Israeli Settlers Force Palestinian Family to Exhume Father's Remains in West Bank

On a Friday in early May 2026, the Asasa family buried their patriarch, 85-year-old Hussein Asasa, in a cemetery in their village south of Jenin in the occupied West Bank. They had coordinated the burial in advance with Israeli security forces and obtained the required military permit [1][2]. Within hours, armed Israeli settlers from the nearby Sa-Nur settlement arrived with spades and demanded the family dig up the body, claiming the grave was too close to their settlement — roughly 300 meters away [3]. When the family hesitated, the settlers threatened to bring a bulldozer [1]. As the grieving relatives complied, settlers threw stones at them [4].

Israeli soldiers were present throughout the incident. According to NPR, they confiscated digging tools from the settlers but did not force them to leave or stop the exhumation [1]. The family ultimately reburied Hussein Asasa in a different cemetery.

"This is appalling and emblematic of the dehumanisation of Palestinians that we see unfolding across the OPT," said Ajith Sunghay, head of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Palestinian office. He added that the Israeli military "either stays idle, or in fact, in many cases, takes the side of Israeli settlers" [1][5].

The Sa-Nur Settlement: A Policy Decision with Consequences

The exhumation did not occur in a vacuum. Sa-Nur was one of 19 settlements evacuated under Israel's 2005 disengagement plan, which also saw the withdrawal of settlers and troops from Gaza. Twenty-one years later, in April 2026, the Netanyahu government officially re-established the settlement, with Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and other ministers attending a celebration at the site [6][7].

The re-establishment was made possible by legislative amendments to the Disengagement Law, removing restrictions on Israeli civilian presence in parts of the northern West Bank. Authorities approved 126 housing units at Sa-Nur, and 16 families moved in [6]. At the ceremony, Smotrich declared that Israeli authorities were "burying the idea of a Palestinian state" [7].

The settlement's revival is part of an acceleration in construction across the West Bank. According to Peace Now, settlement housing unit approvals surged from 4,948 in 2020 to 12,855 in 2023, before settling at 9,956 in 2024 — a sustained expansion that more than doubled pre-2022 levels [8].

Source: Peace Now

Data as of Mar 1, 2025CSV

A March 2026 UN report found that settlement expansion has driven the forced displacement of over 36,000 Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem [9]. More than 100 new settlements have been approved since the current government took power in late 2022 [7].

The Impunity Gap: What Happens When Settler Violence Is Investigated

The Asasa incident raises a question that has persisted for decades: what accountability do settlers face when they commit acts against Palestinians?

According to Yesh Din, an Israeli human rights organization that has tracked law enforcement outcomes since 2005, the answer is: very little. Out of more than 1,700 police investigation files monitored by the group through 2025, 93.6% closed without an indictment. Only 3% resulted in a full or partial conviction [10][11].

Source: Yesh Din

Data as of Dec 1, 2025CSV

The reasons for closure follow a pattern. In 64% of closed cases, police cited "offender unknown" as the basis for ending the investigation. Another 20% were closed for "insufficient evidence." Police failed in 82% of investigations into offenses committed against Palestinians, according to Yesh Din's assessment [10].

The problem extends beyond civilian settlers to the military. Only 5% of investigations into suspected offenses by Israeli soldiers against Palestinians resulted in indictments [10]. Between 2023 and November 2025, Yesh Din documented nearly 30 incidents of organized mass violence by settlers against Palestinians. In 16 of those incidents, soldiers or police were present and "assisted the attack directly or indirectly" [10].

The organization concluded that "the State of Israel and its law enforcement agencies in the West Bank are directly responsible for the violence Israelis perpetrate against Palestinians" [10].

Victim reporting has also declined. Between January 2023 and September 2024, 60.6% of Palestinian crime victims chose not to file a complaint, a figure that rose to 66% in 2024 [11]. Since the current government took office, 57.5% of victims elected not to report crimes at all, reflecting what Yesh Din describes as a fundamental breakdown of trust in the legal system [10].

How the Current Coalition Changed the Rules

The composition of Israel's governing coalition, formed in December 2022, is central to understanding the current dynamics. The coalition includes Likud (32 seats), Smotrich's Religious Zionism party (7 seats), and Itamar Ben Gvir's Otzma Yehudit ("Jewish Power") party (6 seats) — both of which draw their core support from the settler movement [12][13].

Ben Gvir, who has a history of settler activism and was previously convicted of incitement against Arabs, became Minister of National Security, putting him in charge of Israeli police operations. His appointment has coincided with what Yesh Din and other organizations describe as a measurable decline in law enforcement against settler violence in the West Bank [10][12].

Smotrich, as Finance Minister, gained administrative authority over the Civil Administration in the West Bank — the body responsible for governing Palestinian life in Area C, which comprises roughly 60% of the West Bank. In May 2023, the government transferred authority to approve demolition of illegal settler structures to Smotrich's office. This led to a reported decrease in enforcement actions against settler construction violations [12][13]. The government also cancelled the establishment of a "special enforcement unit" that had been planned to address planning and construction violations by settlers [12].

The coalition's guiding principles explicitly prioritize settlement expansion and oppose Palestinian statehood. As Yesh Din noted in a January 2023 policy paper, the coalition agreements "openly express an intention to apply Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank" [13].

International Law and the Protection of the Dead

The forced exhumation of Hussein Asasa intersects with established principles of international humanitarian law. The Fourth Geneva Convention, which governs the treatment of civilians under occupation, contains provisions specifically addressing burial and grave management. Parties to a conflict are required to ensure the dead are "honorably interred" according to their religion, with graves "respected, grouped by nationality, properly maintained and marked" [14].

Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring its own civilian population into occupied territory — the legal basis for the near-universal international consensus that Israeli settlements are illegal [15]. The International Court of Justice reaffirmed this position in its July 2024 advisory opinion, finding that Israeli settlements violate international law through "prohibited transfer" of civilians and land confiscation that breaches the Hague Regulations [16].

The ICJ went further, concluding that Israel's settlement policies constitute "de facto annexation of large parts" of the occupied territory and that its failure to prevent or punish settler violence against Palestinians is "inconsistent with its obligations" [16]. The Court found that Israel must provide "full reparation for the damage caused," including restitution of land and property, evacuation of settlers, and monetary compensation where restitution is impossible [16].

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, under Article 8, classifies the transfer of an occupying power's civilian population into occupied territory as a war crime. The destruction or seizure of property not justified by military necessity is similarly prohibited [15].

However, enforcement of these provisions has been limited. While the ICJ's advisory opinions carry legal weight, they are not directly enforceable. Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute and does not recognize the ICC's jurisdiction over its actions in the occupied territories [15][16].

The Settler Legal Perspective

Israeli settler advocates and some legal scholars contest the international consensus. Their arguments rest on several pillars.

The sovereignty argument holds that Israel cannot be an occupying power in territory to which it claims sovereign title. Proponents point to the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, whose boundaries included the West Bank, as the legal predecessor to Israel's sovereignty claims [15].

The state land doctrine distinguishes between private and public land in the West Bank. Much of the territory was unregistered or held by religious foundations (waqfs), which Israel classified as state land after 1967 and made available for settlement construction [15][17].

Some advocates also argue that the Geneva Convention's prohibition on population transfer applies only to forced transfers, not voluntary settlement. Legal scholar Eugene Kontorovich of George Mason University has argued that Israeli settlements "do not violate international law" under this interpretation [17].

Critics respond that these arguments have been rejected by the ICJ, the UN Security Council, and the vast majority of the international legal community. The ICJ's 2024 advisory opinion specifically addressed and dismissed the argument that settlements could be justified under the Mandate system [16].

Psychological Toll: Trauma Without a "Post"

The forced exhumation of Hussein Asasa compounds what researchers describe as ongoing, cumulative trauma experienced by Palestinians under occupation. Studies have found that 23.2% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza report PTSD, 17.3% experience anxiety disorders, and 15.3% report depression [18]. A World Bank study found that 50% of adults in the West Bank screen positive for depression [18].

Palestinian psychologists have challenged the applicability of the standard PTSD framework to their population. As one mental health official at the Palestinian Ministry of Health put it: "There is no 'post' because the trauma is repetitive and ongoing" [18]. The desecration of burial sites and forced displacement of the dead adds a layer of cultural and spiritual harm that is difficult to quantify but deeply felt in communities where burial traditions carry religious and familial significance.

Research published in the International Journal of Mental Health Systems identified continuous exposure to political violence, displacement, and restriction of movement as key risk factors for mental health deterioration among Palestinians [18][19]. Social support has been found to facilitate post-traumatic growth but does not significantly alleviate core PTSD symptoms in this population [19].

What Recourse Does the Asasa Family Have?

The practical options available to the Asasa family illustrate the gap between legal protections on paper and remedies in practice.

Israeli courts: Palestinians can petition Israeli courts, including the High Court of Justice, but the historical success rate for cases challenging settlement activity or seeking accountability for settler violence is low. Israeli courts have generally upheld the legality of settlement construction and the military's authority in Area C [15].

Palestinian Authority: The PA has limited jurisdiction, primarily in Areas A and B of the West Bank. In Area C, where the incident occurred, the Israeli military and Civil Administration retain full control. The PA can raise complaints through diplomatic channels but cannot directly enforce remedies [12].

International Criminal Court: The ICC opened an investigation into the situation in Palestine in 2021, and its jurisdiction was affirmed by a Pre-Trial Chamber ruling. However, ICC investigations are slow-moving, and no charges related to settlement expansion or settler violence have been brought. The timeline for any individual case would likely span years [16].

ICJ advisory opinions: The July 2024 opinion stated that all UN member states are obligated not to recognize changes to the occupied territory's demographic composition and must not assist in maintaining Israel's unlawful presence [16]. In practice, enforcement depends on political will among member states, and no binding consequences have followed.

Diplomatic channels: Some states have imposed targeted sanctions on individual settlers involved in violence. The United States, under the Biden administration, sanctioned several settlers in 2024. But these measures have been limited in scope and have not addressed structural impunity [12].

The family's most immediate recourse — filing a complaint with Israeli police — faces the statistical reality documented by Yesh Din: a 93.6% chance the case will close without charges [10].

The Broader Pattern

The exhumation of Hussein Asasa is one incident in a pattern that international organizations have documented for years. B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, has stated that "settler violence equals state violence," characterizing settler attacks as an extension of Israeli government policy rather than isolated criminal acts [20].

The UNHCR's global refugee data, while not specific to this incident, places Palestinian displacement in a broader context of worldwide forced migration.

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

The UN has called on Israel to investigate the Asasa incident and hold those responsible to account [5]. Whether that happens will test the same enforcement mechanisms that have produced a 3% conviction rate over two decades.

What remains is the image of Mohammed Asasa, standing over his father's unearthed coffin, forced to carry the body to a new resting place while stones flew at his family — all within sight of Israeli soldiers who had issued the permit to bury Hussein Asasa there in the first place.