A Warning Ignored: How a Jewish Security Group Told Police an Attack Was "Likely" — Six Days Before the Bondi Massacre

On December 8, 2025, the Community Security Group of New South Wales — a volunteer Jewish security organisation — sent an email to NSW Police. The message was direct: "A terrorist attack against the NSW Jewish Community is likely and there is a high level of antisemitic vilification." It listed 13 upcoming events in Sydney's eastern suburbs that could be targets, including a public Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach called "Chanukah by the Sea" [1][2].

Six days later, on December 14, a father and son opened fire at that celebration, killing 15 people and wounding at least 40 others [3][4]. The youngest victim was 10 years old. The oldest was an 87-year-old Holocaust survivor [5].

On April 30, 2026, the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion — led by former High Court justice Virginia Bell — released a 159-page interim report examining what happened before, during, and after the attack. Its findings raise questions about police resourcing, intelligence funding, and whether the warning from a community security group was treated with the urgency it warranted [6][7].

The Warning and the Response

The CSG NSW email of December 8 set the Jewish community's internal security alert to "HIGH" and explicitly flagged the risk of a terrorist attack [1][2]. The organisation requested police presence "for the entirety" of upcoming events, including Chanukah by the Sea, which was expected to draw roughly 1,000 attendees [8].

NSW Police acknowledged the request but indicated it could not provide "static resources" — that is, dedicated officers stationed at the event for its duration. Instead, police said mobile patrols would "check in and monitor" the celebration [2][8]. In the end, three general duties officers and one supervisor were assigned to the Hanukkah event. An internal email instructed the officers that there was "no need to stay the entire duration, but your presence will ensure the community feel safe" [8].

Commissioner Bell's interim report noted that no written risk assessment for the event was produced by NSW Police [8]. The report flagged that the question of whether intelligence agencies "performed effectively in the lead-up to the Bondi Beach attack" remains unanswered — a matter deferred to public hearings that began on May 4, 2026 [6][7].

The Attack

Sajid Akram, 50, and his son Naveed Akram, 24, arrived at Bondi Beach armed with semi-automatic firearms on the evening of December 14, as families gathered to light the first Hanukkah candle [3][9]. Sajid Akram had immigrated to Australia from Hyderabad, India, in 1998; Naveed was born in Australia [9].

The pair had travelled to the Philippines in November, spending time in Davao City on the island of Mindanao — a region with a history of Islamist insurgency. Investigators examined whether the men received training there, but by late December 2025, Australian authorities said they found no evidence of a broader terrorist cell or overseas training [10][11].

Two Islamic State flags were found in the attackers' car. Police later disclosed that both men had filmed a video manifesto containing antisemitic statements and pledges of allegiance to IS [11][12]. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese declared the shooting was "deliberately targeted at the Jewish community on the first day of Chanukah" [3].

Sajid Akram was killed by police at the scene. Naveed Akram, wounded, was charged with 59 offences including 15 counts of murder and terrorism [13].

The Victims

The 15 dead ranged in age from 10 to 87, and included Australian, French, Slovak, and Israeli citizens [5][14]:

• Matilda Britvan, 10, described by her family as "like a sun" wherever she went.
• Alexander Kleytman, 87, a Holocaust survivor who had endured wartime Siberia before building a life in Australia.
• Rabbi Eli Schlanger, 41, the Chabad rabbi who organised the event; he left behind a wife and five children, including an infant barely two months old.
• Rabbi Yaakov Levitan, secretary of the Sydney Beth Din.
• Boris and Sofia Gurman, 69 and 61, a married couple who died attempting to disarm one of the gunmen.
• Reuven Morrison, 62, a Melbourne businessman who was killed while also trying to stop the attack.
• Peter Meagher, a retired NSW Police detective sergeant of 35 years, working as a freelance photographer at the event.
• Dan Elkayam, 27, a French citizen and IT systems administrator.
• Tibor Weitzen, 78, who had immigrated from Israel in 1988.
• Marika Pogany, a Slovak citizen who had immigrated from Czechoslovakia in 1968.
• Edith Brutman, a Jewish nonprofit leader.
• Boris Tetleroyd, a family provider whose son Yakov was injured but survived.
• Adam Smyth, 50, a father of four who was walking with his wife when attacked.

One additional victim had not been publicly identified at the time of reporting [5].

A Shrinking Counter-Terrorism Budget

The interim report disclosed a finding that has become central to the political debate around the massacre: while overall funding for Australia's National Intelligence Community grew by 31 per cent between 2020 and 2025, reaching $14.9 billion, the share of that budget allocated to counter-terrorism "significantly declined" over the same period [6][15].

Source: Royal Commission Interim Report

Data as of Apr 30, 2026CSV

ASIO had raised the National Terrorism Threat Level to "PROBABLE" in August 2024, warning of a "disturbing escalation" in antisemitic incidents. By August 2025, the government confirmed that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had directed attacks on Jewish interests in Australia, including an arson attack on a synagogue in Melbourne and a Jewish restaurant in Sydney [16][17].

Despite these escalating threats, an Australian Federal Police "national surveillance team" — set up under the Commonwealth's High Risk Terrorist Offender regime — was quietly disbanded weeks before the Bondi attack because of what an AFP official described as "current budget pressures and the lack of certainty in relation to ongoing funding" [18]. Funding had been confirmed for only eight of the team's 10 required positions, and only for a single financial year [18].

Prime Minister Albanese disputed that counter-terrorism capabilities had been cut, saying national security agencies "have never had more funding than they have today" [18]. The opposition cited the disbanded team and declining counter-terrorism budget share as evidence that the government had not matched its rhetoric with resources [19].

The Rising Tide of Antisemitism

The Bondi massacre occurred against a backdrop of sharply rising antisemitic incidents in Australia. The Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) documented 2,062 anti-Jewish incidents in the 12 months ending September 2024 — a roughly 317 per cent increase over pre-October 7 levels — followed by 1,654 incidents in the subsequent 12-month period [20][21].

Source: ECAJ Annual Reports

Data as of Dec 3, 2025CSV

Among the most serious incidents before the Bondi shooting were the firebombing of synagogues, Jewish schools, and private homes; threats by two nurses to kill Jewish patients in a hospital; and the discovery of a trailer packed with explosives allegedly intended for a mass-casualty attack on a Sydney synagogue [20].

In early 2026, leaders from the world's seven largest Jewish diaspora communities — the J7 Task Force — convened in Sydney and declared that Australia's experience was "part of a dangerous global pattern." From 2021 to 2023, antisemitic incidents rose 11 per cent in Australia, 82 per cent in the UK, and 83 per cent in Canada. Germany recorded more than 38 antisemitic incidents per 1,000 Jewish residents in 2023 [22][23].

How Australia's Security Framework Compares

The Community Security Group in Australia operates on a model similar to the UK's Community Security Trust (CST), which has a formal national information-sharing agreement with British police forces [24]. Both organisations are volunteer-driven, with professional staff coordinating intelligence and physical security for Jewish communities.

In the UK, the CST is described by police as a "model of best practice" for community security organisations [24]. In Canada, Jewish community security bodies coordinate with the RCMP and local police, though the framework is less formalised than in Britain. Germany relies primarily on state police for synagogue protection, with community organisations playing an advisory role [22].

Australia's CSG operates in each state, issuing threat assessments and coordinating with police. But the Bondi case exposed a gap: while the CSG's December 8 email explicitly warned of a likely attack and requested police protection, NSW Police treated the request as routine, assigning minimal resources and producing no written risk assessment [8]. The royal commission's public hearings are expected to examine whether the information-sharing pipeline between community security organisations, ASIO, and state police is adequate [6].

Civil Liberties Questions

The attack has accelerated debates about the balance between community security and civil liberties. In July 2025 — before the Bondi shooting — Parliament extended ASIO's coercive questioning powers, originally introduced after the September 11 attacks, allowing the agency to detain and question individuals without judicial warrants and with limited access to legal representation. The Law Council of Australia warned that individuals subjected to these powers "need not be suspected of any crime," raising the prospect of "fishing expeditions" [25].

Following the attack, NSW Premier Chris Minns indicated he was open to arming members of the CSG — a proposal that drew criticism from civil liberties advocates and some Muslim community leaders who questioned whether equivalent protections would be extended to other targeted minorities [26].

The question of equitable threat response across communities is not easily answered. Civil society groups have reported that migrants from African countries and Muslims in Australia encounter a higher level of racial profiling by law enforcement [27]. Whether threat warnings from minority communities are assessed with equal seriousness regardless of the community's identity is a question the royal commission has not yet directly addressed, though its terms of reference encompass "social cohesion" broadly [6].

Government Funding and Security Commitments

In the weeks after the attack, the Australian and NSW governments announced a combined $20 million support package, including $1.5 million for additional security at Jewish community locations and $2 million for victim support through Jewish House [28][29].

The federal government had previously committed $25 million to the ECAJ in October 2023 for community security, and in early 2026 added a further $32.5 million — bringing total security grants to $57.5 million — for enhanced protection at synagogues, schools, and community centres [30][31]. The funding supports physical security upgrades and coordination with the National Council for Jewish Community Security.

Jewish community leaders have argued that the funding, while welcome, does not address systemic gaps in police resourcing and intelligence sharing. The ECAJ and other bodies have called for permanent, dedicated police liaison arrangements for Jewish events — not just during high holy days — and for a full-time national counter-terrorism coordinator, as recommended by the royal commission [6][31].

What Remains Unanswered

Commissioner Bell's interim report was explicit about its own limitations. An entire chapter on intelligence agency activities preceding the attack was withheld from the public report, pending the criminal trial of Naveed Akram, who faces 59 charges [6][7]. Five of the commission's 14 recommendations are classified [6].

The central questions — whether ASIO or NSW Police had intelligence specifically about the Akrams, whether the CSG's warning triggered any escalation within the intelligence community, and whether a different police deployment could have changed the outcome — remain unanswered. Public hearings running through May 2026 are expected to hear testimony from intelligence officials and police commanders [6][7].

Bell's final report is due on December 14, 2026 — the first anniversary of the attack [7].

The 15 lives lost at Bondi Beach are now at the centre of a national reckoning about whether Australia's security apparatus matched the threat it had been warned about, and whether a community's plea for protection was heard but not acted upon.