Artemis II Crew Splashes Down After First Crewed Lunar Mission in Over 50 Years

At 5:07 p.m. PDT on April 10, 2026, the Orion spacecraft Integrity hit the Pacific Ocean off the coast of San Diego, carrying four astronauts home from the first crewed voyage beyond low Earth orbit since Apollo 17 in December 1972 [1]. Commander Reid Wiseman, pilot Victor Glover, and mission specialists Christina Koch and Jeremy Hansen — a Canadian Space Agency astronaut — had spent nearly 10 days circling the Moon, traveling 252,756 miles from Earth at their farthest point and breaking the distance record set by the crew of Apollo 13 in 1970 by more than 4,100 miles [2].

Navy divers from the USS John P. Murtha stabilized the capsule with a sea anchor, attached an inflatable collar, and opened the hatch. Lt. Cmdr. Jesse Wang and his medical team entered, conducted initial health checks, and exchanged fist bumps with the crew before transferring them by helicopter to the ship for further evaluation [3]. By April 11, all four astronauts were back in Houston with their families [1].

The mission was a technical success. But it was also the product of a program that has consumed $93 billion since 2012 [4], survived multiple administrations and repeated calls for cancellation, and still has not landed anyone on the lunar surface. The questions surrounding Artemis are no longer about whether the hardware works. They are about whether the economics, the politics, and the timeline add up.

The Price Tag: $4.1 Billion for a Flyby

NASA's Office of Inspector General has calculated the operating cost of a single Artemis mission — including SLS rocket, Orion capsule, and ground operations — at approximately $4.1 billion [5]. The breakdown: roughly $2.2 billion for the SLS rocket, $1 billion for the Orion crew capsule, $570 million for ground infrastructure, and $300 million for the European-built service module [5].

Source: NASA OIG

Data as of Apr 15, 2026CSV

For four astronauts, that works out to just over $1 billion per person for a lunar flyby. For comparison, the entire Apollo program cost approximately $25.8 billion in 1973 dollars, or roughly $309 billion adjusted to 2025 dollars [6]. Spread across 12 moonwalkers and the broader crews who flew lunar missions, that figure is enormous — but Apollo landed on the Moon six times. Artemis II flew around it.

On the other end of the cost spectrum, SpaceX's Starship is projected to cost between $2 million and $100 million per launch, depending on which estimate is used and what reusability assumptions are applied [7]. Even at the high end, Starship's per-flight cost would be roughly 2.5% of an SLS launch. NASA itself awarded SpaceX a $2.89 billion contract to develop the Starship Human Landing System and provide two operational lunar missions [7].

Source: NASA OIG / SpaceX Estimates

Data as of Apr 15, 2026CSV

What Artemis II Proved — and What It Didn't

The primary purpose of Artemis II was to validate the Orion spacecraft and its life-support systems with humans aboard in deep space for the first time [8]. The crew tested manual piloting of Orion during several demonstrations, collecting data on handling characteristics that will guide future rendezvous and docking operations with lunar landers during Artemis III and beyond [8]. They confirmed that the spacecraft's environmental control systems could sustain four people through the radiation environment beyond the Van Allen belts — something Artemis I, the uncrewed test flight in 2022, could measure with instruments but not with human subjects [9].

The crew also conducted science activities. NASA scientists identified approximately 35 geological features for the astronauts to observe on the lunar surface; working in pairs, crew members photographed these sites and described them in real time to scientists at Mission Control [10]. The AVATAR (A Virtual Astronaut Tissue Analog Response) investigation used organ-on-a-chip devices to study the effects of increased radiation and microgravity on human tissues [10]. And in a first for space exploration, the crew conducted a live video call with astronauts aboard the International Space Station from a distance of 232,141 miles — the farthest crew-to-crew communication in history [11].

What Artemis II did not do is land. The Apollo program, by its eighth crewed flight (Apollo 11), had already put two astronauts on the lunar surface. By contrast, Artemis II was a flyby — a mission profile comparable to Apollo 8 in 1968 [8]. More than 50 years after Apollo 17, NASA still cannot replicate the feat of landing humans on the Moon, in part because the human landing system, the lunar spacesuits, and the orbital staging infrastructure remain in development.

The 40-Minute Silence

On April 6, during the seven-hour lunar flyby, Orion passed behind the Moon and entered a planned communications blackout lasting from 6:44 p.m. to 7:25 p.m. EDT — approximately 40 minutes [12]. The Moon's bulk physically blocked radio signals between the spacecraft and NASA's Deep Space Network on Earth [12]. During the blackout, at 7:02 p.m. EDT, Orion reached its closest approach to the lunar surface: just 4,066 miles [12].

Apollo crews experienced similar blackouts. The phenomenon is inherent to any mission using an Earth-based communications relay when the spacecraft passes behind a celestial body. NASA had contingency procedures in place: the spacecraft's onboard guidance systems were designed to operate autonomously, and the crew had trained for anomaly scenarios during the blackout window [12]. Astronaut Koch later told reporters the experience was "surreal," while Hansen told President Trump that he "said a little prayer" during the silence [13].

The blackout underscored a technical limitation that has persisted since the Apollo era. Without a relay satellite network in lunar orbit — something NASA's planned Lunar Gateway station would partially address — communication gaps on the far side are unavoidable.

A Coalition of 61 Nations — and Two Notable Absences

Artemis II was not solely an American project. The European Space Agency provided the Orion service module, which supplies propulsion, power, and life support [14]. Canada contributed astronaut Jeremy Hansen and has committed to providing the Canadarm3 robotic system for the planned Lunar Gateway station [14]. Japan has pledged hardware contributions and crew participation in future missions [14].

The legal framework governing this cooperation is the Artemis Accords, a set of bilateral agreements between the United States and partner nations establishing principles for lunar exploration. Initially signed by eight countries in October 2020, the Accords had 61 signatories as of early 2026, including India, France, Germany, South Korea, and Brazil [15]. The Accords call for transparency, interoperability, the release of scientific data, and the preservation of lunar heritage sites [15].

Two major spacefaring powers are absent. Russia criticized the Accords as a U.S.-centric framework and declined to participate. China is barred from NASA cooperation by the Wolf Amendment, a congressional provision in effect since 2011 [15]. Russia and China have instead pursued the International Lunar Research Station, their own plan for a permanent lunar base in the 2030s [15]. The result is an emerging bifurcation in lunar governance: one framework led by the U.S. with dozens of partners, and another led by China and Russia with a smaller coalition.

The Accords do not, however, create binding mechanisms for sharing lunar resources or scientific data beyond broad principles. Specific data-sharing arrangements are typically negotiated through separate memoranda of understanding between NASA and individual partner agencies [15].

The Political Geography of a Rocket

The SLS rocket exists, in significant part, because of politics. The vehicle was mandated by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, signed by President Obama, which directed NASA to build a heavy-lift rocket using Space Shuttle-derived hardware [16]. The act specified the rocket's capabilities, its initial launch date (2016, missed by six years), and even some of its technical architecture — an unusual level of congressional prescription [16].

The reason was economic as much as technical. SLS prime contractors — Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Aerojet Rocketdyne, and others — have more than 3,800 suppliers spread across all 50 states and Puerto Rico, supporting roughly 60,000 workers [17]. The Planetary Society has mapped SLS contractor locations and found them distributed across hundreds of congressional districts [17]. NASA's own 2019 economic impact report estimated that the SLS and related programs generated $14 billion in total economic output [17].

This geographic spread has made SLS politically durable. Since the program's inception in 2012, both the House and Senate have added funds to SLS every single year, regardless of which party controlled the chamber, and regardless of the program's cost and schedule performance [16]. The Reason Foundation, a libertarian think tank, has argued for canceling SLS and shifting to commercial providers, estimating that retirement would save billions annually [16]. But programs that create jobs in enough congressional districts enjoy a political constituency that abstract cost-benefit analyses cannot easily overcome.

Source: NASA OIG Reports

Data as of Apr 15, 2026CSV

The Trump administration's own fiscal year 2026 budget proposal described SLS as "grossly expensive" and called for terminating both SLS and Orion after Artemis III [18]. Congress responded by including $4.1 billion for SLS in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, mandating minimum spending of $1.025 billion per year through fiscal year 2029 and funding Artemis IV and V [18].

Crediting Trump — and the Longer History

NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman, a former SpaceX mission commander appointed during Trump's second term, told Fox News that Artemis II "would not be possible if it wasn't for President Trump" [19]. Isaacman cited Trump's national space policy, issued at the start of the second term, which directed NASA to return to the Moon "with frequency," establish a lunar base, and pursue nuclear propulsion for eventual Mars missions [19].

The claim has some basis and some limitations. The Artemis program was formally established through Space Policy Directive-1, signed by Trump in December 2017 during his first term, which redirected NASA from the Obama-era goal of an asteroid redirect mission back to the Moon [18]. That directive provided political authorization for the lunar focus.

But the hardware predates Trump. The SLS was authorized in 2010 under Obama. Orion's development began even earlier, under the Constellation program initiated by President George W. Bush in 2005 [18]. The Biden administration continued Artemis funding, and NASA's Artemis I uncrewed test flight launched in November 2022 under Biden [18].

The bottlenecks that delayed Artemis II — including the SLS green run test failures, hydrogen leaks on the launch pad, and heat shield issues discovered after Artemis I — were engineering problems that spanned administrations [18]. No single president created the program, and no single president's decisions were solely responsible for its timeline.

Crewed vs. Uncrewed: The Scientific Debate

Critics of crewed spaceflight have long argued that robotic missions deliver more science per dollar. Artemis I, the uncrewed precursor, carried instruments that measured the deep-space radiation environment and tested spacecraft systems without the weight, life-support requirements, or risk of a human crew [9].

NASA's counter-argument for Artemis II centers on two points. First, human observers provide real-time adaptability that robots cannot match. "Human eyes and brains are highly sensitive to subtle changes in color, texture, and other surface characteristics," NASA stated, arguing that astronaut observations of the 35 targeted geological features could "uncover new discoveries" that complement instrument data [10]. Second, the mission's primary purpose was not science but engineering validation: confirming that the spacecraft can keep humans alive in deep space, a prerequisite for any future lunar landing [8].

Whether that validation required a $4.1 billion crewed flyby rather than additional uncrewed testing is a question that reasonable analysts disagree on. The human health data from the AVATAR organ-on-a-chip experiment and the radiation dosimetry from crew-worn monitors could not have been collected identically on a robotic mission [10]. But the geological observations, while valuable, were limited to photography and verbal descriptions from orbit — a task that high-resolution orbital cameras could approximate at lower cost.

The Road to Artemis III — and the Odds of Landing by 2028

The original plan called for Artemis III to land astronauts on the Moon. That plan has changed. In late February 2026, NASA restructured the mission: Artemis III will now be a crewed test in Earth orbit, focused on rendezvous and docking with one or both commercially developed lunar landers — SpaceX's Starship HLS and Blue Origin's Blue Moon — and testing the new Axiom Extravehicular Mobility Unit (AxEMU) spacesuit [20]. The actual crewed lunar landing has been pushed to Artemis IV, currently targeting 2028 [20].

NASA's Safety Advisory Panel has warned that stacking too many first-time systems and operations into a single flight "materially elevates mission risk and reduces margin" [20]. The panel's concern is not abstract: Starship HLS requires multiple orbital refueling flights before each lunar mission, a capability SpaceX has not yet demonstrated. Blue Origin's Blue Moon lander is similarly in development.

NASA's track record on schedule estimates is poor. The OIG has documented that SLS contracts experienced $2 billion in cost overruns and at least two years of schedule delays for Artemis I alone [4]. The Mobile Launcher 2, originally contracted at $383 million for delivery in 2023, is now projected to cost $2.7 billion and may not be ready until 2029 [4]. Applying NASA's historical slippage rates, independent analysts have suggested that a crewed lunar landing before 2030 is optimistic.

The critical path items are clear: Starship orbital refueling demonstration, HLS uncrewed lunar landing test, AxEMU spacesuit qualification, and — if SLS continues beyond Artemis III — completion of the Mobile Launcher 2. Any single item slipping could cascade through the timeline.

What the Splashdown Means

Artemis II accomplished what it set out to do: it sent humans around the Moon and brought them home safely. That is a genuine achievement, and the four crew members deserve the recognition they've received. The mission validated hardware, collected data, and demonstrated capabilities that will be necessary for any future lunar landing.

But it also laid bare the tensions that define the Artemis program. A $93 billion investment that has yet to land on the Moon. A rocket that costs $4.1 billion per flight while commercially developed alternatives promise costs orders of magnitude lower. A political coalition that sustains funding through job distribution rather than mission efficiency. An international framework that includes 61 nations but lacks binding resource-sharing agreements. And a timeline for actually landing that keeps moving to the right.

The splashdown of Integrity closed one chapter. The harder chapters — landing, building, sustaining a presence — remain ahead, with no guarantee they will be written on schedule or on budget.