EU Airline Industry Warns of Fuel Shortages as Strait of Hormuz Remains Closed

Six weeks after the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran on February 28, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has produced a crisis that is no longer theoretical for European aviation. On April 10, ACI Europe — the trade body representing the continent's airports — warned that the EU faces a "systemic" jet fuel shortage within three weeks unless the strait reopens or alternative supplies materialize at scale [1]. Four Italian airports are already operating under emergency Jet A-1 rationing [2]. The last tanker carrying jet fuel through the strait bound for Europe departed before the conflict began, and no replacements have followed [3].

The question facing airlines, governments, and the 14 million Europeans whose jobs depend on air connectivity is straightforward: how long can reserves last, and who pays when they run out?

The Supply Gap: 40% of Europe's Jet Fuel, Gone Overnight

The Strait of Hormuz normally handles roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day — about 20% of the world's seaborne crude [4]. For jet fuel specifically, Europe's exposure is disproportionately high. According to trade intelligence firm Kpler, at least 42% of total seaborne jet fuel and kerosene imports into the EU-27 and the United Kingdom transited the strait [3]. Some analyses place the figure between 30% and 50%, depending on how indirect Gulf-origin supply chains are counted [5].

This concentration reflects years of declining European refining capacity. As domestic production weakened, the EU became increasingly reliant on Middle Eastern refined products — jet fuel chief among them. The closure has removed over 20% of the global seaborne jet fuel supply, according to George Shaw, an aviation fuel analyst cited by Euronews: "The situation is challenging. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has taken out over 20% of the typical global seaborne jet fuel supply" [3].

What the Price Charts Show

The financial impact has been rapid. WTI crude oil stood at $114.01 per barrel as of early April 2026, up 86.7% year-over-year [6]. But crude prices tell only part of the story. Jet fuel has risen far faster than the underlying commodity.

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of Apr 6, 2026CSV

Northwest European jet fuel hit $1,840 per metric ton on the Platts assessment on April 3 — a record [7]. That represents more than a doubling from pre-conflict levels of approximately $850 per metric ton in January 2026. IATA reported jet fuel averaging $195 per barrel in the first week of April, more than double the average from the prior year [8].

Source: Platts/IATA

Data as of Apr 10, 2026CSV

The refining margin — the gap between crude and refined jet fuel prices — has widened dramatically. In Asian markets, the crack spread surged from about $21 per barrel before the conflict to as high as $144 per barrel before settling around $65 [7]. This divergence means that even if crude prices stabilize, jet fuel costs remain elevated because refining capacity is the bottleneck, not just raw material.

Fuel typically accounts for 20% to 35% of an airline's operating costs [7]. At current prices, many flights booked before the conflict are losing money on every departure.

Reserves: A Patchwork of National Buffers

EU member states maintain emergency petroleum stocks under IEA mandatory obligations, which require 90 days of net import coverage [5]. But these reserves are designed for the broader economy — road transport, heating, and military needs rank ahead of aviation in government allocation priorities [5].

Source: Euronews/IEA

Data as of Apr 7, 2026CSV

Euronews reported reserve coverage by country as follows: the UK holds approximately 3 months, Portugal 4 months, Hungary 5 months, Denmark 6 months, Italy and Germany 7 months, and France and Ireland 8 months [3]. These figures reflect total petroleum reserves, not jet fuel specifically.

For aviation-specific supply, the picture is tighter. The ARA hub — covering Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Amsterdam — held jet fuel inventories of roughly 0.8 to 1.0 million tonnes (5.8–7.3 million barrels), running slightly above seasonal norms as of late March [5]. Boston Warwick's analysis estimated that under a sustained Hormuz closure scenario, the UK would reach a crisis declaration point within 25–30 days, Germany within 30–35 days, and France within 32–38 days [5]. Strategic reserve releases could extend those timelines to 55–75 days depending on the country.

The IEA activated the largest emergency collective action in its history on March 11, making 400 million barrels available across member countries — 301 million barrels of crude oil (70.6%) and 125 million barrels of refined products (29.4%) [9]. European contributions totaled approximately 114.5 million barrels, with emphasis on gasoline, diesel, heating oil, and aviation fuel [10]. However, the IEA warned that jet fuel — one of the most affected refined products — faces worsening shortages in April and May [3].

Which Airlines Are Most Exposed?

Hedging positions — contracts that lock in fuel prices months in advance — are the single largest determinant of which carriers survive this period intact and which face balance-sheet stress.

Ryanair holds the strongest position among major European carriers. CEO Michael O'Leary stated in January 2026 that the airline had locked in 84% of the current quarter's fuel at $77 per barrel and about 80% of the next financial year's requirements at roughly $67 per barrel [11]. At spot prices above $190, those contracts represent enormous savings. However, O'Leary told the Financial Times in late March that Ryanair would not do any new hedging for three months, betting that prices represent a temporary peak [11]. He has nonetheless warned that 10% to 25% of Ryanair's fuel supply could be at risk through May and June [11].

Lufthansa has paused all new hedging activity but remains well covered near-term, with 82% of the current quarter and 77% of the rest of 2026 hedged at pre-crisis rates [7]. The airline faces operational challenges beyond price — it has reported supply chain disruptions at multiple airports [12].

Air France-KLM starts at 70% hedged for the current quarter but drops to 47% by Q4 2026, leaving it notably more exposed than its peers [7]. This declining coverage means the airline's fuel costs will increasingly reflect spot market prices as the year progresses.

SAS has announced over 1,000 flight cancellations for April alone [3].

European carriers entered the crisis with stronger hedging positions than their U.S. counterparts, who had largely abandoned fuel hedging in recent years. On average, European airlines hedged around 80% of their 2026 fuel requirements, according to the Financial Times [7]. But that protection is front-loaded and thins as the year progresses. If the closure extends into summer, unhedged exposure will grow across the board.

Alternative Supply Routes: Expensive and Slow

Three main alternatives exist for rerouting fuel supply to Europe, each with significant trade-offs.

Cape of Good Hope rerouting. Shipping around Africa's southern tip adds 3,500 to 4,000 nautical miles and 10 to 14 days of transit time [13]. Rerouting an Aframax tanker from the Gulf to Northwest Europe via this route adds 16 to 32 days and approximately $933,000 in fuel costs per voyage [13]. Freight rates on this corridor have risen sharply as demand surges. The route is already under strain from Houthi attacks that had diverted Red Sea shipping since late 2023 [13].

Saudi East-West Pipeline (Petroline). This pipeline carries crude from the Abqaiq processing center to Yanbu on the Red Sea, with a capacity of 5 million barrels per day and potential expansion to 7 million [14]. It bypasses the strait entirely. However, Yanbu was not designed as Saudi Arabia's primary export hub, limiting throughput for refined products [14].

UAE Habshan-Fujairah Pipeline. With 1.8 million barrels per day of capacity, this pipeline delivers crude to the Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait [14]. It is already used as a routine export route.

Non-Gulf suppliers. Europe sources crude from Norway (14.6% of EU imports), the United States (14.5%), Kazakhstan (12.2%), and various West African, North African, and Latin American producers [14]. The U.S. exported a record 400,000 tonnes of jet fuel to Europe in March [3]. But these alternatives cannot fully replace Gulf supply volumes in the near term.

Flight Disruptions: The 30-60-90 Day Scenario

The passenger impact is already measurable. Within the first 48 hours of the conflict's escalation, over 5,000 flights were cancelled globally [15]. By early April, nearly 7% of all global flights were cancelled on a single day [15].

Ryanair CEO O'Leary projected that 5–10% of all scheduled European flights could be cut if the strait remains closed through summer [8]. The impact is not uniform across route categories. Boston Warwick's analysis estimated demand reductions by route type: Europe-to-Asia routes face a 20% drop, Europe-to-Middle East routes a 20% drop, transatlantic routes an 8% decline, and intra-European routes a 6% decline, producing an overall European network reduction of about 10% [5].

Long-haul routes are cut first under most carriers' contingency plans. These flights consume the most fuel, and rerouted Asia-Europe services — forced to avoid Gulf and Iranian airspace — burn 5–15% more kerosene on diversions [5]. Cargo operations, which generate lower per-tonne revenue than passenger services, are also early candidates for reduction.

Average ticket prices have risen approximately 24% since the conflict began, with airlines imposing fuel surcharges to offset costs [15]. Global tourism faces a major contraction, with travelers delaying or cancelling trips [16].

The Subsidy Question: Strategic Warning or Strategic Lobbying?

There is a credible case that the aviation industry's public warnings are partly designed to build political leverage. Airlines have reason to seek government intervention: fuel tax waivers, direct subsidies, or early access to strategic petroleum reserves allocated specifically for aviation.

The COVID-19 pandemic established the precedent. Between 2020 and 2022, EU governments provided tens of billions of euros in state aid to airlines. Lufthansa alone received over €6.8 billion from the German government [17]. The EU state aid framework — which permits direct grants, loan guarantees, and tax advantages during crises — remains legally available [17].

European member states currently exempt airlines from fuel tax and airline tickets from VAT, representing a longstanding subsidy structure [18]. Industry groups like IATA have already called on the EU to review its Emissions Trading System obligations in light of the crisis [19]. ACI Europe has framed the shortage in terms designed to maximize political urgency, noting that air connectivity contributes approximately €851 billion to European GDP and supports 14 million jobs [1].

Against this, several factors suggest the warnings are substantively grounded rather than purely strategic. The Italian airport rationing is real [2]. The ARA hub inventory figures are publicly verifiable. And the IEA's own language — describing this as "the largest disruption to world energy supply since the 1970s" — aligns with industry assessments [4]. The situation may be both genuine and strategically amplified simultaneously.

Transport & Environment, a European NGO, has previously documented extensive aviation subsidies across the EU and may argue that additional state support compounds existing distortions [18]. The tension between immediate crisis response and long-term policy coherence on aviation emissions remains unresolved.

IEA Emergency Mechanisms: Legal Thresholds and Aviation's Place in the Queue

The IEA's emergency response system requires member countries to maintain 90 days of net oil import coverage. The March 11 collective action — releasing 426 million barrels — was triggered under Article 5 of the International Energy Program, which allows coordinated response to "major disruptions" in oil supply [9].

However, strategic reserves are managed by national governments, and allocation decisions reflect domestic priorities. Aviation typically ranks fourth or fifth in fuel allocation hierarchies, behind road transport, heating, military needs, and in some countries, agriculture [5]. The legal mechanisms for releasing reserves do not specify aviation as a priority sector.

The European Commission and IEA held a joint stock-taking session on March 18 to assess oil market conditions and coordinate further measures [20]. Individual EU member states retain discretion over how their reserve contributions are distributed across sectors, creating an uneven patchwork of aviation fuel access.

Second-Order Effects: Tourism, Cargo, and Hub Competition

If the disruption extends beyond 90 days, analysts project cascading effects across the European economy.

Tourism. Air connectivity contributes €851 billion to European GDP annually [1]. Southern European economies — Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy — are disproportionately dependent on summer tourism arrivals. A 10% reduction in flight capacity during peak season would translate into billions in lost revenue for hotels, restaurants, and related services.

Air freight. Supply chain costs are rising as cargo capacity is cut. Airlines typically carry freight in the belly holds of passenger aircraft; as passenger flights are reduced, cargo capacity shrinks in parallel. Dedicated freighter operations face the same fuel constraints [5].

Hub competition. European hub airports — Amsterdam Schiphol, Frankfurt, Paris Charles de Gaulle, London Heathrow — compete with Gulf carriers like Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad for connecting traffic. Gulf carriers operating from Dubai and Doha face their own fuel access challenges given proximity to the conflict zone, but they also benefit from direct pipeline access and sovereign support. If the crisis reshuffles connecting traffic patterns, some shifts may prove permanent [16].

Currency and inflation. The EU estimates gas prices have risen 70% and oil by 50% since the conflict began, adding an extra €13 billion to fossil fuel import bills [4]. The euro has strengthened modestly against the dollar (to 1.15 as of April 2026), partially offsetting dollar-denominated fuel costs, but overall inflationary pressure is building across the continent [6].

Historical Comparison: 2011 Libya and 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais

The 2011 Libyan civil war removed approximately 1.6 million barrels per day from global supply, causing a jet fuel price spike of roughly 30% [4]. The 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq-Khurais processing facility briefly knocked out 5.7 million barrels per day — the largest single-day supply disruption in history at that time — but prices recovered within weeks as Saudi Arabia restored production rapidly [4].

The current crisis differs in scale and duration. The Hormuz closure has persisted for over five weeks with no clear end date. The disruption affects not just crude supply but refined product flows, refinery operations in the Gulf, and shipping lanes simultaneously. Unlike the Abqaiq attack, there is no single facility to repair; the bottleneck is geopolitical, not infrastructural. The IEA has characterized it as the largest supply disruption in the history of the world oil market [4].

What Comes Next

The April 10 ACI Europe warning sets a three-week clock. If no significant volumes of jet fuel reach European ports by early May — whether through a reopened strait, redirected supply chains, or strategic reserve releases — the continent will move from localized rationing at Italian airports to systemic capacity constraints across the network.

The ceasefire declared between the U.S. and Iran remains fragile, with ongoing Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Iranian threats to abandon the truce [21]. Even if the strait reopens, IATA chief Willie Walsh warned that it could take months to replenish jet fuel supply chains to pre-crisis levels [22]. The in-transit buffer — middle distillate volumes at sea currently 50% higher than normal — provides several weeks of additional cushion [5], but it is being drawn down, not replenished.

For passengers, the practical implications are rising fares, fuel surcharges, and a narrowing window to book summer travel at pre-crisis prices. For the industry, the question is whether governments will intervene with targeted aviation fuel allocations — and what strings will be attached.