Rand Paul Proposes 'Six Penny Plan' to Balance Budget in Five Years

On September 16, 2025, Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky stood on the Senate floor and reintroduced a proposal he has now brought back in various forms for nearly a decade: a federal budget resolution that would balance the government's books within five years by cutting six cents from every dollar of projected spending [1]. The plan's branding is simple. Its math is not.

The federal government spent approximately $7.0 trillion in fiscal year 2025 [2]. The deficit that year was $1.78 trillion [3]. The national debt has surpassed $38.5 trillion [4]. Interest payments alone exceeded $1 trillion for the first time [5]. Against that backdrop, Paul's Six Penny Plan offers a clean, mechanistic answer: spend 94 cents for every dollar currently budgeted, year after year, until the budget balances.

Whether that answer is realistic—or desirable—depends on where you stand.

How the Six Penny Plan Works

The mechanism is straightforward in concept. For each of the next five fiscal years, Congress would be required to reduce total on-budget spending by six percent from the previous year's levels [1]. After balance is achieved in year five, spending would then be permitted to grow in line with revenues [6].

In dollar terms, the National Taxpayers Union Foundation estimated that the first year would yield roughly $300 billion in savings. Instead of the nearly $16 trillion in cumulative deficits projected over the next decade under current law, the plan envisions surpluses beginning in 2027, with a net surplus of $73 billion over ten years [7].

The plan also locks in provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act to prevent what Paul characterizes as tax increases layered on top of inflation, and it proposes scorekeeping reforms to identify duplicate programs in new legislation [1].

Critically, the plan makes no specific policy assumptions about where the cuts would fall. All savings are assigned to a newly defined budget function—"930: New Efficiencies, Consolidations, and Other Savings"—leaving Congress to determine the specifics later [1].

Source: FRED / U.S. Treasury

Data as of Mar 20, 2026CSV

The Escalating Problem: Why It's Six Pennies Now

Paul's budget proposals trace an arc that mirrors the growth of federal spending itself. When he first offered a version in 2017, a simple spending freeze—zero cuts—was sufficient to project balance within five years [8]. By 2018, the plan required a $400 billion initial cut followed by one percent annual increases [8]. In 2019, the "Pennies Plan" called for two percent across-the-board reductions for five years [8]. By 2021, it was the "Three Pennies Plan" [8].

Now it takes six pennies—six percent annual cuts—to close the gap.

"When I started offering these kinds of budgets four years ago, we could balance with a freeze in spending," Paul said in 2021, as quoted by Reason [8]. The escalation reflects the compounding consequences of delay: federal spending grew from roughly $4.1 trillion in 2018 to over $7 trillion in 2025, driven by pandemic-era outlays, rising entitlement costs, and ballooning interest payments [2][7].

The concept itself predates Paul's involvement. Representatives Connie Mack of Florida and Senator Mike Enzi of Wyoming introduced the original "Penny Plan" in 2011, calling for one percent annual reductions across the board [9].

What Gets Cut? The Plan's Deliberate Silence

The most consequential feature of the Six Penny Plan is what it does not say. The proposal sets topline spending targets but does not specify which programs absorb the reductions.

Paul's office has stated that the plan "has never touched Social Security" and that Social Security cannot be cut under Senate budget rules [10]. But beyond that carve-out, the plan leaves Medicare, defense, Medicaid, and every other federal program on the table—at least in theory.

The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, in analyzing earlier penny plan iterations, noted that Paul's version targets "non-Social Security spending" while preserving topline flexibility [11]. But that flexibility creates a mathematical squeeze. If Social Security (roughly $1.5 trillion) and net interest payments (over $1 trillion) are effectively off the table—since interest must be paid and Social Security is protected by budget rules—then the six percent annual cuts must be absorbed by the remaining $4.5 trillion in spending, which includes defense, Medicare, Medicaid, and all discretionary programs.

The CRFB calculated that under earlier penny plan versions, non-Social Security spending would need to fall "almost 40 percent lower than under current law projections" within five years to achieve balance [11]. Under the current six-penny version, with higher baseline spending, the required percentage reduction to vulnerable programs would be at least as steep.

The Human Scale: Who Loses Access?

While the Six Penny Plan does not name specific program cuts, the required spending reductions would inevitably affect the federal programs that millions of Americans rely on. The scale of potential impact can be estimated from recent congressional debates over comparatively smaller cuts.

Analysis of the 2025 reconciliation bill—which proposed $863 billion in Medicaid reductions and $295 billion in SNAP cuts over a decade—found that the Congressional Budget Office projected 10.9 million additional uninsured Americans within ten years [12]. More than 40 million people receive SNAP each month, including 16 million children, 8 million seniors, and 4 million non-elderly adults with disabilities [12].

The George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health estimated that Medicaid and SNAP cuts of that magnitude could result in one million job losses and $113 billion in reduced state GDP in a single year [13]. Those figures represent cuts far smaller than what a six-percent-per-year reduction applied across federal spending would require.

The Six Penny Plan's lack of specificity is, from one angle, a political strategy: it lets lawmakers vote for fiscal discipline without voting against any particular program. From another, it is the plan's central weakness—a balanced budget with no road map for how to get there.

Source: FRED / U.S. Treasury

Data as of Mar 20, 2026CSV

CBO Projections: The Baseline vs. The Plan

The Congressional Budget Office's most recent projections, published in early 2026, estimate a federal deficit of $1.9 trillion for fiscal year 2026, growing to $3.1 trillion by 2036 [5]. Federal outlays in 2026 total $7.4 trillion, or 23.3 percent of GDP [5]. Debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101 percent of GDP to 120 percent by 2036 [5].

Under the Six Penny Plan's framework, spending would drop to roughly $6.6 trillion in the first year (94 percent of baseline), then continue declining by six percent annually. By year five, total spending would fall to approximately $4.7 trillion—a level the federal government last spent in FY2019, before the pandemic [2].

The NTU Foundation's analysis projected that the plan would produce surpluses beginning in 2027, turning a trajectory of $16 trillion in cumulative debt into a net $73 billion surplus over the decade [7]. But that projection relies on revenues remaining at or above CBO baseline levels, which in turn depends on sustained economic growth. The plan does not account for the possibility that spending cuts of this magnitude could themselves reduce GDP growth and tax revenues—a dynamic that has played out elsewhere.

The Austerity Question: What Does the Evidence Show?

The most relevant modern precedent for rapid fiscal consolidation is the United Kingdom's austerity program beginning in 2010. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government implemented spending cuts representing five percent of GDP over the course of the parliament—a scale comparable to what the Six Penny Plan envisions [14].

The results were mixed at best. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimated that the UK lost two percent of GDP due to the austerity policies in 2010-11 and 2011-12 [14]. Growth remained below trend, unemployment rose, and academic research has found persistent negative effects on employment lasting more than 15 years [15]. Most macroeconomists now assess that the program's first two years were "both too severe and unnecessary" and delayed the recovery that was already underway [14].

Defenders of austerity point to the post-World War II United States, where federal spending dropped sharply and the economy transitioned successfully. But that comparison is imperfect: the postwar economy benefited from pent-up consumer demand, a young workforce returning from military service, and the absence of global competition from war-devastated Europe and Asia—conditions with no modern parallel.

Paul and fiscal hawks counter that the UK comparison is misleading because the Six Penny Plan would pair spending cuts with tax stability through the TCJA extension, whereas UK austerity included tax increases [1]. The Heritage Foundation has argued that penny plan proposals "put the spotlight on out-of-control federal spending" and that addressing the structural growth in outlays is the only viable path to long-term fiscal health [9].

The Fiscal Hawk Critique: Why Not Faster?

Some deficit hawks argue that even six percent annual cuts are too gradual. With the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 100 percent and net interest costs consuming over $1 trillion annually, the compounding cost of delay is substantial [5]. Every year of trillion-dollar deficits adds to the principal on which interest accrues, creating a feedback loop that makes future balancing harder.

Senator Mike Lee and others have argued that mandatory spending programs including Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid "have to be considered" in any meaningful deficit reduction [10]. The Peter G. Peterson Foundation has documented that mandatory spending and interest now account for roughly 73 percent of federal outlays, meaning any plan that exempts them faces arithmetically implausible demands on the remaining 27 percent [16].

The counterargument—made by Paul himself—is political realism. A plan that explicitly cuts Social Security or Medicare would attract zero votes. The Six Penny Plan is designed to be the most aggressive proposal that can plausibly attract majority support, even if it falls short of what pure fiscal mathematics would demand.

Legislative Track Record: A Decade of Votes and Defeats

The penny plan's legislative history is a record of persistent introduction and consistent defeat.

In September 2024, Paul forced a Senate vote on the Six Penny Plan. It failed 39-56, with 35 Republicans voting in favor—more than half the caucus, but far short of the 60 votes needed to advance [6]. No Democrats voted for the measure.

Paul reintroduced the plan on September 16, 2025, as S.Con.Res. 21 in the 119th Congress [1]. The National Taxpayers Union, Americans for Prosperity, and Citizens Against Government Waste issued a joint letter of support [17]. But the plan has attracted no Democratic co-sponsors in any iteration, and a significant minority of Republicans have consistently voted against it.

The pattern across iterations—from the original Mack-Enzi penny plan in 2011 through Paul's escalating versions—shows a proposal that generates debate but not legislation. No provisions of any penny plan version have been enacted into law.

Bond Markets and the Default Question

If the fiscal trajectory is as dire as deficit hawks describe, a natural question follows: why do bond markets continue lending to the United States at rates that, while elevated from pandemic-era lows, remain manageable by historical standards?

The 10-year Treasury yield stood at approximately 4.26 percent as of mid-March 2026 [18]. Credit spreads on corporate bonds remain near all-time lows [19]. Foreign central banks continue to hold trillions in U.S. Treasuries, even as some—notably the People's Bank of China—have reduced their positions [19].

Former Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned that "the preconditions for fiscal dominance are clearly strengthening," noting debt is on a trajectory toward 150 percent of GDP over the next three decades [19]. But for now, the United States benefits from the dollar's status as the world's reserve currency, deep and liquid Treasury markets, and the absence of a credible alternative for global investors seeking safe assets.

The trigger point for a genuine fiscal crisis—the point at which bond markets stop treating U.S. debt as effectively risk-free—is unknown and may not announce itself in advance. CBO projections show interest costs doubling from $1 trillion in 2026 to $2.1 trillion by 2036 [5]. If yields spike due to a loss of confidence, those projections could deteriorate rapidly.

Paul's argument is that the longer Congress waits, the closer it moves to that unknown threshold. His critics respond that cutting six percent of spending annually could itself trigger the economic downturn that accelerates the crisis.

Where This Stands

The Six Penny Plan occupies a specific niche in the federal budget debate: too aggressive for most of Congress, too vague for policy analysts, and too slow for the most committed deficit hawks. Its value may be less as legislation than as a recurring measurement of how far federal spending has drifted from balance. In 2017, a freeze would have sufficed. In 2025, it takes six pennies on the dollar. If nothing changes, the next iteration will require more.

The federal deficit is not an abstraction. It is $1.9 trillion this year, projected to grow, with interest payments compounding on a $38.5 trillion debt. Whether the Six Penny Plan is the right answer is debatable. That the question needs answering is not.