Trump Threatened to 'Blow Up' Oman: How a Gulf Ally Got Caught Between Washington and Tehran

On May 27, 2026, during a cabinet meeting at the White House, President Donald Trump was asked about reports that Oman and Iran were negotiating joint management of the Strait of Hormuz. His answer was blunt: "Oman will behave just like everybody else, or we'll have to blow them up" [1]. The State Department subsequently confirmed the statement was directed at Oman specifically [2].

The remark landed with force across the Middle East. Oman is not a hostile state. It is one of the United States' oldest Arab diplomatic partners, with ties dating to an 1833 Treaty of Amity and Commerce — the first such agreement between Washington and any Arab nation [3]. For over a decade, Oman has served as the primary back-channel between the United States and Iran on nuclear negotiations. And now, in the middle of the most consequential U.S.-Iran confrontation since the 1979 hostage crisis, Trump publicly threatened to destroy it.

The Immediate Context: Who Controls the Strait?

The threat arose from a specific dispute. Since the 2026 Iran war began on February 28 — when the United States and Israel launched large-scale strikes on Iranian military and nuclear targets — Iran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which more than 20% of global oil traffic normally passes [2][4]. Tehran began asserting sovereignty over the strait and charging vessels tolls for passage.

In late April, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Muscat and proposed what he characterized as Iranian-Omani cooperation over the strait, claiming it was "located in the territorial waters of Iran and Oman" with "no international waters in between" [5]. Reports in Iranian state media suggested the two countries were discussing a framework under which passage fees — framed as "service fees" rather than tolls — would be collected jointly [2].

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, countries cannot charge tolls for transit passage through natural straits used for international navigation. The Trump administration viewed Oman's engagement with Iran on this question as a betrayal — a neutral mediator potentially legitimizing Iran's chokehold on global energy markets [1].

Oman's Back-Channel Role: A History

To understand why this threat alarmed diplomats worldwide, the history of Oman's role in U.S.-Iran relations is essential.

The back-channel began in 2012, when Iranian officials passed a message through Oman to the United States suggesting secret meetings in Muscat [6]. William Burns, then Deputy Secretary of State, traveled to Oman for clandestine meetings with Iranian counterparts — sessions he later detailed in his memoir The Back Channel [6]. These talks, facilitated by Sultan Qaboos bin Said, laid the groundwork for what became the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the landmark nuclear agreement that constrained Iran's enrichment program in exchange for sanctions relief [7].

Oman's credibility as a mediator rests on a unique set of relationships. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Oman has no history of hostile relations with Iran. The two countries share a 1977 friendship treaty, and Omanis remember that Iran under the Shah provided military support to Sultan Qaboos during the Dhofar Rebellion in the 1970s [6]. Oman is a Sunni-majority sultanate with an Ibadi Muslim tradition distinct from the broader Sunni-Shia divide, which has allowed it to maintain working relationships with both sides [3].

The first round of Trump-era talks was held in Oman on April 12, 2025, with U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi in separate rooms, messages relayed through Omani mediators [8]. Oman continued to facilitate indirect talks through early 2026, including a February 6 session mediated by Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi [8].

Two Wars in Twelve Months

The diplomatic landscape was transformed by two rounds of military conflict.

In June 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, striking Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. On June 21, the United States joined, bombing multiple Iranian nuclear sites. A ceasefire was declared on June 24 — the "Twelve-Day War" [9][10]. The strikes damaged but did not destroy Iran's enrichment capacity.

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a second, larger campaign. The strikes included the assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei and Ali Larijani, a key negotiating figure [4]. Iran retaliated by closing the Strait of Hormuz and launching strikes across the region. A temporary ceasefire was announced April 7 and extended indefinitely by Trump on April 21 [4].

Iranian drones also struck Omani port cities — Duqm, Salalah, and Sohar — in the early stages of the 2026 conflict, though both sides later downplayed the incidents to preserve their relationship [3]. This attack on a neutral country underscored how Oman's geographic position makes it vulnerable regardless of its diplomatic stance.

The Economics of Threatening an Ally

Oman's economic ties with Iran have grown substantially, making the threat of military action against Muscat a move with significant blowback potential.

Source: Oman Ministry of Commerce / Reuters

Data as of May 28, 2026CSV

Iran pledged in September 2025 to double bilateral trade with Oman to $5 billion [3][5]. Since the war disrupted trade routes through the UAE, Oman has become one of the main conduits for Iranian commerce [5]. The Sultan of Oman issued orders to expand trade with Tehran [11].

Since the February 2026 war began, Omani ports have seen a 117% increase in exports handled from other GCC countries [3]. Cargo handling capacity at Sohar port, 200 kilometers north of Muscat, rose by 55%, according to Oman's Ministry of Transport [12]. This happened because Oman's ports at Sohar, Duqm, and Salalah lie outside the Strait of Hormuz, making them critical alternatives when the strait is closed [3].

The United States also has direct strategic interests in Oman. Under a 2019 Strategic Framework Agreement, the U.S. Navy has access to the ports of Duqm and Salalah, with approximately 80 U.S. Navy port calls annually [3]. Britain maintains a Joint Logistics Support Base at Duqm under a 37-year lease [3]. Threatening to "blow up" a country hosting these facilities introduces operational risks for Western military positioning.

On May 29, reports indicated the Trump administration was considering sanctions against Oman over its engagement with Iran on the Strait of Hormuz, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reportedly involved in discussions about economic pressure as an alternative to military threats [13].

Iran's Nuclear Stockpile: The Ticking Clock

Behind the diplomatic confrontation lies the fundamental question of Iran's nuclear program. Despite two rounds of military strikes targeting enrichment facilities, Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium grew rapidly before the June 2025 attacks.

Source: IAEA Reports

Data as of Feb 27, 2026CSV

By June 2025, Iran possessed 441 kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity — enough, if further enriched to weapons-grade 90%, to fuel an estimated nine nuclear weapons [14][15]. The IAEA reported that Iran's monthly production of 60% material at Fordow had jumped from 4.7 kg per month to 37 kg per month after Iran installed additional cascades of advanced IR-6 centrifuges [14].

Nuclear experts assess that Iran could enrich existing 60% material to weapons-grade purity within days or weeks, though constructing a deliverable nuclear weapon — weaponization — would take months or longer [10][14]. The military strikes damaged enrichment infrastructure, but the IAEA has been unable to fully verify the status of Iran's program since the war began.

The current negotiations include a U.S. demand that Iran surrender its enriched uranium and end all enrichment activity. Iran's position, articulated by Araghchi, is that its program is civilian in nature and that it would consider diluting or down-blending enriched material but not shipping it abroad — a restriction imposed by a directive from the late Supreme Leader Khamenei before his death [14][1]. This gap between U.S. and Iranian positions remains one of the central sticking points.

The Legal Question: Can a President Threaten a Neutral State?

Trump's remark prompted immediate legal scrutiny. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits not only the use of force but also the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state [16].

Raed Jarrar of the DAWN advocacy group characterized the threat as a violation of UN Charter prohibitions, comparing it to "mafia boss" logic [2]. Other analysts noted that Oman is neither harboring terrorists nor posing an imminent threat to the United States — the traditional justifications for presidential use of force.

Under U.S. domestic law, the picture is more complex. A Yale Law Journal analysis by Matthew Waxman found that the President possesses broad, largely unchecked authority to threaten military force, derived from both foreign relations powers and Commander-in-Chief authority [17]. However, Waxman also argued that the President "may not unilaterally threaten force in ways that are dramatically escalatory and could likely lead to war" without congressional authorization [17].

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 requires congressional authorization before initiating hostilities absent an attack on the United States or its armed forces [16]. Whether a public threat to "blow up" a treaty ally crosses constitutional lines depends on whether it is understood as diplomatic bluster or a genuine commitment to military action.

Gulf Reactions and Alternative Mediators

The threat also reshaped regional diplomacy. Muhanad Seloom of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs read the statement as a message to the entire Gulf: "Threatening a small ally is also a message to the whole Gulf: Do not give Iran cover" [2].

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have all pushed for a negotiated settlement between the United States and Iran [1]. Qatar and Pakistan have taken on more prominent mediation roles since the war began. On May 25, an Iranian delegation arrived in Doha to discuss outstanding issues, signaling that Qatar may be absorbing some of Oman's traditional back-channel function [1].

But Oman's unique position is difficult to replicate. Qatar has its own complex history with Gulf neighbors, including a Saudi-led boycott from 2017 to 2021. The UAE severed diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016. Saudi Arabia's rivalry with Iran is structural. Oman's "active neutrality" — a "friends to all, enemies to none" philosophy — gave it credibility with Tehran that other Gulf states lack [3].

Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi had already strained relations with Washington before Trump's threat. In March 2026, Albusaidi publicly criticized U.S. policy, arguing that Washington had "lost control of its own foreign policy" by following Israel into war and that Iran's retaliation was "probably the only rational option available to the Iranian leadership" [3]. These were unusually sharp words from Oman's typically reserved diplomatic corps.

The Steelman Case for Coercive Pressure

Some analysts argue that Trump's threat, however inflammatory, serves a strategic purpose. By publicly warning Oman against cooperating with Iran on the Strait of Hormuz, the administration signals that any arrangement giving Tehran a revenue stream or administrative role over international shipping is unacceptable. If Oman pulls back from the Hormuz discussions, Iran loses a potential partner in legitimizing its closure of the strait, increasing pressure on Tehran to negotiate on U.S. terms.

This logic echoes historical precedents. The United States has long used coercive pressure on smaller allies to shape negotiating environments — from pressuring Gulf states during the 1990-91 Gulf War coalition-building to arm-twisting European allies on Iran sanctions. The argument is that short-term diplomatic damage is acceptable if it forecloses options that would entrench Iran's bargaining position.

The counterargument is that threatening Oman pushes a key intermediary toward Iran rather than away from it. Oman's ports are already absorbing displaced Gulf trade. Its foreign minister has already publicly criticized U.S. war policy. And if Muscat concludes that Washington is an unreliable partner, the 2019 military access agreements that give the U.S. Navy basing options outside the Strait of Hormuz could be at risk — a self-defeating outcome given the current maritime standoff.

What Comes Next

As of late May 2026, U.S. officials claim a broader peace deal with Iran is imminent [1]. The reported framework includes a temporary moratorium on Iranian uranium enrichment, phased sanctions relief, and gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz [4]. But significant obstacles remain: Trump has insisted that Arab and Muslim nations sign the Abraham Accords with Israel as a condition of any deal — a demand unlikely to be met given opposition to Israeli military actions in Gaza [1]. Iran's new leadership, installed after Khamenei's assassination, has yet to demonstrate the authority to make binding commitments.

The threat against Oman may fade as quickly as it arrived — several analysts speculated that Trump may have misspoken, intending to reference Iran rather than Oman [1]. But the damage to the relationship is real. Oman's role as the quiet, trusted intermediary between Washington and Tehran depended on a degree of mutual respect that a public threat to "blow up" the country fundamentally undermines.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has repeatedly stated that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will pursue its own [10]. Israel has already demonstrated its willingness to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. The clock on proliferation does not stop for diplomatic crises.

Whether the Oman threat was strategic signaling, rhetorical carelessness, or something in between, it has added a new variable to an already volatile equation — one where the stakes include nuclear proliferation, global energy markets, and the architecture of Middle Eastern security.