SpaceX Launches Falcon Heavy Rocket for First Time in 18 Months

On April 27, 2026, SpaceX rolled its Falcon Heavy rocket to Launch Complex 39A at Kennedy Space Center for the first time since October 2024 — an 18-month gap that marks one of the longest stretches of inactivity for any operational rocket in the company's fleet [1]. The mission, carrying the 6-metric-ton ViaSat-3 F3 communications satellite to geostationary transfer orbit, was scrubbed that day due to weather violations, with a rescheduled attempt targeting April 28 [2]. But the weather delay is the least interesting part of this story. The real question is what the extended silence says about Falcon Heavy's role in an industry racing toward even larger rockets — and whether the most powerful operational commercial rocket in the Western world is slowly being sidelined by its own maker.

A Rocket That Flies in Bursts

Falcon Heavy debuted on February 6, 2018, with a demonstration flight that sent Elon Musk's personal Tesla Roadster into a heliocentric orbit [3]. In the eight years since, the rocket has flown just 11 times — soon to be 12 — averaging fewer than 1.5 launches per year. That cadence stands in stark contrast to its sibling, the Falcon 9, which has accumulated more than 400 flights and routinely launches multiple times per week [4].

The launch history reveals an irregular pattern. After two flights in 2019, Falcon Heavy went dormant for nearly three years — the longest gap in its operational life — before returning for a U.S. Space Force mission in November 2022 [3]. It then surged to five flights in 2023, its busiest year, before tapering to two in 2024 and zero in 2025 [3].

Source: SpaceX / ElonX.net

Data as of Apr 27, 2026CSV

The sporadic cadence is not a sign of failure but of market positioning. Industry analysts attribute it to economics: Falcon 9 handles the vast majority of commercial launches at lower cost, while Falcon Heavy is reserved for payloads too heavy or destined for orbits too energetic for its smaller sibling [5]. Heavy missions command premium pricing — up to $150 million per launch in expendable configuration, compared to Falcon 9's $67 million list price [6][7].

The ViaSat-3 F3 Mission

The current mission carries the third and final satellite in Viasat's ViaSat-3 constellation, a broadband network designed to deliver more than one terabit per second of aggregate capacity [2]. The F3 satellite, weighing approximately six metric tons and generating 25 kilowatts of power, will provide high-speed internet coverage across the Asia-Pacific region for commercial, defense, and consumer users [8].

The launch configuration reflects the mission's demanding energy requirements. SpaceX is flying two previously-flown side boosters — B1072 on its second flight and B1075 on its 22nd — alongside a brand-new center core, B1098, which will be expended into the Atlantic Ocean after stage separation [9]. The side boosters are expected to land at Landing Zones 2 and 40 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station [9]. Deployment of the satellite from the upper stage is expected roughly five hours after liftoff, at an altitude of approximately 22,236 miles [9].

Viasat has not publicly disclosed the contract value for the F3 launch. However, given the partially-expendable configuration and the payload's mass, industry estimates place the mission cost in the range of $120–150 million, consistent with SpaceX's published pricing for similar profiles [6].

The Cost Advantage — and Its Limits

Falcon Heavy holds a significant cost-per-kilogram advantage over every operational competitor in the heavy-lift market. At a listed commercial price of $97 million in its partially reusable configuration, with a low-Earth-orbit capacity of 63,800 kilograms, it achieves approximately $1,520 per kilogram to LEO [4][7]. That figure undercuts ULA's Vulcan Centaur ($4,410/kg), the European Space Agency's Ariane 6 ($5,300/kg in its two-booster configuration), and even Blue Origin's New Glenn, which is estimated at $1,600–$2,200/kg once operational [4].

Source: SpaceNexus Guide

Data as of Apr 27, 2026CSV

The comparison requires context, however. Vulcan Centaur, priced between $100 million and $150 million depending on configuration, carries roughly 27,200 kg to LEO — less than half of Falcon Heavy's capacity [10]. Ariane 6, at $77–115 million, maxes out at 21,650 kg [4]. New Glenn, which began flight testing in 2025 with commercial operations expected in 2026–2027, is designed for 45,000 kg to LEO at an estimated $70–100 million per launch [11]. None of these vehicles match Falcon Heavy's raw lift capacity, but many customers do not need 63 metric tons to orbit; they need affordable access to geostationary transfer orbit or beyond, where the competitive picture is more nuanced.

Falcon Heavy's cost advantage has held steady since its debut, largely because no competitor has achieved comparable booster reusability at this scale. That gap may narrow as New Glenn matures and if Vulcan eventually integrates engine reuse through ULA's planned SMART reuse system, but for now, Falcon Heavy remains the price leader [4][10].

The Opportunity Cost of Inactivity

An 18-month gap between launches is not free. Each Falcon Heavy sitting idle represents infrastructure, personnel, and manufacturing capacity that could be generating revenue. At $97–150 million per flight, even a single additional launch per year represents significant marginal revenue.

SpaceX does not break out Falcon Heavy financial data separately, making precise opportunity-cost estimates speculative. But the utilization contrast with Falcon 9 is notable. In 2024, SpaceX flew 132 Falcon 9 missions and just two Falcon Heavy missions — a ratio of 66:1 [12]. Falcon 9 generates the overwhelming majority of SpaceX's estimated $9–12 billion in annual launch revenue, while Falcon Heavy contributes a small fraction even in its busiest years [5].

The low flight rate raises a question the company has never directly addressed: is Falcon Heavy commercially viable as a standalone product line, or does it function primarily as a capability bridge — keeping SpaceX competitive for heavy-lift contracts while Starship is developed to eventually absorb that market?

Several factors suggest the latter interpretation. SpaceX has never invested in a second Falcon Heavy launch pad, limiting throughput. The company has not publicly marketed Falcon Heavy for new commercial customers in the way it aggressively sells Falcon 9 rideshare and dedicated missions. And Starship, designed for over 100 metric tons to orbit in its fully reusable configuration, would render Falcon Heavy's capabilities redundant at a fraction of the per-kilogram cost — if it achieves operational reliability [5][13].

The National Security Lifeline

Whatever its commercial future, Falcon Heavy has become indispensable to the U.S. national security space enterprise. Of its 11 completed missions, four have carried classified or military payloads for the U.S. Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office: USSF-44, USSF-67, USSF-52 (which launched the X-37B spaceplane), and GOES-U for NOAA [3][14].

The pipeline is growing. In October 2025, the Space Force awarded SpaceX a $714 million contract for five missions under the National Security Space Launch Phase 3 Lane 2 program's second order year. Four of those five missions require Falcon Heavy: USSF-206 (carrying the 12th Wideband Global SATCOM satellite), USSF-155, NROL-86, and USSF-63, with launches beginning no earlier than fiscal year 2027 [14]. SpaceX is anticipated to receive 28 total Phase 3 missions between fiscal years 2025 and 2029, with a contract ceiling of up to $5.9 billion [15][16].

The concentration of heavy-lift national security missions on a single vehicle creates a strategic dependency. The United States currently has two certified NSSL providers — SpaceX and ULA — but ULA's Vulcan Centaur does not match Falcon Heavy's lift capacity for the heaviest payloads [15]. If Falcon Heavy suffered an anomaly, there is no domestic backup in its weight class. The Space Launch System, the only American rocket with greater thrust, is reserved for NASA's Artemis lunar program and is not available for national security missions [1].

This single-point-of-failure risk has drawn attention from defense analysts. The Space Force has sought to mitigate it by diversifying its provider base through NSSL Phase 3, adding Blue Origin's New Glenn and eventually other vehicles to the certified roster [16]. But New Glenn has not yet demonstrated the high-energy mission profiles that Falcon Heavy routinely performs, and certification for the most demanding NSSL Reference Orbits will take time [15].

Technical Risks of an Extended Stand-Down

Relaunching a rocket system after 18 months of inactivity introduces technical considerations that do not apply to vehicles flying on a weekly cadence. While SpaceX does not publish detailed refurbishment or recertification protocols, the aerospace industry generally requires extended inspections of propellant systems, avionics, structural components, and ground support equipment after prolonged stand-downs.

For Falcon Heavy specifically, the challenge is compounded by the vehicle's complexity. Each Falcon Heavy comprises three modified Falcon 9 first-stage cores and an upper stage, with the center core experiencing unique aerodynamic and structural loads during flight [3]. The two side boosters on this mission — B1072 and B1075 — have flight heritage, with B1075 being one of the most-flown boosters in the Falcon fleet at 22 previous flights [9]. SpaceX's experience with high-reuse Falcon 9 boosters provides some confidence in the refurbishment process, having achieved more than 384 booster re-flights with a 100% success rate as of early 2025 [17].

SpaceX has not been publicly transparent about what additional steps, if any, it takes to recertify Falcon Heavy hardware after an extended gap versus a routine turnaround. The Federal Aviation Administration, which licenses commercial launches, requires operators to demonstrate compliance with safety requirements for each mission, but the specifics of that compliance process are not publicly disclosed [17].

A Busy Runway Ahead

After this mission, Falcon Heavy's manifest fills out considerably for the remainder of 2026. Astrobotic's Griffin Mission One, carrying NASA's VIPER lunar rover as part of the Commercial Lunar Payload Services program, is scheduled for no earlier than July 2026 [18]. NASA's Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope, a flagship astrophysics observatory, is targeting a September 2026 launch on Falcon Heavy from the same pad [19]. Both missions represent high-profile, high-value payloads that underscore Falcon Heavy's continued relevance for NASA's most demanding launches.

Further out, the manifest includes GPS III satellites, additional NSSL missions, and logistics modules for NASA's Gateway lunar space station [3][14]. The question is not whether there is demand for Falcon Heavy in the near term — there clearly is — but whether that demand persists into the late 2020s as Starship reaches operational maturity.

The Starship Shadow

SpaceX has never publicly stated a retirement date for Falcon Heavy. But the company's actions speak loudly. Starship, which achieved its first successful orbital flight and booster recovery in 2025, is designed to carry over 100 metric tons to LEO in a fully reusable configuration at a projected cost that would make Falcon Heavy's pricing look expensive by comparison [13]. If Starship achieves the reliability and cadence SpaceX is targeting, the business case for maintaining a separate Falcon Heavy production line weakens.

Some customers may already be factoring Starship into their planning. Commercial satellite operators with flexible timelines have an incentive to wait for potentially lower Starship pricing rather than commit to Falcon Heavy contracts today. Government customers, by contrast, tend to be more conservative — the Pentagon's acquisition timelines and risk tolerance favor proven vehicles, which may keep Falcon Heavy in the national security rotation longer than commercial demand alone would sustain [5][14].

The transition is unlikely to be abrupt. SpaceX maintained Falcon 1 operations briefly alongside Falcon 9's early flights, and the company has shown willingness to run parallel vehicle programs during transition periods. Falcon Heavy may follow a similar glide path: flying out its committed manifest of government and high-priority commercial missions over the next three to five years while Starship gradually absorbs new bookings [5].

What This Launch Tells Us

The ViaSat-3 F3 mission is, on its surface, routine — a commercial communications satellite headed to geostationary orbit, the kind of mission Falcon Heavy was built for. But the 18-month gap that preceded it, and the packed manifest that follows, illuminate the contradictions at the heart of Falcon Heavy's existence. It is simultaneously the most capable and most cost-effective heavy-lift rocket in the West, and a vehicle that flies so seldom it raises questions about its commercial sustainability. It is a linchpin of U.S. national security space access, and a system with no domestic backup if something goes wrong. It is a bridge to Starship, and a reminder that bridges are only useful until you reach the other side.

For now, Falcon Heavy remains essential. The Pentagon needs it. NASA needs it. Viasat needs it. The question is how many more 18-month gaps the market — and the national security establishment — can tolerate before that essentiality is tested.