Myanmar Military Forces Conscription as Rebel Groups Lose Territory

On February 10, 2024, Myanmar's military junta activated a law that had been dormant for fourteen years. The People's Military Service Law, originally passed in 2010 but never enforced, suddenly made military service mandatory for all men aged 18 to 35 and all women aged 18 to 27 [1]. With a stated target of 5,000 conscripts per month and an annual goal of 60,000, the regime declared that 14 million of the country's young people — 26 percent of the population — were now eligible to be called up [2].

Two years later, the results of that decision are reshaping Myanmar's civil war, its economy, and the lives of millions of its citizens — though not always in the ways the junta intended.

The Numbers: Who Has Been Drafted, and How

By April 2025, the military had completed eleven conscription batches, each nominally comprising 5,000 inductees [3]. Al Jazeera reported approximately 60,000 soldiers drafted in the first year [3]. By mid-2025, with additional batches, estimates from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) placed the total at over 100,000 conscripts [4].

Source: The Irrawaddy / Al Jazeera

Data as of Apr 11, 2025CSV

The official process works through township-level administrators who compile lists and issue summons. But the gap between the bureaucratic framework and its enforcement has been stark. Radio Free Asia documented "snatch and recruit" operations in which young men were abducted from bus stops and public places by plainclothes operatives driving private vehicles [5]. The National Youth Congress recorded 886 conscription-related incidents between February 2024 and February 2025, of which 560 — 63 percent — involved forced recruitment [6].

Local officials have added a layer of corruption. Multiple sources describe administrators extorting payments from families to keep their sons off draft lists [3][5]. In several documented cases, community members killed officials who entered their neighborhoods to compile conscription rolls [3].

The Rohingya, a stateless Muslim minority long denied citizenship under Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law, have been subjected to a particular cruelty. Human Rights Watch documented that the military forcibly recruited more than 1,000 Rohingya men and boys from Rakhine State since February 2024, using a conscription law that technically applies only to citizens — a status the Rohingya have never been granted [7]. Rohingya conscripts described nighttime raids, false promises of citizenship, and as little as two weeks of training before being sent to fight the Arakan Army on the front lines [7].

Who Bears the Burden

The conscription burden falls unevenly. Recruits overwhelmingly come from poor families in junta-controlled lowland areas — predominantly Bamar communities — that lack the resources to pay off officials [5]. Wealthy families in Yangon and Mandalay have reportedly used bribes and connections to secure exemptions, while those in remote ethnic frontier regions are harder for the junta's administrative apparatus to reach but face forced recruitment when troops pass through [5][6].

The law provides exemptions for certain government employees, monks, and students, though enforcement of these carve-outs is inconsistent. In practice, the junta has also released prisoners on the condition they serve in the military, blurring the line between conscription and penal labor [6].

In January 2025, the junta formalized by-laws that restrict eligible youths from leaving the country without permission, effectively turning the border into a second front in the conscription campaign [8].

Penalties and Enforcement

The People's Military Service Law prescribes up to five years' imprisonment for draft evasion [1]. In practice, the Chin Human Rights Organization reported that it has not documented cases of imprisonment for evasion — instead, those who resist are simply conscripted by force [9]. The threat of prosecution, however, falls not only on evaders but on their families. Radio Free Asia reported cases where relatives of draft dodgers faced investigation, property seizure threats, and harassment by local authorities [10].

Enforcement varies sharply by township. In some areas of Mandalay and Sagaing Regions, local administrators enforce conscription rigorously. In others, particularly near active conflict zones, the junta's administrative reach has collapsed entirely, making conscription unenforceable [5][9].

The Battlefield: Resistance Setbacks and Junta Counteroffensives

The conscription push coincides with — and has partly enabled — a shift in battlefield momentum. After resistance forces achieved dramatic victories in late 2023 and throughout 2024, seizing dozens of towns in northern Shan State during Operation 1027 and expanding control in Rakhine, Karen, and Karenni States, the Tatmadaw launched sustained counteroffensives beginning in mid-2025 [4][11].

Key territorial changes since early 2025 include:

• Northern Shan State: The junta recaptured Kyaukme, a strategically important district capital controlling a critical transport artery, in October 2025. Chinese pressure forced the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to return the major city of Lashio to junta control [4][11].
• Mandalay Region: The military retook Thabeikkyin in July 2025, Singu in December, and captured Tagaung — the last resistance-held town in the region — on March 10, 2026, after a month-long advance supported by intensive air and artillery strikes [4].
• Chin State: After resistance forces captured Falam and overran the last junta base in the state in 2025, the Tatmadaw recaptured Falam in April–May 2026 [12].
• Rakhine State: The Arakan Army remains the notable exception, controlling all but three of seventeen townships and operating freely across the state except in the capital Sittwe, the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, and Manaung Island [4][11].
• Kachin State: The junta restored control over a critical roadway linking central Myanmar with Kachin State, though it has been unable to capture Bhamo, a major population center on the Irrawaddy River [4].

A 2026 UN Security Council briefing estimated the junta controls about 21 percent of national territory. Independent mapping projects put the figure closer to one-third, while a field survey credited resistance forces with roughly 38 percent of territory as of December 31, 2025 [11]. The remainder is contested or under fragmented control.

What Changed: Chinese Pressure and Drone Warfare

Two factors beyond conscription explain the military's resurgence. First, China reversed its posture toward several ethnic armed organizations. After opposition victories in 2023–2024 disrupted Chinese economic interests along the border, Beijing cut fuel and ammunition supplies to key ethnic militias and pressured them into ceasefires [4][11]. China reportedly proposed $3 billion in assistance to the regime, and Chinese-supplied drones now provide aerial cover for junta ground operations [11].

Second, the Tatmadaw has integrated unmanned aerial vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft into its operations more effectively, using drone warfare and countermeasures that resistance forces — largely reliant on small arms, improvised weapons, and captured equipment — struggle to match [4][12].

The Three Brotherhood Alliance, which spearheaded Operation 1027, has fractured. In March 2026, the MNDAA turned on its ally the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), capturing the town of Kutkai — a sign that Chinese-brokered arrangements are splitting the resistance from within [4].

Desertion, Defection, and the Replacement Problem

The conscription drive must be understood in the context of the Tatmadaw's own attrition. Conservative estimates as of October 2024 placed defections at 5,800 and desertions at 15,000 since the February 2021 coup [13]. The Council on Foreign Relations reported more than 2,000 soldiers defected, surrendered, or were captured between January and September 2025 alone [11]. In 2024, more than 6,000 soldiers, including higher-ranking officers and entire battalions, surrendered as resistance forces advanced [13].

These figures suggest conscription functions less as force expansion than as replacement for hemorrhaging manpower. The IISS noted that while over 100,000 conscripts have been inducted, many receive minimal training — sometimes as little as three months — before deployment to dangerous front-line positions [3][4]. One analyst quoted by Al Jazeera observed that conscripts assigned to high-risk roles such as being "airdropped behind enemy lines" are "unsurprisingly failing at these tasks — either being killed, defecting or fleeing" [3].

Still, the IISS assessed that conscripts appear to be "fighting effectively" in defensive roles, and no mass desertions or defections among conscripts have been reported as of mid-2025 [4]. The picture is mixed: conscription has provided bodies to hold positions, but the Tatmadaw's offensive capacity continues to rely primarily on air power, artillery, and drone strikes rather than infantry maneuver.

Steelmanning the Junta's Case

The military's narrative — that it is winning the war and restoring order — rests on verifiable, if limited, evidence. The recapture of Kyaukme, Tagaung, and Falam represents genuine territorial recovery, confirmed by IISS mapping data and satellite imagery analysis [4][12]. The restoration of key road corridors between central Myanmar and Kachin State is strategically significant. Resistance forces have indeed lost ground across multiple fronts since mid-2025.

However, several caveats apply. The junta's gains have been concentrated in areas where Chinese pressure on ethnic armed organizations removed the opposition's logistical backbone — a factor the military does not control and cannot replicate in Rakhine or Karenni States where the Arakan Army and Karenni resistance operate independently of Chinese influence [4][11]. The inability to take Bhamo, despite sustained offensive operations, highlights the limits of conscript-reinforced forces against determined defenders. And the International Crisis Group characterized the military's position as "consolidation, not transition" — holding ground rather than achieving the political settlement or outright military victory that would end the conflict [14].

Comparative Context: Russia, Eritrea, and Sudan

Myanmar's conscription drive invites comparison with other wartime or authoritarian drafts.

Russia's 2022 partial mobilization called up 300,000 reservists (with investigative journalists estimating the true figure at closer to 500,000) in September 2022 to stabilize front lines in Ukraine [15]. The mobilization triggered an exodus of approximately 500,000 Russian men, primarily to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and other neighboring countries [15]. Russia's mobilized troops stabilized the front and blunted Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive, but many received limited training and suffered high casualties [15].

Eritrea's indefinite national service requires all able-bodied citizens to serve, ostensibly for 18 months but in practice for an average of six years, with some serving over a decade [16]. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea described conditions as amounting to "slavery-like practices," including forced labor, arbitrary detention, and sexual abuse [16]. Eritrea's system has produced one of the world's highest per-capita refugee outflows.

Myanmar's conscription shares features with both: the chaotic, coercive recruitment methods of Russia's mobilization and the indefinite, abuse-laden service conditions documented in Eritrea. Like Russia, Myanmar has seen a significant refugee outflow triggered by conscription. Like Eritrea, the junta's system disproportionately targets the most vulnerable populations.

The Economic Toll

The conscription law has accelerated an economic decline already set in motion by the 2021 coup. Myanmar's GDP contracted by approximately 1 percent in 2024, following a 12 percent collapse in 2021 — the year of the coup — and anemic recovery since [17].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

The Transnational Institute documented that the conscription law "further worsened labour shortages across various industries" in junta-controlled territory [18]. Exports fell 13 percent and imports 20 percent during 2024–2025 compared to the previous period, while overland border exports dropped 44 percent [18]. Domestic businesses have sold assets and relocated to Thailand, with Myanmar citizens investing 3.7 billion baht ($111 million) in Thai condominiums in a single year [18].

Thailand's Department of Employment reported nearly 2.3 million registered Myanmar migrants by July 2024, with an estimated two million more undocumented [19]. An estimated 1.5 million Myanmar nationals crossed into Thailand between January 2023 and February 2024 — a 50 percent increase in long-term entries compared to the prior year [19]. The ILO noted that outmigration has become "more prominent since the SAC announced the implementation of the conscription law," contributing to labor shortages and wage pressure in the sectors — agriculture, construction, small manufacturing — that form the backbone of the junta's revenue base [20].

Myanmar now ranks as the world's sixth-largest source of refugees, with UNHCR recording 1.47 million refugees of Myanmar origin as of 2025 [21].

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

What Comes Next

The Tatmadaw's conscription-fueled stabilization faces structural limits. The junta held elections in November 2025 that were widely dismissed as illegitimate [14], and its "new administration" amounts to a rebranding of military rule. The resistance remains fragmented but active across most of the country. The Arakan Army continues to expand its de facto state in Rakhine. The Kachin Independence Army holds defensible terrain in the north. And the People's Defence Forces, despite setbacks, retain the capacity to launch attacks in central Myanmar.

Conscription has bought time for the Tatmadaw but at a cost: an economy losing its labor force, a population being pushed across borders, international condemnation from the UN and human rights organizations, and a military whose ranks are increasingly filled with reluctant, poorly trained soldiers. The war that neither side can win shows no sign of ending — only of grinding on, with Myanmar's young men caught between a junta that demands their service and a conflict that offers no safe ground.