Reports Allege China Is Supplying Iran with Missile Technology Amid US-Israeli Strikes

Five weeks into the US-Israeli air campaign against Iran's military infrastructure, a parallel conflict is playing out in shipping lanes, shell companies, and satellite imagery. Multiple Western intelligence assessments and US Treasury designations allege that Chinese entities are supplying Iran with critical missile propellant chemicals, drone components, and navigation technology — materials that could allow Tehran to rebuild what American and Israeli munitions are destroying [1][2].

Beijing categorically denies the transfers. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated in March 2026 that the reports are "not true," adding: "As a responsible major country, China always abides by its international obligations" [3]. The gap between what the evidence shows and what Beijing acknowledges is at the center of a dispute that touches on arms control, sanctions enforcement, and the broader trajectory of US-China relations.

What Is Allegedly Being Transferred

The most extensively documented transfers involve sodium perchlorate, a chemical precursor used to produce ammonium perchlorate — the primary oxidizer in solid rocket fuel for ballistic missiles. During the week of March 2, 2026, two state-owned Iranian vessels departed China's Gaolan Port and are believed to have been transporting sodium perchlorate to Iran [2]. Since the reimposition of UN sanctions in September 2025, Iran has received multiple large shipments of the chemical from China, totaling approximately 2,000 tons [4].

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has identified specific Chinese firms involved in these networks. China Chlorate Tech Co Limited (CCT) was designated in April 2025 for supplying sodium chlorate for missile propellant production. Yiwu City Xianma Import and Export Co Ltd, owned by an individual named Ma Jie, was sanctioned for its role in a UAV engine procurement network [5]. A separate February 2025 State Department action targeted six additional China-based entities involved in procuring "key components" for Iran's ballistic missile program, including materials for carbon fiber manufacturing used in missile airframes [6].

Beyond propellant chemicals, the transfers encompass a broader technology portfolio. Chinese-manufactured sensors, voltage converters, and semiconductors have been found in Iranian drones [7]. In February 2025, the Treasury sanctioned Chinese front companies supplying gyro navigation devices to enhance Iranian-made UAVs. By November 2025, another network connected to Iran's Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company was accused of using shell firms to acquire Chinese sensors and navigation equipment [1].

Perhaps most significantly, China granted Iran access to BeiDou, its global positioning satellite system, in 2021. Since the start of the current conflict, Iran has used BeiDou to produce decoy signals intended to confuse threat analysis and conceal actual military movements [8]. China has also reportedly provided Iran with round-the-clock optical, radar, and signals intelligence from a satellite network exceeding 500 spacecraft [8].

Negotiations are also underway for more advanced weaponry. Iran is reportedly close to finalizing a deal with Beijing for the CM-302 anti-ship missile, the export version of China's YJ-12, a supersonic weapon capable of striking targets at a range of 290 kilometers [9]. Those talks began in 2024 and intensified after the June 2025 12-Day War [9].

The Evidence — and What Skeptics Say

The case against Chinese entities rests on several categories of evidence. Ship-tracking data and satellite imagery have documented repeated voyages between Chinese ports and Iran by sanctioned vessels, with "deliberate efforts to obscure vessel movements" [2]. OFAC has identified a multinational procurement network spanning 32 individuals and entities across Iran, the UAE, Turkey, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine — a network known as the "MVM partnership" that coordinated the procurement of propellant ingredients from China on behalf of Parchin Chemical Industries, part of Iran's Defense Industries Organization [5].

The US Department of Justice has also brought criminal charges. A Chinese national was charged in the Southern District of New York for conspiring to provide materials for ballistic missile production to Iran in violation of sanctions [10].

China's position has remained consistent: blanket denial. This pattern is not new. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, when confronted with allegations of selling HY-2 anti-ship missiles to Iran, Beijing issued the same kind of categorical denial, calling the allegations "groundless" [11]. Today, China's embassy in Israel has rejected reports of missile production equipment or air defense system transfers, emphasizing that China "firmly opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and never exports arms to countries engaged in warfare" [3].

Some independent analysts urge caution about the scope of the allegations. The distinction between state-directed transfers and the actions of private Chinese firms operating in gray markets is often blurred in public reporting. A 2024 analysis in the journal Contemporary Review of the Middle East noted that much of the China-Iran arms relationship involves "more noise, less substance," with actual delivered capability falling short of what headlines suggest [12]. The question is whether the current conflict — and the scale of documented chemical shipments — has fundamentally changed that calculus.

Iran's Depleted Arsenal and the Reconstitution Question

The urgency behind these allegations stems from the state of Iran's missile stockpile. Iran entered the 2026 conflict with an estimated 2,500 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and between 6,000 and 8,000 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) [13][14]. Within ten days, approximately 2,410 MRBMs had been fired, and over 60% of launchers had been destroyed [13].

Source: JINSA / Jerusalem Post / Soufan Center

Data as of Apr 6, 2026CSV

By early April 2026, Iran's missile and drone fire rate had dropped by more than 90% compared to the opening days of the conflict [13]. A Western official told journalists that Iran could still fire 15 to 30 ballistic missiles at all targets combined and 50 to 100 one-way attack drones per day [15]. US and Israeli intelligence assessments diverge on remaining capacity: the US assessment holds that roughly half of Iran's missile launchers remain intact, while Israeli military officials put the figure at 20-25% [15][14].

Despite the numerical reductions, Iran has maintained tactical effectiveness in some areas. Recent attacks have caused a 17% reduction in Qatar's LNG output — damage that could require years to repair — and destroyed a US Air Force E-3 Sentry aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia [15].

Iran is also preserving its remaining inventory. US officials assess that Tehran is deliberately keeping its launch rate low and moving launchers into bunkers and caves [14]. Intelligence agencies have not been able to assess with high confidence exactly how many launchers remain operational [14].

The reconstitution timeline depends heavily on access to foreign components. Armed drones are relatively inexpensive and can be produced quickly, often in civilian facilities [15]. But rebuilding a ballistic missile stockpile requires solid rocket fuel — and the sodium perchlorate shipments from China are precisely the input that process demands. If the reported 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate have reached Iran, that quantity is sufficient to produce propellant for hundreds of missiles [2].

How This Compares to the 1990s

China was Iran's principal external arms supplier for much of the late Cold War and post-Cold War period. Chinese arms transfers to Iran peaked in 1987 at a reported $539 million [11]. During the 1990s, China supplied Iran with anti-ship missiles (the C-802 Noor), artillery systems, armored vehicles, and components for aviation [11]. China also provided Iran with critical assistance on its nuclear program and missile guidance technology during this period [7].

US pressure gradually curtailed these transfers. In conjunction with the October 1997 US-China summit, Beijing took steps to limit sensitive transfers to Iran as part of broader nonproliferation commitments [11]. China stopped entering new arms export agreements with Iran in 2005 and fulfilled existing contracts through 2015, when UN Security Council Resolution 2231 increased international scrutiny [7].

The 2021 Iran-China 25-year Cooperation Program marked a shift. Signed in Tehran by the two countries' foreign ministers on March 27, 2021, the agreement provides for $400 billion in Chinese investment in Iran's economy in exchange for heavily discounted oil [16]. The agreement explicitly calls for strengthening military ties through joint training, exercises, joint research, weapons development, and the creation of a joint commission for military industries [16].

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) has characterized the period since 2021 as "a shift toward a less restrained Chinese approach to providing Iran with kinetic military capabilities" — a departure from the cautious post-2015 period [7]. Chinese banks, front companies, and intermediary firms now facilitate oil transactions, manage the shadow fleet that transports Iranian oil, provide access to controlled technologies supporting Iran's missile and drone programs, and enable the money laundering that underpins these networks [7].

The Sanctions Architecture

The legal framework for US action against Chinese proliferators spans multiple authorities. Executive Order 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters, has been the primary vehicle for designating Chinese entities [5]. The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act provide additional authorities [6].

UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, lifted under the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal, were reimposed in September 2025 after France, Germany, and the UK invoked the snapback mechanism due to Iran's "significant non-performance" of its commitments [4]. This restored the pre-JCPOA restrictions on conventional arms transfers and ballistic missile technology.

Since 2020, the US has designated dozens of Chinese entities and individuals for Iran-related transfers. OFAC's April 2025 action alone covered 32 individuals and entities across eight countries [5]. But enforcement remains uneven. Sanctioned vessels have continued to dock at Iranian ports — four sanctioned Iran-flagged vessels arrived at Iranian ports after the current war began [1]. The practical effect of many designations has been to cut entities off from the US financial system without stopping the underlying transactions, which often flow through intermediaries in Hong Kong, the UAE, and Turkey [5].

The criminal prosecution track has been more selective. The DOJ's indictment of a Chinese national for Iran missile-related transfers in the Southern District of New York represents one of the few cases where sanctions violations have been paired with criminal charges [10].

Washington's Own Arms Pipeline

Any US effort to pressure China over arms transfers to Iran operates against the backdrop of Washington's own massive weapons sales to the Middle East.

Source: US State Department / Congressional Notifications

Data as of Mar 20, 2026CSV

In January 2026, the State Department approved arms sales to Israel worth $6.67 billion and to Saudi Arabia worth $9 billion in the same announcement [17]. In March, the Trump administration invoked emergency powers to push through approximately $23 billion in weapons sales to the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan, including air-defense systems, munitions, and radar equipment [18]. In 2024, the Biden administration had approved a $20 billion arms package for Israel, including F-15 aircraft and advanced air-to-air missiles [19].

The total volume of US arms sales to Middle Eastern states during the 2024-2026 period exceeds $60 billion [17][18][19]. This creates a diplomatic asymmetry that Beijing has not been shy about highlighting. Chinese state media and officials have repeatedly pointed to US weapons flows to Israel — used in operations that have killed civilians in Gaza and Lebanon — as evidence that Washington lacks moral authority to lecture others on arms transfers [3].

This is not merely a rhetorical point. Arms control experts have noted that the absence of a consistent US standard on Middle East weapons transfers weakens the legal and diplomatic foundations for demanding Chinese restraint. When Washington invokes emergency powers to bypass congressional review of Gulf arms deals, it complicates the argument that Beijing should respect multilateral export control regimes [18].

Second-Order Proliferation Risks

If Iran retains or rebuilds a robust missile program with Chinese help, the effects will ripple across the region. Eleven countries in the Middle East and North Africa already possess long-range missiles [20]. Several are actively expanding their capabilities.

Saudi Arabia imported 2,000-kilometer-range DF-2 ballistic missiles from China in the late 1980s and is now developing a domestic missile program, with evidence of solid-fuel technology development — possibly with Chinese assistance. The presence of a solid-fuel burn pit at a Saudi missile facility suggests a program aimed at producing solid-fuel ballistic missiles [20].

Turkey has flight-tested multiple domestically produced missile systems, including the Bora, Cenk, Tayfun, and Atmaca, and continues to expand its capabilities [20].

The UAE and Qatar are investing in Western-origin cruise missiles with substantial range [20].

Each of these programs has its own logic and timeline, but Iran's missile capability is the reference point against which regional states calibrate their own ambitions. A reconstituted Iranian arsenal — particularly one enhanced with Chinese supersonic anti-ship missiles like the CM-302 — would accelerate procurement and development timelines across the Gulf. Saudi Arabia's willingness to pursue its own missile program would likely increase, and the pressure on Turkey to expand beyond short-range systems would grow.

The absence of any regional missile control framework compounds the problem. Iran has consistently argued that it would never accept restrictions on its missile capabilities unless similar restrictions applied to other regional states — particularly Israel, which maintains an undeclared nuclear arsenal and advanced delivery systems [20].

What Would Change Beijing's Calculus

Historically, US leverage over Chinese arms transfers has come from linking proliferation behavior to broader bilateral priorities. The 1997 summit resulted in Chinese restraint because Beijing valued normalized trade relations and progress on WTO accession [11]. During the 2000s, the prospect of UN Security Council consensus on Iran — and China's desire to be seen as a responsible stakeholder — contributed to Beijing's compliance with arms embargoes [7].

Those levers are weaker today. US-China relations are at their most adversarial point in decades. Trade wars, technology export controls, and competition over Taiwan have reduced Beijing's incentive to accommodate Washington on secondary issues like Iran [7]. China is also more dependent on Middle Eastern energy than ever, importing approximately 40% of its crude oil from the Gulf — a dependency that gives Tehran its own leverage over Beijing [16].

Secondary sanctions — targeting Chinese banks and financial institutions that facilitate Iran transactions — represent the strongest remaining tool. But applying them risks further fracturing the US-China economic relationship and could drive more transactions into channels that Washington cannot monitor at all [5].

The most realistic path to constraining Chinese transfers may run through Beijing's own interests. China imports significant volumes of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and has substantial investments across the Gulf. A regional arms race that destabilizes the energy infrastructure Beijing depends on would harm Chinese interests directly. Whether that calculation outweighs the strategic benefits of supporting Iran — and the commercial incentives that drive individual Chinese firms — remains an open question.

The Limits of What We Know

Several caveats apply to this reporting. Intelligence assessments about the volume and content of shipments carry inherent uncertainty, and the US government has an interest in presenting the most alarming picture of Chinese-Iranian cooperation. The distinction between state-directed policy and the actions of private Chinese firms engaged in sanctions evasion is often unclear. Some analysts argue that the most significant Chinese contributions — BeiDou access and satellite intelligence — are more impactful than the chemical shipments that dominate headlines but receive less attention because they are harder to photograph and sanction [8].

The coming weeks will test whether the alleged Chinese supply pipeline can actually outpace the US-Israeli destruction campaign. If Iran manages to sustain or rebuild its missile launch rate, the question of where the components came from will move from intelligence reports to the center of US-China diplomacy.