Second Oil Slick Near Iran Raises Fears of Major Disaster in Global Oil Corridor

The Detection

On May 10, 2026, maritime intelligence firm Windward AI confirmed a second oil slick approximately 12 to 20 square kilometers in area southwest of Iran's Kharg Island, the country's primary crude export terminal [1]. The detection came two days after the European Space Agency's Copernicus Sentinel-2 satellite and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery first identified a much larger slick — roughly 65 to 71 square kilometers — originating from waters west of the island [2][3].

The U.N. University Institute for Water, Environment and Health estimated the primary slick at tens of thousands of barrels, with Business Today reporting a cumulative figure of approximately 80,000 barrels released since May 5, when the leak is believed to have begun [4]. The slick's composition is consistent with crude oil rather than refined product or bunker fuel, according to spectral analysis of the satellite imagery [1].

Leon Moreland of the Conflict and Environment Observatory confirmed the slick "appears visually consistent with oil" and estimated coverage of approximately 45 square kilometers based on imagery from May 6-8 [5]. Louis Goddard, co-founder of Data Desk consultancy, characterized this as potentially the largest single spill since the broader conflict began 70 days earlier [5].

Source and Origin

The Infrastructure Theory

Kharg Island handles roughly 90% of Iran's crude oil exports under normal conditions [5]. Since the United States imposed a naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz beginning March 2, 2026 — following the launch of air operations against Iran on February 28 — the island's storage infrastructure has been under extreme strain [6][7].

By late April, storage tanks at Kharg reached 74% utilization, with analysts estimating Iran had only 17-20 days of remaining capacity before systems became inoperable [4]. The blockade effectively trapped Iranian crude with nowhere to go: export tankers could not transit the strait, and Iran's domestic refineries lack the capacity to absorb the surplus.

AIS tracking data from United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) showed three tankers loading crude at Kharg Island on May 6, the same day the slick was first detected by satellite [8]. An oil slick southwest of the island was documented on May 7 [9]. The proximity of loading operations to the initial detection suggests a possible connection to a failed ship-to-ship transfer or loading accident, though pipeline rupture from aging infrastructure under pressure remains the leading hypothesis among independent analysts [1].

Iran's Denial

Iran's Oil Terminals Company issued a statement denying any leak, claiming inspections found "no evidence of leaks from storage tanks, pipelines, loading facilities or nearby tankers" [1]. An Iranian official characterized the reports as "false" and part of the enemy's "psychological warfare," attributing the visible slick to "oil tanker waste that was discharged into the sea by a European tanker" [5].

This explanation faces scrutiny from multiple directions. The slick's scale — 65+ square kilometers — far exceeds what routine tanker discharge would produce. Its point of origin, traced back via satellite time-series imagery to the immediate vicinity of Kharg's western loading berths, contradicts the European tanker claim [2][5].

Alternative Theories

Some analysts, including those quoted by Fox News, have suggested Iran may be deliberately releasing crude into the Gulf as storage reaches capacity — a "dumping" scenario driven by the impossibility of exporting through normal channels [10]. Others point to possible infrastructure damage from earlier US military strikes on Iranian oil facilities, which targeted locations including Lavan Island earlier in the conflict [11].

Dr. Kaveh Madani, a U.N. official, offered a middle ground: "If this slick gets bigger, we should be seriously worried about there being a leakage of aging infrastructure" [1]. This framing treats the spill as a consequence of systemic failure under wartime pressure rather than deliberate action by any party.

The Strait of Hormuz: Scale of Disruption

Under normal conditions, the Strait of Hormuz facilitates transit of approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day — roughly 20% of global seaborne oil supply and 34% of global crude oil trade [12][13].

Source: EIA / IEA

Data as of May 10, 2026CSV

Since Iran's closure of the strait to non-Iranian vessels on March 2, 2026, daily transits have fallen from 130-160 vessels to fewer than 10 — a reduction exceeding 90% [12]. This removed approximately 19 million barrels per day from global markets, while Iranian exports of roughly 1.5 million barrels per day continued to flow until the slicks disrupted even that reduced volume [12].

For comparison, the 2019 tanker attacks in the Gulf of Oman — when limpet mines damaged the MT Front Altair and MT Kokuka Courageous — briefly disrupted traffic but never closed the strait. Those incidents caused a one-day Brent crude spike of roughly 4% before markets stabilized. The current crisis represents a fundamentally different order of magnitude: a sustained, near-total closure lasting over two months [12].

Market Impact

WTI crude oil reached $114.58 per barrel in April 2026, its highest point during the crisis, representing an 87.6% year-over-year increase from $55.44 in December 2025 [14]. As of early May, prices settled around $109.76 [14]. Brent crude hit $114.4 on May 5 — a 5.8% single-day jump — when the Trump administration announced plans to forcibly reopen the strait [15].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of May 4, 2026CSV

War risk insurance premiums for Hormuz transits surged to approximately 2.5% of a vessel's hull value per voyage at their peak in March, up from 0.1% before the conflict — a 25-fold increase [15]. Although premiums have eased slightly, they remain roughly eight times pre-war levels [15].

Tanker rerouting has compounded the disruption. Houthi-controlled Yemen resumed attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea on February 28, forcing Suez Canal traffic around Africa's Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to transit times [15]. The combined effect of Hormuz closure and Red Sea rerouting has created what CNBC traders call the "NACHO trade" — a bet on prolonged oil supply shock [16].

Energy analysts model a sustained supply disruption affecting end consumers at roughly the 5-million-barrel-per-day shortfall threshold maintained for more than 30 days. The current shortfall of approximately 17-19 million barrels per day has already far exceeded this, driving gasoline prices above $5 per gallon across much of Europe and parts of the United States [12][15].

Environmental Threat

Drift Projections

According to Windward AI's oceanographic modeling, the primary slick is moving southwest from Kharg Island [1]. At current drift rates:

• It could enter Qatar's exclusive economic zone within approximately four days
• Possible landfall near Al Mirfa in the United Arab Emirates within roughly 13 days
• Saudi Arabian eastern coastline exposure within two to three weeks

Desalination at Risk

Tens of millions of people across the Gulf states depend on seawater desalination for drinking water. The UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain collectively operate hundreds of desalination facilities along their Gulf coastlines [4][17]. An oil slick of this magnitude entering intake pipes would force immediate shutdowns, converting a maritime crisis into a humanitarian water emergency.

Marine Ecosystems

The Persian Gulf is a shallow, semi-enclosed basin with slow water circulation — pollutants do not flush as they would in open ocean, instead settling into marine sediment where they persist for decades [4]. Within the projected drift path lie coral reefs, mangrove forests, and seagrass meadows that serve as nurseries for commercially important fish species along the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabian coasts [4][17].

The 1991 Precedent

The most comparable Gulf spill occurred during the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraqi forces released approximately 4 million barrels into the Persian Gulf. That event contaminated 700 kilometers of Saudi Arabian shoreline and killed an estimated 100,000 wading birds [18]. Recovery was slow and uneven: while microbial mats recolonized oiled shores within a year and most salt-marsh areas showed recovery by 1995, isolated pockets of low-energy mudflats showed "hardly any indication of improvement" even five years later [18]. Long-term studies concluded that damage to coastline sediments and marine ecosystems persisted for decades [18].

The current spill, at an estimated 80,000 barrels, is far smaller than the 1991 event. But it occurs in a Gulf already stressed by multiple conflict-related spills — CNN reported in April that oil spills from the Iran war were visible from space at multiple locations, including a five-mile slick near Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz [11].

Legal Framework and Liability

International Conventions

The Persian Gulf is designated a "Special Area" under MARPOL Annex I, the International Maritime Organization's principal convention for prevention of pollution by oil [19]. This designation imposes stricter discharge standards than apply in open waters.

The 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution — commonly called the Kuwait Convention — provides the primary regional framework [20]. Administered by the Regional Organisation for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME), it covers all Gulf states. The associated Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Center (MEMAC) was established to facilitate cooperative response to marine emergencies [20].

Jurisdictional Complications

When a spill originates in or near Iranian territorial waters, the question of who bears cleanup responsibility becomes politically charged. Under the "polluter pays" principle embedded in both MARPOL and the Kuwait Convention, Iran would bear primary liability if the slick originates from its infrastructure [20]. However, Iran's position — that the slick comes from a European tanker — would shift liability to the vessel's flag state and insurer.

As of May 11, neither Iran, Oman, nor any Gulf state has formally invoked MARPOL emergency provisions or the Kuwait Convention's mutual aid protocols [1]. The ongoing military conflict between the US-Israel coalition and Iran makes cooperative response mechanisms effectively inoperative. ROPME requires diplomatic channels that are currently severed or severely constrained.

Response Capacity Gap

Available Assets

No international oil spill response fleet has been formally deployed to the area. The ongoing conflict makes access to Iranian waters practically impossible for foreign response vessels [11]. Iran's own cleanup capacity is unknown but presumed limited given wartime conditions and the strain on its maritime resources.

For reference, the US Coast Guard's response to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill involved 552 personnel and more than 60 oil skimmers at peak operations [21]. The current situation would require comparable or greater assets deployed in an active conflict zone — a scenario for which no precedent or protocol exists.

Geopolitical Constraints

Even if Gulf states wished to deploy skimmer fleets or dispersant stockpiles, they would need to operate in or near Iranian territorial waters under wartime conditions. The US naval blockade adds a further complication: vessels entering the area risk being intercepted or caught in hostilities. Regional coast guards — particularly those of Oman, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia — possess oil spill response equipment but face operational restrictions that make deployment to the spill's origin point infeasible under current conditions [11].

A worst-case scenario — a major blowout or catastrophic tank failure at Kharg — could release millions of barrels. The gap between such an event and available response capacity is measured not in percentages but in orders of magnitude. The equipment exists globally, but the political and military conditions to deploy it do not.

Who Is Affected

Fishing Communities

The Persian Gulf supports fishing industries across Iran, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Iranian fishing communities along the Gulf coast number in the hundreds of thousands. UAE fishing villages along the coast from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah depend on Gulf catches for both livelihood and food security [17].

Population at Risk

Al Mirfa, the UAE coastal town in the projected landfall path, has a population of approximately 10,000. But the broader at-risk population — those dependent on Gulf desalination plants and fisheries — numbers in the tens of millions across the GCC states [4][17].

Economic Dimensions

Beyond immediate environmental damage, the spills add uncertainty to an already destabilized energy market. Each new slick raises questions about the integrity of Iran's broader oil infrastructure — Kharg Island alone has storage capacity for approximately 20 million barrels. If the infrastructure failure theory is correct, the 80,000 barrels released so far may represent only the beginning of a larger chronic leak as storage systems degrade under continued pressure [4][6].

What Comes Next

The trajectory of this crisis depends on factors that remain uncertain: whether the leak at Kharg can be contained under wartime conditions, whether the second slick represents a separate failure point or an extension of the first, and whether diplomatic channels can be opened to allow environmental response regardless of the broader conflict.

What is clear is that the Persian Gulf — one of the world's most ecologically fragile and economically critical waterways — is accumulating damage that will outlast whatever resolution the current conflict eventually reaches. The 1991 precedent suggests recovery timelines measured in years to decades. The current situation, with multiple active spill sources and no response capacity in place, has the potential to exceed that precedent in cumulative environmental harm even if no single event matches its scale.