Russia Holds Victory Day Parade Without Tanks Amid Ukraine War Setbacks

On May 9, 2026, Russian troops marched across Red Square to mark the 81st anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany — but for the first time since 2007, not a single tank, missile launcher, or armored vehicle accompanied them [1]. The Russian Defense Ministry announced the decision in late April, citing the "current operational situation" without elaboration [2]. Su-25 attack jets trailed smoke in the Russian tricolor overhead, a visual designed to fill the gap left by absent ground hardware [3].

The absence of armor on Russia's most symbolically important national holiday raises questions that reach far beyond parade logistics. After more than four years of war in Ukraine, Russia's military has sustained documented equipment losses on a scale not seen since World War II — and the parade's steady shrinkage year over year tracks closely with those losses.

A Parade in Decline: 2022 to 2026

The Victory Day military parade has served for decades as the Kremlin's foremost display of martial power. In 2020, the last pre-COVID parade at full scale, approximately 200 military vehicles rolled through central Moscow [4]. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the parade that May still featured 131 vehicles — roughly consistent with prior years [4].

The decline began in 2023. That year, analysts counted just 51 vehicles in the procession — a quarter of the 2020 level [4]. The aircraft flyover was cancelled in both 2022 and 2023 [5]. In 2024, the vehicle count rose slightly to around 60, but the centerpiece was a single tank: a World War II-era T-34, a museum piece rather than a frontline weapon [5]. The 80th anniversary parade in 2025 saw a partial rebound, with approximately 150 vehicles and 11,000 troops, boosted by the milestone occasion and the attendance of 29 foreign leaders including China's Xi Jinping [6].

Then came 2026: zero vehicles, no cadets from the prestigious Suvorov and Nakhimov military schools, and a guest list that had collapsed to a handful of attendees [1][2].

Source: CNN, Army Recognition, Moscow Times

Data as of May 8, 2026CSV

The Scale of Russia's Armor Losses

The shrinking parade coincides with armor losses that independent trackers describe as extraordinary. As of mid-2025, the open-source intelligence project Oryx had visually confirmed the destruction, capture, or abandonment of over 4,030 Russian main battle tanks in Ukraine [7]. The total count of visually confirmed Russian equipment losses exceeded 21,550 individual pieces, including armored fighting vehicles, artillery systems, and aircraft [7].

These figures represent only losses for which photographic or video evidence exists. Actual losses are assessed to be significantly higher [7]. Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces had hit 1,159 Russian tanks in the first five months of 2025 alone [8].

Source: Oryx / WarSpotting

Data as of May 1, 2026CSV

To understand what 4,030 confirmed tank losses mean, they must be measured against Russia's pre-war inventory. A U.S. Army analysis published in 2025 estimated that the losses represent 121–143% of Russia's operational tank force at the war's start [9]. Russia entered the conflict with an active fleet of roughly 2,800–3,300 modern tanks, supplemented by thousands of older models in long-term storage [10].

Satellite imagery analysis by OSINT researcher Jompy, tracking Russia's storage depots, found that pre-war reserves of approximately 7,342 stored tanks had been drawn down dramatically [10]. By October 2025, only 92 tanks in storage were assessed to be in decent condition — all T-72B variants. Another 1,606 remained but in poor condition, with roughly 60% being older T-64, T-72 Ural/A, and T-80UD models of questionable combat utility [10]. All 112 stored T-90 tanks — Russia's most modern pre-war model — had been mobilized, leaving zero in reserve [10].

Can Russian Factories Keep Up?

Russia has mounted a significant industrial effort to replace battlefield losses. Uralvagonzavod, the country's primary tank manufacturer in Nizhny Tagil, has shifted to 24-hour production cycles [11]. Estimates of current output vary. The Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), using satellite imagery and procurement data, assessed that Russia could produce up to 300 T-90M tanks per year [12]. Other analysts place the figure lower, between 150 and 200 new-hull T-90Ms annually, with the Omsktransmash plant contributing an additional 150 refurbished T-80BVM tanks [11].

Uralvagonzavod has outlined plans to increase T-90 production by 80% by 2028 compared to 2024 levels, and to begin production of a new variant, the T-90M2, with 10 units planned for 2026 and output scaling to a combined 428 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks by 2028 [11].

Even the most optimistic production estimates, however, fall short of the rate of attrition. If Russia lost roughly 1,159 tanks in five months in early 2025 — a pace consistent with Ukrainian claims — annual losses could approach 2,500 or more [8]. Against maximum estimated production of 300–400 new and refurbished tanks per year, Russia faces a substantial deficit that can only be bridged by continuing to draw down Soviet-era storage reserves — reserves that satellite imagery shows are approaching exhaustion [10][12].

Labor shortages compound the problem. Defense factories compete for workers with the military itself, as young men are deployed to combat. Reports indicate that some facilities have resorted to hiring pensioners and disabled workers [9].

The Official Explanation — and Its Critics

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov attributed the decision to exclude equipment from the 2026 parade to Ukrainian "terrorist activities," stating: "Against the backdrop of this terrorist threat, of course all measures to minimize danger are being taken" [3]. The framing cast the decision as a prudent security measure rather than an admission of resource constraints.

There is a case for the security explanation. Ukraine has steadily extended its drone strike range deep into Russian territory, hitting targets in the Urals — over 1,500 kilometers from the front line [13]. A 2023 drone struck a Kremlin building itself [3]. Conflict Intelligence Team co-founder Ruslan Leviev identified the real vulnerability not as the parade route but the staging areas outside Moscow where equipment is assembled, which would be easier targets for long-range strikes [2]. Military blogger Alexander Kots suggested the parade itself nearly faced outright cancellation over the drone threat [2].

Kirill Martynov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta Europe, reinforced the security argument: "A breach of air defense during this parade, with all the distinguished guests present, is absolutely a very real threat" [3].

But critics note that the security rationale does not fully account for the four-year pattern of decline, which began before Ukraine possessed the long-range strike capability it has today. An anonymous military expert quoted by the Moscow Times characterized the decision as "purely political" — designed to avoid the embarrassment of a disrupted live broadcast rather than reflecting a genuine equipment shortage [2]. The truth may involve elements of both: security concerns providing a politically acceptable explanation for a decision also driven by the practical difficulty of pulling equipment from an active war zone for a ceremonial display.

Diplomatic Attendance: Isolation or Resilience?

The guest list for the 2026 parade tells its own story. In 2025, the Kremlin touted the attendance of 29 foreign heads of state, including Xi Jinping, Brazil's Lula da Silva, and Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, alongside leaders from Central Asia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cuba, and several African nations [6]. Serbia's Aleksandar Vučić and Slovakia's Robert Fico were the only European leaders present, with Fico becoming the first EU/NATO leader to attend since the 2022 invasion [6].

Source: Moscow Times, Kremlin

Data as of May 8, 2026CSV

For 2026, confirmed foreign attendance collapsed. As of early May 2026, only Slovakia's Fico was publicly confirmed among leaders from the EU or NATO, and the broader guest list shrank dramatically [2]. The United States did not send representatives despite President Trump's diplomatic outreach to Moscow [6]. Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev and Laos' Thongloun Sisoulith cancelled at the last minute [6].

The pattern reveals a distinction between milestone years and ordinary ones. The 80th anniversary in 2025 drew a large turnout partly because it offered foreign leaders political cover — commemorating a universally recognized historical event. A routine 81st anniversary during an ongoing, internationally condemned war offered no such cover.

The Shift to Infantry-Heavy Warfare

Russia's armor depletion has measurably altered how its military fights. The U.S. Army's analysis documented a transition from large-scale divisional armored operations — the kind Russia attempted in its initial drive toward Kyiv — to "company and below assault forces" operating predominantly in eastern and southern Ukraine [9].

The shift has been driven not only by equipment losses but by the battlefield dominance of unmanned aerial systems. Drones now account for an estimated 60–80% of all combat casualties in the Ukraine conflict as of 2025, making concentrated armored formations extremely vulnerable [9]. Russian armor assaults now typically involve lone vehicles or small groups, frequently fitted with improvised "cope cages" — welded metal screens intended to detonate drone-dropped munitions before they reach the hull [9].

The human cost of this infantry-centric approach has been severe. Mediazona, an independent Russian outlet that cross-references obituaries, social media posts, and public records, has documented Russian military fatalities in the hundreds of thousands [14]. Western estimates place total Russian casualties — killed and wounded — at approximately one million by mid-2025, with some assessments suggesting up to 250,000 killed [14][9]. The UK government stated to the OSCE that Russia "continues to incur catastrophic losses for minimal gains in an unsustainable war" [15].

The territorial arithmetic underscores the cost: after the initial large-scale advances and retreats of 2022, Russia's net territorial gains in 2023 and 2024 were measured in single-digit kilometers along most of the front, achieved through repeated small-unit infantry assaults at extraordinary casualty rates [15].

Can Russia Sustain the War?

Western defense think tanks offer a mixed but sobering assessment. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) concluded that Russia will be able to sustain its war effort throughout 2026, finding "little indication" that its ability to continue fighting has diminished [16]. The IISS estimated Russia spent approximately $186 billion on defense in 2025 — equivalent to 7.3% of GDP — after several years of sharp increases [16].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Russia's GDP grew 4.3% in 2024, buoyed partly by military-industrial spending [17]. But this growth masks underlying strain. Inflation has risen, labor markets are tight due to wartime mobilization, and the civilian economy faces increasing competition with the defense sector for workers and resources [13].

CSIS analysts Max Bergmann and Maria Snegovaya assessed that despite "immense costs," the war "remains sustainable for the Kremlin in the foreseeable future" and that Russia's goals in Ukraine have not changed [18]. GLOBSEC's scenario analysis identified "Prolonged War of Attrition" as the most probable trajectory through 2026 [19].

The key variable in these projections is storage reserves. Russia's ability to sustain high-intensity combined-arms warfare — as opposed to the infantry-heavy attritional fighting it currently conducts — depends on whether it can continue to draw refurbishable tanks and armored vehicles from depots. With satellite imagery showing those depots approaching depletion, the U.S. Army analysis projected that Russia's strategic armor reserve would be "likely depleted sometime in 2026" [9][10].

This does not mean Russia would stop fighting. It means the character of the war would continue shifting further toward infantry operations, drone warfare, and artillery — at continued high human cost. Russia's domestic drone production capacity has expanded to approximately 30,000 Shahed-type UAVs per year, with projections to double that by 2026 [16].

Domestic Reception

Putin's approval rating — as measured by state-affiliated pollsters whose methodology faces scrutiny — has dipped to around 70%, its lowest point since the war began [13]. Political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya described a broader mood: "The feeling that something is going not right has been ongoing for a few months" [13]. Putin faces pressure from hardliners who want escalation and from business interests who want resolution [13].

The internet restrictions imposed during the parade generated visible frustration. Student Anna Chizhikova, 21, complained she could not access her banking app, pay for lunch, or contact friends: "It's hard to see it as care for me" [13]. Other citizens expressed weary acceptance. "Nothing will end any time soon," one Moscow resident said. "We will have to still be patient" [13].

Russia's wartime censorship laws prohibit public discussion of military casualties or criticism of the armed forces, making genuine public sentiment difficult to measure. Independent polling — to the extent it can be conducted inside Russia — suggests support for the war has softened but not collapsed, with many Russians expressing fatigue rather than opposition [13][14].

What the Empty Square Means

The absence of tanks on Red Square is not, by itself, proof that Russia is running out of armor. The Kremlin's security rationale is not implausible, and the decision carries political logic regardless of equipment availability. But it exists within a context of documented, visually verified losses exceeding Russia's entire pre-war operational tank fleet, storage depots reduced from over 7,000 tanks to fewer than 100 in serviceable condition, and a production capacity that cannot match the rate of destruction.

Whether the parade's emptiness reflects a deliberate choice, a forced one, or both, the pattern across five years is clear: each successive Victory Day has featured fewer vehicles, fewer foreign guests, and a more defensive posture. The parade that once served as the Kremlin's foremost projection of military strength now functions as an annual measurement of what the war in Ukraine has cost.