Iran Carries Out Executions by Hanging, Including Minors, Amid Ongoing Conflict

Iran hanged at least 2,228 people in 2025, more than doubling the previous year's total and setting the highest annual execution count in the 37-year tenure of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei [1]. In the first two months of 2026 alone, at least 648 more people were executed — 341 in January and 307 in February — as the country simultaneously fought a foreign war and crushed a domestic uprising [2]. Among the dead are teenagers, members of ethnic minorities, and protesters whose trials lasted days rather than months. The numbers place Iran in a category of its own among executing nations, responsible for an estimated 64% of all recorded executions worldwide in 2024 [3].

The Numbers: A Steep and Sustained Escalation

Iran's execution rate had declined between 2015 and 2020, with annual totals hovering between 250 and 270 [4]. The reversal since 2021 has been sharp and accelerating.

Source: Iran Human Rights / NCRI / Amnesty International

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

The trajectory is clear: from 333 recorded executions in 2021, to 582 in 2022, 853 in 2023, 1,006 in 2024, and 2,228 in 2025 [1][4]. The 2025 total includes executions carried out in 97 cities across all 31 provinces, with 376 hangings in December 2025 alone — the deadliest single month in nearly two decades [1]. Because Iran's judiciary does not systematically publish execution data, human rights organizations estimate the true figure is higher; fewer than 4% of 2025 executions were reported through official channels [5].

For historical comparison, the last period of comparable killing was the 1988 mass executions of political prisoners, when estimates range from 2,800 to 30,000 killed over several months [6]. The current surge differs in its sustained, month-after-month character rather than a single concentrated wave.

Among countries that still carry out capital punishment, Iran's totals dwarf all others except China, whose execution numbers are classified as state secrets but are estimated by Amnesty International to number in the thousands annually. Saudi Arabia executed 196 people in 2024, and Egypt executed at least 25 — both far below Iran's total [3].

What the Condemned Were Charged With

The two dominant categories of capital offense in 2025 were murder under the Islamic legal principle of qisas (retribution-in-kind), accounting for 1,093 executions, and drug-related offenses, accounting for 1,002 [7]. Together they represent 94% of all executions.

Source: Iran Human Rights Society

Data as of Jan 5, 2026CSV

The remaining cases include 38 people charged with moharebeh (waging war against God) or efsad-fil-arz (corruption on earth), 19 classified as political executions, and 14 for espionage [7]. These charges — particularly moharebeh — carry mandatory death sentences under Iran's Islamic Penal Code and have been applied expansively to protesters, activists, and members of banned political organizations [8].

The sharp rise in drug-related executions is notable. Capital punishment for drug crimes jumped 163% in the two years following the September 2022 Mahsa Amini protests compared to the same period before, from 302 cases to 796 [9]. Human rights organizations argue this increase is not explained by changes in drug trafficking patterns and instead reflects the regime's use of drug charges — which are easier to prosecute and attract less international scrutiny — as a parallel mechanism of population control [5].

Children on the Gallows

Iran executes more juvenile offenders — individuals who were under 18 at the time of their alleged crime — than any other country [10]. At least 70 juvenile offenders were executed between 2010 and 2023, according to Iran Human Rights [10]. In 2025, six people who were minors at the time of their offense were put to death [1].

Iran ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1994, which prohibits the death penalty for crimes committed by anyone under 18. However, upon ratification, Iran filed a reservation stating that "if the text of the Convention is or becomes incompatible with the domestic laws and Islamic standards at any time or in any case, the Government of the Islamic Republic shall not abide by it" [11]. Multiple UN bodies have deemed this reservation so broad that it defeats the treaty's purpose [11].

Under Iran's 2013 Islamic Penal Code, the "age of criminal responsibility" is defined by Sharia as the age of maturity: 9 lunar years for girls and 15 lunar years for boys [10]. In practice, Iran sentences children convicted of capital offenses to death but delays execution until they turn 18, a procedural distinction that authorities cite as formal compliance with the CRC [12].

The January 2026 uprising produced new juvenile cases. Amnesty International documented at least 30 people facing death sentences from fast-tracked trials connected to the protests, including minors [13]. Saleh Mohammadi, 18, was sentenced to death on February 4, 2026, after being arrested in Qom; he reported fractures from beatings during interrogation, and the court dismissed his torture allegations without investigation [13]. Two 17-year-olds — Matin Mohammadi and Erfan Amiri — were undergoing capital trials before Tehran's Revolutionary Court for alleged involvement in a fire at a Basij base, despite one having been arrested before the incident occurred [13]. In March 2026, a 19-year-old wrestler was among three men hanged in Qom in the first executions directly linked to the January protests [14].

Protests, War, and the Escalation Pattern

The current execution surge correlates with three overlapping crises.

The 2022 Mahsa Amini Protests. After the death of 22-year-old Mahsa (Jina) Amini in morality police custody in September 2022, months of nationwide "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests followed. The government executed at least eight protesters on charges of moharebeh, beginning with Mohsen Shekari on December 8, 2022 [15]. In total, at least 1,425 people were executed in the two years after Amini's death — nearly double the figure for the equivalent preceding period [9]. Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, director of Iran Human Rights, characterized the death penalty as "the Islamic Republic's most crucial tool for instilling fear in society, aiming to stifle dissent and preventing future protests" [9].

The December 2025–January 2026 Uprising. Triggered by a currency collapse, soaring inflation, and state mismanagement, this wave of protests became the largest since the 1979 revolution, with an estimated 5 million participants [16]. The government's response included lethal force on a scale that human rights organizations described as massacres, with the deadliest incidents on January 8–10, 2026. HRANA documented 7,007 deaths in a named list published in February 2026 [16]. Executions of arrested protesters began in March 2026, with Iran's judiciary chief stating that rapid sentencing would serve as a deterrent [14].

The 2026 Iran War. Amid armed conflict with external adversaries, the government has accelerated executions of political prisoners and members of banned opposition groups. Between March 19 and April 6, 2026, 13 political executions were carried out in 18 days — nearly matching the 17 political executions for all of 2025 [17]. Six of those executed were members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), and five were arrested during the January uprising [17]. Human rights monitors have described the wartime atmosphere as cover for what amounts to a political purge, with officials prioritizing internal suppression over the external conflict [17].

Ethnic Minorities: Disproportionate Targeting

Ethnic minorities constitute a vastly disproportionate share of Iran's executed population, particularly for political and drug-related offenses.

Source: Iran Human Rights

Data as of Mar 1, 2025CSV

Of 164 people executed for political affiliation between 2010 and 2024, 52% were Kurdish, 29% were Baluch, and 16% were Arab [18]. Kurds make up approximately 10–13% of Iran's population; Baluch people represent an estimated 2–6% [18]. Yet in 2024, at least 108 Baluch prisoners were executed, accounting for 11% of all recorded executions that year [18]. In April 2025, 35 of the 110 people executed — 32% — were Baluch [5].

The pattern extends beyond political cases. Drug-related executions fall disproportionately on Baluch communities in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan, a border region with Afghanistan where poverty rates are among the highest in the country [18]. Amnesty International reported in 2023 that ethnic minorities face "an escalating use of the death penalty" accompanied by trials "lacking transparency or access to legal counsel" [19]. Defendants from minority communities frequently report being denied the right to choose their own lawyers, with court-appointed attorneys providing minimal defense [13].

Afghan nationals have also been heavily affected: at least 80 Afghan citizens were executed in Iran in 2024, triple the previous year's figure [8].

The Government's Defense

Iranian officials and judiciary figures defend the execution regime on several grounds.

The theological argument holds that hadd punishments — those prescribed by Sharia for specific offenses — carry fixed sentences that cannot be altered by human legislation. For crimes classified as qisas, the death penalty is framed as the victim's family's right to retribution, not the state's prerogative [20]. Government officials have argued that Iran's legal system faithfully implements Islamic jurisprudence, and that external criticism constitutes interference in religious sovereignty [20].

On deterrence, the judiciary has explicitly invoked the rapid execution of protesters as a mechanism to prevent future unrest. Following the January 2026 protests, the judiciary chief stated publicly that swift sentencing would discourage further participation in demonstrations [14]. For drug offenses, officials have cited Iran's geographic position along major trafficking routes from Afghanistan as justification for harsh penalties [20].

However, the deterrence argument faces significant counter-evidence. Despite record execution numbers in 2024 and 2025, the December 2025 protests were the largest in the Islamic Republic's history [16]. Drug trafficking has not measurably declined despite hundreds of annual executions for narcotics offenses [5]. Several Islamic legal scholars have argued that Sharia itself permits the suspension of capital punishment, noting that the Quran emphasizes mercy and that alternative punishments exist within the tradition [21].

Public Hangings and Their Impact

Among the 2,228 executions carried out in 2025, at least 13 were conducted in public [1]. Public executions in Iran typically involve hanging from cranes or portable gallows in open spaces. In one documented case, an execution in Isfahan was staged near an elementary school during afternoon hours, with approximately 200 boys witnessing the hanging [22].

Human rights organizations and medical researchers have documented the psychological effects on communities subjected to public executions. The Heinrich Böll Foundation's 2025 report on Iran's death penalty describes a cycle of fear that "begins from the moment of accusation, spreading uncertainty and psychological trauma among detainees and their families" [8]. Children of condemned prisoners face social stigma, insecurity, and exclusion, while families endure prolonged anxiety from sentencing through execution, often resulting in depression and social isolation [22].

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) characterized the practice as "psychological warfare," arguing that public executions are designed to "remind society that power rests only in [the regime's] hands" [22]. Forced confessions broadcast on state television compound this effect; despite EU sanctions against Iran's state broadcaster IRIB for airing coerced statements, the practice has continued [8].

International Response: Sanctions, Statements, and Their Limits

International criticism has been extensive but has not produced a reversal.

United Nations. The UN General Assembly's Third Committee has repeatedly passed resolutions expressing "serious concern" at Iran's execution of minors and calling on Iran to cease the practice [11]. In September 2025, UN experts described the execution rate as "unprecedented" and called for accountability [4]. In January 2026, the Human Rights Council extended mandates for its Fact-Finding Mission and Special Rapporteur on Iran and called for an urgent investigation into violations connected to the December 2025 protests [23].

European Union. The EU designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization in February 2026 — a step long debated and resisted within Europe — prompted in part by the scale of domestic repression during the January uprising [24]. The EU approved new sanctions against 19 Iranian officials and entities in March 2026 [24]. The United Kingdom separately sanctioned ten Iranian officials, including police chiefs and IRGC members, as well as FARAJA, Iran's law enforcement agency [25].

China and Russia. Both countries have opposed the broader sanctions framework. At the UN Security Council, Chinese and Russian representatives contested the legal basis for reimposing sanctions under the "snapback" mechanism, arguing that the JCPOA's expiration in October 2025 rendered the mechanism void [26]. Neither country has imposed independent sanctions related to Iran's execution practices, and both maintain significant trade relationships with Tehran.

Gulf States. Regional diplomatic engagement with Iran has focused primarily on security and trade rather than human rights. No Gulf Cooperation Council member has publicly conditioned diplomatic or commercial relations on execution practices.

The gap between international rhetoric and action remains wide. As the Heinrich Böll Foundation's analysis concluded, "symbolic actions must be matched by concrete policy" — a recognition that sanctions on individual officials have not altered the structural incentives driving the execution surge [8].

The Evidence and Its Limits

All execution data cited in this article originates from human rights organizations — principally Iran Human Rights, the Iran Human Rights Society, Amnesty International, and HRANA — because Iran's judiciary does not publish comprehensive execution statistics. These organizations rely on networks of informants, media monitoring, and family contacts; they acknowledge that true totals are likely higher than documented figures [5].

Iran's government disputes the framing of these organizations, characterizing them as politically motivated and aligned with opposition groups. Independent verification of individual cases is difficult given restrictions on press freedom, internet shutdowns during protest periods, and the imprisonment of journalists and lawyers who document executions [17].

The charge categories themselves carry ambiguity. The boundary between "drug-related" and "political" executions is contested: human rights groups argue that some drug charges are pretextual, particularly when applied to ethnic minority prisoners from restive regions [18]. Similarly, the moharebeh charge — carrying a mandatory death sentence — has been applied to acts ranging from armed rebellion to road blockage during protests, raising questions about proportionality [15].

What is not in dispute is the trajectory. By every available measure, Iran is executing people at a rate not seen in decades, and the acceleration shows no sign of slowing.