercise establishes a new baseline. What was once a theoretical capability is now a demonstrated one — and each demonstration invites a response.

What's in the Strike Radius

If cross-strait hostilities began, Taiwan's civilian infrastructure would be immediately at risk. TSMC's advanced semiconductor fabrication plants — which produce the majority of the world's leading-edge chips — sit on Taiwan's western coast, well within range of PLA short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and precision-guided munitions [18].

But direct strikes on fabs may not even be necessary. Semiconductor manufacturing depends on continuous power supply, water treatment, chemical logistics, and supply chain coordination. Even precision-guided munitions create shockwaves, vibration, and dust infiltration within a several-kilometer radius that would render cleanroom operations impossible [18]. One analysis estimates a 59% probability that a Taiwan fab would be offline for 90 or more days conditional on a blockade scenario, compared to just 3.7% absent military action [19].

Taiwan's civil defense preparations remain uneven. Air raid shelters are widely designated across the island, but many lack basic provisions, clear access protocols, or public familiarity [20]. Training initiatives exist but are fragmented and not tied to defined roles during a crisis [20]. Compared to Israel's Home Front Command or South Korea's extensive civil defense drills — conducted monthly with mandatory public participation — Taiwan's civilian preparedness lags behind peer nations facing comparable threats.

The Missile Balance: Asymmetry by Design

Taiwan does not attempt to match China's missile forces in volume. The PLA Rocket Force fields roughly 900 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, alongside hundreds of land-attack cruise missiles and long-range guided rockets [9]. China's Eastern and Southern Theater Commands maintain overwhelming quantitative superiority.

Taiwan's strategy is instead built on asymmetric deterrence — making invasion costly rather than impossible. The island's indigenous missile arsenal includes the Hsiung Feng II (subsonic, 150-250 km range), the Hsiung Feng III (supersonic, 400 km range), the Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack cruise missile (subsonic, up to 1,200 km), and the Yun Feng supersonic cruise missile (Mach 3, 1,200 km range) [9][21][22]. The Yun Feng, in particular, could theoretically strike Shanghai or military targets deep in China's interior [22].

Mass production goals are ambitious: Taiwan's National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology aims to produce more than 1,000 missiles per year by the end of 2026 [9]. Combined with U.S.-supplied systems, the strategy is to saturate an invasion fleet with enough anti-ship firepower to impose unacceptable losses.

Domestic Politics: Budgets, Recalls, and the 2028 Shadow

The HIMARS test does not exist in a political vacuum. Taiwan's defense budget has risen sharply under President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party, reaching a record 3.32% of GDP in fiscal year 2026 [20][23].

Source: Taiwan MND / BISI

Data as of May 9, 2026CSV

Lai proposed a $40 billion "special defense budget" to fund U.S. weapons acquisitions, indigenous missile production, and an integrated air defense network he called "T-Dome" [23]. The legislature passed a reduced version — $24.8 billion over eight years — in May 2026, after months of wrangling between the DPP and the opposition Kuomintang [23][24].

Public opinion is divided. A 2025 Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation poll found 49.4% of adults supporting the high defense budget, with 39.7% opposed [25]. On the question of increasing spending to 3% of GDP, support was somewhat stronger at 53.5% [25]. Meanwhile, 51.8% of respondents preferred Taiwanese independence, 24.2% favored the status quo, and 13.3% preferred unification with China [25].

The KMT, which favors more pragmatic engagement with Beijing, has used the defense budget as a political lever, delaying passage and demanding greater oversight [24]. Local elections scheduled for late 2026 will serve as the first major test of whether the DPP's defense-forward posture commands majority support — and as a bellwether for the January 2028 presidential race [25][26].

The timing of the HIMARS test — weeks after the special defense budget's passage and months before local elections — has led some observers to question whether the exercise reflects deterrence strategy, domestic political calculation, or both. The DPP has an interest in demonstrating that defense spending produces visible results; the KMT has an interest in framing those results as provocative.

What Happens Next

Taiwan has now demonstrated that U.S.-supplied weapons can reach Chinese territory from its western coast. The 300-kilometer range of HIMARS, combined with the 1,200-kilometer range of indigenous Yun Feng missiles, means that a significant portion of China's southeastern military infrastructure falls within Taiwan's strike envelope.

Beijing has responded to each escalatory step with drills of increasing scale and operational realism, culminating in blockade simulations that test logistical coordination rather than simply demonstrating firepower. The cycle — arms sale, test, drill, response — has its own momentum.

The variables that could break the cycle in either direction are political: the outcome of Taiwan's internal budget debates, the trajectory of U.S. policy under shifting administrations, Beijing's assessment of the costs and timing of military action, and the degree to which regional actors — Japan, the Philippines, Australia — choose to be drawn into or remain apart from the escalation ladder.

For now, the rockets have been fired, the strait has been crossed in symbolic terms, and the question is not whether the next step will come, but what form it will take.