Coordinated Bombings, Arson, and a Shadowy New Group: Inside the Escalating Assault on Jewish Life in Europe

In the early hours of March 9, 2026, an explosion ripped through a historic synagogue on rue Léon Frédéricq in Liège, Belgium, blowing out its windows and damaging its facade [1]. Within days, a synagogue in Rotterdam was set ablaze, a Jewish school in Amsterdam was hit by an explosive device, and ambulances belonging to London's Hatzola Jewish emergency service were torched [2]. A previously unknown group calling itself Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya — "The Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right" — claimed responsibility for each attack [3].

The March 2026 assault wave marks the most concentrated series of coordinated attacks on Jewish institutions in Europe in decades. But it did not emerge in a vacuum. It arrived atop years of steadily rising antisemitic violence, a trend that accelerated sharply after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza, and that has been further inflamed by the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict that began in late February 2026 [4][5].

The March 2026 Attack Wave: A Timeline

The attacks attributed to HAYI unfolded across at least four countries in a span of two weeks [2][3]:

• March 9 — Explosive detonation at a synagogue in Liège, Belgium. No casualties; significant structural damage [1].
• March 11 — HAYI claimed an attack on a "Zionist target" in Greece, though details remain unconfirmed by authorities [3].
• March 13 — Arson attack on a Rotterdam synagogue at approximately 3:40 a.m.; four suspects aged 17 to 19 arrested near another synagogue in the city. The same night, an explosive device detonated at a Jewish school in Amsterdam [2][6].
• March 22 — Four ambulances belonging to Hatzola, the Jewish volunteer emergency service in London, were set on fire [3].
• March 23 — A planned attack on a Chabad Hebrew school in Heemstede, Netherlands, was thwarted by police [3].
• March 24 — Two minors were arrested after setting a car ablaze in the Jewish quarter of Antwerp [3].

These European incidents coincided with attacks on Jewish sites elsewhere: shootings at two Toronto synagogues, a vehicle-ramming attack at a Michigan synagogue near Detroit by a Lebanese-born suspect (who was killed by security), and an armed incident near a synagogue in Trondheim, Norway [6].

Who Is HAYI? The Iran Connection

HAYI appeared publicly for the first time in early March 2026. Israel's Diaspora Ministry identified it as linked to Iranian terror networks, and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague published an analysis identifying what it called "hybrid threat signals" pointing toward Iranian state involvement [7][8].

The ICCT report noted that HAYI's claims were disseminated through Telegram channels "closely linked to the IRGC ecosystem," particularly those affiliated with Iraqi pro-Iranian militias [8]. The attack timing, target selection, and use of explosives aligned with "known patterns of Iranian external operations," the report stated [8]. Since 1979, the ICCT has identified 218 Iranian external operations globally, with 102 occurring in Europe — and more than half of those since 2021 [8].

However, analysts have flagged inconsistencies. Hans-Jacob Schindler, senior director of the Counter Extremism Project, told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency: "Whether the perpetrators are connected, or whether it's a framework the IRGC is giving them, is up for discussion" [3]. The group's Arabic name contains a spelling error, its propaganda imagery is inconsistent with standard pro-Iranian symbology, and its claimed Greece attack lacks public corroboration [3].

All individuals arrested so far have been teenagers or young adults. The Rotterdam suspects were five youths from Tilburg aged 17 to 19; the Antwerp suspects were minors [3][2]. This profile is consistent with what the ICCT describes as a "disposable agents" model — young recruits offered financial incentives, providing the sponsoring state with plausible deniability [8].

The Broader Numbers: A Multi-Year Escalation

The March attacks represent the sharp end of a trend visible in data across major European countries.

Source: CST, RIAS, ADL J7 Report, Italian Jewish community data

Data as of Mar 25, 2026CSV

In the United Kingdom, the Community Security Trust (CST) recorded 3,700 antisemitic incidents in 2025, the second-highest annual total in its history, trailing only the 4,298 recorded in 2023 [9]. For the first time, every calendar month exceeded 200 incidents. October 2025 was the worst month, with 463 incidents — driven in part by the first fatal antisemitic terror attack on British soil since CST began keeping records in 1984: a car-ramming and stabbing at Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur [9].

In Germany, Berlin police tallied 2,267 antisemitic crimes in 2025, the city's largest-ever total [10]. Nationally, police recorded 3,200 antisemitic crimes in just the first nine months of 2024 [11]. In France, 1,570 antisemitic incidents were recorded in 2024, nearly quadrupling the previous year's figure and accounting for 62 percent of all religious hate crimes in the country [11]. Italy documented an all-time high of 963 antisemitic incidents in 2025, a 10 percent increase over 2024 — itself described as a 400 percent increase over prior levels [4][10].

The ADL's inaugural J7 report, covering the seven largest Jewish communities outside Israel, documented increases from 2021 to 2023 of 185 percent in France, 75 percent in Germany, and 82 percent in the United Kingdom [11]. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has recorded up to a 400 percent rise in antisemitic activities since the Gaza war began [5].

Perpetrator Ideologies: A Complex and Contested Picture

One of the most politically charged questions is who is carrying out these attacks. The data that exists suggests no single ideological profile dominates.

In Germany, the civil society reporting network RIAS found that 41 percent of antisemitic attacks in recent years were committed by individuals with Islamist motivations, 20 percent by far-right perpetrators, and 16 percent by far-left actors [12]. The ADL's Marina Rosenberg stated at the J7 report launch: "We've been seeing a normalisation of antisemitism in societies across the political spectrum" [11].

The U.K.'s CST data shows that 53 percent of incidents in 2025 — 1,977 cases — referenced Israel, Palestine, or the Hamas attack, with explicitly antisemitic language or targeting. Of these, 1,766 employed anti-Zionist rhetoric and 387 equated Israel or Jewish people with Nazis [9].

Government transparency on perpetrator demographics varies. Germany's RIAS system provides relatively detailed breakdowns. France and the U.K. record incidents but publish less granular ideological data. Belgium and the Netherlands have disclosed limited information about the HAYI suspects beyond their ages [3][6]. Some researchers argue this opacity itself is significant (see below).

Jewish Communities Under Pressure

Europe's Jewish population stands at roughly 1.3 million — down from 9.5 million before World War II [13]. France has the continent's largest community at approximately 440,000, followed by the U.K. at around 312,000 and Germany at 118,000 to 125,000 [13][14]. In Germany, more than 40 percent of the Jewish population is over 65, while fewer than 10 percent are under 15 [13].

The behavioral impact of sustained antisemitic violence is measurable. The FRA's 2024 survey found that 96 percent of Jewish respondents across Europe reported encountering antisemitism [15]. The CST documented Jewish families removing mezuzot (religious doorpost markers), changing children's school routes, and avoiding synagogues unless armed security is present [9]. The ADL reported Jews hiding religious symbols and changing names on ride-sharing apps to avoid identification [11].

Emigration from France to Israel reached the tens of thousands between 2014 and 2017, following earlier waves of antisemitic attacks [13]. The current crisis has not yet produced comparable emigration data for 2025-2026, though community organizations report renewed interest.

Security spending has increased substantially. Belgium deployed military troops to guard synagogues, schools, and community centers in Brussels, Antwerp, and Liège — the first such deployment in five years [16]. Italy stationed armed soldiers with automatic weapons in Rome's Jewish quarter [4]. In the U.K., King Charles became patron of a British Jewish security nonprofit following the Hatzola ambulance attacks [3]. These state-funded deployments supplement already significant private security budgets maintained by Jewish communities across Europe.

Source: Jewish Population Review, Institute for Jewish Policy Research

Data as of Mar 25, 2026CSV

The Geopolitical Trigger: Gaza, Iran, and the Spillover Effect

The correlation between Middle Eastern conflict and European antisemitism is well-documented but its interpretation is contested.

The sharpest modern spike began after October 7, 2023. The FRA recorded up to a 400 percent increase in antisemitic incidents in the immediate aftermath [5]. The March 2026 attack wave coincided with the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict that began on February 28, 2026 [4][6].

The CST's 2025 data shows that 53 percent of U.K. antisemitic incidents explicitly referenced the Middle East conflict [9]. In the United States, 58 percent of antisemitic incidents in 2024 included elements related to Israel or Zionism, a first in the ADL's audit history [17].

HAYI's own messaging frames its attacks as retaliation for actions against Muslims. But analysts note that the group's operational model — if indeed directed by Iran — serves state geopolitical interests rather than spontaneous communal grievance [8].

Russian information operations add another layer. French investigators have suspected Russia of involvement in a campaign to paint Stars of David on buildings in Paris, part of broader efforts to "feed political extremes in order to weaken geopolitical rivals" [5].

The Classification Debate: Antisemitism vs. Political Protest

The question of where anti-Israel political expression ends and antisemitism begins remains one of the most disputed issues in European public life.

The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition, adopted by the European Commission as its benchmark, identifies certain Israel-related expressions as antisemitic — including denying Jewish self-determination, applying double standards to Israel, and holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeli actions [18]. It explicitly states that "criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic" [18].

Critics argue the definition is applied too broadly. In 2017, 243 British academics contended it "seeks to conflate criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism" [18]. In 2022, 128 scholars urged the United Nations not to adopt it, while 104 human and civil rights organizations warned it "has often been misused to wrongly label criticism of Israel as antisemitic" [18].

The European Network Against Racism (ENAR) has called for approaches that distinguish between antisemitic acts and political protest [19]. Some Jewish community leaders have also raised concerns about misclassification — arguing that overly broad categorization risks both inflating statistics and undermining the credibility of genuine antisemitism reporting.

Countries use different criteria. Belgium revised its instructions in April 2024 to establish specific indicators for identifying antisemitic motives when recording discrimination and hate crimes [15]. The U.K.'s CST applies its own analytical framework, reviewing each reported incident individually — in 2025, it received 6,701 reports but classified only 3,700 as antisemitic after analysis [9].

Law Enforcement Response and Legal Gaps

Arrest and conviction rates for antisemitic crimes remain difficult to compare across borders because EU member states use different recording methodologies [15]. The FRA has acknowledged that "recording of reported incidents is often inconsistent as Member States use different methodologies and data can therefore not be compared" [15].

In the HAYI cases, arrests have been made in the Netherlands (four teenagers in Rotterdam) and Belgium (two minors in Antwerp), but prosecutions are in early stages [3]. The speed of arrests — within hours in some cases — suggests active intelligence monitoring, though it also raises questions about whether the attacks could have been prevented.

A notable conviction came in December 2025, when Lithuanian politician Remigijus Žemaitaitis was found guilty of inciting hatred against Jews through social media posts and fined €5,000 — a penalty critics described as inadequate [15].

The European Commission's 2024 progress report on its antisemitism strategy noted efforts to improve judicial training and prosecution standards, including seminars organized through the European Judicial Training Network [15]. But the report acknowledged the gap between recording incidents and achieving convictions remains wide.

The Undercounting Debate

Some researchers argue that political sensitivities have distorted the public picture of antisemitism's sources.

In Germany, the distinction between police-recorded data (which initially categorized unattributed antisemitic crimes as "far-right" by default) and civil society data from RIAS (which applies different categorization standards) has generated debate about whether Islamist-motivated antisemitism is systematically undercounted in official statistics [12]. RIAS data showing 41 percent Islamist motivation stands in tension with police figures that historically attributed a larger share to the far-right [12].

The ICCT report on the March 2026 attacks called for European intelligence agencies to "move beyond a counter-terrorism focus primarily centred on conventional, non-state actors" and develop frameworks for addressing state-sponsored terrorism — an implicit acknowledgment that existing analytical categories may be inadequate [8].

Government officials have pushed back against undercounting claims. The European Commission's strategy emphasizes improving data collection and alignment of methodologies across member states, and the FRA has committed to helping standardize recording practices [15].

What Comes Next

The March 2026 attacks have prompted the most visible security escalation around European Jewish sites in years: soldiers on streets in Belgium and Italy, heightened police presence in the Netherlands and the U.K., and intensified intelligence cooperation across borders [4][16].

Whether HAYI represents a durable organized threat or a temporary Iranian proxy operation remains an open intelligence question. The ICCT analysis warned that the "crime-terror nexus" model — using recruited young people as operational assets — can be replicated quickly and cheaply, making disruption difficult [8].

The underlying trend lines, however, extend well beyond any single group. Antisemitic incidents across Europe's major Jewish communities have remained at two to four times their pre-October 2023 levels for over two years [9][10][11]. The FRA's finding that 96 percent of European Jews report encountering antisemitism reflects a lived reality that predates and will outlast the current attack cycle [15].

For a Jewish population that numbers 1.3 million across the continent — a fraction of what it was before the 20th century's catastrophes — the question is increasingly existential: whether a secure Jewish life in Europe remains viable, or whether the current trajectory will accelerate a demographic decline already well underway [13].