Iran Executes Graduate Student Convicted of Spying for CIA and Israeli Intelligence

At dawn on May 11, 2026, Iranian authorities hanged Erfan Shakourzadeh, a 29-year-old aerospace engineering graduate student, at Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj after convicting him of spying for the CIA and Israel's Mossad intelligence service [1][2]. The execution was carried out in secret — his family received no prior notice and was denied a final visit [3].

In a letter smuggled out of prison before his death, Shakourzadeh wrote: "I was arrested on fabricated espionage charges and, after eight and a half months of torture and solitary confinement, was forced into a false confession. Do not let another innocent life be taken in silence" [3][4].

His case has become a flashpoint in the broader debate over Iran's escalating use of capital punishment, the integrity of its espionage prosecutions, and the human cost of the ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict.

Who Was Erfan Shakourzadeh?

Shakourzadeh studied electrical engineering at the University of Tabriz before enrolling in a master's program in Aerospace Engineering and Satellite Technology at Iran University of Science and Technology, one of the country's most prestigious institutions [1][5]. He graduated first in his class and went on to work at a scientific organization specializing in satellite constellation control and positioning systems [3][6].

His academic profile — a top-performing graduate student in a sensitive technological field — fits a pattern that human rights organizations have documented for years. Iran has repeatedly targeted scientists, engineers, and academics with espionage charges, particularly those working in fields adjacent to the country's military or nuclear programs [7][8]. Among those executed on similar charges in recent years: Rouzbeh Vadi, described by state media as a nuclear scientist, was hanged in August 2025 for allegedly passing information about Iran's nuclear program to Mossad [9]. Kourosh Keyvani, a dual national, was executed in early 2026 after being convicted of photographing sensitive locations for Israeli intelligence [10].

The IRGC's Intelligence Organization arrested Shakourzadeh in February 2025 [3]. According to Iran's judiciary-affiliated Mizan News Agency, he had "attempted to contact enemy intelligence services in three stages, the first and third stages being related to the Mossad and the second stage being related to the CIA," and had shared classified information about "his workplace, access level, duties, and other sensitive information" [6][11].

The Evidence Question

No detailed evidence from Shakourzadeh's trial has been made public [4][12]. The judiciary's account relies on broad allegations — contact with foreign intelligence, sharing of workplace information — without disclosing intercepts, documented meetings, financial records, or other corroborating material.

What has surfaced raises questions. According to Hengaw, the Norway-based Kurdish human rights organization, security agents confiscated Shakourzadeh's phone during his arrest and cited landscape photographs he had taken near his workplace as evidence of links to Mossad and opposition groups [3]. The judiciary also released a video described as a confession, in which Shakourzadeh discusses CIA and Mossad recruitment efforts — a video he later repudiated as coerced [4][6].

Iran's Revolutionary Courts — the judicial bodies that handle espionage cases — operate under rules that human rights organizations have consistently criticized. Defendants charged with national security offenses are restricted to choosing a lawyer from a government-approved list; in 2018, the judiciary published a roster of just 20 such attorneys for Tehran, none of whom were human rights lawyers [13][14]. Judges routinely deny defense counsel access during interrogations, and courts accept confessions obtained under duress [13][15]. Proceedings are typically closed, with no independent observers permitted [14].

Amnesty International issued a statement in June 2025 warning of "growing fears over torture and executions of individuals accused of 'espionage' for Israel," noting that convictions were "based on confessions obtained under torture" and that defendants were "denied the right to their lawyer of choice" [7].

Iran's Execution Surge

Shakourzadeh's hanging is part of a broader escalation. Iran executed at least 1,639 people in 2025 — the highest figure recorded since 1989, a 68% increase over 2024's 975 executions, and a rate that averages more than four executions per day [16][17]. At least 190 executions have been recorded in 2026 so far [5].

Source: Iran Human Rights / Amnesty International

Data as of May 11, 2026CSV

The spike in espionage-related executions is directly tied to the June 2025 twelve-day war between Israel and Iran. At least eight people were executed on charges of "collaborating with Mossad and Israel" in the immediate aftermath of that conflict [7][16]. Since the broader US-Israel-Iran war began on February 28, 2026, at least five more have been hanged on espionage charges [1][5].

Source: Iran Human Rights / HRANA / Amnesty International

Data as of May 11, 2026CSV

A new espionage bill introduced after the June 2025 military escalation expanded the legal definition of espionage to include activities such as contact with foreign and diaspora media outlets, broadening the scope of conduct that can carry the death penalty [16].

The Wrongful Conviction Record

Iran's track record on espionage prosecutions includes numerous cases that international observers, foreign governments, and eventually Iran itself have acknowledged as unjust.

The most prominent category involves dual nationals detained on espionage charges later revealed to serve as bargaining chips. In September 2023, Iran released five Americans — Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others — in a prisoner swap with the United States. All had been imprisoned on unproven espionage charges [18][19]. Shargi had been convicted without a trial. Austrian-Iranian Kamran Ghaderi's espionage trial was described by Amnesty International as "grossly unfair," relying on confessions obtained through torture [20].

Research published in the Oxford Journal of International Criminal Justice documented at least 66 foreign and dual nationals detained by Iran since 2010, arguing that the practice constitutes "hostage-taking" under international law [20]. The IRGC arrested at least 30 dual nationals in a two-year period ending in 2017, mostly on spying charges [20].

The proportion of Revolutionary Court espionage defendants who confessed under conditions classified as coercive by human rights organizations is difficult to quantify precisely, because Iran does not publish trial records. But the pattern is consistent: in virtually every espionage case documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Iran Human Rights, and HRANA over the past decade, defendants report being held in prolonged solitary confinement and subjected to physical and psychological pressure before confessing [7][13][15].

Intelligence Community Silence

Neither the CIA nor Mossad has publicly commented on Shakourzadeh's case. This is standard practice. Intelligence agencies do not confirm or deny the identity of sources or operatives, whether the individual in question was genuinely recruited or not [6][11].

The reasoning is straightforward: confirming an asset's identity — even posthumously — endangers other sources. Denying the relationship could be read as abandonment by other potential recruits. The default posture is silence, which means that an executed defendant's guilt or innocence cannot be inferred from the response of the agencies accused of recruiting them.

This creates an informational asymmetry that works to the advantage of the prosecuting state. Iran can present its narrative through state media and judiciary statements. The accused intelligence services say nothing. Defense counsel, where present at all, operates under severe constraints. The result is that the public record consists almost entirely of the prosecution's claims.

The Steelman Case for Iran

Iran's government would argue — and has argued, through state media — that foreign intelligence penetration of its scientific institutions is real, not hypothetical.

There is documented evidence that Western intelligence agencies have sought to recruit Iranians with access to sensitive programs. The CIA launched Farsi-language recruitment campaigns on social media targeting Iranians in 2023 [21]. Israel's Mossad has conducted extensive intelligence operations inside Iran, including the assassination of multiple nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2020, the 2018 theft of Iran's nuclear archive from a warehouse in Tehran, and a series of sabotage operations against nuclear and military facilities [22].

From Tehran's perspective, an aerospace engineer working on satellite systems who contacts foreign intelligence services is not a hypothetical threat — it is the exact scenario that counterintelligence exists to prevent. Iran's satellite and missile programs overlap significantly, and individuals with access to satellite positioning systems could plausibly provide information of military value.

The question is not whether Iran faces genuine intelligence threats — it does — but whether its judicial system is capable of distinguishing real spies from innocent people. The evidence from decades of cases suggests that the Revolutionary Court system, with its closed proceedings, restricted defense access, and reliance on coerced confessions, is structurally incapable of making that distinction reliably [13][14][15].

Diplomatic Leverage and Its Absence

The execution occurred against the backdrop of an active war. Since February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel have been conducting military operations against Iran, following the collapse of nuclear negotiations [23][24]. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the initial strikes [23]. Diplomatic channels, while not entirely severed — indirect negotiations over a ceasefire framework continued through May 2026 — are strained to a degree unprecedented in the post-1979 period [25].

Previous prisoner swaps required functional, if tense, diplomatic relationships. The September 2023 US-Iran exchange was mediated by Oman and Qatar and included the unfreezing of $6 billion in Iranian assets [18][19]. No comparable back-channel exists in the current wartime environment.

The absence of a swap deal for Shakourzadeh — or any attempt to negotiate one that has been publicly reported — reflects the collapse of the diplomatic architecture that made such exchanges possible. Iran, under military attack and with its leadership decapitated, has less incentive to offer concessions. The US and Israel, engaged in active hostilities, have no standing framework for prisoner negotiations with Tehran.

For individuals detained on espionage charges inside Iran, this means the already slim possibility of release through diplomatic intervention has effectively vanished for the duration of the conflict.

Consequences for the Family

Iran's treatment of families of those convicted of national security crimes follows a documented pattern. The US State Department's 2023 human rights report on Iran noted that authorities "take punitive measures against the families of journalists, dissidents, protesters and human rights defenders," including "interrogation, travel bans, arbitrary detention, and torture" [26].

In espionage cases specifically, families face compounded pressures. Relatives of Rouzbeh Vadi reported that his confession was extracted only after threats against his mother [7]. Shakourzadeh's execution was carried out without notice to his family and without a final visit — itself a form of punishment [3].

Iranian law does not formally impose collective criminal liability on relatives of convicted individuals. But in practice, families of those executed for national security offenses face social stigma, economic consequences from the loss of a breadwinner, potential seizure of assets connected to the case, and informal pressure from security services to remain silent [26]. Several families of those executed on espionage charges have reported being warned not to speak to media or publicly discuss their relative's case [7][26].

What This Case Reveals

Erfan Shakourzadeh's execution sits at the intersection of several forces: a wartime security environment that has dramatically lowered the threshold for espionage prosecutions in Iran; a judicial system that international observers have consistently found incapable of conducting fair trials in national security cases; an intelligence conflict between Iran and Western agencies that provides a plausible backdrop for espionage allegations but also a convenient pretext for political repression; and the complete breakdown of diplomatic mechanisms that once offered a faint possibility of intervention.

Whether Shakourzadeh was a spy, a convenient scapegoat, or something in between may never be established with certainty. What can be established is that the process by which he was convicted and killed did not meet the standards necessary to make that determination credibly. A closed trial, a government-approved lawyer, a confession obtained after months of reported torture, and an execution carried out in secret — these are not the hallmarks of a judicial system confident in its evidence.

Iran executed at least 1,639 people last year. Erfan Shakourzadeh was one person. The gap between those two numbers contains the full weight of what is at stake.