The Fertilizer Chokepoint: How a Closed Strait of Hormuz Threatens Years of Global Hunger

On February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched an air campaign against Iran and assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz collapsed almost overnight. Transits dropped from roughly 130 vessels per day to just six — a 95% decline [1]. The immediate focus fell on oil, as it always does with Hormuz. But the slower-moving, more consequential crisis is about something most people never think about: fertilizer.

About one-third of the world's seaborne fertilizer trade passes through this 21-mile-wide corridor between Iran and Oman [2]. That share translates to roughly $13.5 billion in annual exports from five Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Bahrain — reaching 43 countries [3]. Two months into the closure, urea prices have risen 50%, and the UN World Food Programme projects that 45 million additional people could be pushed into acute hunger if the disruption continues past June [4].

What Moves Through Hormuz — and Why It Matters for Every Farm on Earth

The strait is not merely a conduit for finished fertilizer. It is the bottleneck for an interconnected chain of chemical inputs without which modern agriculture cannot function at current yield levels.

Source: UNCTAD / Kpler

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

Sulfur is the most underappreciated vulnerability. Between 44% and 50% of the world's seaborne sulfur — a byproduct of oil and gas refining — originates in the Persian Gulf [5]. This sulfur is the essential feedstock for manufacturing phosphate fertilizers. Morocco's OCP Group, the world's largest phosphate exporter, depends on approximately 3.7 million metric tons of Gulf sulfur annually [5]. With the strait closed, that sulfur is trapped, and phosphate production plants in Morocco and China that rely on it have begun to slow or halt operations [5].

For urea — the most widely traded nitrogen fertilizer — global trade stood at around 50.8 million metric tons per annum in 2025, of which approximately 10.6 million metric tons came from Gulf states that ship through Hormuz, mainly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE [3]. Saudi Arabia alone accounts for roughly 16% of global fertilizer exports [3].

The countries most directly exposed include India, which imports 6% to 8% of its fertilizer from these Gulf producers; South Korea; Thailand; Australia; Brazil; and the United States [3]. But the most vulnerable populations are in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia — countries like Sudan, Somalia, and Tanzania that depend on Gulf fertilizer imports and lack the foreign reserves to pivot to alternative suppliers at higher prices [6].

The 'Eight-Year' Precedent: What History Says About Reopening Contested Straits

The comparison that has captured public attention — and the phrase "eight-year disruption" — comes from the Suez Canal closure of 1967–1975. When Egypt sank ships and laid mines at the start of the Six-Day War, the canal shut on June 6, 1967, and did not reopen until June 5, 1975 — eight years to the day [7]. Fifteen ships and their crews were trapped for the duration, forming the so-called "Yellow Fleet" coated in desert sand [7].

Reopening required a specific sequence: a ceasefire (the 1973 Yom Kippur War had to end first), a military disengagement (Israeli troops withdrew from the canal's west bank by March 1974), and extensive mine-clearing operations. The USS Inchon deployed 12 minesweeping helicopters, and the British Royal Navy contributed minehunters for Operation Rheostat. Even then, the canal was only declared "99% clear" of mines — not 100% [7].

The Strait of Hormuz presents a different but no less intractable challenge. Iran has not sunk ships in the channel; it has used naval interdiction and the threat of anti-ship missiles to deter transits [1]. Reopening would require either a negotiated ceasefire and Iranian agreement to restore transit passage, or a sustained multinational military operation to secure the strait under fire. The UK and France have hosted two conferences on the question, and 36 countries signed a statement expressing readiness to contribute to reopening efforts. On April 17, France and the UK announced plans for an international defensive mission — but only once a "sustainable ceasefire" is agreed [8].

The legal framework adds friction. The 1949 ICJ Corfu Channel ruling established that warships have the right of transit through international straits, even through territorial waters, provided the transit is peaceful [9]. But Washington and Tehran disagree on the strait's fundamental legal status: the U.S. treats it as an international waterway; Iran considers parts of it territorial waters [10]. This ambiguity has no quick legal resolution.

Economic Damage: Beyond the Suez Comparison

The 2021 Suez Canal blockage by the Ever Given delayed goods worth an estimated $9.6 billion per day but was resolved within six days [11]. The Hormuz closure is categorically different in scale and duration.

The Dallas Federal Reserve has noted that what distinguishes this disruption from earlier oil supply shortfalls — the 1973 Arab embargo, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait — is its magnitude. Those crises removed roughly 6% of global oil supply. The current Hormuz closure threatens a shortfall close to 20%, making it three to five times larger [12]. Brent crude surpassed $100 per barrel on March 8, 2026, for the first time in four years, peaking at $126 [13].

UNCTAD projects global merchandise trade growth will slow from 4.7% in 2025 to between 1.5% and 2.5% in 2026 [14]. But the food security dimension may prove more consequential than the energy shock. The FAO projects a roughly 3% decline in global wheat production for 2026 on reduced sowings and weather stress [4]. The USDA's Prospective Planting report estimates that U.S. plantings of corn and wheat — both nitrogen-fertilizer-intensive crops — will fall 3% each relative to 2025 [4].

Source: BLS / Bureau of Labor Statistics

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

U.S. food prices, as measured by the CPI for food, stood at 346.8 in March 2026, up 2.7% year-over-year [15]. That figure understates the pipeline effect: fertilizer price increases during the spring planting season will feed into harvest costs and retail prices over the following 6 to 12 months.

Who Runs Out First: The 90-Day Clock

The WFP's projections break down the coming hunger surge by region.

Source: WFP

Data as of Mar 17, 2026CSV

Asia faces the largest projected increase at 24%, followed by West and Central Africa at 21% and East and Southern Africa at 17% [16]. The ten countries already accounting for two-thirds of the world's acutely food-insecure population — Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen — stand to be hit hardest [17].

Sudan exemplifies the compounding risk: it imports roughly 80% of its wheat and is simultaneously experiencing civil war [16]. Somalia, in the midst of severe drought, has already seen essential commodity prices rise at least 20% since the conflict began [16].

Strategic Reserves: How Much Buffer Exists

Major powers maintain strategic petroleum reserves of varying depth. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve held 413 million barrels as of December 2025, against a full capacity of 714 million barrels — roughly 100 days of import coverage [18]. China holds an estimated 1.3 billion barrels, the world's largest stockpile, covering 80 to 90 days of imports, and in October 2025 began accelerating expansion with 11 new storage sites planned [19]. Germany maintains roughly 90 days of net oil import coverage; France holds 90 to 100 days [20].

Strategic food reserves are less transparent. China is widely reported to hold the world's largest grain stockpiles — estimated at over half of global wheat and rice reserves — though precise figures are state secrets. Most other countries rely on commercial supply chains rather than government-held food stockpiles, making them acutely sensitive to disruptions in trade flows.

The Trump administration has taken one notable step: directing the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to provide political risk insurance, with the DFC announcing a reinsurance facility providing up to $40 billion in revolving coverage for vessels transiting the region [21].

The Steelman Case Against Panic

Not all analysts share the most alarming projections. Several factors temper the "food crisis" framing.

Rerouting is possible, if expensive. Some Gulf cargo has begun moving via the Cape of Good Hope, adding over $1 million in fuel costs per voyage and up to three weeks of transit time [5]. This is economically painful but physically feasible for ships that can exit the Gulf through alternative means or were already outside the strait when the closure began.

Non-Gulf fertilizer capacity exists. The International Fertilizer Association's November 2025 outlook projected that 2026 nitrogen capacity would increase 4% over 2024, and phosphate and potash by 5% each [4]. Canada, Russia, and North American producers like CF Industries and Nutrien operate entirely outside the conflict zone. CF Industries stock has surged over 70% year-to-date, reflecting both the supply squeeze and its positioning as a beneficiary [22].

Past Hormuz tensions did not produce sustained shortfalls. Iran has threatened the strait repeatedly — during the Iran-Iraq War's "Tanker War" phase (1984–1988), during heightened tensions in 2012 and 2019 — without following through on a total closure. However, the current situation is qualitatively different: Iran is under active military attack, and the closure is not a threat but a fait accompli [1].

The 4% capacity increase is not enough. As IFPRI has noted, the projected capacity growth is "clearly not sufficient to compensate for the present supply reductions caused by the war" [4]. And the sulfur bottleneck means that even producers outside the Gulf, like Morocco's OCP Group, cannot ramp up phosphate output without finding alternative sulfur sources [5].

Who Profits From the Crisis

The financial beneficiaries are visible in equity and commodity markets. CF Industries hit record highs, while Mosaic surged roughly 10% in a single session when the strait closure became apparent [22][23]. Nutrien received a buy upgrade from Jefferies with a $96 price target [22].

In the oil market, back-end curve positioning has attracted speculative interest, with traders betting that post-war restocking demand and energy security stockpiling will keep prices elevated well beyond the immediate conflict [13]. War-risk insurance premiums for Hormuz transits have risen from 0.125% to between 1% and 5% of ship insurance value, generating windfall revenues for reinsurers willing to underwrite the risk [21].

The question of whether market actors are amplifying the crisis narrative through futures positioning is harder to answer. Commodity futures prices reflect both genuine supply-demand fundamentals and speculative activity, and the two are difficult to disentangle in real time. What is clear is that the physical supply disruption is real — this is not a paper crisis driven by speculation alone.

The Climate Multiplier: El Niño Meets the Fertilizer Shortage

The Hormuz crisis does not exist in a meteorological vacuum. Through the first quarter of 2026, NOAA confirmed that La Niña persisted in a weakened state, and forecasters now project a transition to what could be the strongest El Niño in a decade during the second half of 2026 [24].

For South Asia, this is particularly concerning. Indian weather authorities warn that the monsoon season could bring rainfall at just 70% to 90% of the average — below normal for the first time in three years [24]. India depends heavily on imported fertilizer and is now facing reduced domestic production ahead of the monsoon. As one analyst told Foreign Policy: "If fertilizer costs remain high, low rainfall will encourage farmers not to use it," creating "a vicious cycle that compounds yield loss" [25].

The compounding probability is not speculative. Reduced fertilizer application lowers crop resilience to drought. Drought reduces the return on whatever fertilizer is applied. Both effects reduce yields. If an El Niño-driven reduction in South Asian monsoon rainfall coincides with the ongoing fertilizer shortage in the same 12-month window, the resulting harvest losses would be larger than either factor alone would produce.

What Comes Next

The historical record offers little comfort about timelines. The Suez Canal took eight years to reopen. The Corfu Channel dispute (1946–1949) required an ICJ ruling but involved a far simpler geopolitical configuration [9]. The Strait of Tiran blockade in 1967 was resolved only by the Six-Day War itself — military force, not diplomacy.

The current configuration around Iran involves a state under active bombardment, with no clear path to a ceasefire, no functioning Iranian leadership to negotiate with following Khamenei's assassination, and deep disagreement among major powers about the legal and military framework for reopening the strait [8][10].

Every week the strait remains closed, the fertilizer that should have reached farms during the spring planting window does not arrive. That window cannot be moved. The corn not planted in April will not be planted in July. The wheat not fertilized in March will yield less in August. The food price consequences of this disruption are already locked in for 2026, and the longer the closure persists, the further forward the agricultural damage extends — into 2027 and beyond.

The $9.6 billion per day that the Ever Given's six-day blockage cost was an acute shock with a quick resolution [11]. The Hormuz closure is a chronic wound. Its costs are measured not in days of delayed shipping but in planting seasons missed, yields reduced, and populations pushed from food insecurity into famine.