Iran Revolutionary Guard Reportedly Deploying Child Soldiers as Young as 12

On March 26, 2026, Rahim Nadali, a cultural official in the IRGC's 27th Mohammad Rasulullah Division in Tehran, announced on state television that a new campaign called "Homeland Defending Combatants for Iran" would accept volunteers as young as 12 [1][2]. "Given that the age of those coming forward has dropped and they are requesting to participate, we lowered the minimum age to 12," Nadali said, adding that children aged 12 and 13 could join "if they wish" [3].

Three days later, 11-year-old Alireza Jafari was killed at a Basij-run checkpoint in Tehran during an Israeli drone strike. His 9-year-old brother was also present. Iranian authorities confirmed the child had been killed "while serving" at the checkpoint alongside his father, a Basij member [1]. According to Amnesty International, the boy's mother told investigators her husband had taken Alireza because there was a shortage of personnel at the site [1].

These events have placed Iran's recruitment of minors under renewed international scrutiny, with both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issuing detailed reports within days of each other in late March and early April 2026 [1][2].

What the Evidence Shows

Amnesty International's April 2026 report analyzed 16 photos and videos posted online since March 21, 2026, depicting children holding AK-pattern assault rifles or standing alongside IRGC forces at checkpoints and on patrols in Tehran, Mashhad, and Kermanshah [1]. Ghoncheh Habibiazad, a senior reporter for BBC Persian Forensic, shared with Amnesty screenshots of text messages from four eyewitnesses in Tehran, Karaj, and Rasht who described children aged 13 to 16 at checkpoints holding Kalashnikov rifles, with some appearing to struggle under the weapon's weight [1].

Human Rights Watch separately documented the same recruitment campaign, noting that tasks assigned to child recruits extend well beyond logistical support. While the IRGC described roles including cooking, medical care, and supply distribution, HRW found that children were also assigned to checkpoint staffing, operational patrols, intelligence patrols, and vehicle convoys — activities that place them directly in combat zones [2].

A reasonable question is who produced this evidence and whether adversarial interests shaped the findings. The Amnesty report relied on open-source visual verification and eyewitness testimony gathered through BBC Persian — a credible, though not wholly independent, intermediary. The IRGC's own public announcement on state television, however, constitutes primary-source confirmation of the recruitment age being set at 12, making this a case where the accused party's own statements corroborate the core claim [1][2]. What remains harder to verify independently is the scale: how many children have actually enlisted, and how many have been deployed to active combat roles versus support positions.

The Personnel Shortage Driving Recruitment

The timing of this campaign is inseparable from the military context. As U.S. and Israeli strikes intensified across Iran in early 2026, Basij checkpoints in Tehran became direct targets. Thousands of airstrikes hit Iranian positions in the preceding month, and multiple Basij headquarters were struck [2][4].

Reports indicate that morale among Basij fighters has collapsed. Videos circulating on Iranian social media showed Basij members fleeing after civilians played drone sounds through mobile phones [4]. Israel Hayom reported that the IRGC lowered recruitment ages as the Basij militia suffered heavy casualties and a growing shortage of adult volunteers [4].

Amnesty International framed the recruitment campaign as a direct consequence of these pressures: the IRGC is "risking children's lives for some extra manpower" [3]. The recruitment push through mosques housing Basij bases across Tehran suggests institutional coordination rather than spontaneous volunteerism [1][2].

How Iranian Law Enables Child Recruitment

Iran's domestic legal framework creates the conditions for child enlistment. Under the IRGC Recruitment Regulations Law, Article 93 defines "Ordinary Basijis" with no minimum age specified. Article 94 allows children aged 15 and above to serve as "Active Basijis" after completing training, and Article 16 permits those 16 and older to serve as "Special Basijis" [1].

Iran ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994, which prohibits the recruitment of children under 15 into armed forces. Iran signed but has never ratified the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which raises the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities to 18 [5][6]. This distinction matters: signing creates an obligation not to defeat the treaty's purpose, but imposes no binding enforcement mechanism.

Under customary international humanitarian law — which applies to all states regardless of treaty ratification — conscripting or enlisting children under 15, or using them to participate actively in hostilities, constitutes a war crime [1][6].

The Afghan Fatemiyoun Pipeline

The current recruitment campaign is not Iran's first use of child soldiers. The most extensively documented prior case involves the Fatemiyoun Brigade, an IRGC Quds Force-affiliated militia composed of Afghan Shia fighters deployed to Syria beginning in 2013 [7][8].

Human Rights Watch confirmed in 2017 that at least eight Afghan children had served in the Fatemiyoun Brigade. All eight were killed in Syria, and four were only 14 years old at the time of death [7]. The Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRANA) organization published a report in 2024 documenting broader patterns: recruitment agents targeted Afghan migrants in factories and prisons, offering legal residency, housing, financial rewards, and the annulment of prison sentences in exchange for "volunteering" [8][9].

Former Fatemiyoun fighters have described being arrested by Iranian security forces and given a choice between prison, deportation, or deployment to Syria [8]. For undocumented Afghan families in Iran — a population numbering in the millions — this created a coercive dynamic in which participation was neither fully voluntary nor formally compelled.

Afghanistan remains one of the top refugee-producing countries globally, with 4.8 million refugees according to 2025 UNHCR data [10]. Many reside in Iran, where their precarious legal status makes them particularly vulnerable to recruitment pressure.

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

The Fatemiyoun Brigade's total deployment was substantial. Commander Samad Rezai stated in 2018 that approximately 80,000 individuals had been sent to Syria, with 2,800 killed. Another Fatemiyoun official, Zuhair Mujahid, cited over 2,000 killed and 8,000 wounded by 2017 [8]. The exact number of children among these figures remains unclear — a significant gap in the evidentiary record.

Iran in Comparative Context

Iran's use of child soldiers, while serious, is not unique. The UN verified 8,655 cases of child recruitment and use globally in 2023 — the highest in nearly a decade and part of an upward trend since 2018 [11].

Source: UN Secretary-General Annual Reports on Children and Armed Conflict

Data as of Jun 1, 2024CSV

The Democratic Republic of Congo led verified cases in 2023 with over 2,000, followed by Somalia (1,580), Myanmar (1,160), Nigeria (910), Syria (730), and Yemen (520) [11].

Source: UN Secretary-General Report on Children and Armed Conflict, 2024

Data as of Jun 1, 2024CSV

In Yemen, the Houthi movement — an Iranian ally — has recruited children on a far larger scale than Iran's own documented cases. A senior Houthi official told the Associated Press in 2018 that the group had inducted 18,000 child soldiers. The UN verified at least 1,851 individual cases since 2010, and nearly 2,000 Houthi-recruited children were killed on the battlefield between January 2020 and May 2021 alone [12][13]. All parties to the Yemen conflict, including the Saudi-backed coalition and government-aligned militias, have been implicated in child recruitment [12].

ISIS at its peak operated dedicated child training camps and used children in suicide operations — a qualitatively different form of exploitation. The scale of Houthi child recruitment dwarfs Iran's documented cases, though Iran's role as a state actor rather than a non-state militia raises distinct legal implications under international humanitarian law.

Iran's precedent during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) remains the most extreme historical case within its own record. Iranian officials have acknowledged that over 550,000 children were recruited during that conflict, with at least 36,000 killed [1]. The current campaign, while operating at a much smaller documented scale, echoes the institutional mechanisms used during that war — particularly the Basij's role as the primary recruitment vehicle.

Why International Accountability Has Failed

Iran has appeared on the U.S. State Department's Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) list since 2018, for seven consecutive years [14]. The CSPA, enacted in 2008, restricts U.S. arms sales and military assistance to listed countries. But because Iran has never been slated to receive such assistance — owing to decades of broader sanctions — the CSPA designation has imposed no additional practical consequences [14].

The UN Secretary-General's annual report on children and armed conflict maintains a "list of shame" of parties that recruit children. Iran-affiliated groups, including the Fatemiyoun Brigade, have appeared in these reports, but Iran itself has largely avoided direct listing as a state party responsible for child recruitment [5][11]. This contrasts with countries like Myanmar and Yemen, where state armed forces appear on the list directly.

The International Criminal Court presents another theoretical avenue for accountability. Recruiting children under 15 is codified as a war crime under the Rome Statute, and the ICC has successfully prosecuted individuals for this charge — most notably Thomas Lubanga of the DRC in 2012. But Iran is not a party to the Rome Statute, and a Security Council referral would be required to extend ICC jurisdiction. Russia and China, both veto-wielding members, have historically blocked such referrals against allies [15].

The U.S. position is further complicated by the current administration's own hostility toward the ICC. After reimposing sanctions on the court over its investigations involving Americans and Israelis, Washington has limited its credibility in calling for ICC action against Iran [15].

The U.S. Treasury has taken targeted action against businesses financially supporting the Basij and IRGC's recruitment infrastructure. In 2018, OFAC designated a network of entities providing financial support to Basij activities including the recruitment, training, and deployment of child soldiers [16]. Whether these sanctions have materially affected recruitment capacity is unclear.

Financial Incentives and Coercion

The mechanisms driving children and families into IRGC-affiliated service vary by population. For Iranian families, the Basij operates through a network of mosque-based recruitment centers embedded in low-income neighborhoods, offering social services, religious programming, and community standing alongside military roles [2][3]. The current campaign explicitly markets participation as patriotic defense of the homeland.

For Afghan refugee families, the calculus is different. Undocumented Afghans face deportation, lack of work permits, and exclusion from social services. The Fatemiyoun recruitment pipeline offered a path to legal residency — a powerful inducement for families with no alternative [8][9]. Reports of coercion — arrest followed by a "choice" between prison, deportation, or deployment — blur the line between voluntary and compelled participation [8].

Financial payments have also been documented. The HRANA report noted promises of "significant amounts of financial support" alongside housing and legal status [8]. For impoverished families, particularly in a country experiencing severe economic strain under sanctions, these incentives can be functionally coercive even without explicit threats.

Psychological and Physical Outcomes

No Iran-specific research on the rehabilitation or long-term outcomes of former child soldiers associated with the IRGC or Basij has been published. Iran operates no known formal demobilization, disarmament, or reintegration (DDR) program for minors — a gap that distinguishes it from countries like Colombia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC, where international organizations have established structured reintegration frameworks [17].

The broader literature on child soldiers documents consistent patterns: post-traumatic stress, difficulty reintegrating into civilian communities, educational disruption, and lasting stigma. A follow-up study of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone found persistent psychological difficulties alongside community rejection [17]. The absence of equivalent research on Iranian cases is itself a finding — it reflects both the closed nature of the Iranian system and the lack of international access to affected populations.

For Afghan Fatemiyoun veterans, the situation is compounded by their precarious status in Iran. Returned fighters who expected legal residency have in some cases found their promises unfulfilled, leaving them in the same vulnerable position they occupied before deployment [8].

What Has Been Proposed and What Remains Blocked

Several policy mechanisms have been proposed to address Iran's use of child soldiers:

Targeted sanctions on IRGC commanders: The U.S. and EU have sanctioned senior IRGC figures for various reasons, but sanctions specifically tied to child recruitment have been limited to the 2018 Treasury designations of Basij-affiliated businesses [16]. Expanding individual sanctions to commanders directly overseeing the current "Homeland Defending Combatants" campaign has been proposed by Human Rights Watch [2].

ICC referral: Requires a UN Security Council vote, where Russia and China would likely veto. Neither country has shown willingness to support international prosecution of Iranian officials [15].

Arms embargo expansion: Iran is already subject to extensive weapons restrictions, limiting the additional leverage available through this mechanism.

UN listing: Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have both called for the UN Secretary-General to include Iran's armed forces in the annual children and armed conflict report [1][2]. Inclusion would trigger monitoring and reporting obligations but carries no binding enforcement.

Domestic legal reform: Both organizations have urged Iran to ratify the Optional Protocol, raise the minimum service age to 18 across all IRGC regulations, and issue explicit orders prohibiting the deployment of minors [1][2].

The Historical Echo

Iran's current recruitment campaign operates at a fraction of the scale seen during the Iran-Iraq War, when child soldiers were sent across minefields and into human wave attacks. The Basij of the 1980s and the Basij of 2026 share an institutional lineage, but the contexts differ: the earlier war involved existential national defense against an invading army, while the current conflict stems from escalating exchanges with the U.S. and Israel.

What the two periods share is the underlying institutional willingness to treat children as a manpower reserve. The IRGC's Recruitment Regulations Law, with its absent or low age minimums, was not written in 2026 — it reflects a longstanding legal architecture that facilitates child enlistment when political or military pressure creates demand [1].

The question now is whether the documented death of Alireza Jafari and the formal announcement of recruitment starting at age 12 will produce consequences that years of reports on the Fatemiyoun Brigade did not. The evidentiary record is clearer than it has been in years — the Iranian government has publicly stated the policy. Whether that clarity translates into accountability depends on political will that has, so far, been absent.