Alabama's Unending Redistricting War: How One State's Congressional Map Fight Could Reshape Voting Rights Across the South

On May 27, 2026, Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall filed an emergency application with the U.S. Supreme Court, asking the justices to let the state use a congressional map that a unanimous three-judge federal panel had blocked the previous day as "tainted by intentional race-based discrimination" [1][2]. The request capped a legal saga that has now consumed four years, three trips to the Supreme Court, and produced a map that federal courts have repeatedly struck down — yet that Alabama keeps trying to use.

The stakes extend far beyond Alabama's seven congressional seats. The case sits at the intersection of the Supreme Court's new framework for evaluating racial gerrymandering claims under Louisiana v. Callais [3] and the ongoing effort by Republican-led Southern legislatures to redraw districts that were created to give Black voters a fair shot at electing their preferred candidates. What the Court decides in the coming days — perhaps by June 1, the deadline Alabama requested — will shape the 2026 midterms and set a template for redistricting battles in Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, and beyond [4].

The Maps: One District or Two?

Alabama is approximately 27% Black, according to the 2020 Census [5]. Under the court-ordered remedial map used in the 2024 elections and the May 2026 primaries, the state has two districts where Black voters have a meaningful opportunity to elect their preferred candidates: District 7, with a Black voting-age population (BVAP) of roughly 55%, and a reconfigured District 2, with a BVAP of about 48.7% [5][6].

Source: U.S. Census Bureau / Court Filings

Data as of May 27, 2026CSV

The 2023 map drawn by Alabama's Republican-controlled legislature kept District 7 largely intact but redesigned District 2 to have a BVAP of only about 40% — a level that, in Alabama's racially polarized voting environment, is insufficient for Black voters to elect their candidates of choice [2][6]. The result: under the legislature's map, one of Alabama's seven districts (14.3%) would be a Black-opportunity seat, despite Black residents making up 27% of the state's population. Under the court's map, two of seven districts (28.6%) would be Black-opportunity seats — a ratio closely approximating the Black share of the population [5].

Source: U.S. Census Bureau / Ballotpedia

Data as of May 27, 2026CSV

How does Alabama compare to its neighbors? Mississippi, where Black residents make up 38% of the population, has one majority-Black district out of four (25%). Georgia, at 33% Black, has four majority-Black districts out of 14 (28.6%) — though those gains are now threatened by the Callais decision. Louisiana, also 33% Black, reverted to one majority-Black district out of six (16.7%) after the Supreme Court struck down its two-district map in Callais [4][7]. South Carolina, with a Black population share similar to Alabama's at 27%, has one majority-Black district out of seven (14.3%) [5].

The Legal Ping-Pong

The procedural history reads like a legal relay race with no finish line.

2022: A three-judge district court found that Alabama's post-2020 census congressional map likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting Black voting power. The court ordered Alabama to draw a second majority-minority district [8].

2023: The Supreme Court affirmed that ruling 5-4 in Allen v. Milligan, with Chief Justice John Roberts joining the Court's three liberal justices and Justice Brett Kavanaugh [8]. Alabama's legislature then defied the order, passing a map with only one majority-Black district and a second district at roughly 40% BVAP. The district court rejected this map and imposed its own remedial plan with two Black-opportunity districts [6].

2024: Alabama used the court-ordered map for the 2024 elections.

2025: The district court found that the legislature's 2023 map not only violated Section 2 but also constituted intentional racial discrimination under the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause [2][9].

April 29, 2026: The Supreme Court decided Louisiana v. Callais, holding 6-3 that Louisiana's creation of a second majority-Black district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The decision, authored by Justice Samuel Alito, reworked the 40-year-old Thornburg v. Gingles framework, making it substantially harder for plaintiffs to prevail in Section 2 vote-dilution cases [3][10].

May 11, 2026: The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's ruling against Alabama's map and remanded for reconsideration in light of Callais, in a 6-3 order. Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented [11][12].

May 26, 2026: On remand, the three-judge panel — which included two Trump appointees — unanimously blocked the 2023 map again, finding that Callais did not change its conclusion. The panel grounded its decision on the 14th Amendment's prohibition of intentional racial discrimination, not on Section 2, effectively sidestepping Callais [1][2][9].

May 27, 2026: Alabama filed an emergency application with the Supreme Court seeking a stay [13].

Alabama's Legal Theory

Alabama's argument has evolved across the litigation. In its current posture, the state advances several interlocking claims.

First, Alabama contends that the remedial map requiring two majority-minority districts is itself an unconstitutional racial gerrymander under the framework established in Shaw v. Reno (1993), which held that race cannot be the predominant factor in drawing district lines [14]. The state argues that creating a second majority-Black district in Alabama requires packing Black voters in a way that subordinates traditional redistricting principles — compactness, contiguity, respect for county and municipal boundaries — to racial considerations.

Second, Alabama argues that Callais fundamentally changed the legal landscape. Under the Callais majority's reasoning, Section 2 does not compel the creation of majority-minority districts when doing so requires race-predominant line-drawing. Alabama maintains that the court-ordered remedial map falls into precisely this category [3][10].

Third, and more broadly, Alabama advances the position that Section 2, as applied to require districts drawn to give minority voters an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, effectively mandates proportional racial representation — an outcome the Supreme Court has repeatedly called constitutionally suspect [14]. As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his Allen v. Milligan dissent, the ruling forced Alabama to "intentionally redraw its congressional districts so that black voters can control a number of seats roughly proportional to the black share of the State's population" [8].

The Counter-Arguments

Voting rights advocates and the plaintiffs in the Alabama cases offer a fundamentally different framing.

The ACLU's Davin Rosborough, lead attorney on the case, stated after the May 26 ruling: "The court recognized what we already knew: the Alabama legislature's repeated refusal to provide Black Alabamians with fair representation in Congress is racial discrimination" [15].

The district court's finding of intentional discrimination is central to the plaintiffs' position. The panel wrote that "the Legislature well knew that a plan without an additional Black-opportunity district would dilute Black Alabamians' opportunity to participate in the political process, and it intentionally enacted that very plan" [9]. This finding rests on the 14th Amendment, not Section 2 — meaning Callais, which addressed Section 2 methodology, may not control.

VRA scholars who support the law respond to the proportional-representation critique by distinguishing between proportionality as a mandate and proportionality as a benchmark. The Gingles framework never required that minority voters receive representation proportional to their population share. Instead, it asked whether a sufficiently large and geographically compact minority community could constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district — a test that incorporates traditional redistricting criteria alongside demographic analysis [8][10]. The Campaign Legal Center and Brennan Center for Justice have argued in amicus briefs that eliminating Section 2's protections would permit states to engage in precisely the kind of vote dilution the Voting Rights Act was designed to prevent [10][16].

The Callais Effect Across the South

The Supreme Court's Callais decision has sent shockwaves through redistricting litigation nationwide. The Southern Poverty Law Center warned that the ruling "appears to clear the way for Louisiana — and other states — to engage in the discriminatory practice of vote dilution" [4].

The Campaign Legal Center characterized the decision as having "eviscerated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act" [16]. An NPR analysis estimated that at least 15 congressional districts — all currently held by Democrats — could be redrawn to favor Republicans following Callais [4].

States are already acting. Texas redistricted in 2025 to increase Republican representation [4]. Georgia faces the prospect of eliminating or diluting two majority-minority districts, which could net Republicans one to two additional House seats [7]. Several Republican-controlled states, including Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee, have signaled plans to redraw maps [4][7].

If the Supreme Court grants Alabama's stay and allows the 2023 map to stand through the 2026 midterms, it would establish a powerful precedent: that states can use maps found to intentionally discriminate against Black voters while litigation continues. For the roughly dozen other Section 2 cases working through federal courts, such a signal from the justices could embolden further delay [4][16].

The Post-Shelby County Pattern

Alabama's litigation strategy fits a pattern that voting rights advocates have documented since the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder eliminated the preclearance requirement — which had required states with histories of voting discrimination to obtain federal approval before changing their election laws [17].

The 2020 redistricting cycle was the first in six decades without preclearance protections [17]. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund has noted that after Shelby County, "many states that historically engaged in discriminatory voting practices implemented expansive voter suppression tactics, including voter identification requirements, voting roll purges, and partisan and racial gerrymandering" [17].

Section 2 litigation, the remaining enforcement mechanism, is slow by design. Alabama's case illustrates the problem: the original challenge was filed in 2021, the Supreme Court affirmed the violation in 2023, and three years later the state still has not implemented a lawful map. Each procedural turn — remand, reconsideration, emergency application — buys time. If Alabama wins a stay from the Supreme Court, the 2026 midterm elections in November could proceed under the map that three federal courts have found violates federal law [1][13].

The Cost and the People Behind It

Specific figures on Alabama's total legal expenditures in the redistricting litigation are not publicly itemized in a single accessible document. The state's defense has been led by Attorney General Steve Marshall, who has been a vocal proponent of the state's position [18]. Marshall practiced law in Birmingham and Montgomery at the firm Maynard Cooper and Gale P.C. before entering public service [18]. His office has handled the litigation across multiple proceedings at the district court, circuit court, and Supreme Court levels, spanning at least three separate consolidated cases: Allen v. Singleton, Allen v. Milligan, and Allen v. Caster [18][12].

The financial burden of multi-year, multi-forum constitutional litigation is substantial. Alabama taxpayers have funded the defense of maps that have been struck down repeatedly, while plaintiffs — represented by the ACLU, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and other organizations — have borne their own costs [15][8].

What Black Alabamians Stand to Lose

The practical consequences of the map fight are concrete. Under the legislature's 2023 map, Black communities in Alabama's Black Belt region and along the Gulf Coast would be split across multiple districts where they lack the numbers to influence outcomes [9].

Currently, Representative Terri Sewell, a Democrat, represents Alabama's 7th Congressional District — the state's sole majority-Black district under the legislature's map. Sewell has secured significant federal funding for the district: $5.5 million in direct funding for local projects in 2026, $3.2 million for Black Belt infrastructure in 2025, and $23.8 million from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law for rail safety improvements [19][20]. Under the court's remedial map, a second district would give Black voters along the Gulf Coast similar opportunities to elect a representative responsive to their priorities.

Research on majority-minority districts in comparable states has shown that such districts tend to produce representatives who are more attentive to the specific needs of Black communities — from healthcare access in rural areas to infrastructure investment in historically underserved regions [19].

What Happens Next

The timeline is compressed. Alabama has asked the Supreme Court to rule on its stay request by June 1 [13]. Alabama's primary elections already took place in May 2026 under the court-ordered map with two Black-opportunity districts [11]. If the Supreme Court grants a stay and allows the 2023 map to be used for the November general election, the state would need to reconcile two different sets of district lines — one used for primaries, another for the general election — creating significant administrative and legal complications.

The three-judge panel anticipated this scenario. In its May 26 opinion, the court wrote: "We cannot see our way clear to requiring Alabamians to cast their votes in the 2026 elections under a districting plan tainted by intentional race-based discrimination" [9].

The question now is whether six justices on the Supreme Court see it the same way — or whether Callais has shifted enough ground to let Alabama's map stand, at least temporarily. The answer will ripple across every Southern state where the boundaries of representation are being redrawn.