Inside Iran's Execution Machine: How Record Killings and Digital Isolation Work in Tandem

Iran's execution apparatus and its internet censorship infrastructure have escalated in lockstep since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, forming what human rights organizations describe as a coordinated system of repression. The numbers tell a stark story: recorded executions rose from 582 in 2022 to 1,639 in 2025 [1], while the regime simultaneously constructed the architecture for one of the most restrictive internet environments on earth [2].

The Execution Surge: Year by Year

The scale of Iran's use of the death penalty has accelerated sharply since September 2022, when the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini in morality police custody triggered nationwide protests. According to the 18th Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran, published jointly by Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and ECPM (Together Against the Death Penalty), recorded executions have followed a steep upward trajectory: 582 in 2022, 834 in 2023, 975 in 2024, and 1,639 in 2025—a 68% increase in the final year alone [1]. Amnesty International's figures for 2025 are even higher, recording at least 2,159 executions [3]. By comparison, Iran carried out 267 executions in 2020 and 333 in 2021, before the post-Amini escalation began [1].

Source: Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) / ECPM

Data as of Apr 13, 2026CSV

In the first three months of 2026, at least 656 executions had already been carried out, maintaining the pace of roughly four to five per day [4]. Among those executed in connection with the protests specifically, Amnesty International has documented at least 10 cases, with a further 12 people remaining at risk of execution [5]. The broader surge extends well beyond protest-related cases, encompassing individuals convicted under drug charges, vague national security statutes, and charges of moharebeh (enmity against God) and efsad-e fel-arz (corruption on earth) [6].

Drug Charges as Political Cover

A defining feature of Iran's execution campaign is the use of drug-related convictions to obscure political motives. In 2025, 795 people—48.5% of all executions—were put to death on drug-related offenses, a 58% increase from the 503 drug executions recorded in 2024 [1]. Human rights organizations have documented a pattern in which political prisoners are sentenced to death on trumped-up, nonpolitical charges, including drug smuggling, making the true number of political executions difficult to determine [6].

Source: Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO)

Data as of Apr 13, 2026CSV

The UN Human Rights Council's Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Iran found in February 2024 that the regime had committed systematic crimes against humanity during the protest crackdown [7]. The report documented forced confessions extracted through torture—a finding corroborated by multiple organizations regarding the cases of executed protesters Mohsen Shekari and Majidreza Rahnavard [5].

Since February 28, 2026, Iranian authorities have carried out at least 39 executions on what Amnesty International described as "politically motivated charges following torture-tainted grossly unfair trials," comprising 16 protesters, nine dissidents, 10 individuals accused of espionage, and four accused of "armed rebellion against the state" [8]. Vaguely defined "national security" and "espionage" charges have become an increasingly common tool for criminalizing dissent and securing death sentences [8].

The Architecture of Digital Isolation

Iran's internet censorship has evolved from conventional filtering into what researchers call a "new model of censorship" [9]. The Telecommunication Infrastructure Company (TIC) holds a monopoly on internet traffic entering and leaving the country. Through the National Information Network (NIN), authorities have been constructing a layered internet system that fundamentally restructures who can access the global web [2].

In July 2025, Iran's Supreme Council for Cyberspace passed a regulation formalizing a two-tiered internet hierarchy. Under this system, access to the global internet is no longer a default right but a privilege granted based on professional necessity and political loyalty [10]. The implementation includes "white SIM cards"—special mobile lines issued to government officials, security forces, and approved journalists that bypass the state's filtering apparatus entirely [10].

The technical infrastructure relies on deep packet inspection (DPI), DNS blocking, HTTP and HTTPS filtering, and protocol-level blocking [9]. In February 2024, the Supreme Council for Cyberspace prohibited the use of unlicensed VPNs, with major providers including NordVPN, ProtonVPN, and TunnelBear becoming inaccessible [2]. The domestic VPN market—estimated at over $85 million annually—has been driven underground, with the government criminalizing unlicensed VPN use since 2022 [2].

Comparison with China and Russia

Iran's system draws heavily on Chinese technical assistance. A 2026 report by Article 19 documented that China has provided material and technical support to Iran's censorship infrastructure since at least 2010 [11]. The Chinese firm Huawei and telecoms equipment manufacturer ZTE have been identified as providing technology that enables Iran's filtering capabilities [12].

Iran's National Information Network is architecturally similar to China's Great Firewall in its ambition to create a domestic internet isolated from the global network [11]. However, Iran's implementation differs in key respects: while China's system is technically more sophisticated, with granular content filtering and real-time keyword censorship, Iran has relied more heavily on blunt shutdowns and bandwidth throttling. Russia's SORM surveillance system, by comparison, focuses on data interception rather than content blocking, and shows "negligible evidence of bidirectional censorship at the national level," according to researchers [13].

Iran's January 2026 blackout introduced a novel approach: maintaining global routing presence while isolating domestic users through DPI and selective protocol blocking, effectively creating the appearance of connectivity while cutting off actual access [9].

The Blackout-Execution Nexus

The correlation between internet shutdowns and state violence is not coincidental. It is, according to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, deliberate.

On January 8, 2026, as protests triggered by currency collapse and inflation spread nationwide, Iranian authorities imposed a near-total internet blackout [14]. The shutdown coincided with a dramatic escalation of lethal force. Iran International, citing hospital registration data, estimated approximately 36,500 deaths during the crackdown, with a specific list documenting 30,304 protest-related deaths registered in civilian hospitals for January 8–9 alone [15]. Human Rights Watch stated that the blackout was designed to conceal atrocities [16].

The blackout lasted 88 days—the longest nationwide internet disruption recorded in any country—isolating more than 90 million people [14]. During this period, authorities carried out mass arrests and expedited judicial proceedings on capital charges [8].

This pattern has precedent. During the November 2019 protests, Iran imposed a week-long internet shutdown during which Amnesty International later documented that at least 304 people were killed [17]. The 2022 Mahsa Amini protests saw localized shutdowns timed to periods of peak security force activity [2].

President Masoud Pezeshkian himself acknowledged in December 2025 that he lacks the authority to lift internet restrictions, stating the decision rests with the Supreme National Security Council [18].

Who Supplies the Surveillance State?

Iran's digital repression infrastructure relies on foreign technology. The Chinese company Tiandy, one of the world's largest video surveillance firms with nearly $700 million in annual sales, has supplied cameras and AI-enabled software—including facial recognition technology and software that claims to detect a person's race—to Iran's Revolutionary Guard, police, and military [19]. The United States sanctioned Tiandy in December 2022, and the European Union followed with sanctions on Tiandy's Iranian representative in January 2023 [20].

European companies have also been implicated. Germany's Bosch corporation sold surveillance equipment to Iran. Denmark's Milestone Systems delivered video analysis software to Iran until 2019. Britain's Creativity Software supplied location-tracking systems to MTN Irancell, Iran's second-largest mobile network provider [21].

The EU banned exports of surveillance technology to Iranian authorities, though enforcement has been inconsistent [22]. In May 2024, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a final rule clarifying regulations on technology sales to Iran [23].

Economic Pressure and the Engagement Debate

Iran's economy provides context for both the protests and the regime's response. Inflation has remained above 30% since 2019, reaching 44.6% in 2023 before easing slightly to 32.5% in 2024 [24].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

This economic pressure has fueled an internal debate within Iran's political establishment. Reformists and pragmatists, including President Pezeshkian and Economy Minister Hemmati, have argued that economic recovery without sanctions relief is impossible, pushing for engagement with Western powers [25]. Hardliners, led by figures like Saeed Jalili, view negotiations as capitulation and have opposed nuclear talks with the United States [25].

The steelman case for engagement holds that Western sanctions and isolation have strengthened hardliners by destroying the economic base that moderate politicians depend on for legitimacy. When the economy deteriorates, the argument goes, the security establishment gains relative power because it controls smuggling networks and sanctions-evasion mechanisms, while reformists lose their primary policy tool—economic improvement through integration [26].

Historical evidence offers partial support. During the JCPOA period (2015–2017), when sanctions were partially lifted, executions did not decline meaningfully, suggesting that economic engagement alone does not automatically moderate state violence [1]. However, a younger generation of hardline officials increasingly frames the conflict as existential, and some analysts warn that if this faction concludes Washington's goal is regime change rather than policy change, pressure could grow for escalation rather than restraint [26].

Trading Partners and Their Silence

Iran's major trading partners hold theoretical leverage but have shown minimal inclination to use it. China accounts for approximately 30% of Iran's trade ($18.2 billion), followed by Turkey ($4.3 billion), the UAE (7.3% of trade), and Russia ($3.05 billion) [27].

None of these governments have publicly conditioned their commercial relationships on human rights improvements. China has actively facilitated Iran's repression through technology transfers [11]. Russia's deepening military cooperation with Iran—particularly the exchange of drone technology—has created mutual dependencies that make human rights pressure unlikely [26]. Turkey and the UAE maintain commercial relationships driven by geographic proximity and energy needs [27].

Freedom House has called on Washington to improve sanctions collaboration with democratic governments and place greater pressure on countries known for weak compliance, including the UAE, Turkey, and China [28].

The Hollowing Out of Civil Society

The combined effects of executions, imprisonment, and digital isolation have produced measurable damage to Iranian civil society. Since the 2022 protests, authorities have arbitrarily arrested, threatened, or summoned hundreds of protesters, human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, media workers, labor activists, students, and teachers [3].

Of the 125 journalists prosecuted in 2024, 40 were women, many reporting on human rights and women's rights [29]. More than 400 Iranian journalists and artists abroad have had their assets inside Iran seized for allegedly supporting "hostile foreign actors" [29].

Iran's brain drain has accelerated. The country ranked second globally for emigration of educated professionals, with 150,000 to 180,000 scientific professionals leaving between 2007 and 2021—representing an estimated annual economic loss of $50 to $70 billion [30]. The healthcare sector has been particularly affected: 3,000 nurses leave annually, nearly 10,000 doctors have requested professional certificates for emigration, and 80% of medical students are considering leaving [31]. An adviser to President Pezeshkian acknowledged in November 2024 that the average age of emigration has dropped below 18 [31].

Between 40% and 53% of college students, graduates, doctors, and professors express a desire to emigrate [30]. The drivers are not purely economic—political repression, human rights abuses, and the lack of civil freedoms are consistently cited alongside corruption and economic decline [30].

What Remains

Iran's execution campaign and its censorship infrastructure serve the same strategic purpose: the elimination of dissent through physical destruction and informational isolation. The execution numbers—climbing from 267 in 2020 to 1,639 in 2025—represent a sixfold increase in five years [1]. The internet architecture—from conventional filtering to a two-tiered system with loyalty-based access—represents a qualitative shift from censorship to digital apartheid [10].

The January 2026 blackout demonstrated that these tools work in concert. When the regime needed to suppress a mass protest movement, it simultaneously cut communications and unleashed lethal force, confident that the scale of violence would not be documented in real time [14][16].

International responses have remained largely symbolic. UN bodies have issued reports and condemnations. Western governments have imposed targeted sanctions. Iran's major trading partners have continued business as usual. Inside the country, the combination of state violence, economic collapse, and digital isolation continues to drive the educated and the young toward emigration, hollowing out the very civil society that might otherwise press for change from within.