Netanyahu Announces Intensified Israeli Military Campaign Against Hezbollah

On May 25, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed the Israel Defense Forces to "press the pedal even harder" against Hezbollah in Lebanon, ordering an expansion of airstrikes against the Iran-backed group after a U.S. official signaled Washington would approve a larger operation [1]. The directive came as the IDF launched a wave of strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure in the southern city of Tyre and, for the first time since a fragile ceasefire was brokered in April, targeted sites in the eastern Bekaa Valley [2].

Netanyahu stated that Israeli forces had eliminated more than 600 fighters in recent weeks and declared the need to "intensify the blows, increase the force" [1]. The announcement raises fundamental questions: Can sustained military pressure accomplish what the 2006 war failed to achieve — a durable degradation of Hezbollah's capacity — or will it produce another cycle of destruction followed by rebuilding?

The Human Cost: Casualties and Displacement

The numbers from the current conflict already surpass those of the 34-day 2006 Lebanon War, which killed approximately 1,200 Lebanese and 165 Israelis and displaced roughly one million people [3].

According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, more than 3,000 people have been killed in Lebanon in the fighting since March 2, 2026 [1]. In the broader period dating to October 2023, Israeli attacks have killed 4,047 people in Lebanon, including 316 children and 790 women, and injured 16,638 others [3]. The IDF estimates that approximately 3,800 Hezbollah fighters were killed between October 2023 and December 2024 alone, with Hezbollah's own internal estimates suggesting losses of up to 4,000 fighters [4]. On the Israeli side, 45 civilians and 76 IDF soldiers and reservists have been killed since October 2023 [3].

Source: Lebanese Health Ministry / IDF / Wikipedia

Data as of May 25, 2026CSV

Displacement figures are equally stark. Israeli evacuation orders now cover 15% of Lebanese territory and have displaced around 1.2 million people — roughly 22% of the country's population [5]. At the height of earlier fighting in October 2024, between 200,000 and 300,000 displaced Lebanese fled across the border into Syria [3]. The World Bank's Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimated the total economic cost of the conflict at $14 billion, with $6.8 billion in physical damages and $7.2 billion in lost productivity and revenue [3].

What Israel Says It Is Hitting

The IDF has framed its intensified campaign as a precision effort to dismantle Hezbollah's command, control, and weapons infrastructure. The most concentrated action came on April 8, 2026 — dubbed "Operation Eternal Darkness" — when approximately 50 Israeli Air Force aircraft struck over 100 targets in 10 minutes across Lebanon [6]. Israel stated the operation hit Hezbollah headquarters, intelligence centers, missile infrastructure, and sites tied to the Radwan Force (Hezbollah's elite commando unit) as well as aerial and naval units [6].

Earlier strikes in 2026 targeted senior Hezbollah commanders in the Beirut area alongside dozens of headquarters linked to Hezbollah and Iranian networks in the Dahiyeh district, the densely populated southern suburb of the Lebanese capital [7]. In late May, strikes expanded to Tyre and the Bekaa Valley, areas that had been largely untouched since the April ceasefire [1].

Independent verification of strike outcomes remains limited. The April 8 strikes killed at least 303 people and wounded 1,150, according to Lebanese health authorities [8]. Whether those casualties were predominantly combatants, as the IDF claims, or included large numbers of civilians, as Lebanese officials and international observers contend, remains disputed. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has struggled to maintain casualty-tracking capacity in areas where access is restricted [9].

The Price Tag: Israel's Expanding Defense Budget

The financial burden of sustained multi-front warfare has driven Israel's defense spending to record levels. The Knesset approved a 2026 defense budget of approximately $44.8 billion, an increase of roughly $9.5 billion over the previous year [10]. That figure has already proven insufficient: defense officials estimate an additional NIS 33 billion (approximately $9 billion) will be needed by year-end, potentially bringing total military expenditure to NIS 177 billion [11].

Source: Breaking Defense / Jerusalem Post

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

Daily direct military expenditure has reached approximately $410 million — NIS 1.5 billion per day [11]. Four IDF divisions are deployed in southern Lebanon [10].

The United States has been the principal arms supplier. Since October 2023, Congress has enacted legislation providing at least $16.3 billion in direct military aid to Israel, including $14.1 billion through the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act to resupply munitions [12]. In January 2025, President Trump released a Biden-era hold on 1,800 MK-84 2,000-pound bombs, and in February 2025 the Trump administration declared an "emergency" to fast-track nearly $4 billion in additional weapons sales [12].

Conditions on aid have shifted with administrations. In February 2024, President Biden issued a national security memo requiring recipients of U.S. military aid to provide written assurances of compliance with international law. The Trump administration rescinded that memo in February 2025 [12]. No comparable conditions have been publicly attached to current resupply.

Civilian Infrastructure Under Strain

The toll on Lebanese civilian infrastructure has been severe, particularly in the south and Beirut's southern suburbs. As of April 20, 2026, six hospitals had been closed due to the hostilities and 15 damaged, while 51 primary healthcare centers were shuttered and seven damaged [9]. The World Health Organization recorded 147 attacks on healthcare facilities since March 2, 2026, resulting in 100 deaths and 233 injuries among healthcare workers [9].

The destruction of the Qasmiyeh Bridge, a major artery connecting Sidon and Tyre, has severely impeded movement between northern and southern Lebanon [9]. Disruptions to fuel distribution threaten hospital operations, water pumping stations, and electricity generation across the south [9].

An estimated 150,000 people remain in southern Lebanon, and humanitarian organizations have reported significant barriers to reaching them [9]. UNICEF reported in April that children's access to education, healthcare, and clean water had been "catastrophically" curtailed in affected areas [13]. The UN Human Rights Office has documented widespread damage to residential buildings, road networks, schools, and religious sites, with civilian objects "entirely destroyed or severely damaged" [14].

The Strategic Argument: Can Intensification Succeed Where 2006 Failed?

Israeli military and intelligence officials argue that the current campaign has achieved a qualitatively different level of degradation than the 2006 war. Before that conflict, Hezbollah held approximately 15,000 rockets and missiles and fired about 4,000 during the 34-day war [15]. In the years afterward, the group rebuilt to an arsenal estimated at over 150,000 munitions, including precision-guided missiles, advanced antitank weapons, and drones capable of reaching deep into Israeli territory [15].

By October 2024, the IDF estimated that Hezbollah had lost between one-half and two-thirds of its total munitions stockpile [16]. Israeli officials contend that the current campaign's targeting of command structures, manufacturing facilities, and storage sites — combined with the disruption of Iranian supply lines following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria — has created conditions fundamentally different from 2006.

Skeptics are not persuaded. Analysts at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have warned against assuming Iran's supply lines to Hezbollah are permanently severed, noting that "Iranian arms smuggling has historically thrived in collapsed or weak state environments" [17]. As post-Assad Syria reopens to cross-border traffic in reconstruction supplies, vehicles, and humanitarian aid, Iran could use those channels to reconstitute both Hezbollah and its proxy factions [17].

The Legal Battle Over Proportionality

The International Commission of Jurists has called on Israel to "cease indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks," finding that strikes on densely populated residential neighborhoods and commercial areas in central Beirut constituted "prima facie violations of the principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law" [8]. The April 8 Operation Eternal Darkness strikes drew particular scrutiny: more than 150 locations struck simultaneously across Lebanon, including in the Bekaa Valley and densely populated Beirut [8].

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk condemned the strikes, and UN experts stated: "This is not self-defence. It is a blatant violation of the UN Charter, a deliberate destruction of prospects for peace, and an affront to multilateralism" [18]. The International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute raised similar concerns, calling for accountability and "lasting peace" [19].

Israel's legal position rests on the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Middle East Forum has argued that Israel's war in Lebanon is legal under international law because Hezbollah's ongoing rocket and drone attacks constitute an armed attack triggering the right of self-defense, and that Israel targets military objectives even when Hezbollah embeds them in civilian areas [20]. Israeli officials have consistently maintained that Hezbollah bears responsibility for civilian casualties by operating from residential neighborhoods, hospitals, and mosques.

Legal scholars remain divided. Writing in Just Security, analysts argued that Israel's campaign may violate the necessity requirement internal to the right of self-defense, contending there is no necessity for Israel to use force in Lebanon because the underlying conflict stems from the broader regional war with Iran [21]. The principle of proportionality under customary international humanitarian law prohibits attacks expected to cause civilian harm excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage — a standard whose application to specific strikes is inherently contested [21].

Iran's Capacity to Resupply

Iran's ability to reconstitute Hezbollah's arsenal is the central variable in whether Israeli strikes produce lasting results. Tehran faces its own constraints: expanded EU and U.S. sanctions, economic pressures from the 2026 Iran war and its aftermath, and the loss of its primary land corridor through Syria following Assad's fall [22].

The Trump administration has targeted Hezbollah's political and institutional infrastructure through sanctions, designating Lebanese parliamentarians, security officials, and allies of the group for allegedly seeking to preserve Hezbollah's influence over Lebanese state institutions and obstruct disarmament efforts [23].

Yet analysts caution that supply route interdiction has historically proven temporary. The Washington Institute has noted that as Syria reopens, an influx of legitimate cross-border commerce will provide cover for Iranian smuggling — a pattern that persisted for decades through far more stable environments [17]. Hezbollah relies on Iran for its most sophisticated systems, including precision-guided missiles and advanced antitank weapons, and any sustained cutoff of these specific capabilities could meaningfully slow reconstitution compared to the post-2006 period [16].

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

Lebanon's displacement crisis exists within a broader global refugee landscape. Syria — Lebanon's neighbor and the corridor through which Iranian arms historically transited — remains the world's largest refugee-producing country with 5.5 million refugees, while Lebanon itself has hosted over one million Syrian refugees for more than a decade, straining infrastructure now being further degraded by the current conflict.

Diplomatic Off-Ramps: Where Talks Stand

A U.S.-brokered ceasefire took effect on April 17, 2026, following Operation Eternal Darkness. The 10-day truce was extended on April 23 for three weeks, and again on May 15 for 45 days [24]. Peace talks have involved Israeli, Lebanese, and U.S. ambassadors, mediated by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, with the first formal meeting held on April 14 at the State Department [25].

President Trump directly mediated between the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors at the White House and pledged that Washington would help Beirut "protect itself" from Hezbollah [25]. A fourth round of talks is scheduled for June 2–3, 2026, with a military coordination meeting between Lebanese, Israeli, and American delegations at the Pentagon on May 29 [25].

The core issues on the table are the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the Lebanese army's takeover of the south, financial support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and an enforcement mechanism for any ceasefire [25]. France and Qatar have been involved in parallel diplomatic efforts, though the U.S.-led track has taken precedence.

The obstacles are structural. Israel demands Hezbollah's disarmament as a precondition for withdrawal. Hezbollah refuses to disarm while Israeli forces remain on Lebanese territory [25]. The Lebanese government, weakened by years of economic crisis and political paralysis, lacks the institutional capacity to impose disarmament unilaterally. Previous arrangements — including UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war — failed to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament.

Netanyahu's May 25 order to intensify strikes, issued while the ceasefire extension remains nominally in effect, has raised questions about whether the military track and the diplomatic track are working at cross purposes. Both sides have accused each other of ceasefire violations since April [25], and the escalation of strikes in the Bekaa Valley represents a geographic expansion beyond pre-ceasefire targeting patterns.

What Comes Next

The coming weeks will test whether the military and diplomatic tracks can coexist. The June 2–3 talks and May 29 Pentagon meeting represent the most concrete diplomatic framework since the conflict escalated in March. But Netanyahu's domestic political calculus — facing pressure from right-wing coalition partners urging a broader Lebanon campaign [26] — may pull in the opposite direction.

The $410 million daily cost of operations, the mounting humanitarian toll, and the approaching limits of U.S. munitions resupply all create pressure for resolution. Whether that pressure produces a durable agreement or simply another temporary arrangement — to be followed, as in 2006, by Hezbollah's reconstruction — depends on variables that military force alone cannot control: Iran's strategic calculations, the Lebanese state's institutional recovery, and the willingness of external powers to enforce whatever terms emerge.