Blood and Brotherhood: Mojtaba Khamenei's Anti-US Alliance Pitch Collides With the Wreckage of Iran-Gulf Relations

On May 26, 2026, in a 14-page written message marking Eid al-Adha, Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei made his most significant public statement since taking power. "I, with sincerity and purity of intention, invite all Islamic countries and governments to friendship and cooperation in goodness," he wrote, calling for a "New Islamic Civilization" and warning that "the United States will no longer have a safe haven for its mischief and for establishing military bases in West Asia" [1].

The timing was deliberate. Khamenei's message was a direct counter to President Trump's efforts to expand the Abraham Accords to the same set of regional capitals — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain [2]. Yet three months earlier, Iranian missiles had struck targets in every one of those Gulf states. The dissonance between the violence of February and the brotherhood rhetoric of May defines the central tension in Middle Eastern geopolitics today.

The Twelve-Day War and Its Aftermath

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury / Operation Roaring Lion, a coordinated strike campaign targeting Iran's nuclear infrastructure, ballistic missile sites, air defenses, and leadership [3]. Nearly 900 strikes in the first 12 hours killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, dozens of officials, and approximately 170 civilians when a missile struck a girls' school adjacent to a naval base in Minab [3].

Iran's retaliation was sweeping. Tehran launched missiles and drones at Israel, US bases across the region, and military and civilian targets in all six GCC states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE [4]. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting approximately 20% of global oil supplies [3]. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait responded with their own strikes on Iran and its regional allies [4].

A conditional ceasefire was declared on April 8, 2026 [3]. But the damage to the painstakingly built Iran-Gulf rapprochement — five years in the making since the 2023 China-brokered Saudi-Iran normalization deal — was severe [5].

WTI crude oil prices spiked sharply during the conflict, reaching $114.58 per barrel in April 2026 before partially retreating:

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of May 26, 2026CSV

Mojtaba Khamenei: Power Without Precedent or Credentials

Mojtaba Khamenei, 56, became Iran's third Supreme Leader on March 9, 2026, just nine days after his father's assassination [6]. The Assembly of Experts election that formalized his selection ran from March 3 to 8, but the outcome was shaped well before the vote. According to multiple reports, IRGC commanders applied "repeated contacts and psychological and political pressure" on Assembly members, lobbying senior clerics and warning that delay could fracture the state [7][8].

The selection represented several firsts, none of them comfortable for the regime's self-image. It was the first dynastic succession in the Islamic Republic's history, contradicting the revolutionary narrative that the system rejects hereditary rule [9]. Mojtaba lacks the senior clerical rank traditionally required of a Supreme Leader [8]. His authority derives not from religious legitimacy but from his utility to the IRGC, which views him as "a pliable and reliable figure capable of preserving internal cohesion" [9].

Since the succession, the IRGC has "tightened its grip over wartime decision-making, taking the lead on all major strategic decisions" [9]. The Guards now function simultaneously as intelligence network, economic conglomerate, internal security apparatus, and policy architect. The Supreme Leader's office survives formally, but as the Gulf International Forum analysis put it, "the basis of its authority has shifted" from clerical legitimacy to security apparatus support [9].

This context matters for interpreting Mojtaba's "New Islamic Civilization" pitch. Dr. Omar Mohammed of George Washington University characterized the statement as "a bid to build an alliance against the Abraham Accords," with Iran positioning itself as "God's instrument" to expel American military presence from Muslim soil [2]. Yet Mojtaba holds office at the IRGC's pleasure. His public posturing likely reflects, rather than drives, the security establishment's strategic calculations.

The Alliance Pitch: Ambition vs. Credibility

Mojtaba's invitation targets eight specific countries that Trump has approached about Abraham Accords expansion: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain [2]. The specific commitments Iran is seeking from each remain unclear — the May 26 statement operated at the level of civilizational rhetoric rather than concrete proposals for military, economic, or diplomatic cooperation.

This vagueness is itself revealing. Iran is in no position to offer meaningful security guarantees to states it attacked three months ago. As Dr. Mohammed noted, Tehran is now inviting the same capitals it fired upon to "brotherhood," creating deep skepticism [2]. The "Ummah" doctrine is not new — Ali Khamenei used similar language for years — but the younger Khamenei's version arrives in a fundamentally different strategic environment [2].

The proposal's real audience may be domestic. With Iran's economy devastated by escalating sanctions and war damage, and with the regime's legitimacy undermined by both the dynastic succession and the brutal crackdown on the December 2025 protests (which spread to more than 200 cities following currency collapse and record inflation), an anti-US civilizational narrative serves to rally hardline constituencies and justify continued militarization [10][11].

Iran's inflation has remained chronically elevated, with consumer prices rising over 30% annually in recent years:

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Gulf Backchannels: Hedging, Not Realignment

Despite the war's destruction, backchannel diplomacy between Iran and Gulf states has not ceased entirely. Oman, which brokered the 2025 US-Houthi ceasefire and has historically maintained open channels with Tehran, remains the primary conduit [5]. Iranian negotiators were in Doha for talks on a "possible peace framework" as recently as late May 2026 [1]. Qatar's shared management of the North Field/South Pars gas reserve gives it structural incentives to maintain communication [5].

The question is whether these contacts represent genuine strategic realignment away from US security guarantees or tactical hedging designed to extract better terms from Washington.

The Carnegie Endowment's analysis of the war's impact on US-Gulf ties argues the answer is primarily the latter. Saudi Arabia "most likely will still seek stronger military ties with the United States" because replacing American military equipment with Chinese or Russian alternatives remains practically difficult [12]. However, the analysis warns that Gulf leaders cannot repeatedly threaten diversification "without losing credibility, unless they actually exercise it" [12].

The UAE represents a different trajectory. Abu Dhabi has maintained its Israel normalization policy despite Iranian aggression, with Israel deploying Iron Dome air defense batteries and personnel to the UAE during the war [13]. The two countries have established a joint fund to acquire and develop weapons systems [13]. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has grown more suspicious of Israel and pivoted toward deepening defense ties with Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt [13].

This divergence among Gulf states undermines Mojtaba Khamenei's pitch for a unified Islamic front. The GCC is not moving as a bloc toward either Washington or Tehran.

The Price Tag of American Protection

The scale of US military investment in the Gulf helps explain why a clean break remains unlikely for either side.

Between 40,000 and 50,000 American military personnel are stationed across the region, with major concentrations at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (the forward headquarters for US Central Command), Naval Support Activity Bahrain (approximately 9,000 personnel), and multiple facilities in Kuwait (roughly 13,500 personnel) [14][15].

During and immediately after the 2026 war, the Trump administration invoked emergency powers to push through approximately $23 billion in weapons sales to the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan, including over $16 billion in air defense systems, munitions, and radar equipment [16]. This came on top of the $142 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia announced in 2025, described as the largest defense sales agreement in history [16]. Additional approved sales include $4 billion to replenish Qatar's Patriot missile capacity and $2.5 billion for Kuwait's Integrated Battle Command System [17].

Source: CNBC, The Hill, Al-Monitor

Data as of Mar 20, 2026CSV

Yet the war exposed a fundamental contradiction: US bases did not protect Gulf states from Iranian attack, and in some cases may have made them more vulnerable by making them targets [14][18]. All Gulf governments refused to allow American forces to use their facilities to launch strikes against Iran, revealing the limits of the alliance's operational dimension [12].

Prior Détentes: A Pattern of Promise and Collapse

Mojtaba Khamenei's outreach fits a recurring pattern in Iran-Gulf relations in which periods of diplomatic opening are followed by strategic reversal.

During the Khatami presidency (1997–2005), Iran pursued a "dialogue of civilizations" that produced the most significant Saudi-Iranian engagement since the 1979 revolution, including Crown Prince Abdullah's attendance at the 1997 OIC summit in Tehran [19]. That opening collapsed after September 11, 2001, and the subsequent US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Under Rouhani (2013–2021), Iran again prioritized Gulf outreach, proposing the "Coalition for HOPE" (Hormuz Peace Endeavour) and securing the 2015 nuclear deal, which briefly opened space for regional diplomacy [20]. That effort was undone by Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and escalating US maximum pressure sanctions.

The most recent rapprochement — the 2023 China-brokered Saudi-Iran normalization — achieved more concrete results than either predecessor: reopened embassies, resumed Hajj flights for the first time in a decade, and a December 2025 trilateral meeting in Tehran with Chinese participation [21][22]. But it too was shattered by the February 2026 war.

Each cycle has been deeper than the last in terms of institutional engagement. Each has also proven fragile against external shocks, suggesting that durable Iran-Gulf normalization requires resolution of the underlying US-Iran confrontation, not just bilateral Gulf diplomacy.

Hardliners vs. Pragmatists: What "Seeping Into Tehran" Means

The claim that Gulf backchannel diplomacy is "seeping into Tehran" and influencing hardliner calculations rests on observable evidence: Iran's foreign ministry acknowledged in May 2026 that Tehran and Washington had reached "understandings on many issues" in Doha-hosted talks [1]. The mere fact that negotiations continued through and after the war suggests pragmatist factions retain some influence on policy.

But Mojtaba's "New Islamic Civilization" messaging points in the opposite direction — toward a hardliner response designed to constrain pragmatist concessions. The regime maintains order through coercion: after the December 2025 protests, documented tactics included "internet blackouts, militarized urban control, and mass intimidation" [9]. Selective social permissiveness, such as relaxed dress code enforcement, operates as a pressure relief valve to prevent organized political opposition [9].

A leaked report in late May suggested that a draft US memorandum of understanding breached eight of ten terms approved by Khamenei [23], indicating that even the new Supreme Leader's red lines are being tested by the pace of negotiations. This tension — between the diplomatic track and the civilizational-resistance rhetoric — is the defining feature of Tehran's current posture.

The Human Cost: Three Populations in the Crossfire

The diplomatic maneuvering obscures the concrete costs borne by three distinct civilian populations.

Iranian civilians under sanctions. US sanctions, escalated sharply in late 2025 with "snapback" provisions, have driven drug prices up 50% for approximately 6 million patients with chronic diseases [10]. Prices for some antiepileptic drugs have spiked 300%, and counterfeit medications have flooded the market [10]. "Overcompliance" by international banks — refusing even legally permitted transactions out of fear of sanctions violations — magnifies the humanitarian impact [10]. Protests erupted across 200 cities in December 2025 following the rial's collapse [11].

Yemeni civilians in proxy conflict. The eight-year Yemen war has killed more than 19,200 civilians, including over 2,300 children, from coalition airstrikes alone [24]. Some 21.6 million people — including 11 million children — need humanitarian aid, and more than 4.5 million are displaced [24]. While the Oman-brokered US-Houthi ceasefire in early 2025 paused Red Sea attacks, Yemen's underlying crisis remains unresolved [24].

Gulf migrant workers. The ILO estimates over 24 million migrant workers reside in GCC countries, including more than 9 million Indian nationals [25]. During the February-March 2026 conflict, migrant workers were killed by falling debris from intercepted missiles and drones while working in streets, worksites, and shared accommodation [25][26]. Many are unable to evacuate due to financial constraints and restrictive employment conditions tied to the kafala sponsorship system [25].

Source: ILO, Walk Free

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

These populations have almost no representation in the diplomatic process. Gulf migrant workers lack political rights in their host countries. Iranian citizens are excluded from meaningful participation in foreign policy by the IRGC-dominated power structure. Yemeni civilians remain subject to the decisions of external powers. The diplomatic calculus on all sides treats their welfare as secondary to security and economic interests.

What Comes Next

Mojtaba Khamenei's "New Islamic Civilization" gambit faces long odds. He is inviting the same governments Iran attacked in February to join a civilizational bloc led by a regime that lacks religious legitimacy, governs through coercion, and has just demonstrated its willingness to fire on its neighbors. Gulf states, for their part, are more likely to use Iranian outreach as bargaining chips with Washington — demanding better defense terms, clearer security commitments, and advanced weapons systems — than to abandon the American security umbrella wholesale.

The more consequential dynamic may be the quiet one. As ceasefire negotiations continue in Doha, as Oman maintains its mediating role, and as the practical necessities of shared geography reassert themselves, the backchannel track will likely outlast the civilizational rhetoric. Whether it can produce anything more durable than previous détente cycles depends on variables none of the regional actors fully control — above all, the trajectory of US policy toward Iran under a second Trump administration navigating between the promises of the Abraham Accords and the realities of a region where American bases proved to be neither shields nor deterrents.