Hamas Signals Willingness to Surrender Heavy Weapons — But the Gap Between 'Some' and 'All' Could Restart the War

Two senior Hamas officials in Gaza have told mediators the group is prepared to relinquish some automatic rifles and other arms — a concession that falls well short of the full disarmament demanded by Israel, the United States, and the UN-backed Board of Peace [1]. The offer, relayed through Arab diplomats in Cairo in early April 2026, marks the first time Hamas figures have publicly acknowledged any willingness to part with weapons since the October 2025 ceasefire began [2]. But the distance between what Hamas is offering and what the peace plan requires remains vast, and the consequences of that gap — for the ceasefire, for 2.1 million Gazan civilians, and for the broader architecture of Middle East diplomacy — are growing more urgent by the day.

What Hamas Is Offering — and What It Is Not

Hamas negotiators have expressed willingness to hand over the group's heavy weapons, including rockets, missile launchers, and maps of its tunnel network, while insisting on retaining lighter weapons for what they describe as self-defense [3]. According to a report cited by the Jerusalem Post, an earlier U.S. draft demilitarization plan would have allowed Hamas to keep "small arms" — a category that could encompass the estimated 60,000 AK-47-style rifles the group still holds [4][5].

This partial offer stands in stark contrast to the Board of Peace's phased disarmament plan, formally presented in March 2026. That plan, endorsed through UN Security Council Resolution 2803, calls for full demilitarization over eight months [6]. Under its terms, Hamas would be required to surrender all heavy weaponry within 90 days, destroy its tunnel network, and ultimately hand over all remaining firearms — including rifles — to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) [7].

Israel has been unequivocal: it will not accept partial disarmament or a "symbolic step," and has stated it will not withdraw from the security perimeter along the Yellow Line as long as Hamas retains military capabilities [8]. When the Board of Peace's April 14 deadline passed without Hamas acceptance, Israeli officials signaled readiness to resume military operations [9].

The Arsenal in Question

Estimating Hamas's current weapons stockpile requires triangulating between Israeli military intelligence, independent analysts, and the group's own statements. Before October 7, 2023, Hamas was estimated to possess between 18,000 and 30,000 rockets and missiles, along with roughly 80,000 small arms [10][11]. The war has dramatically depleted the rocket arsenal: a senior IDF commander stated in early 2025 that Hamas retained approximately 7,000 rockets and dozens of drones [12], while more recent estimates from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) put the current rocket count closer to several hundred to 1,500 [13].

Source: IDF / INSS estimates

Data as of Apr 20, 2026CSV

Small arms tell a different story. Israel estimates Hamas still holds around 60,000 AK-47-type rifles and retains roughly 20,000 fighters [5]. RPG-7 variants, supplied historically through Iranian channels, number in the low thousands [11]. Much of Hamas's recent explosives have reportedly been fashioned from unexploded Israeli ordnance — a finding reported by the New York Times that underscores both the group's resourcefulness and the difficulty of any verification regime [14].

A partial handover of heavy weapons — rockets, launchers, anti-tank missiles — while retaining the bulk of small arms would, by these estimates, represent surrender of the most degraded portion of Hamas's arsenal while preserving the weapons most useful for internal control and guerrilla operations.

Who Is Speaking — and Who Is Not

The factional dynamics within Hamas are central to assessing whether any disarmament signal is credible. The officials who conveyed willingness to discuss weapons handover are political figures operating through diplomatic channels in Cairo and Doha [1]. The military wing has delivered a different message entirely.

Abu Obeida, the spokesman for Hamas's Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, stated in April 2026 that the group is "not ready even to consider any disarmament" and dismissed reports of negotiating progress as "all nonsense" [15]. The Qassam Brigades have characterized disarmament as "collective suicide" [16].

This split mirrors a broader internal struggle. Hamas's Shura Council — its secretive consultative body — has been convened to adjudicate between two competing camps [17]. Khalil al-Hayya, seen as close to Iran, supports continued armed resistance until Israel withdraws entirely from Gaza. Khalid Mashaal, aligned more closely with Qatar and Turkey, has pursued negotiated compromises [17]. The question of which faction prevails will determine whether political statements in Cairo translate into actual weapons handovers on the ground in Gaza — where the Qassam Brigades, not the political bureau, control the guns.

The Security Gap: What Each Side Demands

Hamas has told mediators it will not discuss disarmament without guarantees that Israel will completely withdraw from Gaza [8]. The group's broader demands include: a permanent ceasefire (not the current phased truce); full Israeli pullout from the Strip, including the security corridor; an end to the blockade with implementation of the agreed 600-truck-per-day humanitarian aid target; and, according to Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal, the establishment of a Palestinian state based on pre-1967 lines [18][19].

Israel's position leaves little room for overlap. Israeli officials have demanded Hamas relinquish both civilian and security control of Gaza, with Defense Minister statements indicating Israel will return to war if demilitarization is not achieved [9]. The U.S. has backed this framework: Trump's 20-point peace plan makes disarmament a precondition for subsequent phases of the truce [6].

Hamas has also pointed to Israeli non-compliance with existing ceasefire terms as grounds for refusing further concessions. Humanitarian aid deliveries remain well below the agreed thresholds, and the IDF has reported 14 ceasefire violations by Palestinian armed groups between April 8 and 16, while Hamas accuses Israel of continued airstrikes and restrictions on movement [20][16].

Precedents: When Armed Groups Have — and Haven't — Disarmed

The historical record of negotiated disarmament by non-state armed groups offers limited encouragement for those expecting a rapid resolution.

Source: Peace Accords Matrix / Crisis Group

Data as of Apr 20, 2026CSV

The IRA (1998–2005): The Provisional Irish Republican Army's disarmament took seven years from the Good Friday Agreement to completion. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) oversaw the process, with the IRA conducting three verified acts of decommissioning before its final disarmament in September 2005 [21]. The process was characterized by repeated delays, political crises, and suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Crucially, the IRA retained political structures (Sinn Féin) that gained electoral power as the military campaign wound down — an incentive structure that does not currently exist for Hamas's Qassam Brigades.

FARC (2016–2017): Colombia's FARC-EP completed weapons handover in roughly 18 months, surrendering over 8,112 firearms, 1.3 million rounds of ammunition, 22 tons of explosives, and 3,000 grenades to UN observers [22]. However, a significant number of weapons were never recovered, and FARC dissident factions — who rejected the peace deal — have since rearmed and continued fighting [23]. The Colombian precedent suggests that even when a central leadership agrees to disarm, splinter groups that reject the agreement can sustain armed operations.

The PLO after Oslo (1993–2000): The Oslo Accords required the Palestinian Authority to combat terrorism and coordinate security with Israel but did not mandate full PLO disarmament [24]. The process collapsed with the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000 and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Significantly, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad — groups outside the Oslo framework — carried out attacks throughout the period, demonstrating the limits of partial agreements that exclude key armed actors [25].

Each of these cases underscores a consistent finding in conflict research: disarmament by non-state groups as a unilateral concession is unlikely when a conflict ends in stalemate, because armed groups fear that once they surrender weapons, the opposing side will fail to deliver on political commitments [22].

The Guarantor Problem

UN Security Council Resolution 2803, passed in November 2025, authorized the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to Gaza, with a mandate running through the end of 2027 [26]. Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE are designated as guarantors alongside the United States, sharing responsibility for ensuring both Israel and Hamas uphold ceasefire commitments [27].

But the guarantor framework faces structural challenges. Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is explicitly conditioned on "standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization" — meaning the guarantors must verify disarmament before Israel is obligated to pull back [26]. Hamas views this sequencing as a trap: disarm first, then hope Israel withdraws — the same dynamic that contributed to Oslo's failure [16].

The ISF itself remains largely notional. No contributing nations have been formally confirmed. A U.S.-hosted forum in Qatar discussed force composition, with Turkey reportedly excluded from participation [28]. The legal authority of any stabilization force to prevent weapons re-acquisition — particularly through the extensive tunnel network connecting Gaza to Sinai — remains unresolved. Egypt's capacity and willingness to police its side of the border, through which weapons have historically been smuggled, is a variable that no resolution can fully control.

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

The scale of displacement in the region provides context for the humanitarian stakes. UNHCR data shows that Syria, Ukraine, and Afghanistan remain the world's largest sources of refugees, with Sudan climbing rapidly [29]. Gaza's population — while not captured in refugee statistics in the same way, since most Palestinians fall under UNRWA's mandate — faces displacement pressures comparable to the world's worst crises.

The Skeptic's Case

Critics of Hamas's disarmament signals point to a pattern of tactical positioning before major negotiating deadlines. Before the January 2025 ceasefire, Hamas signaled flexibility on hostage releases while maintaining maximalist positions on other issues — a sequence that extended negotiations by months [30]. Before the 2023 prisoner exchange, Hamas used public statements of willingness to negotiate as cover while its military wing continued operational preparations [11].

The specific verification gap is structural. Previous ceasefire agreements have lacked mechanisms to confirm weapons destruction, monitor tunnel networks, or prevent manufacturing of new ordnance from salvaged materials. Hamas's documented ability to fabricate weapons from unexploded Israeli munitions means that even complete surrender of existing stockpiles would not guarantee demilitarization without an intrusive, long-term inspection regime — something neither Hamas nor Israel has agreed to [14].

The steelman case for skepticism also rests on Iran's role. Hamas has historically received weapons, funding, and training from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [11]. Even if Hamas's current leadership in Gaza agrees to disarm, Iran retains the capability and, many analysts argue, the incentive to re-supply proxy forces in the Palestinian territories [17]. The death of Ali Khamenei has introduced uncertainty into Iran's strategic posture, but the IRGC's operational relationships with Palestinian armed groups predate and may outlast any single Iranian leader [17].

What Happens to 2.1 Million Civilians

Three broad scenarios confront Gaza's population, each with distinct humanitarian implications.

Scenario 1: Full disarmament and PA return. Under Trump's 20-point plan, successful demilitarization would lead to the Palestinian Authority resuming administrative control of Gaza, backed by the ISF and international reconstruction funding [6]. UNRWA has pre-positioned food sufficient for 2.1 million people for three months outside Gaza's borders, and shelter materials for hundreds of thousands [31]. But the PA has not governed Gaza since Hamas's 2007 takeover, and its administrative capacity — already strained in the West Bank — faces serious questions about whether it could manage a shattered territory.

Scenario 2: Partial disarmament with Hamas retaining political control. This outcome — arguably the most likely based on current negotiating positions — would see Hamas surrender heavy weapons while maintaining governance functions and a lightly armed security apparatus. Israel has rejected this scenario, but some regional mediators view it as the only achievable compromise. The humanitarian risk is a permanent semi-blockade, with Israel maintaining security restrictions tied to Hamas's continued armed presence.

Scenario 3: Breakdown of talks. If negotiations collapse, Israel has signaled it will resume military operations [9]. The IDF's April statements about ceasefire violations suggest operational preparations are already underway [20]. For civilians, this scenario means renewed displacement, further destruction of infrastructure, and deepening of the humanitarian crisis that has defined Gaza since October 2023.

International legal bodies have offered assessments but limited leverage. The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the occupation, while significant as a legal matter, has not produced binding enforcement mechanisms. UNRWA, the primary humanitarian actor in Gaza, faces its own existential questions after Israeli legislation restricting its operations [31].

The Clock Is Running

The Board of Peace has set and missed multiple deadlines. The April 14 target for Hamas acceptance of the disarmament plan passed without agreement [9]. Direct U.S.-Hamas talks — the first since the ceasefire began — took place in Cairo on April 15, with Hamas representative Khalil al-Hayya pressing for Israeli compliance with phase-one commitments before any discussion of disarmament [32].

The eight-month disarmament timeline envisioned in the Board of Peace plan assumed an April start date. Every week of delay compresses the schedule further, increasing the likelihood that the process — if it begins at all — will either be rushed or extended beyond the ISF's current mandate, which expires at the end of 2027 [26].

What Hamas has signaled — willingness to discuss surrendering weapons it has largely already lost (rockets depleted by war) while retaining weapons it needs for internal control (rifles, light arms) — may be less a strategic concession than an acknowledgment of military reality. Whether that acknowledgment can be converted into a durable agreement depends on variables that neither side currently controls: Iran's post-Khamenei posture, the ISF's ability to materialize, Egypt's border enforcement, and the willingness of both Hamas and Israel to accept arrangements that fall short of their stated maximums.