The Pacific Pivot: Hegseth's Praise for Asian Allies Exposes a Widening Rift With Europe

At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 30, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth delivered a keynote address that amounted to a public report card for America's alliance network — and the grades were distributed along stark geographic lines. Asian partners received praise; European allies received warnings [1][2].

"The era of the United States subsidising the defence of wealthy nations is over," Hegseth declared. "We need partners, not protectorates. We seek alliances built on shared responsibility, not dependency" [3].

The speech represents the clearest articulation yet of the second Trump administration's approach to alliance management: reward those who spend, punish those who don't, and make the Indo-Pacific — not Europe — the primary theater of American strategic attention.

What Hegseth Said

Hegseth structured his address around the concept of "model allies" — nations that are "the most capable, clear-eyed, and ready to defend their national interests" [1]. He singled out South Korea for having "invested consistently in its own defence," noting that Seoul "lives on the front lines, and so they build real combat power" [1]. Japan was commended for working to "accelerate its defence transformation," while the Philippines drew praise for a 12% increase in defense spending and Australia for committing to deeper integration with U.S. joint forces [3][4].

The Defense Secretary set a new benchmark: 3.5% of GDP in defense spending, up from the 2% target NATO allies agreed to at the 2014 Wales Summit [4]. This aligns with the commitment NATO members made at The Hague Summit in 2025, which established 3.5% as the core defense spending floor and 5% as the broader security target by 2035 [5].

On Europe, Hegseth was blunt: "For too long, polite pleas from our European allies to spend more on their own defence fell on deaf ears. They are finally playing catch-up" [1]. He warned that "allies who refuse to step up and carry their own weight for our collective defense will face a clear shift in how we do business" [1].

The Spending Scorecard: Asia vs. Europe

The comparison Hegseth draws is selective but grounded in real numbers. Among the praised Asian allies, South Korea spends approximately 2.8% of GDP on defense, Australia 2.3%, the Philippines 1.6%, and Japan 1.4% [6].

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2026

Data as of Apr 28, 2026CSV

Among the major European NATO members, as of 2025: Poland leads at 4.48%, the United Kingdom at 2.54%, France at 2.25%, Germany at 2.14%, Italy at 2.02%, and Spain at 2.01% [5][7].

Source: NATO Defence Expenditure Report 2025

Data as of Dec 1, 2025CSV

The picture is more complicated than Hegseth's rhetoric suggests. Japan, at 1.4% of GDP, spends less as a proportion than every major European NATO ally now meets. The Philippines at 1.6% likewise falls below the 2% floor that all NATO allies hit in 2025 — a historic first [5]. South Korea at 2.8% does exceed most European allies, but Poland's 4.48% dwarfs any Indo-Pacific partner.

The distinction Hegseth appears to draw is not purely about current levels but about trajectory and threat perception. Japan's defense budget rose 9.7% in 2025 alone — the 13th consecutive annual increase — reaching $62.2 billion [8]. South Korea has pledged to reach the 3.5% target [4]. The Philippines increased spending 12% year-on-year [4].

Europe's Defense Surge — The Numbers Hegseth Downplays

European allies have seen their own spending surge, particularly since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Germany's defense spending rose 23% in real terms in 2024 and 18% in 2025, with the budget doubling from its 2021 level to €95 billion. Berlin has committed to €117.2 billion in 2026 and €162 billion by 2029, following reform of the constitutional debt brake [7][9].

France allocated €68.5 billion in 2026, or 2.25% of GDP, despite fiscal pressures [7]. European NATO allies and Canada collectively invested over $574 billion in defense in 2025, up from 1.4% of combined GDP in 2014 to 2.3% [5].

The structural argument European officials make is that their spending increase — from abysmal baselines — represents a more dramatic financial and political lift than maintaining already-high levels. Germany went from 1.27% of GDP in 2021 to 2.14% in 2025, effectively doubling its defense commitment in four years [7]. Constitutional debt limits, procurement bureaucracies built for peacetime, and the political challenge of redirecting welfare-state spending toward the military all constrain the speed of European rearmament.

The Strategic Pivot: Pentagon Doctrine Shifts East

Hegseth's rhetoric aligns with formal doctrinal changes. The 2026 National Defense Strategy places homeland defense and China deterrence above all other priorities, with Europe explicitly downgraded in the command hierarchy [10]. The strategy calls for "a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain" and encourages "regional allies and partners to do more for our collective defense" [10].

A leaked Hegseth memo earlier in 2026 advised European allies to assume primary responsibility for conventional defense against Russia, with a reported deadline of 2027 for taking over the majority of NATO's conventional capabilities — from intelligence to missile defense [11].

This represents a departure from previous administrations. While the Biden administration and the first Trump term both called the Indo-Pacific a "priority theater," neither formally subordinated the European theater in doctrinal terms. The 2026 NDS, notably, does not even use the phrase "priority theater" for the Indo-Pacific — instead treating China deterrence as embedded within homeland defense [10].

Whether this reflects genuine strategic consensus within the Pentagon is unclear. INDOPACOM's unfunded priorities list for FY2026 shows persistent resource gaps [10], while EUCOM retains significant deployed forces. The formal positions of the Joint Chiefs have not publicly contradicted the Secretary, though the absence of explicit endorsement from senior uniformed leaders is itself notable.

The Money Trail: Who Benefits From the Pacific Shift

The shift in strategic emphasis corresponds directly to arms sales flows. U.S. proposed arms transfers to East Asia and the Pacific grew from $25.06 billion in FY2024 to $27.1 billion in FY2025, an 8.12% increase [12]. Taiwan alone accounted for $11.4 billion across nine notifications in FY2025; the Philippines received $5.7 billion in proposed sales [12].

Source: US State Department, FY2025 Arms Transfers Report

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

Major defense contractors are positioned accordingly. In July 2025, Lockheed Martin received approximately $4.29 billion to manufacture JASSM and LRASM cruise missiles for delivery to Japan, Finland, the Netherlands, and Poland. Raytheon secured a separate contract worth $3.5 billion for AMRAAM production [13]. In February 2026, Lockheed Martin and Fujitsu announced a joint venture for Japan's next-generation defense communications satellite [13].

The AUKUS partnership continues generating contracts: Raytheon Australia received A$277 million for Collins-class submarine combat system sustainment in November 2025 [13]. The broader AUKUS architecture — with its nuclear submarine pillar and advanced capabilities pillar — represents hundreds of billions in potential long-term procurement.

Defense industry lobbying interests are clear: the pivot East means larger addressable markets. Japan's record $55.1 billion defense budget, South Korea's rising allocations, and Australia's multi-decade submarine and missile programs collectively represent a market that is growing faster than European procurement pipelines can absorb new orders.

European Responses: Between Resentment and Acceleration

European governments have adopted a dual strategy: avoiding overt confrontation with Washington while accelerating independent defense capabilities [11]. The Hegseth memo and broader Trump administration rhetoric have catalyzed what years of American complaints could not — genuine movement toward European strategic autonomy.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has pushed to "Europeanize" NATO, a framing that acknowledges the reality of reduced U.S. commitment [11]. Some capitals have responded by exploring an integrated European army as a long-term goal. The EU's March 2026 defense data report shows member states collectively increasing budgets, though coordination remains fragmented [7].

The February 2026 NATO ministerial meeting was notable for Hegseth and Secretary of State Rubio's absence — a signal that European defense discussions are no longer a priority venue for Washington [11].

Public Opinion: Support in Principle, Resistance in Practice

Polling across Europe reveals a gap between abstract support for higher defense spending and willingness to fund it. In France, a March 2025 Ipsos poll found 68% of respondents favoring increased defense spending [14]. In the UK, YouGov found 49% in favor in June 2025 — but 57% opposed tax increases to fund it, and 53% opposed cutting other public spending for defense [14].

In Poland, despite the country's 4.48% spending rate, 58% of respondents opposed a proposed temporary defense tax, with only 32% supporting it [14]. Two-thirds of Europeans told pollsters their armies cannot take on Russia militarily [14].

This creates a political bind for European leaders: voters support the abstract concept of security but resist the fiscal trade-offs. Whether American pressure accelerates this shift or hardens domestic resistance remains contested. The Centre for European Reform notes that public support for defense spending requires careful framing around specific threats rather than abstract alliance obligations [14].

The Comparison Problem

Hegseth's framing contains a fundamental asymmetry. The Asian allies he praises face an immediate, geographically proximate threat in China — much as South Korea faces North Korea. This concentrates political will and public spending support in ways that Europe's diffuse Russian threat does not similarly motivate.

Japan's constitutional constraints on military spending, only recently loosened through reinterpretation, kept its spending artificially low for decades — meaning recent increases represent a normalization, not an achievement comparable to Europe's rearmament from peace-dividend baselines.

Moreover, European allies have provided substantial contributions to collective security that Hegseth's GDP metric ignores. Since 2022, European nations have delivered over €100 billion in military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine — a direct response to the primary land war threatening allied territory [9]. Germany, France, and the UK have deployed troops to NATO's eastern flank, maintained air policing rotations, and absorbed millions of Ukrainian refugees.

The Asian allies, by contrast, operate in a fundamentally different threat environment: one characterized by deterrence rather than active conflict. Praising their spending trajectory while discounting Europe's wartime mobilization involves a selective reading of burden-sharing.

What Comes Next

The 3.5% target Hegseth has set creates an immediate sorting mechanism. South Korea has already pledged to meet it [4]. Japan, at 1.4%, faces a longer road than most European allies — though its political trajectory favors continued increases. Australia, mid-AUKUS implementation, will likely reach the threshold through submarine and missile procurement alone.

For Europe, the pressure creates two possible outcomes: accelerated spending that satisfies Washington, or a definitive break toward strategic autonomy that accepts reduced U.S. engagement as permanent. Germany's commitment to €162 billion by 2029 suggests the former path remains viable [7], but the political sustainability of open-ended increases without visible American reciprocity is uncertain.

The Shangri-La speech positions the United States as a market-maker in security relationships — offering preferential access to intelligence, arms sales, and industrial collaboration to those who pay admission [4]. Whether this transactional model produces more capable allies or simply fractures the alliance architecture remains the central unanswered question.

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV