900,000 Gallons of Caustic Chemicals, Nine Missing Workers, and a Paper Mill's Troubled Safety Record

At 7:18 a.m. on Tuesday, May 26, a tank containing approximately 900,000 gallons of white liquor — a highly corrosive alkaline solution — imploded at the Nippon Dynawave Packaging Company mill in Longview, Washington [1]. The rupture killed at least one worker, left nine others unaccounted for and presumed dead, and sent nine more to area hospitals with burns and inhalation injuries ranging from mild to critical [2]. By Tuesday evening, officials had suspended recovery operations, calling the site too unstable to enter safely. As of Wednesday morning, roughly 90,000 gallons of the caustic chemical remained inside the collapsed structure [3].

The incident ranks among the most severe industrial accidents in the Pacific Northwest in recent years, and it has drawn scrutiny toward the facility's regulatory history, the adequacy of chemical safety oversight in the pulp and paper industry, and the environmental risks posed by nearly a million gallons of corrosive material released near the Columbia River.

The Chemical: White Liquor and Its Hazards

White liquor is a chemical mixture composed primarily of sodium hydroxide (NaOH) and sodium sulfide (Na₂S), with smaller amounts of disodium carbonate [4]. In the Kraft pulping process — the dominant method for converting wood into paper pulp — white liquor is used as a cooking agent to dissolve lignin, the organic polymer that binds wood fibers together [5].

The solution is strongly alkaline, with a pH typically exceeding 13, making it corrosive enough to cause severe chemical burns on contact with skin and tissue damage if inhaled [1]. At the concentrations and volumes present in the Longview tank, direct exposure would be immediately life-threatening. Fire Chief Scott Goldstein expressed concern about "additional leakage from the tanks because it is caustic," and noted the material cannot be contained or skimmed from surfaces the way oil can — it must self-neutralize over time with water [3].

The initial report from emergency responders described the tank as holding approximately 80,000 gallons at 60% capacity [6]. Officials later corrected that figure to approximately 900,000 gallons total capacity, a discrepancy that underscores the confusion and information gaps that marked the early hours of the response [2].

Timeline: From Rupture to Recovery Suspension

The Longview Fire Department received the call at 7:18 a.m. [7]. The initial dispatch described "an implosion or explosion of a tank with three burned and one missing," according to Chief Goldstein [1]. Within minutes, the scale of the disaster became apparent.

Five fire engines, seven ambulances, four chief officers, and one hazardous materials team responded to the scene at 3401 Industrial Way [7]. Battalion Chief Mike Gorsuch described what crews encountered as "a mass casualty scene" [7]. Ten people were ultimately transported to hospitals: eight mill employees went to PeaceHealth St. John Medical Center in Longview, with four later transferred to Legacy Oregon Burn Center in Portland for treatment of severe chemical burns [2]. One firefighter was also treated and released [6].

By afternoon, Battalion Chief Matt Amos confirmed that nine employees remained unaccounted for and that all affected families had been notified [1]. He characterized the operation as a recovery — not a rescue — effort, stating: "Due to the instability of the site, some areas remain inaccessible at this time" [1].

Recovery operations were suspended Tuesday evening. Emergency responders planned to resume Wednesday morning, focusing first on stabilizing the collapsed tank and removing the estimated 90,000 gallons of white liquor still inside before attempting to reach the areas where the missing workers were believed to be [3].

The gap between the 7:18 a.m. emergency call and the point at which nine workers were confirmed missing raises questions about alarm activation and evacuation protocols. The available reporting does not yet clarify precisely when the rupture occurred relative to the first call, or whether any internal alarm was triggered before emergency services were contacted. These details will likely be central to any subsequent investigation [2][6].

The Facility and Its Owner

The Longview mill sits along the Columbia River in a city of about 38,000 people that has long depended on paper, lumber, and shipping industries [3]. The facility dates to 1953 and employs roughly 1,000 workers across two operations: a kraft pulp and paper mill with about 550 employees and a liquid packaging plant with about 450 employees [7]. The mill produces material for tissues, printing paper, cups, plates, cartons, and other goods, turning out approximately 280,000 tons of product annually [3].

Tokyo-based Nippon Paper Group purchased the facility from Weyerhaeuser in 2016 for $285 million, rebranding it as Nippon Dynawave Packaging Company [1]. Since the acquisition, the company has not responded to media requests for comment on the incident, and the parent company had not issued a public statement as of Tuesday evening [2].

A Pattern of Regulatory Violations

Records show a steady accumulation of regulatory actions against the facility in the years preceding the tank rupture.

Source: OSHA / EPA / WA Ecology

Data as of May 27, 2026CSV

The Washington Department of Labor & Industries cited Nippon Dynawave four times between 2019 and 2025 for workplace safety violations [1]. In 2021, the state issued a $700 fine for a serious respiratory protection violation [8]. Other citations involved fall protection failures — including missing guardrails on a platform more than four feet high — and COVID-era face-covering violations totaling $2,700 [1]. In a separate incident, the facility was cited after a worker lost a finger due to equipment that had not been properly secured [1].

At the federal level, the EPA documented at least 19 informal air and water quality violations over a five-year period, along with five formal citations [3]. Total fines amounted to $16,000, of which only $10,000 was collected [3]. The Washington Department of Ecology separately fined the company in 2020 and 2021 for exceeding wastewater discharge limits, releasing more solids into treated water than permitted, and exceeding sulfur dioxide emissions thresholds [8]. In 2024, the state levied two additional fines totaling $6,500 for wastewater and air pollution violations [3].

Two safety complaints remained open at the time of the May 26 incident. One, filed March 4, involved concerns about a valve on an aqua ammonia clarifier tank. A second, filed May 6 — just 20 days before the tank rupture — alleged a sinkhole caused by a failed drain at the facility [8]. Neither complaint was directly related to white liquor storage, but they point to ongoing infrastructure concerns.

The cumulative picture is one of persistent, low-level regulatory friction. Total state fines over the past five years amounted to roughly $3,400 for workplace safety violations [1]. Whether penalties of that magnitude serve as a meaningful deterrent for a facility generating hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue is a question regulators and legislators will now face.

Previous Incidents at the Site

The May 2026 tank rupture was not the first major incident at the Longview mill.

In July 2023, a large industrial fire broke out on the evening of July 18, fueled by wood chip storage piles at the facility [9]. The blaze took days to fully extinguish, damaged conveyor belts, a barge dock, a barge, and a maintenance outbuilding, and sent thick smoke across southwest Washington and into the Portland metropolitan area [9]. The fire was later ruled accidental, though investigators could not determine its exact cause [10].

In 2017, the facility reported a spill of 4,000 to 5,000 gallons of sulfuric acid, which was contained on-site without injuries [3].

These incidents, combined with the regulatory record, establish a history of operational disruptions at the site that predates the current ownership and continued after Nippon Paper Group took control.

Who Are the Missing Workers?

Officials have not released the names or specific roles of the nine unaccounted-for workers [2]. The facility employs a mix of permanent staff and contractors across its pulp mill and packaging operations. Workers in the areas closest to the white liquor tank would likely have included process operators, maintenance technicians, and possibly contractors performing routine upkeep — though this has not been confirmed [7].

The employment classification of the missing workers — whether permanent employees, temporary workers, or outside contractors — carries legal significance. Under Washington state law and federal OSHA regulations, the host employer (Nippon Dynawave) bears responsibility for providing a safe work environment regardless of employment status, but the specific obligations and liability pathways differ for contractors versus direct employees [8]. Workers' compensation coverage, wrongful death claims, and the scope of potential negligence suits all hinge in part on these classifications.

Families were directed to a family assistance center established at the Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers union hall [1], suggesting at least some of the affected workers were union members.

Regulatory Jurisdiction and Multi-Agency Response

The response has involved a layered set of state and federal agencies, each with distinct jurisdiction.

The Washington Department of Labor & Industries, which administers the state's OSHA plan, has primary authority over workplace safety investigations [8]. The department had already opened two inspections at the facility in 2026 before the tank rupture [8]. The agency will lead the investigation into whether the facility met its obligations under the Process Safety Management standard, which governs facilities handling hazardous chemicals above specified threshold quantities.

The Washington Department of Ecology oversees air and water quality permits at the site and will investigate the environmental dimensions of the spill [1]. The EPA, which documented at least 19 informal violations at the facility over the past five years, has enforcement authority under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act [3].

Governor Bob Ferguson mobilized the Washington National Guard Civil Support Team, which arrived on-site to assist the Department of Ecology with air monitoring [6]. Ferguson also directed the National Guard Homeland Response Force to deploy for search-and-recovery operations in contaminated environments and mass decontamination if needed [6]. "We stand with you, we'll be here to do everything we can to help with the situation," Ferguson stated [2].

Senator Patty Murray called the incident "an absolute tragedy" [3].

Coordination between these agencies will be tested in the weeks ahead. Chemical incidents of this scale often expose friction between workplace safety regulators, environmental agencies, and emergency management authorities over sequencing of access, evidence preservation, and cleanup priorities.

Environmental Contamination and the Columbia River

The white liquor released from the ruptured tank spilled into a drainage ditch connected to the facility's stormwater system [3]. That storm drain system feeds into the mill's diking system, whose pumps discharge directly into the Columbia River [3].

Emergency responders shut off the pumps to prevent further discharge, and Department of Ecology officials said they were assessing the environmental impact [3]. Unlike petroleum spills, white liquor cannot be skimmed or mechanically collected from water. Officials said the chemical would "neutralize over time" when diluted [3].

The long-term environmental implications remain unclear. If significant quantities of the alkaline solution reached soil or the river, the elevated pH could harm aquatic life in the affected stretch of the Columbia. The river supports salmon runs, and the Longview stretch is used by both commercial and recreational fisheries.

Full remediation costs for industrial chemical releases at pulp and paper facilities vary widely depending on the volume released, the extent of soil and water contamination, and the duration of exposure. Comparable incidents at other industrial sites have produced cleanup costs ranging from hundreds of thousands to tens of millions of dollars [5]. Legal precedents under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Washington's Model Toxics Control Act hold operators strictly liable for contamination cleanup costs, meaning Nippon Dynawave could face significant financial exposure regardless of whether the company is found to have been negligent [5].

Industry Context

The pulp and paper industry in the United States employs tens of thousands of workers across facilities that handle large volumes of hazardous chemicals as part of standard operations [11]. White liquor, black liquor (a byproduct of the Kraft process), chlorine dioxide, and sulfuric acid are routinely stored and transported within these facilities. The Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded 5,070 fatal work injuries across all U.S. industries in 2024, down slightly from 5,283 in 2023 [11].

Source: OSHA / News Reports

Data as of May 27, 2026CSV

The Longview incident comes at a time when the paper and packaging industry is consolidating ownership — with foreign-headquartered companies acquiring aging U.S. infrastructure — while federal enforcement budgets for both OSHA and the EPA have faced repeated pressure. Whether the regulatory framework applied to facilities like Nippon Dynawave is adequate to prevent incidents of this magnitude, or whether existing penalties function primarily as a cost of doing business, is a question that this disaster has made unavoidable.

What Happens Next

The immediate priority remains recovering the nine missing workers from the unstable site. That effort depends on stabilizing the collapsed tank and removing the remaining 90,000 gallons of white liquor — a process that could take days given the structural concerns [1].

Simultaneously, investigators from at least three agencies — the Washington Department of Labor & Industries, the Department of Ecology, and the EPA — will seek to determine why the 900,000-gallon tank failed [8]. Whether the cause was mechanical failure, corrosion, a maintenance lapse, or some other factor is unknown. Chief Goldstein stated it was "too early" to assess the cause [2].

For the families of the nine missing workers, for the city of Longview, and for the roughly 1,000 employees whose workplace is now an active recovery zone, those answers cannot come soon enough.