Trump Demands Arab World Join Abraham Accords 'Immediately' — But the Math Doesn't Add Up

On May 24, 2026, President Donald Trump held a conference call with leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain to discuss the emerging deal with Iran. Then he made a demand that left several of the world's most powerful Muslim leaders speechless — literally. Trump told the assembled heads of state that after the Iran war concludes, it should be "mandatory" that all of them who lack formal peace agreements with Israel "simultaneously sign onto the Abraham Accords" [1].

"There was silence on the line, and Trump joked and asked if they are still there," a U.S. official told Axios [1]. Trump said his envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff would follow up in the coming weeks [2].

The demand — sweeping, abrupt, and delivered as a fait accompli — raises a central question: can the transactional logic that produced the original Abraham Accords in 2020 scale to the entire Muslim world, or has the ground shifted so fundamentally since October 7, 2023 that the framework itself has become an obstacle to the broader peace Trump claims to want?

What the Abraham Accords Actually Achieved

The Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020 between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, followed by Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, represented a genuine break from decades of Arab diplomatic consensus. For the first time, Arab states normalized relations with Israel without requiring progress on Palestinian statehood — abandoning the conditions set by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative [3].

Six years later, the economic results are sharply uneven. UAE-Israel bilateral trade has grown from approximately $200 million in 2020 to $3.24 billion in 2024 — a sixteen-fold increase [4]. The two countries signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2023 targeting $10 billion in annual non-oil bilateral trade by 2030 [5]. The Abraham Fund, a joint initiative, has aimed to mobilize $3 billion in private sector investment [5].

Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics / Al-Monitor

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

But the other signatories tell a different story. Bahrain-Israel bilateral trade reached just $11.5 million in 2023 [6]. Morocco-Israel trade stood at $116 million, well short of the $500 million five-year target set in a 2022 cooperation agreement [6]. Sudan, mired in civil war since April 2023, has seen virtually no economic benefit. Between 2021 and 2024, total trade between Israel and all Accords partners plus Egypt and Jordan increased by 127%, but the overwhelming majority of that growth was UAE-driven [6].

Israel's trade as a share of GDP has actually declined since the Accords were signed, dropping from 54.9% in 2021 to 54.5% in 2024, reflecting the broader economic disruptions caused by the Gaza war and regional instability [7].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

The Saudi Question: A Prize Out of Reach

Saudi normalization with Israel is the strategic centerpiece of Trump's ambitions — and the element most resistant to his approach. Riyadh has set conditions that are, under Israel's current government, unachievable.

After Trump's May 24 call, a Saudi source told the Times of Israel that the kingdom would not normalize relations "without an irreversible pathway to Palestinian statehood" [8]. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan has stated publicly that "the kingdom will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel" without an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital [9].

A Saudi royal family source offered a more granular timeline: "Normalization likely won't happen under Netanyahu's current government. But maybe it will happen before the end of October 2026 — if a new government is formed that accepts the two-state principle and ends the Middle East crisis once and for all" [10].

These are not new conditions. They predate October 7, 2023. But the Gaza war hardened them into red lines. In a Washington Institute for Near East Policy survey published in August 2025, 99% of Saudi respondents said establishing "normal relations and peace" with Israel would be a negative step [8]. The Saudi public has moved from ambivalence to near-total opposition.

What's on the Table — Arms, Alliances, and Nuclear Energy

The incentive package the United States has assembled for Saudi Arabia is substantial. In late January 2026, the Trump administration approved a $9 billion weapons package for Saudi Arabia, centered on 730 Patriot missiles and related air defense equipment [11]. Trump also designated Saudi Arabia as a Major Non-NATO Ally — the twentieth country to receive the status — though this designation carries no binding security guarantees [12].

But Saudi Arabia's demands go further. Riyadh has sought a treaty-level U.S. security commitment unprecedented outside of Europe and East Asia [12]. The Biden administration had pursued talks on a bilateral defense treaty that would have included restrictions on Saudi military cooperation with China and guaranteed access for U.S. forces to Saudi territory [12]. Whether the Trump administration is prepared to offer the same — and whether the U.S. Senate would ratify such a treaty — remains uncertain.

Congressional skepticism is already visible. Rep. Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, accused the administration of rushing arms sales in ways that "disregard Congressional oversight and years of standing practice" [11]. Any treaty-level defense commitment would require two-thirds Senate approval, a threshold that arms packages to Saudi Arabia have historically struggled to clear.

Israeli officials have their own concerns. A U.S.-Saudi defense treaty and advanced weapons sales could, in Israeli assessments, erode Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) — the legal and strategic principle underlying decades of U.S. military assistance to Israel [13].

Arab Public Opinion: The Constraint Leaders Cannot Ignore

The gap between elite-level diplomacy and public sentiment has widened into a chasm. According to the Arab Center Washington DC's Arab Opinion Index 2025, 87% of citizens across the Arab world oppose recognition of Israel, while only 6% accept it [14]. The highest opposition rates were recorded in Libya (96%), Jordan (95%), and Kuwait (94%) [14].

Source: Arab Center Washington DC - Arab Opinion Index 2025

Data as of Aug 1, 2025CSV

Even in countries that have normalized, the backlash is measurable. In Morocco, public support for normalization dropped from 31% in 2022 to 13% after October 7, 2023, according to Arab Barometer [15]. In none of the seven countries surveyed by Arab Barometer in 2023-2024 did support for normalization exceed 13% [15].

The Foreign Affairs analysis of this data, published in partnership with Arab Barometer, argued that public opinion is now a binding constraint on Arab leaders considering normalization — not merely a background factor they can manage through media control [16]. In Arab Barometer's March 2024 survey, 84% of respondents reported boycotting companies perceived as supporting Israel, 62% had donated to support Gazans, 40% had shared pro-Palestinian messages online, and 22% had participated in public solidarity activities [15].

These numbers carry a specific political implication: any Arab leader who signs the Abraham Accords faces domestic political risk with limited historical precedent. The closest analogue is Egypt's post-Camp David isolation in the Arab world after 1979, when Cairo was expelled from the Arab League for a decade. Today, in an era of social media and instantaneous public mobilization, the domestic costs could manifest faster and more unpredictably.

The Palestinian Question the Accords Were Designed to Bypass

The foundational innovation of the Abraham Accords was decoupling Arab-Israeli normalization from Palestinian statehood. Critics argue this was not a feature but a fatal flaw.

The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, endorsed by all 22 Arab League members, had offered Israel full normalization with the entire Arab world in exchange for withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee problem based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194, and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital [3]. The Abraham Accords abandoned each of these conditions.

Palestinian leaders across the political spectrum condemned the agreements. The Palestine Liberation Organization called the UAE deal a "betrayal" that undermined decades of Arab consensus [17]. Critics point to UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which established the land-for-peace framework, and Resolution 338 (1973), which called for negotiations based on that framework, arguing that the Accords circumvent the legal architecture built over half a century of international diplomacy [17].

The strongest counter-argument from normalization proponents is pragmatic: decades of conditioning normalization on Palestinian statehood produced neither normalization nor statehood. The Accords, by contrast, created real diplomatic relationships, trade flows, and people-to-people contact. Proponents argue that integrating Israel into the regional economy creates incentives for Israel to moderate its policies — that normalization is a precondition for Palestinian progress, not a reward for it [6].

This argument has weakened since October 2023. Israel's military operations in Gaza, its expansion of settlements in the West Bank, and the current government's explicit rejection of Palestinian statehood have made it difficult to argue that normalization is producing moderation [18].

How Trump's Push Compares to Past Efforts

Trump's demand for simultaneous, mass normalization is without precedent in scale, but its underlying logic — that the United States can broker Arab-Israeli peace through economic incentives and security guarantees — has a long lineage.

The Oslo Accords (1993) were built on direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, with the United States as facilitator rather than dealmaker. Oslo produced the Palestinian Authority and a framework for final-status talks but collapsed amid the Second Intifada, mutual distrust, and expanding settlements [3].

The Arab Peace Initiative (2002) took the opposite approach from the Abraham Accords: full normalization conditional on full withdrawal. It was endorsed unanimously by the Arab League but never seriously pursued by Israel or the United States [3].

The Biden administration's Saudi track (2023) came closest to what Trump now envisions. Biden offered Saudi Arabia a comprehensive defense treaty, civil nuclear cooperation, and advanced weapons in exchange for normalization with Israel that would include meaningful concessions on Palestinian statehood. The deal appeared close to completion before October 7 derailed negotiations [19].

Trump's approach differs in ambition and method. Rather than patient bilateral diplomacy, he is seeking mass accession through a single conference call and follow-up envoy visits. The countries engaged — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey — represent a far more complex diplomatic landscape than the UAE and Bahrain, which had limited historical hostility toward Israel and strong existing security relationships with the United States.

Regional Consequences: Who Gains, Who Loses

The geopolitical calculus of Saudi normalization extends far beyond the bilateral relationship.

Iran's position has been dramatically weakened by the 2026 war, which degraded its ballistic missile and nuclear programs under 12 days of Israeli and U.S. bombing [20]. Iran's "Axis of Resistance" — the network of proxy forces including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis — has been either destroyed or severely degraded as a coherent strategic network [20]. In this context, Saudi normalization with Israel would formalize the Sunni-Israeli alignment against Iran that has operated informally for years.

Hamas has been hollowed out as a military organization, but the absence of a political settlement in Gaza means it — or a successor — retains relevance as a spoiler [20]. Hezbollah has been decapitated by Israeli operations, leaving Israel's northern border quieter than it has been in years [20].

The Palestinian Authority faces its own crisis of legitimacy. Its failure to hold scheduled elections has eroded support, particularly among younger Palestinians turning to local defense committees outside established factions [20]. Saudi normalization without meaningful Palestinian statehood concessions would further marginalize the PA.

Saudi Arabia itself has been hedging. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani signed landmark defense and intelligence-sharing agreements in late 2025, signaling Saudi interest in a more autonomous regional role rather than integration into a U.S.-brokered framework [21]. Riyadh is increasingly positioning itself as a "middle power" rather than a participant in Western-led regional architectures [21].

The Gap Between Demand and Reality

Trump's demand for simultaneous Abraham Accords accession rests on an assumption: that the United States holds sufficient leverage — through security guarantees, arms sales, and the Iran deal — to compel Muslim-majority nations to normalize with Israel regardless of domestic political constraints.

The evidence suggests otherwise. Pakistan rejected the proposal outright [2]. Saudi Arabia restated its Palestinian statehood conditions within hours [8]. Turkey, which has positioned itself as a vocal critic of Israeli operations in Gaza, faces elections in which normalization would be politically toxic. Qatar, which hosts Hamas's political bureau, has built its regional influence partly on its role as a mediator between Israel and Palestinian factions — a role that formal normalization would complicate.

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2023CSV

The Abraham Accords produced real results where the preconditions were favorable: states with limited popular hostility toward Israel, strong bilateral economic interests, and specific quid pro quos (Morocco received U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara; Sudan was removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list) [3]. Extending that framework to states where public opposition exceeds 90%, where Palestinian solidarity is a core element of national identity, and where the quid pro quos would need to be orders of magnitude larger is a qualitatively different challenge.

The question is not whether Trump can expand the Abraham Accords. The question is whether the Accords framework — normalization without Palestinian statehood — can survive contact with the states that actually matter for regional peace. So far, the silence on the line suggests the answer.