Inside Iran's Factional Bloodletting: Moderates Who Bet on a Trump Deal Now Face Elimination

On February 27, 2026, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi announced what appeared to be a breakthrough: Iran had agreed to never stockpile enriched uranium and to accept full IAEA verification [1]. Less than 24 hours later, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated military strike campaign against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and upending the entire political order [2]. The moderates who had spent months building the case for negotiation were left exposed — their diplomatic strategy in ruins, their domestic rivals ascendant, and their personal safety in question.

"If the moderates were to push toward negotiation and a ceasefire, they will be considered traitors and will most likely be eliminated," warned Hooshang Amirahmadi, a policy expert on Iranian politics, in late March 2026 [3].

That warning captures the central tension now defining Iran's internal power struggle. The country is simultaneously fighting a war, selecting new leadership, suppressing mass protests, and experiencing what multiple outlets have described as the deepest economic crisis in its modern history [4]. Within that chaos, the question of who gets to speak for Iran — and what happens to those who spoke for compromise — has become existential.

The Moderate Faction: Who They Are and Where They Stand

The moderate camp in Iranian politics is not a formal party but a loose coalition of officials who favor diplomatic engagement with Western powers, economic liberalization, and de-escalation of regional conflicts. Their most visible figure is President Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist elected in the 2024 presidential election and confirmed by the late Ali Khamenei [5].

Pezeshkian's presidency, however, has been largely symbolic. Despite holding a seat on the three-member Interim Leadership Council convened after Khamenei's assassination, he is "powerless in practice," according to multiple analysts [6]. His attempt in early March 2026 to signal restraint — stating that Iran would only target neighbors if their soil had been used for U.S. attacks — provoked immediate hardliner backlash. One parliamentarian said publicly that "it would be best if Pezeshkian never spoke until the war was over" [7].

The moderate network extends beyond Pezeshkian. Former President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif were the principal architects of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal [8]. Several members of Iran's Majlis (parliament) have historically supported engagement, though the Guardian Council's systematic disqualification of reformist candidates in the 2020, 2021, and 2024 elections has dramatically reduced their numbers [9]. Within the clerical establishment, some figures in Qom have periodically endorsed pragmatic approaches, though most of Iran's clerical hierarchy remains outside the official government structure and avoids direct confrontation with hardliners [10].

The Pattern: What Happens to Iranian Moderates After Failed Deals

The risk facing Iran's current moderates is not hypothetical. There is a clear historical pattern of political consequences for officials who advocate engagement with the West and then see those efforts fail.

After the 2015 JCPOA's effective collapse following the U.S. withdrawal in 2018, the political cost fell squarely on those who had negotiated it. Khamenei moved to purge reformists from positions of influence, contributing to the deal's final death by blocking meaningful engagement with European signatories [8]. The Guardian Council — a 12-member body, half theologians appointed by the supreme leader, half legal scholars selected by parliament — disqualified moderate conservatives and reformists "on an unprecedented scale" ahead of subsequent elections [9].

The mechanisms of elimination in Iran's system extend beyond electoral disqualification. The Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), the judiciary under figures like Ayatollah Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and the supreme leader's office each hold independent power to sideline, arrest, or worse — silence political figures. Seyed Hassan Khomeini, a reformist grandson of the Islamic Republic's founder seen as a potential future leader, was banned from running for the Assembly of Experts as a direct "pushback against anyone proposing changes to the clerical government following the nuclear deal" [8].

The current situation is more volatile than any previous cycle. Iran is at war. The supreme leader has been killed. And the moderates' negotiating partners — the United States and Israel — are the ones who launched the strikes.

The New Power Structure: Mojtaba Khamenei and the IRGC

On March 8, 2026, the Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei, the 56-year-old son of the slain supreme leader, as his successor. He won 59 of 88 votes in a process held largely online due to wartime security concerns [11]. The selection was driven by IRGC leaders who insisted on expediency, despite Mojtaba's limited religious credentials — an unusual concession in a theocratic system that traditionally demands senior clerical status for the position [12].

Mojtaba Khamenei has never held elected office. He operated for years behind the scenes in his father's office, cultivating deep ties with the IRGC [11]. Hard-line elites welcomed his emphasis on "security and ideological purity" and his determination to strengthen the IRGC's power, expecting him to "intensify domestic repression and maintain an aggressive posture toward Israel and the United States" [13].

The IRGC's institutional position has expanded considerably. Ahmad Vahidi, a former defense minister under international sanctions for his alleged role in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina, was appointed IRGC commander-in-chief on March 1, 2026 [14]. Qods Force chief Esmail Qaani and judicial figure Mohseni-Ejei round out a leadership structure dominated by security and ideological hardliners [3].

The Guardian Council, chaired by 99-year-old Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati since 1992, retains its gatekeeper role over all elections and legislative review [10]. The Expediency Discernment Council, which arbitrates disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council, is now populated with IRGC-aligned figures. Together, these bodies form the institutional machinery through which moderates can be removed from public life — or targeted more directly.

The Economic Pressure Cooker

The economic conditions driving Iran's crisis are severe and measurable. They form the backdrop against which both moderates and hardliners make their political arguments.

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Inflation reached 48.6% in October 2025 and remained above 42% through December, according to Iran's own statistics [4]. The World Bank projected in late 2025 that annual inflation would rise toward 60% [15]. Food prices surged 72% year-on-year, and health and medical goods increased 50% [16].

Source: IMF, Iran Central Bank

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

The Iranian rial's collapse has been staggering. At the time of the JCPOA signing in 2015, the exchange rate was approximately 32,000 rials to one U.S. dollar. When the U.S. withdrew from the deal in 2018, it had already fallen to around 120,000. By March 2025, it crossed the 1,000,000 mark — making it the least valuable currency in the world. As of late 2025, it reached 1,750,000 rials per dollar [4] [17].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

Official unemployment figures from the World Bank show Iran's headline unemployment at roughly 8.3% in 2025 [18], but these numbers obscure the real picture. Iran's Majlis reported that 50% of males aged 25–40 are unemployed and not looking for work. The labor force participation rate has dropped to 41%, well below regional averages, as workers exit the labor market entirely [4].

These conditions triggered nationwide protests beginning December 28, 2025, starting with bazaar merchants and quickly spreading to all 31 provinces. The demonstrations became the largest since the 1979 revolution, reaching more than 200 cities [16] [19]. The government's response was lethal: internal Ministry of Health estimates indicated thousands killed in the crackdown [19].

The Hardliner Case: Why They Say Moderates Are Wrong

The hardliner position against diplomatic engagement is not simply ideological rigidity. It rests on a specific empirical argument that deserves examination.

Hardliners point to the JCPOA as a cautionary tale. Iran complied with the deal's nuclear restrictions from 2016 to 2018, yet many U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear program — targeting Iran's missile development, regional proxy support, and human rights record — remained in place [20]. The promised economic benefits of sanctions relief were limited in practice, partly because international banks and companies feared U.S. secondary sanctions even during the deal's implementation [8].

Then the United States withdrew unilaterally in 2018, reimposing all sanctions despite Iran's verified compliance. From the hardliner perspective, the complying party was punished while the violating party faced no consequences [21]. This experience, they argue, demonstrates that the United States cannot be trusted to uphold agreements and that moderates who stake their credibility on such deals are at best naive and at worst complicit in weakening Iran's bargaining position.

Hardliners also point to the strategic dimension. The JCPOA's ten-year timeline, they argue, allowed Iran to develop its missile and drone capabilities — which proved operationally significant in the current conflict [21]. From this view, Iran's security is better served by military deterrence than by negotiated agreements that the other side can abandon.

The Libya precedent looms large in this argument. Muammar Gaddafi dismantled Libya's nuclear program through negotiations with the United States and United Kingdom in 2003. Eight years later, NATO intervened militarily and Gaddafi was overthrown and killed. North Korea, by contrast, developed nuclear weapons and has faced no military intervention [22]. Iranian hardliners invoke this comparison regularly: countries that give up nuclear capabilities become vulnerable; countries that keep them remain secure.

What the Moderates Were Proposing

The moderate faction's negotiating position, as it emerged through the five rounds of talks in 2025 and the February 2026 Oman channel, centered on several key elements. Iran signaled willingness to accept limits on uranium enrichment and expanded IAEA inspection access — the reported February 27 "breakthrough" included an agreement to never stockpile enriched uranium and to allow full verification [1].

In return, moderates sought comprehensive sanctions relief — not the partial relief of the JCPOA, which left major sanctions categories in place. Iran's broader conditions, articulated after the war began, included safeguards against future attacks, war reparations, and recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz [23].

The gap between these positions and what the Trump administration demanded was substantial. The U.S. pressed for complete dismantlement of Iran's enrichment program — not caps, but elimination [24]. Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed skepticism about the prospects: "I'm not sure you can reach a deal with these guys" [25]. The administration offered no formal security guarantees for Iranian officials who engaged in diplomacy — a significant point given that strikes were launched during active negotiations [2].

The Nuclear Threshold Question

If hardliners fully consolidate control and diplomatic channels close, the question of Iran's nuclear weapons timeline becomes central.

Source: IAEA Quarterly Reports

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

As of mid-2025, the IAEA reported that Iran possessed 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity — a 50% increase over just three months [26]. Technical analysis indicates that converting this stockpile to weapons-grade (90% enrichment) would require only about 1% of the separative work already invested. At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Iran could produce 233 kg of weapons-grade uranium — enough for an estimated nine nuclear weapons — within three weeks [27].

The February-March 2026 strikes damaged the entrance to the Natanz facility but did not destroy it, according to the IAEA [28]. Iranian lawmakers have since pushed for withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a step that would remove remaining international monitoring constraints [29].

The distance from Iran's current enrichment capacity to a functional nuclear weapon involves additional steps beyond uranium enrichment — weaponization, delivery system integration, and testing — but the enrichment threshold is the longest and most technically demanding phase. By most assessments, Iran has effectively crossed that threshold in terms of fissile material capacity.

What Comes Next

The situation as of late March 2026 is defined by competing pressures that show no sign of resolution.

Trump stated on March 30 that talks with Iran were going well and that Iran had "agreed to most of the American demands" [30]. Iran's parliament speaker Ghalibaf rejected ongoing negotiations the following day, saying Iran "could not be forced into submission" [3]. These contradictory claims may reflect genuine disagreement within Iran's leadership — or deliberate ambiguity from both sides.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described the days ahead as "decisive" and characterized the Iranian regime as "fractured" [31]. U.S. intelligence assessments predict a weakened but more hard-line government in Tehran, backed by the IRGC [13].

For Iranian moderates, the historical pattern is clear. Those who negotiate with the West and fail face political destruction. Those who negotiate and are then attacked by their negotiating partners face something worse: the accusation that they enabled the attack itself. The February 28 strikes — launched during an active diplomatic process — gave hardliners their most potent argument yet: that engagement with the United States is not just futile but dangerous.

Whether moderates survive this moment depends on factors largely outside their control: the trajectory of the war, the depth of economic pain the population is willing to endure, and whether any negotiated outcome emerges that they can claim credit for. If none does, the consolidation of hardliner power under Mojtaba Khamenei and the IRGC will likely proceed without meaningful resistance — carrying Iran closer to the nuclear threshold and further from the possibility of diplomatic resolution.