Gulf States Want the Iran War to End — But Only After Tehran Pays a Higher Price

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their Gulf neighbors publicly call for de-escalation. Behind closed doors, they are lobbying Washington to keep the pressure on Iran — and they have a specific list of demands before they will support a ceasefire.

A War the Gulf Didn't Start but Now Wants to Shape

When the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026 — including a decapitation strike that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — Gulf Arab states were not consulted in advance [1]. Within hours, Iranian missiles and drones struck military facilities, civilian airports, hotels, and energy infrastructure across Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, and Kuwait [2]. The Gulf states, which had lobbied Washington in 2024 to prevent exactly this scenario, found themselves in the crossfire of a war they had tried to avoid [3].

Now, four weeks into the conflict, those same governments have shifted from reluctant bystanders to active participants in shaping its outcome. According to reporting from the Washington Post, CNN, and Foreign Policy, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait have communicated to the Trump administration that they oppose an immediate ceasefire and want Iran's military capabilities degraded further before any peace deal is reached [1][4][5].

What the Gulf States Want Destroyed

The demands are specific. Saudi officials have told Washington that Tehran's cruise and ballistic missile capabilities must be degraded "as much as possible" before the war ends [1]. The UAE's presidential adviser Anwar Gargash stated publicly that it would be "difficult" for the region to continue living with Iran's missile and drone programs intact, and that the UAE's thinking "turns toward solutions that ensure lasting security" in the Gulf [4].

The Gulf wish list extends beyond missiles. Gargash identified four categories: Iran's nuclear threat, its missile and drone arsenal, and what he called "the bullying of the straits" — a reference to Iran's history of threatening maritime passage through the Strait of Hormuz [4]. The UAE has debated whether to send its own military forces into the fight and has lobbied against any ceasefire that leaves Iranian military capability intact [4].

Qatar has taken a more cautious line. Former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim warned that the region "must not be dragged into a direct confrontation with Iran," reflecting Doha's traditional preference for mediation over military escalation [5].

Source: CNBC / Euronews / Al-Monitor

Data as of Mar 26, 2026CSV

The Military Buildup Behind the Position

The Gulf position is backed by decades of arms purchases. The United States supplied half of all arms imports to the Middle East and North Africa between 2020 and 2024, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE as the top recipients — constituting nearly 20 percent of all global arms imports [3].

In May 2025, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a $142 billion defense sales agreement — the largest in history — providing Riyadh with what Washington described as "state-of-the-art warfighting equipment" [6]. Since the war began, the Trump administration has invoked wartime emergency powers to bypass congressional review and push through an additional $23 billion in arms sales to the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. The UAE alone received $8.4 billion worth of drones, missiles, radar systems, and F-16 aircraft [7][8].

Saudi Arabia has made concrete military commitments in return. Riyadh expelled the Iranian military attaché and embassy staff on March 21, and opened King Fahd Air Base for U.S. operations — a reversal of its earlier refusal to let American forces use Saudi airspace and infrastructure against Iran [4].

The Toll So Far

The human cost of the war has been severe. By mid-March, the Human Rights Activists News Agency reported over 1,200 civilians killed in Iran by U.S.-Israeli strikes, including nearly 200 children [9]. The Iranian Red Crescent Society documented strikes on 5,535 residential units, 1,041 commercial units, 14 medical centers, and 65 schools [9].

The most internationally condemned incident occurred on the war's first day: a U.S. Tomahawk missile strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School in Minab, Hormozgan province, killed 168 people — over 100 of them children. Amnesty International's investigation found the school had been physically separated from an adjacent IRGC compound since 2016, and satellite imagery showed it had distinct entrances and painted grounds resembling other schools. Amnesty characterized the strike as either "gross negligence" or potentially a "war crime" [10].

The regional spillover has displaced hundreds of thousands. UNHCHR reported 700,000 Lebanese displaced by March 10, with Israeli evacuation orders across southern Lebanon pushing that figure above one million by late March [11]. UNICEF reported more than 1,100 children injured or killed across the region — 200 in Iran, 91 in Lebanon, 4 in Israel, and 1 in Kuwait — with millions unable to attend school [11]. In Iraq, a U.S. strike on the Habbaniya military base killed seven members of the Iraqi Armed Forces and injured 13 others [11].

Iran's Proxy Networks: Degraded but Not Dead

One of the Gulf states' primary justifications for continued conflict is the need to dismantle Iran's proxy network — the constellation of armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that Tehran has funded and directed for decades.

The network entered 2026 already weakened. The 2024-2025 Israeli campaign killed Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and most of the group's senior military leadership. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 severed the 1,574-kilometer land corridor through which Iran had transferred weapons to Lebanon for decades [12].

The current war has accelerated this degradation. Israeli strikes on Iranian telecommunications infrastructure severed the encrypted channels connecting Tehran to Beirut, Baghdad, and Sanaa. The financial pipeline — estimated at $700 million annually to Hezbollah alone and $100-200 million to the Houthis — has been disrupted by the destruction of Iranian banking infrastructure [12]. The killing of the IRGC intelligence chief on March 18 eliminated personal relationships through which proxy management functioned [12].

But the network has not collapsed. The Houthis have declined to escalate, prioritizing their peace process with Saudi Arabia and domestic governance. Iraqi militias have gained relative power as Tehran's only accessible proxy force, and their leadership has used this leverage to demand greater independence from Iran [12]. Each proxy group is now making autonomous decisions based on local interests rather than Iranian strategic direction — a fragmentation that may, paradoxically, make them harder to control through any future diplomatic agreement.

The Nuclear Question

The Gulf states' strategy of prolonging the war to degrade Iran's capabilities carries a specific risk: accelerating the nuclear threat they claim to want to eliminate.

Before the June 2025 Israeli strikes, Iran possessed approximately 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent — enough, when further enriched to weapons-grade 90 percent, for nine nuclear weapons [13]. A single cascade of 175 IR-6 centrifuges could have produced enough weapons-grade material for one bomb every 25 days. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in May 2025 that Iran would need "probably less than one week" to produce weapons-grade highly enriched uranium [13].

The June 2025 and February 2026 strikes damaged enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, and the IAEA reported in early March 2026 that it had no access to any of Iran's four declared enrichment facilities [13]. IAEA Director General Grossi stated that Iran's enrichment program "has been significantly set back" [13].

Yet IAEA Director General Grossi also stated unequivocally: "we don't see a structured program to manufacture nuclear weapons" in Iran [14]. When asked if Iran was "days or weeks away from building a bomb," he responded "no" [14]. The Arms Control Association noted that military strikes occurred despite ongoing diplomatic negotiations showing "substantial progress" toward a potential agreement — raising questions about whether the war itself has made a negotiated resolution to the nuclear question harder, not easier [14].

Oil Prices and the Economic Fallout

The economic consequences of the Gulf states' preferred approach — continued war — are already staggering.

Source: FRED / U.S. Energy Information Administration

Data as of Mar 23, 2026CSV

WTI crude oil prices were trading around $66-67 per barrel before the war began on February 28. Within days, they surged past $70 and have climbed steadily, exceeding $98 per barrel by March 20 [15]. Brent crude surpassed $100 per barrel on March 8 for the first time in four years, peaking at $126, with some analysts predicting $150 in a worst-case scenario [16].

Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz on March 4, through which roughly 20 percent of the world's oil passes daily. Tanker traffic dropped by approximately 70 percent, with over 150 ships anchored outside the strait [16]. Combined oil production from Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE dropped by at least 10 million barrels per day by March 12 — the most severe global supply disruption since the 1970s [16].

The Dallas Federal Reserve estimated that fourth-quarter global real GDP growth could fall 0.2-0.3 percentage points depending on the disruption's duration [16]. Beyond oil, the Strait's closure disrupted 45 percent of the global sulfur supply and spiked fertilizer costs worldwide [16].

The Legal Question

International law scholars have been blunt in their assessment of both the war's legality and the Gulf states' advocacy for its continuation.

UN special rapporteur Ben Saul stated: "This is not lawful self-defence against an armed attack by Iran, and the UN Security Council has not authorised it" [17]. Rebecca Ingber of the Cardozo School of Law emphasized that the UN Charter permits force only when authorized by the Security Council or exercised in self-defense against an imminent armed attack — neither condition was met [17].

Yusra Suedi of the University of Manchester characterized the strikes as "an act of use of force that was unjustified," arguing that imminence requires something "instant, overwhelming" and "happening now" — not speculative future threats [17]. Brian Finucane of the International Crisis Group described U.S. legal justifications as "scattershot" and said "certainly none of them amount to a serious international legal argument" [17].

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2817 condemning Iran's "egregious attacks" against its neighbors [18], but Russia and China's push for an "immediate and unconditional ceasefire" was blocked by the anticipated U.S. and UK veto [17]. UN experts have called for an immediate ceasefire and an international peace conference [19].

Iran has long argued that Gulf states, backed by the United States, are the primary regional aggressors. The Gulf position — openly advocating continued military action to weaken Iran before pursuing peace — has provided Tehran's narrative with new ammunition, even as Iran's own retaliatory strikes on civilian targets across the Gulf have drawn widespread condemnation [18].

What Comes Next

The Gulf states have outlined four structural demands for the post-war order: advance consultation before any U.S. military action that could trigger retaliation on their territory; enhanced and integrated air defense systems; clarified security commitments specifying what protection Washington will actually provide; and economic risk-sharing for infrastructure damage and investor confidence losses [5].

No Gulf official has publicly specified a timeline — weeks, months, or open-ended — for continued operations. The absence of concrete milestones or verifiable benchmarks raises a fundamental question: if the goal is the degradation of Iran's military capabilities, how much degradation is enough?

The IAEA cannot access Iran's enrichment facilities. Iran's proxy networks are fragmenting rather than surrendering. The Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted. Oil prices are nearly 50 percent above pre-war levels. Over a thousand Iranian civilians are dead. And Gulf states hosting U.S. forces — the same ones lobbying for continued conflict — have themselves absorbed Iranian missile strikes on their airports, ports, and energy infrastructure.

The Gulf gamble is that continued military pressure will yield a postwar order fundamentally different from the pre-war status quo. The risk is that it produces the opposite: a more isolated, more radicalized Iran with stronger incentives to pursue the nuclear weapon it has so far chosen not to build.