Israeli Man Arrested for Building Bomb Lab in Alleged Iranian Plot Against Former PM Bennett

On April 9, 2026, Israeli police and the Shin Bet security agency disclosed that a 22-year-old Haifa resident had been arrested the previous month for manufacturing explosives in an Iranian-directed plot to kill former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett [1][2]. The suspect, Ami Gaydarov, had allegedly produced between 8 and 10 kilograms of TATP — a volatile explosive favored by terrorists for its simple recipe and difficulty of detection — in a rented apartment in downtown Haifa [3]. Three co-conspirators were also detained, and indictments for all four are expected within days [2].

The case marks what Israeli security officials have called "a serious escalation" in Iran's covert operations inside Israel [4]. It is the latest and most operationally advanced in a wave of Iranian espionage and assassination plots that has accelerated sharply since 2024, with authorities now having filed more than 40 indictments against roughly 60 defendants recruited by Iranian intelligence [5].

The Bomb Lab

Gaydarov allegedly rented the Haifa apartment specifically to serve as a laboratory for explosive manufacturing [3]. With guidance from his Iranian handler, he synthesized TATP — triacetone triperoxide — a white crystalline powder that possesses roughly 83% of the destructive power of TNT [6]. TATP is classified as one of the most sensitive explosives known, prone to detonation from impact, friction, or temperature changes [6]. It has been used in multiple major terrorist attacks, including the 2005 London bombings and the 2016 Brussels attacks, because its precursor chemicals — acetone and hydrogen peroxide — are commercially available [6].

The quantity Gaydarov produced was substantial. Superintendent Maor Goren of the Israel Police noted that the 8 to 10 kilograms of TATP recovered was "nearly 30 times greater" than the 300 grams used in the 2025 Bat Yam bus attacks [3]. Gaydarov also tested the material in an underground parking garage in Haifa, recording the detonation on his cellphone with two associates present [3]. Investigators said the test produced what they described as a "powerful blast" from a small amount of the material [3].

The operational readiness of the plot at the time of arrest remains partially unclear from public disclosures. Gaydarov was reportedly "carrying out operations for the Iranians up until the night before his arrest" [3], but authorities have not stated whether a specific date or method for the assassination attempt against Bennett had been finalized. Gaydarov himself was reportedly unaware of his target's identity — his Iranian handler had not disclosed that the intended victim was the former prime minister [3].

Recruitment and Payment

Gaydarov first made contact with Iranian operatives in August 2025 through Telegram job groups — the same platform that has become the primary recruitment channel for Iranian intelligence operations targeting Israelis [7][3]. The recruitment followed a pattern that the Shin Bet has documented across dozens of cases: initial contact through social media, small payments for seemingly innocuous tasks, and a gradual escalation toward more serious assignments [7].

Over approximately seven months, Gaydarov received between NIS 70,000 and NIS 80,000 (roughly $19,500–$26,000) for his work [2][3]. The payments were transferred primarily through cryptocurrency and digital wallets, with some funds routed through PayPal [3]. He purchased dedicated communication devices to maintain secure contact with his handlers [2].

Beyond the bomb-making, Gaydarov carried out intelligence-gathering missions during Operation Roaring Lion — the Israeli military campaign against Iran that began on February 28, 2026 [8]. These included photographing the Haifa port and missile impact sites in northern Israel, recording real-time missile interception footage, documenting civil defense alert details, and attempting to locate a U.S. Navy destroyer expected at the port [3]. He was also tasked with identifying a property overlooking the port for potential installation of surveillance equipment [2].

Three other suspects were arrested alongside Gaydarov. Sergey Libman and Eduard Shovtiyuk were detained for allegedly assisting in acquiring raw materials for the explosives, concealing the finished product, and participating in testing [2][3]. A fourth, unnamed suspect independently disposed of explosive material after receiving it from Gaydarov [3].

A Pattern of Iranian Recruitment Inside Israel

The Gaydarov case is far from isolated. Iranian recruitment of Israeli citizens for espionage and operational tasks has surged dramatically, with the Shin Bet reporting a 400% increase in recruitment attempts in 2025 compared to 2024 [7]. In 2025 alone, 25 Israelis and foreign residents were indicted for spying for Iran, while 120 separate Iranian espionage incidents were thwarted [9].

Source: Times of Israel, Shin Bet Reports

Data as of Apr 9, 2026CSV

The recruits cut across Israeli society. Those charged with espionage include Russian-Israeli soldiers from the Haifa suburbs, a Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) man from Bnei Brak, a West Bank settler, an Arab Israeli college student, four active-duty IDF soldiers, and a former police interpreter [7][9][10]. In one high-profile case, former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev was convicted and sentenced to 11 years for espionage on behalf of Iran [11].

Source: Shin Bet / Jerusalem Post

Data as of Apr 9, 2026CSV

The common thread is not ideology but financial vulnerability. Iranian intelligence targets individuals from "the weakest strata of society," according to the Shin Bet, promising easy and quick money [7]. Gaydarov, a 22-year-old from Haifa with no known prior criminal record or ideological motivation, fits this profile precisely. The initial payments are small — often a few hundred dollars for photographing a location or gathering publicly available information — before assignments escalate to intelligence collection and, in this case, bomb-making [7].

This recruitment model differs from traditional espionage operations that rely on ideologically motivated agents or foreign operatives with diplomatic cover. Iran has instead adopted a volume-based approach, casting a wide net through social media and encrypted messaging platforms in the hope that some recruits will prove capable of carrying out more serious tasks [7].

Foiled Plots and the Targeting of Israeli Officials

The Bennett plot fits within a broader pattern of Iranian assassination attempts against Israeli officials that has intensified since 2024. The Shin Bet has publicly confirmed foiling multiple plots, several at advanced stages [12].

In September 2024, Moti Maman of Ashkelon was accused of being recruited by Iran to assassinate Israel's sitting prime minister, defense minister, or the head of the Shin Bet [12]. That same month, Hezbollah — Iran's Lebanese proxy — sought to assassinate former Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon with a bomb in Tel Aviv's Yarkon Park [12]. In January 2026, seven men from East Jerusalem were arrested for planning assassinations on behalf of Iran [12]. And in late 2024 through mid-2025, Mexico, with U.S. and Israeli intelligence assistance, foiled an alleged Iranian plot to assassinate Israeli Ambassador Einat Kranz Neiger [13].

Days after the Gaydarov arrest was made public, Israeli authorities announced they had foiled a second Iranian plot targeting Bennett — a separate operation involving a different suspect [14]. The disclosure of two simultaneous assassination operations against the same former prime minister underscored the scale and persistence of Iran's campaign.

The targeting of a former prime minister rather than a sitting official raises distinct legal and strategic questions. Under international law, the recruitment and direction of a civilian to carry out an assassination on foreign soil constitutes a violation of sovereignty and could engage state responsibility under the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, which hold states accountable for acts carried out by persons "acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State" [15]. Whether Bennett's status as a former rather than current head of state affects the legal calculus is less clear, though the prohibition on assassination as an instrument of state policy applies regardless of the target's current office [15].

Iran's Denials and the Evidence Question

Iran has consistently denied involvement in assassination campaigns abroad. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in a Fox News interview: "This is not our policy to kill anybody outside Iran, let alone the president of another country" [16]. Iranian officials have characterized Israeli allegations as fabricated pretexts for military escalation [16].

These denials sit alongside a substantial and growing body of allegations from multiple governments. The U.S. Department of Justice charged Afghan national Farhad Shakeri in November 2024 with plotting to assassinate then-President-elect Donald Trump at the direction of the IRGC [16]. Israeli courts have processed dozens of cases in which defendants have acknowledged contact with Iranian handlers [11][17].

The evidentiary question remains significant, however. Most of the publicly available evidence in Israeli espionage cases comes from Shin Bet investigations and prosecution filings. Independent verification is limited. Court proceedings provide one layer of judicial scrutiny, but many cases have involved plea bargains rather than full evidentiary trials [17]. Critics and skeptics note that intelligence agencies have institutional incentives to emphasize foreign threats, and that the broader context of the Iran-Israel war creates conditions in which allegations of Iranian plotting serve domestic political purposes.

At the same time, the sheer volume of cases — spanning multiple countries, involving different intelligence agencies, and producing criminal charges in varied legal systems — makes a blanket dismissal of Iranian involvement difficult to sustain. The convergence of U.S., Israeli, and Mexican investigations pointing to Iranian direction of assassination plots represents a body of evidence that extends beyond any single government's assertions [12][13][16].

Security Failures and Counterintelligence Gaps

That a 22-year-old with no apparent training was able to manufacture 8-10 kilograms of high explosive in a rented apartment in Israel's third-largest city raises questions about domestic counterintelligence capacity. The bomb lab operated for months before detection, during a period when Israel was actively at war with Iran [3][8].

The Shin Bet and Israel Police have pointed to their success in ultimately detecting and dismantling the plot as evidence that their systems work [2]. But the timeline suggests the intervention came late. Gaydarov was in contact with his Iranian handler from August 2025 and was arrested in March 2026 — a seven-month operational window during which he manufactured explosives, conducted a test detonation, and carried out multiple intelligence-gathering missions [3].

The Israeli government's response has included both operational and legislative measures. In February 2026, with the backing of Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, authorities issued a directive to pursue citizenship revocation for individuals convicted of serious espionage offenses on behalf of Iran [5]. The Prime Minister's office and the Shin Bet also launched a public awareness campaign warning Israeli citizens about Iranian recruitment tactics [7].

The Courts: A Bottleneck

Despite the wave of arrests and indictments, convictions have lagged far behind. As of early 2026, only two defendants in Iranian espionage cases had received sentences: Moti Maman, sentenced to 10 years following a plea deal, and Elimelech Stern, a 22-year-old ultra-Orthodox yeshiva student from Beit Shemesh, who received three years for conducting espionage missions [17][11].

The bottleneck has multiple causes. State Attorney Amit Isman directed prosecutors to reject plea deals and mediation in Iranian spy cases, requiring full evidentiary trials — a policy intended to maximize deterrence but one that has slowed case resolution [17]. Israel's courts are already backlogged with approximately 500,000 pending cases, and 50 judicial positions remain unfilled [17].

Security officials have warned that the delays undermine deterrence. If potential recruits see that those who are caught face years of legal limbo rather than swift and severe punishment, the calculus of accepting Iranian money may shift in the wrong direction [17].

The sentencing patterns that have emerged so far suggest a range. Stern's three-year sentence reflected his financial rather than ideological motivation and relatively limited espionage activities. The judge in his case, Miriam Lomp of the Jerusalem District Court, wrote that although his crime was serious, the sentence was "relatively moderate" given his circumstances [11]. Segev's 11-year term, by contrast, reflected the gravity of a former cabinet minister providing intelligence to an enemy state [11]. Gaydarov and his co-defendants, if convicted of manufacturing explosives for an assassination plot, would likely face charges at the upper end of the severity spectrum.

The Wartime Context

The Gaydarov case cannot be understood outside the context of the 2026 Iran-Israel war. Operation Roaring Lion, launched on February 28, 2026, alongside the U.S. Operation Epic Fury, has involved approximately 5,700 combat sorties and more than 540 strike waves across Iran [8]. Israeli forces assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28 and subsequently killed Iran's intelligence minister [8][18]. Israeli officials assessed that roughly 80-85% of Iran's air defense architecture had been destroyed [8].

Iran responded with over 200 attack waves involving ballistic missiles and drones against Israel, U.S. bases, and allied countries, and closed the Strait of Hormuz [8]. The conflict expanded to include a renewed Lebanon war with Hezbollah, killing more than 1,700 people by early April [8].

In this context, the Iranian recruitment of Israelis for espionage and assassination takes on dual significance. It represents both an intelligence-gathering effort during active hostilities and an asymmetric weapon — an attempt to strike at Israeli leadership through proxies when conventional military options have been degraded. Gaydarov's assignments reflected both functions: intelligence collection on military infrastructure (the port, missile impact sites, a U.S. warship) alongside preparation for a targeted killing [3].

What Comes Next

Indictments against Gaydarov and his three co-defendants are expected within days [2]. The legal proceedings will test whether the Israeli justice system can process cases of this severity more quickly than the espionage cases that have languished in court backlogs.

For Bennett, the disclosure of two separate Iranian plots against him in the span of a month places him in an unusual category — a former head of state facing active assassination threats from a nation-state adversary. Bennett has not publicly commented on the plots [2].

The broader question the case raises is whether Iran's strategy of recruiting ordinary Israeli citizens as operational assets can be effectively countered through arrests and prosecutions alone, or whether it represents a structural vulnerability that demands a fundamentally different counterintelligence approach. With recruitment attempts up 400% and a war providing both motive and cover, the bomb lab in downtown Haifa may be less an aberration than a warning [7].