Israel Launches Major Airstrikes on Lebanon as Iran Ceasefire Shows Signs of Strain

The two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, announced on April 7 after weeks of Pakistani-mediated diplomacy, was supposed to be a turning point — a pause in the most significant military confrontation in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq War. Instead, within hours, it became a case study in the limits of bilateral agreements in a multi-front conflict.

On April 8, Israel launched what its military called "the largest coordinated strike" of the current war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, hitting more than 100 targets in 10 minutes across Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the eastern Bekaa Valley [1]. Lebanon's health ministry reported at least 89 people killed and 700 wounded [1]. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office declared that the ceasefire "does not include Lebanon" [2]. The White House confirmed this interpretation [3].

Iran immediately threatened to withdraw from the ceasefire and re-close the Strait of Hormuz if the attacks on Lebanon continued [4].

What the Ceasefire Actually Says

The US-Iran ceasefire was brokered by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who announced on April 7 that both sides and their allies had agreed to an "immediate ceasefire everywhere, including Lebanon and elsewhere" [5]. The core terms, as reported by multiple outlets:

• The US and Israel would suspend bombing of Iran for two weeks [6].
• Iran would allow "safe passage" through the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire period, "via coordination with Iran's Armed Forces" [7].
• The US received a 10-point proposal from Iran that President Trump described as a "workable basis" for further negotiations [6].
• Peace talks were scheduled for Friday, April 10, in Islamabad, with Vice President JD Vance expected to lead the US delegation [7].

The fundamental ambiguity is the scope: Pakistan and Iran understood Lebanon to be included. Israel and the United States say it was not. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told Axios that the ceasefire "doesn't apply to Israeli strikes in Lebanon" [3]. A senior US official said Netanyahu raised the Lebanon issue in a phone call with Trump shortly before the announcement, and the two leaders agreed that "fighting in Lebanon could continue" [3].

This disagreement is not a technicality. Stopping Israeli strikes against Hezbollah was one of Iran's key demands [4]. If Iran views the agreement as broken, the entire ceasefire framework collapses — along with the prospect of reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

Israel's Legal and Strategic Position

Israel is not a signatory to the US-Iran ceasefire. No legal or diplomatic mechanism in the agreement gives the US authority to constrain Israeli military action in Lebanon. Netanyahu has consistently framed operations in Lebanon as a separate campaign — Operation Roaring Lion — distinct from the broader US-Iran confrontation that began on February 28 when the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran and killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei [8].

Israeli officials cite ongoing weapons transfers to Hezbollah as justification for continued strikes. The IDF has identified Hezbollah's Reinforcement and Weapons Transfer Unit (Unit 4400) as responsible for smuggling weapons from Iran into Lebanon via Syria [9]. Israel struck multiple sites it described as intelligence headquarters, rocket and naval unit infrastructure, and assets of Hezbollah's elite Radwan Force [1].

In early 2026, even before the current escalation, Israeli forces struck Lebanon nearly every day, citing violations of the November 2024 ceasefire by Hezbollah. Israel claimed Hezbollah was rebuilding its militant infrastructure, while the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL disputed some of Israel's characterizations of the threat [10]. An IDF Northern Command assessment acknowledged that Israel had "overestimated damage to Hezbollah" during the 2024 campaign and that Iran could keep supplying missiles "as long as the war continues" [11].

The steelman case for continued Israeli strikes rests on this operational reality: pausing while Hezbollah actively rearms through Syrian border routes, Israeli officials argue, would hand the group a strategic advantage that no two-week diplomatic window can offset [9].

What Was Hit — and What the Evidence Shows

The IDF stated it struck more than 100 Hezbollah targets in the April 8 wave, including weapons storage sites, command infrastructure, and facilities belonging to Hezbollah's aerial and naval units [1]. Several strikes hit dense commercial and residential areas in central Beirut without prior warning [1].

Independent verification remains limited. Residents and local officials denied that some of the buildings hit were military sites [12]. Journalists on the ground reported strikes on multi-story apartment buildings in Beirut's southern suburbs [1]. The IDF acknowledged that targets were located in civilian areas but blamed Hezbollah for operating within them [9].

In earlier phases of the 2026 Lebanon war, Israel struck sites ahead of a key disarmament meeting organized by the Lebanese government — a move critics argued was designed to undermine diplomatic solutions to the Hezbollah weapons question [10]. Hezbollah, for its part, has been an active combatant: on March 2, it launched a coordinated rocket and drone attack against Israel after the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, and more recently claimed to have hit an Israeli military ship with a naval cruise missile 68 nautical miles off the Lebanese coast [13][14].

The Humanitarian Cost

The scale of displacement in Lebanon has reached levels comparable to the worst moments of the 2006 war and the 2023-2024 conflict. More than 1.2 million people — roughly one-fifth of Lebanon's population — have been forced from their homes since hostilities intensified in March 2026 [15]. Over 136,000 have registered at collective shelters [15]. Hundreds of schools and public buildings have been converted into emergency housing [16].

Source: UNHCR / Lebanese Ministry of Public Health

Data as of Apr 8, 2026CSV

As of April 1, Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health reported at least 1,318 people killed, including 125 children, and 3,395 injured, including 429 children [17]. These figures predate the April 8 mass strikes. The UN described Lebanon as facing a "perfect storm" of conflict, displacement, and dwindling humanitarian resources [17]. More than 4.1 million people — over 70% of the population — were already in need of humanitarian assistance before the March 2026 escalation began [17].

Airstrikes have damaged hospitals, roads, water infrastructure, and electricity networks in Beirut, South Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley [15]. Aid access has been constrained by ongoing military operations, though precise comparisons to the 2006 conflict are difficult because the current war involves simultaneous operations across more of Lebanon's territory.

The Strait of Hormuz: Energy Markets on a Knife's Edge

The ceasefire's most tangible global consequence involves the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 21 million barrels of oil per day normally transit. Iran closed the strait after the war began, creating what energy analysts have called the largest oil supply disruption in history [18].

Source: Kpler / Bloomberg

Data as of Apr 8, 2026CSV

Under the ceasefire, Iran agreed to reopen the strait for safe passage during the two-week period. But the April 8 Israeli strikes on Lebanon prompted immediate threats from Iran to reverse that commitment. Iran's state-affiliated Fars news agency reported that oil ships' Hormuz transits were blocked again after the Lebanon strikes [19]. As of April 8, the strait remained largely closed, with more than 800 freighters stuck inside the Persian Gulf and only three ships observed leaving the region [19].

The supply disruption has been staggering: outages estimated at 7.5 million barrels per day in March, rising to a peak of 9.1 million bpd in April [20]. WTI crude oil closed at $112.41 per barrel in early April, with Brent at $109.77 [20]. At their peak, Brent prices surpassed $126 per barrel — the highest since 2022 [20]. FRED data shows WTI at $104.69 as of late March, up 45.7% year-over-year [21].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of Mar 30, 2026CSV

Wall Street analysts have modeled scenarios in which prices reach $170 or even $200 per barrel if the strait remains closed [20]. Countries in Asia have already begun fuel rationing [22]. Iran has selectively allowed Chinese vessels to pass, citing Beijing's diplomatic posture, while blocking others [18].

Escalation Pathways If the Ceasefire Collapses

The ceasefire faces structural threats from multiple directions. The Lebanon question is the most immediate: if Iran concludes that continued Israeli strikes constitute a violation of the agreement's spirit, Tehran has signaled it will resume hostilities and re-close the Strait of Hormuz [4].

RAND analysts have assessed Iran's "escalate to de-escalate" strategy, noting that Tehran's approach carries significant risks of backfiring, leaving Iran "poorer, weaker, and more isolated" [23]. The killing of Khamenei and dozens of senior officials in the initial US-Israeli strikes has created political uncertainty within Iran that complicates coherent decision-making [8].

The proxy dimension remains active. Hezbollah is already a combatant in Lebanon. Yemen's Houthis joined Iran's strikes on Israel in early April [14]. IISS analysis has examined how Gulf states could increase costs for Tehran but risk further escalation [24]. The Al Jazeera Centre for Studies noted that the initial US assault wave used Tomahawk cruise missiles from naval assets in the Mediterranean, and that any perceived ceasefire violation — whether by Iran directly or affiliated groups — could trigger immediate escalation rather than contained retaliation [25].

Iran's proxy network, while weakened and fragmented by the war, still includes groups capable of striking Gulf energy infrastructure [25]. Analysts at the Stimson Center have outlined scenarios in which embattled Iranian factions resort to attacks on Gulf targets to force external powers into imposing a broader ceasefire [26].

The immediate question is whether the Islamabad talks scheduled for Friday can produce enough progress to sustain the ceasefire past its initial two-week window — or whether the Lebanon gap will consume the agreement before negotiations begin.

The Diplomacy Gap

The fundamental problem is structural: the US brokered a bilateral ceasefire with Iran, but the conflict is not bilateral. Israel is an independent actor with its own military objectives in Lebanon. Hezbollah operates as both an Iranian proxy and an autonomous political-military organization. The Houthis have their own calculus. Gulf states face energy and security pressures that don't map neatly onto US-Iran negotiations.

Pakistan's mediation brought the two primary combatants to a pause. But pausing two parties in a five- or six-party conflict produces the situation visible on April 8: a ceasefire that holds in one theater while war intensifies in another, with the energy infrastructure connecting them — the Strait of Hormuz — serving as the mechanism through which escalation in Lebanon translates into global economic consequences.

The 2006 Lebanon War ended with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 after 34 days. The current conflict, now in its sixth week, has produced comparable displacement, higher cumulative casualties, and a global energy crisis that the 2006 war never triggered. Whether the Islamabad talks can bridge the gap between a bilateral ceasefire and the multi-lateral reality on the ground will determine whether the next two weeks bring de-escalation or a wider war.