'Absolute Right': Trump's Defiant Tariff Claims Collide with Constitutional Reality

On a late Sunday night in March 2026, President Donald Trump took to Truth Social with a nearly 1,000-word tirade against the Supreme Court, federal judges, and what he characterized as a judiciary that had "RANSACKED" the country. At the center of his fury: the claim that he possesses "the absolute right to charge TARIFFS in another form" — a statement that legal scholars across the political spectrum say is flatly unsupported by the ruling he claims to be citing [1][2].

Trump's assertion arrives nearly a month after the Supreme Court's landmark 6-3 decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which struck down the sweeping tariffs he had imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and amid a cascade of new legal challenges to the replacement tariffs he imposed within hours of that defeat [3][4]. Together, these developments represent the most significant constitutional confrontation over trade policy since the New Deal — and a stress test for the separation of powers at a moment when the administration is simultaneously waging an undeclared war in Iran and navigating the worst energy crisis in a generation.

The Supreme Court Draws the Line

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA — a 1977 law granting the president emergency economic powers against foreign threats — does not authorize tariffs. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority alongside Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson, was unequivocal: "IEEPA contains no reference to tariffs or duties" and "until now no President has read IEEPA to confer such power" [3][5].

The ruling invalidated the tariffs Trump had imposed on imports from Canada (25%), Mexico (25%), and China (10%) under drug-trafficking emergency declarations, as well as the so-called "Liberation Day" tariffs of at least 10% on all imports worldwide justified by trade deficit concerns. Only tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act — covering steel, aluminum, and copper — survived [6].

In a portion of the opinion joined by Gorsuch and Barrett, Roberts invoked the "major questions" doctrine, holding that Congress does not hide authority to impose sweeping economic policies in the vague language of old statutes. The constitutional principle at stake was foundational: the power to tax, including through tariffs, belongs to Congress [5][7].

The financial impact was staggering. The IEEPA tariffs had collected more than $160 billion before being struck down, triggering an estimated $175 billion refund liability — though the Court left the mechanics of reimbursement unresolved [8][9].

The Dissent Trump Misread

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a sprawling 63-page dissent, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas, arguing that tariffs are "a traditional and common tool to regulate importation" and that IEEPA's broad language plainly covered them [10].

Critically, Kavanaugh also mused that "the decision might not substantially constrain a President's ability to order tariffs going forward," pointing to alternative statutory authorities including Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Sections 122, 201, and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 [10].

This passage — from a dissent, representing only the views of three justices on a nine-member court — appears to be the basis for Trump's claim of an "absolute right." But as Chief Justice Roberts explicitly stated in the majority opinion, the Court does not "speculate on hypothetical cases not before us" [3]. The majority neither endorsed nor rejected the legality of tariffs under those alternative authorities. It simply did not address them.

"The President is citing a dissent as if it were the holding," said one constitutional law professor quoted in multiple analyses. "A dissent is, by definition, the view that did not prevail" [2][11].

Section 122: The Untested Replacement

Within hours of the ruling, Trump signed an executive order invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, declaring that the United States was experiencing "fundamental international payments problems" and imposing a 10% tariff on imports from most countries for 150 days — through July 24, 2026 [12][13]. No president had ever used Section 122 to impose tariffs.

The legal theory underlying the move faces severe headwinds. Section 122 was enacted during the Bretton Woods era of fixed exchange rates, when a "balance of payments deficit" meant the United States was literally shipping gold reserves to foreign central banks. The U.S. abandoned the gold standard in 1971 — more than 50 years ago [14][15].

"Under a floating exchange rate, insufficient private financial inflows are remedied by currency depreciation," economists at the Peterson Institute for International Economics wrote. "Because the United States has a floating exchange rate and a large supply of attractive financial assets, it faces no difficulty financing current account deficits" [14].

In a striking irony, the administration's own lawyers argued during the IEEPA case that Section 122 was no substitute for IEEPA authority, precisely because "balance of payments deficits" are conceptually distinct from trade deficits [14][15]. The administration is now relying on the very authority it previously said was inadequate.

Source: FRED / U.S. Energy Information Administration

Data as of Mar 9, 2026CSV

A Wave of Legal Challenges

On March 5, 2026, a coalition of 24 state attorneys general and governors filed suit in the U.S. Court of International Trade, challenging the Section 122 tariffs on two primary grounds: first, that no balance-of-payments deficit exists in any technically meaningful sense; and second, that the statute requires tariffs to be applied in a "broad and uniform" manner, yet the administration has riddled its order with country-specific exemptions and product carveouts [16][17].

The states' challenge was joined by many of the same businesses and trade groups that prevailed in Learning Resources, as well as small businesses arguing they cannot absorb even a 10% surcharge during a period of war-driven inflation [17].

California Governor Gavin Newsom filed a separate suit, while the Court of International Trade began consolidating the growing docket of challenges [18]. The pace of litigation is remarkable: the Section 122 tariffs have been in effect for barely three weeks and already face more legal challenges than the IEEPA tariffs accumulated over months.

Adding pressure, Trump announced on Truth Social his intention to raise the Section 122 rate to 15% — the statutory maximum — though no formal executive order implementing the increase has been issued [19]. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimated the tariffs would generate roughly $35 billion at 10% over their 150-day life, rising to $50 billion at 15% [19].

Markets in the Crossfire

The tariff chaos has compounded an already volatile economic environment. The Iran war, which began February 28 with strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has sent crude oil prices surging from roughly $67 per barrel in late February to nearly $95 by mid-March — a 40% increase in two weeks [20]. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted 20% of global oil supply.

Source: FRED / S&P Dow Jones Indices

Data as of Mar 16, 2026CSV

The S&P 500 has declined from nearly 6,980 in late January to around 6,630 by mid-March, buffeted by the twin shocks of war and trade uncertainty [20]. For businesses that had already built supply chains around the IEEPA tariff structure, the whiplash of invalidation followed by a new tariff regime under different legal authority — with its own expiration date and legal vulnerabilities — has created what one trade attorney described as "the most chaotic U.S. trade policy landscape in a century."

Congress Stirs — But May Not Act

The Supreme Court's ruling has given new momentum to congressional efforts to reclaim trade authority. Representative Jimmy Panetta introduced the Reclaim Trade Powers Act, which would strike Section 122 entirely from the Trade Act of 1974, arguing that the provision is an anachronism of the gold standard era [21]. Senators Raphael Warnock and Tim Kaine introduced companion legislation in the Senate to end the Section 122 tariffs and require congressional approval for future trade actions [22].

Ways and Means Committee Democrats have proposed broader legislation requiring congressional votes on all new tariffs, treated as privileged measures to prevent procedural delays [23].

Yet passage remains unlikely. Republican leadership has shown no appetite for constraining presidential trade authority, and with Congress consumed by the Iran war powers debate and a looming government funding deadline, tariff reform legislation has little floor time available. The Section 122 tariffs expire on July 24 unless Congress votes to extend them — creating a de facto sunset that may reduce the urgency for legislative action [12].

The Constitutional Stakes

The deeper significance of Trump's "absolute right" claim extends beyond any single tariff rate or legal challenge. It reflects a theory of executive power in which the president can cycle through statutory authorities — IEEPA, Section 122, Section 232, Section 301 — until one survives judicial review, effectively maintaining unilateral tariff authority regardless of what any single court says.

"What we're seeing is a game of whack-a-mole," said a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The Supreme Court struck down one legal basis, and the administration moved to another within hours. If Section 122 falls, they'll try Section 301 or expand Section 232. The question is whether the courts will keep pace" [7].

The administration has also launched new Section 301 trade investigations targeting 16 economies, laying the groundwork for tariffs under yet another statutory authority — one that, unlike Section 122, has been used before and carries fewer obvious legal vulnerabilities [7].

For the judiciary, the stakes are equally high. Trump's late-night attack on the Supreme Court as "a weaponized and unjust Political Organization" — language previously reserved for lower courts — signals that the administration views even a 6-3 loss as illegitimate [1]. Combined with his attacks on Judge James Boasberg and other federal judges, the rhetoric raises questions about whether the executive branch will comply in good faith with adverse rulings, particularly on the $175 billion refund obligation.

What Comes Next

The coming months will test the limits of presidential trade authority in ways not seen since the 1930s. The Section 122 tariffs face their first major court hearing in the Court of International Trade in April. The tariffs expire in July unless extended by a Congress that shows no inclination to do so. The $175 billion refund process has barely begun. And the administration is simultaneously building new tariff authorities under Section 301 that could dwarf anything imposed under IEEPA or Section 122.

Trump may not have the "absolute right" to impose tariffs. But in the gap between what the law says and what the courts can enforce, the administration has found room to keep the tariffs flowing — at least for now.