Eleven Days at the Top: Israel Kills Hamas Military Chief Mohammed Odeh, Accelerating a Decapitation Campaign With No Clear Endgame

On the evening of May 26, 2026, at least three powerful explosions struck the Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City as residents shopped for the Eid al-Adha holiday. The Israeli military had found Mohammed Odeh — the man who, eleven days earlier, had been named commander of Hamas's armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades [1]. Odeh, his wife, and two of his children were killed. At least three other people died and more than 20 were wounded in the strike, which destroyed the upper floor of the al-Kayali apartment building in a busy market area [2].

The next morning, Hamas confirmed the death. And then thousands of mourners gathered in Gaza City, draped four bodies in green Hamas flags, marched from a mosque through the streets, and fired shots in the air [3].

The juxtaposition — a precision killing followed by a defiant mass funeral — captures the central contradiction of Israel's campaign against Hamas's command structure: the leadership keeps dying, and the organization keeps functioning.

Who Was Mohammed Odeh?

Odeh was born in 1974 in Gaza's Jabaliya refugee camp and joined Hamas at its founding in 1987 [4]. His career traced a path through nearly every critical arm of the Qassam Brigades. He served as a battalion commander in central Jabaliya for several years, led the northern Gaza brigade between 2017 and 2019, and worked in the arms manufacturing department [5]. But his primary domain was intelligence.

As the longtime head of the Qassam Brigades' intelligence division, Odeh played a central role in developing the unit's capabilities — particularly after Hamas discovered what it described as an Israeli espionage ring in Gaza in November 2018, which the group called an "intelligence treasure trove" [5]. Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee described Odeh as having participated in planning the October 7, 2023 attacks, and Hamas itself stated he had "clear imprints in all stages" of organizational activities [4].

In the chain of command, Odeh occupied the same seat once held by Mohammed Deif — the reclusive, long-serving Qassam Brigades commander whom Israel killed in 2024 (with his death confirmed in 2025) [4]. Deif had been the preeminent military figure in Hamas for over two decades; Odeh, by contrast, was an intelligence operative thrust into operational command by attrition. After Mohammed Sinwar (who succeeded Deif) was killed in May 2025, Odeh was offered the top post but declined [6]. He accepted only in May 2026, after the killing of Izz al-Din al-Haddad left the position vacant again [6].

His tenure lasted eleven days.

The Strike: Intelligence, Method, and Civilian Cost

The Israeli military said the attack "followed months of intelligence monitoring aimed at tracking the movements of Odeh and his operatives" [1]. The strike hit a residential building in Rimal — one of Gaza City's more established commercial neighborhoods — during evening hours as residents prepared for the holiday [2].

Gaza health officials reported six dead total (including Odeh and his family) and more than 20 wounded [2]. By the standards of Israel's prior targeted killings of Hamas commanders, the civilian toll was comparatively contained. The 2002 strike that killed Salah Shehadeh, then commander of the Qassam Brigades in Gaza, used a one-ton bomb dropped on a densely populated residential area, killing 14 civilians alongside Shehadeh [7]. The July 2024 strike targeting Mohammed Deif killed over 90 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities, though Israel disputed the figure [8].

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz framed the operation as part of an ongoing effort to eliminate those responsible for October 7. Israel stated that Odeh was "one of the last senior commanders in Hamas' military wing who took part in the planning and execution of the October 7 massacre" [1].

The Decapitation Scorecard

Since October 7, 2023, Israel has killed a succession of Hamas's most senior military and political figures in what analysts have called the most sustained counter-leadership campaign against a non-state armed group since the U.S. targeting of al-Qaeda after 2001 [9].

Source: Multiple news sources

Data as of May 28, 2026CSV

The list of eliminated leaders includes: Mohammed Deif, the longtime Qassam Brigades commander (killed July 2024); Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas's political bureau chief (killed July 2024 in Tehran); Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of October 7 and Hamas's overall leader in Gaza (killed October 2024); Mohammed Sinwar, who succeeded his brother (killed May 2025); Izz al-Din al-Haddad (killed May 15, 2026); and now Odeh (killed May 26, 2026) [4][10].

The pace has accelerated in 2026. Al-Haddad and Odeh were killed just 11 days apart, and Odeh held the top military post for the shortest duration of any Qassam Brigades commander in the organization's history [3].

Israel has also targeted figures it described as serving in Hamas's civil governance structure in Gaza, including Ismail Daalis and Ismail Barhoum [10].

Does It Work? The Historical Record

The question of whether killing leaders degrades Hamas has been studied for over two decades, and the evidence is mixed.

After Israel killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas's spiritual founder, in March 2004, and his successor Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi just weeks later, Hamas initially escalated attacks against Israeli targets — though with reduced lethality [9]. By late 2004, however, Hamas leadership began signaling willingness to discuss ceasefires, which some analysts attributed partly to leadership attrition [9].

After Ahmed Jabari, the Qassam Brigades' operational commander, was killed in November 2012 at the start of Operation Pillar of Defense, Hamas replaced him and continued fighting, though the eight-day conflict ended with an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire [11]. Mohammed Deif, who had survived multiple assassination attempts, effectively stepped into the vacuum [11].

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore published an assessment noting that "more competent leaders have replaced those killed, while organisations have demonstrated the ability to regenerate and remain effective" [9]. The Institute for Security and Development Policy characterized Israel's targeted killing strategy as "a double-edged sword," noting that while it disrupts operational planning in the short term, it can harden public support for the targeted organization [12].

A key pattern emerges: Hamas has never failed to name a successor. The interval between a commander's death and replacement has shortened from weeks or months to days. Odeh himself was appointed three days after al-Haddad's death [6].

The Funeral: What It Signals

The mass funeral held on May 27 in Gaza City carried operational significance beyond mourning. Thousands gathered openly, marched through the streets in an organized procession, and did so under green Hamas flags — all within a city that Israel has bombed continuously for 19 months [3].

Abu Al-Abd Odeh, one of Mohammed Odeh's relatives, told mourners at the mosque: "This journey will not stop and the struggle of the Palestinian people will continue on all levels" [3].

For Hamas, the funeral served as a demonstration of organizational cohesion and territorial presence. Staging a public, large-scale gathering in Gaza City — with armed men firing in the air — requires logistics, crowd mobilization, and at minimum a permissive security environment. Israeli security officials cited by Ynet acknowledged that while the commander killings "weaken Hamas' military wing in Gaza in relation to the group's political leadership," the strikes also serve primarily as "a message to Hamas operatives in Gaza that they are still being hunted" [13] — an implicit concession that the organization itself remains operative.

Who Comes Next?

With Odeh dead, the pool of senior Qassam Brigades commanders with pre-October 7 institutional memory has narrowed sharply. According to Israeli and independent assessments, the most likely candidates to succeed Odeh include:

Imad Aqel, described as "the only senior Gaza commander from the October 7-era IDF chart still alive" [13]. Born in 1971 in Jabaliya, Aqel joined Hamas's military wing in the early 1990s and currently serves as head of Hamas's "home front staff" — responsible for logistics, infrastructure, weapons production, and supply [13]. He sits on Hamas's military council and is considered one of the organization's most secretive figures.

Hussein Fayyad, a prominent field commander in northern Gaza who leads forces in Beit Hanoun and has reportedly survived several assassination attempts during the war [14].

Fayez Baroud, identified by the European Council on Foreign Relations as a senior Qassam Brigades commander believed to still be alive [14].

No independent analysts have publicly assessed whether any of these figures would be more or less inclined toward ceasefire negotiations than Odeh. The rapid turnover in leadership — four commanders killed or replaced since 2024 — means each successor arrives with less institutional authority and less ability to enforce discipline or negotiate binding agreements on Hamas's behalf.

The Ceasefire Context

The strike on Odeh occurred against the backdrop of a ceasefire process that has effectively collapsed. The first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement, brokered in late 2024 and implemented in January 2025, achieved the return of hostages held by Hamas [15]. But phase two — which was to include broader disarmament discussions and a path toward ending hostilities — has stalled.

Hamas rejected demands for disarmament, calling them "unacceptable," and insisted that Israel first fully implement phase one terms, including humanitarian aid delivery and partial military withdrawal [15]. Israel, for its part, has continued military operations in Gaza, with the IDF reporting 19 ceasefire violations by Hamas between May 6 and May 20 alone [6]. Since the ceasefire agreement, Israeli military fire has killed nearly 600 Palestinians and wounded some 1,600, according to the UN [16].

Israel's position is that post-ceasefire strikes target individuals who pose ongoing threats or who approach the armistice line [2]. Critics, including the UN Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East, have called on Israel to halt escalating violence and consolidate the ceasefire [16].

The Legal and Diplomatic Dimension

The strike on Odeh adds another data point to the ongoing international legal scrutiny of Israel's military operations in Gaza. South Africa's genocide case before the International Court of Justice, filed in December 2023, alleges that Israel's military campaign in Gaza violates the Genocide Convention [17]. Israel submitted its response in March 2026 [17].

The ICJ has issued provisional measures emphasizing "the fundamental importance of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution under international humanitarian law" [17]. Under international humanitarian law, proportionality does not require equality of casualties — it requires that civilian harm not be excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage [17]. Whether the killing of a military commander who held his post for 11 days, at the cost of additional civilian deaths in a residential area during a holiday, meets that standard is a question that international legal scholars continue to debate.

The Cost of the Campaign

Israel's sustained military operations in Gaza have exacted a significant toll on its own forces.

Source: IDF / Times of Israel

Data as of May 28, 2026CSV

The Israeli Defense Ministry reported 1,152 total Israeli fatalities as of October 2025, encompassing soldiers, police, security officials, and those who died from related causes [18]. IDF combat deaths peaked in 2024 at 558, declined to 151 in 2025, and have continued at a lower rate in 2026 [18][19]. Around 42% of the deceased were under 21 years old, and an estimated 1,000 soldiers are wounded each month [18]. Twenty-one soldiers took their own lives in 2025 [19].

The diplomatic cost has also accumulated. The ICJ proceedings, International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Israeli leaders, and tensions with allied governments over civilian casualties have created sustained international pressure that shows no sign of abating.

The Counterargument

The strongest case against the strategic value of killing Odeh rests on three pillars.

First, historical precedent: every senior Hamas commander killed has been replaced, often within days, and the organization's capacity to conduct operations — whether military attacks, governance functions, or public demonstrations like Odeh's funeral — has persisted through more than two decades of leadership attrition.

Second, the negotiation problem. Each killed leader takes with them institutional knowledge — about hostage locations, about internal organizational dynamics, about the terms previously discussed in negotiations. The rapid cycling of leadership makes it harder, not easier, to reach binding agreements, because each new commander has less authority to deliver on commitments.

Third, the legitimacy dynamic. Research by the ISDP and others has documented that targeted killings can increase public support for the targeted organization among the affected population [12]. The thousands who turned out for Odeh's funeral, and the defiant rhetoric of his family members, suggest that this dynamic remains operative in Gaza.

Israel's defenders counter that the alternative — allowing known October 7 planners to continue operating — is untenable, and that the accelerating pace of replacements is itself evidence of degradation: each successor is less experienced, less connected, and less capable than the last [13].

Both arguments contain truth. The question is which effect dominates — and after 19 months, the evidence does not clearly favor either side.

What Remains

As of late May 2026, the Qassam Brigades have cycled through four commanders since the start of the war. The phase two ceasefire negotiations are frozen. Israeli military operations continue inside Gaza. Hamas retains the capacity to organize public events, fire rockets (as it did at the Kerem Shalom crossing in early May, killing four Israeli soldiers), and appoint new leaders [6][15].

Imad Aqel, the last surviving October 7-era senior commander on Israel's targeting chart, is now the most hunted man in Gaza [13]. Whether he assumes the top post — and how long he holds it — will be the next chapter in a cycle that has produced diminishing returns for all sides and mounting costs for the civilians caught between them.