Report Documents Long-Term Harm to Iranian Children from Conflict

Five weeks after US and Israeli forces launched coordinated strikes across Iran on February 28, 2026, the physical destruction is measurable: 216 children dead, 1,881 injured, 763 schools damaged, and 334 health facilities hit [1][2]. But UNICEF, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and multiple medical researchers now warn that the measurable toll understates the actual damage. The effects on children's psychological development, education, and long-term health are accumulating in ways that will outlast any ceasefire.

The Numbers So Far

Iran's Ministry of Health reported that as of April 3, 2026, more than 2,100 civilians had been killed and 27,900 injured since fighting began [1]. Among the dead were 216 children and 251 women. Among the injured, 1,881 were children—55 of them under two years old [3].

Source: OCHA Humanitarian Update No. 02

Data as of Apr 3, 2026CSV

The single deadliest incident involving children occurred on the first day of the war. A strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab, Hormozgan province, killed 168 students and staff [4]. Human Rights Watch verified at least 82 names from official lists, including 63 confirmed children, and concluded from satellite imagery that "highly accurate, guided munitions" struck the school building directly [4]. HRW called for the attack to be investigated as a war crime, noting the school was physically separated from an adjacent IRGC Naval Forces compound by walls and had independent street access [4]. The Israeli military said it was "not aware of any strikes in the area," while US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said they were "investigating that" [4].

The Norwegian Refugee Council reported that over 3.2 million people were internally displaced within one month, primarily fleeing major urban centers [5]. Across at least 20 provinces, 61,000 homes and 19,000 commercial units sustained damage [5]. Nearly 500 schools and 275 medical centers were damaged in the first 25 days alone, figures that rose to 763 and 334 respectively by early April [1][5].

Source: NRC / OCHA

Data as of Mar 25, 2026CSV

Psychological and Developmental Harm

Mental health researchers have identified a pattern across conflict zones: children exposed to war exhibit severe psychological consequences including PTSD, cognitive developmental delays, emotional dysregulation, and social withdrawal [6][7]. The question for Iran is not whether these effects will emerge, but how severe they will be.

UNICEF's ad interim representative to Iran, Monika Oledzka Nielsen, stated that children in Iran are "exposed to physical harm and psychological distress" from ongoing strikes, and that the "cumulative impact of ongoing strikes, instability, and disruption to essential services" affects "their immediate safety, long-term health, development, and well-being" [8].

An ABC News report citing pediatric trauma specialists noted that children in active war zones face compounding risks: acute stress responses in the short term, followed by chronic PTSD, depression, and anxiety disorders that can persist for years without intervention [6]. A peer-reviewed study published in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications found that war-exposed children exhibited "cognitive developmental delays, emotional dysregulation (e.g., aggression, apathy), and social withdrawal" [7].

Direct comparisons with other conflict zones are instructive but imperfect. In Gaza, UNICEF has described conditions as "the most dangerous place in the world to be a child," with tens of thousands killed or injured [9]. In Yemen, after years of war and blockade, child malnutrition rates reached levels classified as famine conditions by the UN. In Syria, studies documented PTSD prevalence rates above 50 percent among displaced children after sustained bombing campaigns. Iran's conflict is only five weeks old, so comparable longitudinal data does not yet exist. But researchers at Global Voices argue that childhood trauma from war already constitutes "a global public health crisis" based on established patterns across these settings [9].

Direct Violence Versus Secondary Causes

A central analytical question is how much of the harm to Iranian children stems from direct military strikes versus secondary effects—sanctions, economic collapse, and healthcare infrastructure degradation.

The direct military toll is documented: 216 children killed, 1,881 injured, and hundreds of schools and hospitals hit in five weeks [1]. But Iran entered this conflict with a health system and economy already weakened by decades of international sanctions.

A 2024 study published in Globalization and Health found that sanctions reduced total Iranian welfare by 14 to 15 percent and that "a larger portion of income went towards basic necessities such as food, which might have exacerbated malnutrition and food insecurity, particularly among vulnerable populations" including children [10]. Human Rights Watch reported in 2019 that US "maximum pressure" sanctions harmed Iranians' right to health by restricting access to medicines, including for children with cancer [11]. A scoping review in the International Journal of Health Planning and Management documented that sanctions caused healthcare infrastructure to "deteriorate and become obsolete," while migration of trained health workers further reduced capacity [12].

Damage to 334 health facilities as of April 2026 [1] compounds this pre-existing fragility. OCHA estimated that healthcare access was disrupted for approximately 10 million people, including 2.2 million children [1].

Distinguishing the relative contribution of military violence versus sanctions is methodologically difficult. The Lancet Regional Health published a March 2026 analysis describing Iran's situation as a compounding crisis where "war, legality, and the erosion of population health" are interlinked rather than separable [13]. Independent researchers have not yet produced an attribution model for the current conflict.

Who Is Responsible for Child Welfare—and Who Is Funding It?

UNICEF operates in Iran and has been active in child protection programs, reporting that in the first half of 2025, approximately 4,590 children at risk were identified in Iranian hospitals, with over 70 percent of cases flagged by trained social workers [14]. The Iranian Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare, working with UNICEF, identified 11.5 million households near or below the multidimensional poverty line, including 1 million households (approximately 4 million people) requiring urgent humanitarian assistance—and this was before the war began [14].

OCHA's humanitarian response plan for Iran requires $80 million to support 2.8 million people, but as of late March 2026, funding remained far short of that target [5].

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child issued a statement in March 2026 declaring that "children must never be collateral damage" and calling on all parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law [15]. Iran ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994, though with reservations regarding provisions "contrary to the Islamic Shariah" [16]. Denmark, Austria, and Italy have formally objected to these reservations as impermissibly broad under international law [16].

The ICRC issued a 2026 statement to the UN Human Rights Council reaffirming that the Convention requires all states parties to "safeguard the rights to life, survival, and development of every child" in armed conflict [17].

The Budget Question: Guns Versus Schools

Critics of the "endless harm" framing—particularly from Iranian diaspora organizations and some Western governments—argue that the Iranian government bears primary responsibility for the vulnerability of its children because of its spending priorities.

According to World Bank data, Iran allocated approximately 2.9 percent of GDP to education in 2023, down from 3.1 percent in 2020, compared to a global average of 4.4 percent [18]. Health spending stood at 5.8 percent of GDP in 2021, below the global average of 7.2 percent [19]. Meanwhile, official military spending rose from $5.7 billion in 2021 to over $10.3 billion by 2023, according to SIPRI [20].

Source: World Bank / SIPRI

Data as of Jan 1, 2024CSV

The Free Iran Scholars Network estimated that Iran spent approximately $2 trillion on military programs between 1995 and 2024, representing more than 20 percent of total economic output over that period [20]. Their analysis argued that "redirecting even 10 percent of the military spending—$200 billion—would have had transformative national consequences" for education and healthcare [20].

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio made a similar argument publicly, stating "Imagine if they spent that money on their people" [21].

Iran's government has countered that international sanctions—not domestic budget choices—are the primary constraint on social spending. At UN Human Rights Council sessions, Iranian representatives have argued that sponsors of human rights resolutions "have never genuinely cared for the human rights of Iranians, otherwise, they would not have imposed sanctions which impacted the lives of Iranians" [22]. UN independent experts have noted that "decades of U.S. interference in Iran through coups, military interventions and unilateral sanctions have caused chaos in the region" [23].

Both arguments contain documented elements. Iran's military spending is high relative to its social spending, and international sanctions have measurably reduced the resources available for healthcare and education. The relative weight of each factor remains contested.

Can the Damage Be Reversed? Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) offers the closest historical parallel. A 2025 study in the Journal of Trauma & Dissociation examined adults who experienced childhood trauma during that conflict and found that while some exhibited post-traumatic growth (PTG)—a "transformative psychological process that promotes improved cognitive functioning and resilience"—this outcome was heavily dependent on social support systems and cultural context [24].

The study found that "social support has proven to be an essential component in buffering the negative effects of trauma and stress, facilitating recovery and adaptation" [24]. But it also documented that "the broader context of social and cultural changes had significant effects on individuals' growth trajectories," with PTG "both helped and hindered by the sociocultural upheaval that occurred during and after the Iran-Iraq war" [24].

Research on intergenerational transmission suggests the stakes are high. A study on chemical warfare survivors from the Iran-Iraq War found that PTSD "can inherit as a behavioral model between generations," and that female offspring of evacuated mothers were five times more likely to be hospitalized for mood disorders [25]. A separate study published in ScienceDirect in 2025 documented lasting effects of the Iran-Iraq War on education and employment outcomes among children who were school-age during the conflict [26].

For post-sanctions recovery, Libya offers a partial comparison. After the fall of Gaddafi and the easing of sanctions, Libya's health and education systems did not recover within a generation. Ongoing instability prevented the sustained investment and institutional rebuilding that would have been required. Researchers have generally concluded that recovery timelines depend less on the severity of initial harm than on the stability and resource levels of the post-conflict environment.

Credibility and Methodology of the Reports

Humanitarian reports on Iran have faced scrutiny from multiple directions. The Iranian government has accused organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International of advancing "geopolitical agendas" rather than conducting neutral assessments [22]. The OHCHR's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, whose mandate was extended in early 2026, has faced opposition from countries arguing that the body is being used as "a tool for coercive measures" [22][27].

On the other side, HRW's investigation of the Minab school attack used satellite imagery analysis, verified casualty lists, and documented methodology consistent with its standard investigative protocols [4]. OCHA's figures rely on data from Iran's Ministry of Health, cross-referenced where possible with independent verification [1]. UNICEF's data on child welfare predates the current conflict and draws on long-standing partnerships with Iranian government ministries [14].

The constraints on independent verification are real. Iran implemented internet shutdowns following the start of hostilities, limiting the ability of journalists and independent researchers to confirm casualty figures in real time [4]. This creates an information environment where both overcounting and undercounting are plausible, and where all published figures should be treated as provisional.

Legal Obligations Under International Law

The legal framework is relatively clear, even if enforcement is not. Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Iran, the United States, and Israel are all signatories (though the US has not ratified it), states are obligated to protect children from the effects of armed conflict [16][17].

The ICRC's 2026 statement to the Human Rights Council emphasized that "all parties to a conflict are obliged to respect international human rights law and international humanitarian law," including specific protections for children [17]. Amnesty International issued an urgent call in March 2026 for all parties to "protect civilians and respect international law amid escalating regional conflict" [28].

No international body has completed a formal compliance assessment for the current conflict, which is ongoing. The Human Rights Council has extended the mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, but its investigations to date have focused primarily on the 2025–2026 protest crackdowns rather than the military conflict that began in February 2026 [27].

Whether any of the parties to this conflict will face formal legal accountability for harm to children remains an open question. Historical precedent from comparable conflicts—including in Syria, Yemen, and Gaza—suggests that legal proceedings, if they occur, unfold over years or decades.

What Comes Next

The ceasefire reached in early April 2026 offers a potential pause, but humanitarian organizations emphasize that even an immediate and permanent end to fighting would not reverse the damage already done. The 216 children killed cannot be brought back. The 1,881 injured face long recovery periods. The 763 damaged schools require reconstruction. And the psychological effects—documented across every comparable conflict—will persist in the absence of sustained mental health services that Iran's weakened health system is not currently equipped to provide.

Research from the Iran-Iraq War, from Syria, and from Gaza consistently shows the same pattern: the harm to children from armed conflict does not end when the fighting does. Whether Iran's children follow the trajectory of post-traumatic growth or intergenerational trauma will depend on decisions made not just in Tehran, but in Washington, at the United Nations, and among the international donor community in the months and years ahead.