North Korean Weapons Reported in Use by Iran Against US Forces

When Iran launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles at the U.S.-U.K. base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean on March 20, 2026, the weapons fell short of their target [1]. But the technology that propelled them traced back not to Tehran's own laboratories, but to a factory complex built with North Korean engineers, North Korean blueprints, and North Korean components — the end product of a weapons pipeline that has operated, largely uninterrupted, for more than 40 years [2].

The failed Diego Garcia strike crystallized a problem that defense analysts have warned about for years: Iran's ability to threaten American forces across an expanding geographic range depends on a missile infrastructure that is, in the words of one analyst, "almost completely North Korean" [3].

The Arsenal: What North Korea Built for Iran

Iran's liquid-fuel ballistic missile program owes its existence to Pyongyang. The relationship began during the Iran-Iraq War, when in October 1980, three Iranian Boeing 747 cargo planes flew to North Korea and returned with artillery shells and medical supplies — the first documented military transaction between the two countries [4].

By the early 1990s, the transfers had grown far more significant. North Korean Defense Minister Marshall O Jin U met with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) head Mohsen Rezai in Tehran in November 1990 and authorized the sale of Scud-C missiles with a 500-kilometer range [4]. North Korea ultimately shipped approximately 200 Scud-C missiles to Iran and constructed the production facility that manufactures its domestic variant, the Qiam short-range ballistic missile [3].

The Qiam has been used in attacks against U.S. facilities and Gulf targets in the current conflict [3]. Beyond short-range systems, North Korea provided at least 150 No Dong medium-range missiles — known in Iran as the Shahab-3 — and built the factory to produce them, though the facility still requires North Korean parts and specialists to operate [3].

Source: UANI, Arms Control Association, Military.com

Data as of Mar 24, 2026CSV

Since 2013, North Korea has also shipped components for an 80-ton rocket booster based on the Soviet-designed RD-250 engine, the same propulsion technology that powers Pyongyang's Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile [2]. The Hudson Institute assessed that Iran's attempted Diego Garcia strike — its first operational use of intermediate-range ballistic missiles — was made possible in part through "external technical assistance, likely from North Korea" [5].

Beyond missiles, North Korean conventional weapons have reached Iran's proxy network. The South Korean National Intelligence Service identified North Korean F-7 rocket-propelled grenades and Bang-122 artillery shells in the possession of Hamas [6]. A Hamas-aligned group in Gaza was also found with North Korean-made 122mm multiple rocket launchers [6]. These weapons reached non-state actors through a distribution chain running through Iran, with intermediaries in Lebanon, Sudan, and Egypt [6].

The Pipeline: How the Weapons Move

The transfer network between Pyongyang and Tehran relies on methods refined over decades to circumvent international monitoring. According to the Congressional Research Service, these include ship-to-ship transfers at sea, transshipment through third countries, splitting consignments across multiple containers and vessels, and concealing illicit items within bulk cargo [7].

The digital dimension has expanded as well. Individual agents involved in proliferation have turned to encrypted messaging applications and private chatrooms to exchange sensitive information, including missile test data [8]. Since 2013, the shipment of RD-250 engine components has represented a shift from delivering complete weapons systems to transferring the industrial capacity to build them — a harder target for interdiction efforts [2].

North Korean technicians have maintained a persistent physical presence in Iran, servicing production lines and advising on missile integration. Reporting from Military.com indicates that Pyongyang's engineers were actively rebuilding Iranian missile sites until hostilities began in 2026, and that "if Iran survives, those same experts will return quickly" [3].

The Money: North Korea's Arms Export Economy

For North Korea, the relationship with Iran is primarily financial. Tehran has paid Pyongyang an estimated $3 billion annually for weapons, technical assistance, and missile production support [3]. This revenue stream has been a critical lifeline for a regime under comprehensive international sanctions.

Source: South Korean NIS, NK News, Military.com estimates

Data as of Mar 24, 2026CSV

However, the Iran account is no longer Pyongyang's largest. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, North Korea has become a major arms supplier to Moscow. South Korea's National Intelligence Service estimated that between August 2023 and December 2024, North Korea earned between $7.67 billion and $14.4 billion from military cooperation with Russia, with artillery, ammunition, and ballistic missile deliveries accounting for the bulk — an average of roughly $10.4 billion [9]. Direct revenue from North Korean troop deployments to Russian front lines added approximately $620 million [9].

The scale of the Russia trade dwarfs the Iran pipeline, but the loss of Iranian revenue would still represent a significant blow. Together, these two clients account for the vast majority of North Korea's hard currency earnings from arms exports, with other customers contributing an estimated $500 million or less [9][3].

Casualties and the Attribution Problem

Between October 2023 and November 2024, Iran and its proxies conducted more than 180 attacks against U.S. forces in the Middle East, wounding over 180 service members and killing three — including three soldiers in a January 2024 drone attack on Tower 22 base in Jordan carried out by the Iran-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah [10][11].

Attributing specific casualties to North Korean-origin versus Iranian-manufactured munitions is difficult. The ballistic missiles Iran fires are produced domestically on North Korean-designed production lines using North Korean technical specifications, making the distinction between "North Korean" and "Iranian" weapons partly semantic [3]. The Qiam missiles striking U.S. positions are Iranian-assembled but North Korean in lineage. No public U.S. military assessment has broken down casualties by the national origin of the munitions that caused them.

This attribution challenge extends to proxy weapons as well. While the South Korean NIS has identified specific North Korean small arms and artillery in Hamas's arsenal [6], the volume of these transfers relative to Iran's own production for its proxies remains unclear.

The Sanctions Collapse

The international architecture for monitoring and enforcing North Korean arms sanctions has effectively disintegrated. On March 28, 2024, Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts — the independent body that had monitored North Korean sanctions compliance since 2009 [12]. Russia was the sole vote against renewal; China abstained [12].

The Panel's mandate expired on April 30, 2024. Without it, there is no UN third party monitoring compliance or documenting sanctions evasion [13]. France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States accused Russia of killing the panel to prevent it from reporting on "Moscow's own violations of Security Council resolutions" as it seeks North Korean military support for its war in Ukraine [12].

Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia defended the veto by arguing that extending the panel's mandate "would not contribute to normalizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula" [12].

The legal tools available to Washington are limited. Both China and Russia hold veto power on the Security Council, blocking any new enforcement mechanisms. The U.S. has imposed bilateral sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) [14], and the Treasury Department has sanctioned entities in both countries for their cooperation. But these measures have not stopped the flow of weapons or technical expertise.

The Skeptics: Is the Threat Overstated?

Not all analysts agree on the scale or significance of the North Korea-Iran weapons relationship. Michael Elleman, then a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), challenged renewed speculation about active missile collaboration in a 2016 analysis published by 38 North, arguing that the evidence for ongoing transfers was weaker than commonly assumed [15].

A 2021 analysis, also from 38 North, framed the relationship as more "transactional partnership" than strategic alliance, noting that some scholars argue "there is not any important proliferation going on between North Korea and Iran (and hasn't since the 1980s), that the Iranian and North Korean threats are both over-hyped" [16].

Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated in 2016 that Iran-North Korea missile cooperation had slowed, though he did not claim it had stopped entirely [15]. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal did not fully halt Iran's ballistic missile cooperation with Pyongyang [17].

Critics of the "North Korean weapons pipeline" framing argue that it can serve a specific policy agenda — building the case for military action against Iran by linking it to a second nuclear-armed adversary, or justifying expanded missile defense spending. They note that Iran has developed considerable indigenous weapons production capacity, and that attributing its entire missile program to North Korea understates Tehran's own technical achievements over three decades.

However, events in 2025 and 2026 — particularly the Diego Garcia strike attempt and the rapid reconstitution of Iranian missile infrastructure after the June 2025 Twelve-Day War — have strengthened the case that the pipeline remains active and operationally significant [5][18].

Historical Context: Is This New?

The transfer of weapons technology from nuclear-armed states to U.S. adversaries is not without precedent. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and China supplied massive quantities of weapons to North Korea, North Vietnam, Egypt, Syria, and numerous other states and non-state actors engaged in conflicts with the United States or its allies.

The scale of Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East alone — including thousands of tanks, aircraft, and surface-to-air missile systems to Egypt and Syria in the 1960s and 1970s — dwarfs the North Korea-Iran pipeline in absolute terms. China's provision of weapons and logistics to North Korean and North Vietnamese forces directly killed tens of thousands of American service members.

What distinguishes the current situation is not scale but structure. The Soviet Union and China were recognized great powers operating within (if against) the international order. North Korea is a heavily sanctioned pariah state that, at least in theory, is prohibited from exporting any arms under multiple UN Security Council resolutions. The pipeline persists not because it is too large to stop but because the enforcement mechanisms have been deliberately dismantled by states that benefit from North Korean arms [12][13].

Regional Fallout: The THAAD Problem

The most concrete demonstration of how the Iran-North Korea nexus affects U.S. allies came in March 2026, when Washington began redeploying elements of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system from South Korea to the Middle East to replace radar damaged in an Iranian-backed drone strike [19].

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung publicly opposed the move. "While we have expressed opposition to the possible redeployment, the reality is that we cannot fully impose our position," he said at a cabinet meeting [20]. Consultations between Seoul and Washington also examined the potential relocation of Patriot air defense batteries [20].

The redeployment generated anxiety in East Asia. South Korean analysts warned that even a temporary reduction in U.S. missile defense capability could raise questions about the durability of American security commitments at a time when North Korea is expanding its missile arsenal [19]. Some suggested Pyongyang might interpret the adjustment as an opportunity to test allied readiness [19].

The broader strategic concern is zero-sum: every missile defense asset deployed to counter Iranian threats built with North Korean technology is an asset unavailable to counter North Korean threats directly. The Chatham House think tank warned that the Iran conflict risks "triggering a new wave of nuclear proliferation" as states in both the Middle East and East Asia reconsider whether U.S. extended deterrence guarantees remain credible [21].

Japan, already investing heavily in counterstrike capabilities in response to North Korea's missile buildup, has watched the THAAD redeployment closely. The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) documented how China, Russia, and North Korea collectively helped Iran "rapidly reconstitute key elements of its missile and military infrastructure" after the losses of 2024 and 2025, including dual-use items for ballistic missile production, intelligence capabilities, and air defense systems [18].

What Comes Next

The North Korea-Iran arms relationship is older than many of the analysts studying it. Four decades of transfers have created a degree of technical integration that sanctions alone are unlikely to unwind — Iran's missile production lines are built on North Korean designs, staffed in part by North Korean engineers, and dependent on North Korean components.

With the UN Panel of Experts dissolved, Russia and China blocking new Security Council enforcement, and U.S. military assets being shuffled between theaters, the pipeline operates in what amounts to a permissive environment. The question is no longer whether North Korean weapons are reaching Iran and its proxies — the evidence for that is extensive, even if its precise scope is debated. The question is whether any existing institution has both the authority and the will to stop it.