Russian Official Warns Europe to Expect More Drone Incidents Following Romania Strike

A Russian-made kamikaze drone slammed into a 10-story apartment building in the Romanian city of Galați on the morning of May 29, 2026, burning through a top-floor flat and injuring a 53-year-old woman and a 14-year-old boy [1]. Hours later, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chair of Russia's Security Council, posted a statement that read less like a denial and more like a promise: "Let them get ready: this will continue to happen" [2]. European citizens, he added, "will not be able to sleep peacefully" [3].

The strike is the 28th documented Russian drone breach of Romanian airspace since Moscow began targeting Ukrainian port infrastructure along the Danube River in 2022 [4]. But it is the first to cause physical injuries on NATO territory — and it has pushed the alliance, the EU, and Romania itself into responses that go beyond the diplomatic notes and summoned ambassadors that followed the previous 27 incidents.

What Happened in Galați

Romanian military radar tracked a Geran-2 drone — Russia's domestically produced version of the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 — as it crossed into national airspace at 1:54 a.m. local time, travelling at nearly 200 km/h [5]. The drone had been launched as part of a broader overnight strike on the Odesa region of southern Ukraine, roughly 15 km across the border [4]. It remained in Romanian airspace for approximately four minutes before striking the roof of the apartment block in central Galați [1].

Romanian authorities scrambled two fighter jets and a helicopter with authorization to shoot the drone down, but the aircraft arrived too late [1]. Romania's defense minister confirmed the drone was "undoubtedly a Russian-made product" based on serial numbers recovered from the wreckage [5]. The roof was left visibly charred, and both injured residents were hospitalized with burns but reported in stable condition [1].

The failure to intercept the drone exposed a gap that military analysts have flagged for years: traditional air-defense radar was designed to track large, fast-moving aircraft and missiles, not small, slow, low-altitude drones like the Geran-2, which flies at altitudes that often fall below conventional radar coverage [6].

The Escalation Pattern

The Galați strike did not occur in isolation. Russian airspace violations of NATO member states have accelerated sharply since 2022, rising from four confirmed incidents that year to five in 2023, six in 2024, and 18 in 2025 — a 200% increase year over year [7]. Through the first five months of 2026, at least 10 additional incidents have been recorded [7].

Source: The Conversation / NATO Reports

Data as of May 29, 2026CSV

The geographic scope has expanded in parallel. In 2022, violations affected three NATO members. By 2025, six member states — Romania, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Turkey, and France — had documented incursions [7]. Incident severity has also grown: a drone penetrated nearly 60 miles into Polish territory in 2025; a separate drone remained in Romanian airspace for approximately four hours; and a 21-drone swarm forced the closure of airports in Warsaw, Rzeszów, and Lublin [7].

Romania alone has logged 28 breaches [4]. Poland has documented more than 20 drone entries in a single night [7]. In December 2025, five unidentified drones overflew France's Île Longue naval base — home to France's nuclear ballistic missile submarines [7].

Of the 18 incidents recorded in 2025, only two triggered Article 4 consultations — the NATO treaty provision allowing a member to request alliance-wide discussion when it believes its security is threatened. Poland invoked Article 4 after a September drone swarm, and Estonia followed after a MiG-31 fighter incursion the same month [8]. No incident since 2022 has prompted an Article 5 discussion — the collective defense clause that treats an attack on one member as an attack on all [9].

The Legal Threshold: When Does a Drone Strike Become an Armed Attack?

Article 5 has been invoked only once in NATO's 77-year history, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States [9]. The threshold is deliberately high and politically, rather than strictly legally, determined.

Legal scholars identify several factors that shape whether a drone incident crosses the Article 5 line: attribution to a state actor, the scale and consequences of the strike, and whether the incident fits a pattern of "systemic disregard for territorial integrity" [9]. An isolated and unintended drone impact — particularly one causing limited damage — may fall below the threshold even if it technically constitutes a use of force under international law [9].

Romania's Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu framed the Galați strike as falling under Article 4 rather than Article 5, calling it "a serious and irresponsible escalation" while requesting allies to accelerate the transfer of counter-drone systems [4]. The distinction matters: Article 4 triggers consultation, while Article 5 triggers collective defense.

The closest parallel remains the November 2022 missile strike in Przewodów, Poland, which killed two people. That incident was ultimately attributed to a stray Ukrainian air-defense missile rather than a Russian weapon, and no Article 5 consultation was held [9]. The Galați strike is different in that the drone was confirmed as Russian-made and launched during a Russian attack — but the question of whether it was deliberately directed at Romanian territory or simply went off course remains contested.

Russia's Framing: Deflection and Deterrence

Moscow's official response has combined denial, deflection, and what analysts describe as coercive messaging.

Medvedev questioned whether the drone was even Russian, saying "it still needed to be ascertained which country the drone belonged to" — despite Romanian authorities' serial-number identification [2]. He told European leaders to "shut up" and stop expressing outrage, arguing they were "directly participating in a war against Russia" through weapons transfers to Ukraine [3]. Russian state media framed the controversy as a Western attempt to distract from Ukraine's attack on a school in Russia's Starobelsk region [10].

This dual posture — denying responsibility while warning of more incidents — echoes Cold War-era patterns. During the 1980s, Soviet military aircraft routinely violated Finnish and Swedish airspace, and Moscow's standard response combined dismissal of the specific incident with implicit signals that the violations reflected political displeasure with the targeted country's policy choices [11]. Russia violated Finnish airspace again in 2022, as Helsinki was weighing NATO membership, and four Russian fighter jets entered Swedish airspace over the strategically located island of Gotland shortly after Stockholm announced its own NATO bid [11].

Analysts at the European Leadership Network argue that Medvedev's statement functions as coercive messaging regardless of whether the Galați drone was deliberately targeted or an accident: by publicly framing future incidents as inevitable, Moscow signals that the costs of supporting Ukraine will extend to European civilian populations [8].

The Western Responsibility Question

A steelman case exists that NATO decisions have contributed to conditions making these incidents more frequent and harder to attribute.

Ukrainian drone operations, which NATO members fund and supply, have themselves breached allied airspace. A NATO fighter jet shot down a suspected Ukrainian drone in Estonia in 2026 — the first time NATO fired in defense since the Baltic states joined the alliance in 2004 [12]. Lithuania reported drones loaded with explosives entering its airspace from Ukrainian-launched operations [12]. Poland's Ministry of Defense publicly demanded that Ukrainian Armed Forces drones not threaten the security of NATO countries [12].

Ukraine and the Baltic states blame Russia for these incidents, arguing that Russian electronic warfare systems jam or redirect Ukrainian drones toward NATO territory [12]. Russia, in turn, has accused NATO of allowing European airspace to be used as a corridor for attacks on Russian territory [12].

The attribution problem cuts both ways. If Russian drones stray into Romania during strikes on Odesa, and Ukrainian drones stray into the Baltics during strikes on Russian positions, then both parties' military operations create spillover risks — and the alliance's policy of supplying long-range strike capability to Ukraine while maintaining that NATO is not a party to the conflict becomes harder to sustain as a legal and political proposition.

Europe's Drone Defense Gap

The Galați intercept failure highlighted a continent-wide vulnerability. NATO's existing air-defense architecture was built to detect fighter jets and ballistic missiles, not small drones flying at low altitudes and slow speeds [6].

The European Drone Defence Initiative (EDDI) — originally called the "Drone Wall" — aims to build a multi-layered, cross-border counter-UAS system along the EU's 4,000-kilometer eastern frontier by the end of 2027 [6]. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania form the initial foundation, with Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ukraine, and Moldova expected to join [6].

Spending commitments are substantial. Poland has allocated over $2.17 billion for anti-drone fortifications and surveillance along its eastern border [6]. Ireland announced a $1.85 billion defense modernization plan that includes radar upgrades and counter-drone technologies [6]. The European Defence Fund has directed nearly half of its $8 billion budget toward drones, air-defense technologies, and cross-border interoperability [6]. Latvia became the first NATO member to deploy acoustic detection along its entire eastern border, completing 87% coverage by September 2025, with a 150% budget increase for UAS capabilities in 2026 [6].

But the initiative has divided EU capitals. Frontline states — Poland, the Baltics, Finland — view it as urgent. France, Germany, Italy, and Greece have questioned the cost, technical feasibility, and the precedent of Brussels directing national defense procurement [6].

The Range Problem

The Geran-2 drone that struck Galați has an estimated operational range of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometers [13]. From Russian launch sites near the Ukrainian border, that radius encompasses Bucharest (650 km), Warsaw (850 km), Berlin (1,300 km), and Paris (2,100 km) [13]. At the upper end of its range, nearly all of Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and most of France fall within reach [14].

Source: Euronews / Kyiv Post

Data as of May 29, 2026CSV

Russia has also developed advanced variants with significantly greater speed. The Geran-3 reaches 370 km/h; the Geran-4, 500 km/h; and the Geran-5, effectively a small cruise missile, can reach 600 km/h [15]. The standard Geran-2 carries a 50-kilogram explosive warhead, though a heavier 90-kg variant exists with reduced range [13].

European civilian infrastructure within this radius includes power grids, ports, refineries, and nuclear facilities. Romania's civil-defense protocols for drone threats remain limited — the Galați apartment building was evacuated after the strike, not before it [1]. No European NATO member has established public evacuation procedures specifically for drone attacks, though Lithuania has issued guidance on sheltering in place [12].

Consequences So Far — and Whether They Matter

Romania's response to the Galați strike was its strongest to date: the Russian consul in Constanța was declared persona non grata, the Russian consulate in the Black Sea port city was ordered closed, and the Russian ambassador was summoned [1]. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a 21st package of sanctions, saying Russia had "crossed yet another line" [4]. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte condemned Russia's "recklessness" and pledged to strengthen defenses [4].

But analysts at the European Leadership Network note that the previous 27 Romanian airspace violations produced the same cycle: summons, condemnation, diplomatic notes requesting Moscow take "all necessary measures to prevent future violations" — and each time, Moscow took none [8]. NATO has not characterized any of the 28 incidents as warranting collective defense under Article 5 [8].

The fundamental deterrence problem, as one analysis puts it, is that NATO "cannot dissuade further violations without imposing costs on Russia after every incursion" [8]. Current responses lack the "certainty and swiftness" required for effective deterrence [8]. A Geran-2 drone costs roughly $10,000 to produce, while the AIM-120 missile used to intercept it costs many times more — creating a cost asymmetry that favors the attacker [8].

Proposed countermeasures include intelligence flights around Russia's Kaliningrad exclave after every incursion, deployment of surveillance drones toward Russian territory, and consistent interception protocols scaled to incident severity [8]. None have been adopted.

What Comes Next

The Galați strike and Medvedev's warning present NATO with a strategic dilemma. Treating each drone incursion as an isolated accident avoids escalation but erodes deterrence. Treating the pattern as deliberate provocation risks a confrontation that neither side has shown willingness to initiate.

Romania has signaled it will pursue the Article 4 consultation path [4]. The EU's 21st sanctions package, if adopted, would be the most directly linked to a specific territorial violation of a member state. But the track record of 27 prior incidents followed by no material change in Russian behavior suggests that unless the alliance's calculus shifts — either through a deadlier incident or a political decision to impose graduated military consequences — Medvedev's prediction may prove accurate.

The drone that hit Galați was built for roughly $10,000 and spent four minutes in Romanian airspace [1][8]. The political, legal, and military questions it raised will take considerably longer to resolve.