India's Population Projected to Peak and Decline Faster Than Expected

India's total fertility rate has fallen to 1.9 children per woman — below the 2.1 replacement level for the first time in the country's history [1]. The decline, confirmed by a 2024 government report and consistent with trends from the National Family Health Survey-5 (2019–21), has forced a wholesale revision of population projections that until recently assumed India would keep growing well into the second half of the century [2].

The question is no longer whether India's population will peak. It is how soon, how sharply it will decline afterward, and whether the country's institutions — its pension systems, labor markets, political structures, and fiscal frameworks — can adapt to a reality that almost no one planned for.

The Numbers: Two Projections, One Direction

Two major projection models now bracket India's demographic future, and both tell a story of faster decline than previously expected.

The UN's World Population Prospects 2024, released in July 2024, projects India's population peaking at approximately 1.69 billion around 2054, then declining to about 1.5 billion by 2100 [3]. This is itself a significant downward revision from the UN's 2022 projections, which placed the peak higher and later.

The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), publishing in The Lancet, projects an earlier and lower peak: 1.6 billion around 2048, followed by a steeper decline to 1.09 billion by 2100 — a 32% drop from peak [4]. The IHME model incorporates more aggressive assumptions about the pace of female education expansion and contraceptive access, both of which have historically correlated with faster-than-expected fertility decline.

The gap between these two projections — roughly 400 million people by century's end — reflects genuine uncertainty. But the direction is not in dispute: India will grow old before it grows rich, and it will do so faster than the models predicted even five years ago.

Source: UN WPP 2024 & Lancet/IHME 2024

Data as of Jul 1, 2024CSV

How Fast Fertility Fell — and Why Models Missed It

India's fertility rate dropped from 5.9 children per woman in 1950 to 3.5 in 2000, then accelerated: 2.2 in the NFHS-4 survey (2015–16), 2.0 in NFHS-5 (2019–21), and an estimated 1.9 by 2025 [5][2]. That final drop below replacement happened roughly a decade ahead of most projections.

Source: UN World Population Prospects 2024 / NFHS

Data as of Jul 1, 2024CSV

Several mechanisms drove this acceleration, and the NFHS data helps disentangle them.

Female education is the single strongest predictor. NFHS-5 found that women with 12 or more years of schooling had a TFR of 1.4, compared to 2.8 for women with no schooling [5]. India's female literacy rate rose from 53.7% in 2001 to 70.3% in 2011 and has continued climbing since, with gross enrollment ratios in secondary education for girls rising sharply.

Urbanization plays a reinforcing role. Urban India's TFR was 1.6 in NFHS-5, compared to 2.1 in rural areas [5]. India's urban population share crossed 35% by 2020 and continues to rise, pulling the national average down.

Rising costs of child-rearing in an aspirational economy have changed family-size preferences. NFHS-5 found that the ideal family size reported by women aged 15–49 dropped to 1.8, below the actual TFR — suggesting fertility may continue falling [5].

Contraceptive access expanded significantly between NFHS-4 and NFHS-5. Modern contraceptive prevalence rose from 47.8% to 56.5% among married women, with the sharpest gains in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh that had previously lagged [5][6].

A Country Divided: State-Level Fertility and the Delimitation Crisis

The national TFR of 1.9 conceals enormous variation. Delhi records 1.2 children per woman. Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal are at 1.3. Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh sit at 1.4 [5]. These are fertility rates comparable to South Korea and Italy — countries that are already deep into population decline.

At the other end, Bihar's TFR remains 2.98, Uttar Pradesh is at 2.35, and Jharkhand is at 2.26 [5]. The demographic gap between India's south and north is not narrowing fast enough to prevent a political collision.

Source: National Family Health Survey 5 (2019-21)

Data as of Jan 1, 2021CSV

That collision has a name: delimitation. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment of 1976 froze Lok Sabha seat allocation based on 1971 Census figures, explicitly to avoid penalizing states that reduced fertility [7]. The 84th Amendment of 2001 extended that freeze until after 2026 [7]. The freeze is now expiring.

If parliamentary seats are reallocated based on current population, the five major southern states — Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Telangana — stand to lose a collective 27 seats, while Uttar Pradesh and Bihar would gain substantially [7][8]. The Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, which sought to address this imbalance, was defeated in the Lok Sabha [9].

Southern state leaders have framed this as a "demographic penalty" — states that invested in education, healthcare, and family planning are being punished with reduced political representation [8]. The issue also extends to federal fiscal transfers, creating perverse incentives: states that controlled population growth receive proportionally less central funding per capita.

A May 2026 Carnegie Endowment paper described the delimitation debate as "India's unfinished argument over what representation means in a federal democracy" [10].

The Demographic Dividend Window: Open, But Closing

India's working-age population (15–64) currently constitutes approximately 67% of the total population, and is projected to grow from 990 million in 2024 to 1.13 billion by 2050 — adding 144 million potential workers, more than the combined working-age populations of Japan and Germany [11][12].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

This is the much-discussed "demographic dividend" — the economic boost that comes when a country has a large share of working-age people relative to dependents. India's dividend window is expected to peak around 2041 and persist until roughly 2055–56 [13].

But a dividend requires jobs, and jobs require skills. The data on India's preparedness is sobering.

Only 4% of Indian youth aged 15–29 have formal vocational training, compared to 70% in South Korea [13][14]. India's labor force participation rate stands at 55.6%, compared to 64.9% in China and 67.9% in Indonesia [15]. Three million graduates enter the workforce annually, but 33% are unemployed or underemployed [14]. High-technology sectors report a 51% skill deficit [14].

Source: ILOSTAT — International Labour Organization

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

The revised population timeline compresses the window further. If fertility continues declining at the current pace, India's dependency ratio — the number of non-working-age people per working-age person — will begin rising by the early 2040s rather than the 2050s. Every year of delay in absorbing working-age Indians into productive employment is a year of dividend lost permanently.

Pensions and Elder Care: A Fiscal Reckoning

India has 153 million people aged 60 and above today. That number is projected to reach 347 million by 2050 [16]. The old-age dependency ratio is expected to hit 30% by mid-century [16].

The country is structurally unprepared. Over 85% of India's workforce is in the informal sector [17]. Eighty-four percent of workers receive no retirement or pension benefits [16]. The National Pension System and Atal Pension Yojana together cover only about 5.3% of the total population [16]. Nearly 40% of India's elderly belong to the poorest wealth quintile, and 18.7% live without any source of income [16].

India's pension system ranks among the bottom three globally in adequacy [18]. The Observer Research Foundation noted that the Union Budget 2026–27 allocated minimal additional resources for elder care despite the demographic trajectory being well-understood [19].

Japan offers a cautionary comparison. When Japan's median age was roughly where India's will be around 2045, Japan already had universal pension coverage, a per-capita GDP several multiples higher than India's current level, and a healthcare system ranked among the world's best [20]. India will face similar demographic pressures with a fraction of the fiscal capacity and institutional infrastructure.

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

The Success Story Argument

Not all demographers view the fertility decline as a crisis. A significant contingent argues that the speed of India's transition is evidence of policy success — specifically, the success of investments in female education, healthcare access, and reproductive autonomy.

Proponents of this view point to several pieces of evidence. India's fertility decline was achieved without the coercive measures that characterized China's one-child policy [4]. It occurred across religious and caste lines, suggesting broad-based social change rather than top-down enforcement [5]. And the decline in desired family size (to 1.8 in NFHS-5) indicates that smaller families reflect genuine preferences, not just access to contraception [5].

The UNFPA's 2025 report on India's demographic transition explicitly cautioned against borrowing crisis framing from East Asian contexts, noting that India's age structure remains far younger than China's or South Korea's and that the dependency ratio will not become unfavorable for at least two decades [6]. India's median age is currently around 28, compared to China's 39 and Japan's 49 [3].

This perspective holds that the real risk is not fertility decline itself but the failure to invest in the large working-age cohort that already exists — turning a demographic asset into a liability through underinvestment in education and job creation rather than through insufficient births.

Pro-Natalist Policies: What the Evidence Actually Shows

Several East Asian countries have attempted to reverse fertility decline through financial incentives. The results offer limited encouragement.

South Korea has spent heavily on pro-natalist measures since its 2006 "Saeromaji Plan," including cash transfers, expanded parental leave, and childcare subsidies. Korean parents now receive between 35 and 50 million won (roughly $25,000–$36,000) in total support from birth through childhood [21]. South Korea's TFR has nonetheless continued falling, reaching 0.72 in 2023 — the lowest recorded fertility rate of any country in history.

Research on South Korea's baby bonus program found that 74% of expenditures went to "infra-marginal" births — children who would have been born regardless of the subsidy [21]. To meaningfully move the fertility rate, the program would need to be approximately 15 times larger [21].

Singapore has implemented the most comprehensive financial incentive package among East Asian countries, including direct cash grants, tax relief, and subsidized childcare [22]. Its TFR has remained below 1.2 for over a decade.

A 2025 study published in Taylor & Francis found that declining marriage rates among women aged 25–29 are the most influential factor shaping TFRs across East Asia, suggesting that current policies are fundamentally mistargeted — they subsidize childbearing within marriage while the underlying shift is away from marriage itself [23].

At India's income level and scale, replicating even the modest effects of East Asian pro-natalist spending would require fiscal commitments that are difficult to reconcile with the country's existing infrastructure and social spending gaps.

Geopolitical Assumptions Under Revision

India's projected demographic trajectory has been embedded in a wide range of geopolitical and economic assumptions by foreign governments and institutions.

The narrative of India as a counterweight to China has rested partly on the expectation that India's working-age population would continue growing as China's shrank — a "great population swap" [24]. India's working-age population is still expected to surpass China's in share terms by 2030 [11], but the revised peak and decline timeline means the advantage will be shorter-lived than assumed.

The U.S. Federal Reserve published a dedicated analysis in April 2026 examining India's growing role in the global economy, noting the country's demographic position as a factor in capital allocation and supply-chain diversification strategies [25]. Projections of India overtaking the U.S. economy in PPP terms by 2045 and China by 2063 depend on sustained GDP growth rates of 6–7%, which in turn depend on productively employing the working-age population [12][26].

If India's demographic window closes faster than expected — and if the skills gap prevents full use of even the current working-age cohort — the timeline for these economic milestones extends or becomes unreachable. Defense and trade planners in Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra who have built Indo-Pacific strategies partly around India's demographic weight may need to recalibrate [27].

RAND Corporation research has noted that China and India are "heading down different demographic paths," but that India's path is now converging toward China's pattern faster than anticipated [27].

What Comes Next

India's demographic transition is unfolding in compressed time. The country has roughly 15–20 years before its dependency ratio begins deteriorating — a window in which it must simultaneously:

• Create formal-sector employment for hundreds of millions of workers who currently lack skills credentials
• Build pension and elder-care systems that cover an informal workforce of over 700 million
• Resolve the political crisis over delimitation without creating permanent regional grievances
• Maintain the GDP growth rates that its geopolitical positioning depends on

The fertility decline itself is not reversible in any meaningful policy timeframe, nor — as the success-story argument holds — is reversal necessarily desirable. The question is whether India's institutions can adapt to a future that arrived ahead of schedule.

The demographic data is clear. The institutional response is not yet visible at the scale required.