US Expands Ebola Screening to Atlanta-Area Airport

On the evening of May 22, 2026, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport — the busiest airport in North America by total passenger volume — became the third U.S. facility to conduct enhanced Ebola entry screening for travelers arriving from Central and East Africa [1]. The decision by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention added Atlanta to a short list that already included Washington Dulles International Airport and George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston [6].

The expansion followed a rapid-fire series of public health escalations: a WHO declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on May 17, a confirmed Ebola case in an American working in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a 30-day entry ban on foreign nationals from three affected countries [2][7]. Behind those moves lies a familiar tension in outbreak response — whether screening at airports actually catches cases, or whether it primarily serves to reassure the public while straining limited resources.

The Outbreak: Bundibugyo Strain, Rapid Spread

The current epidemic originated in Ituri Province in the northeastern DRC. A suspected index case — a nurse in the city of Bunia — died on April 24 [8]. The Bundibugyo ebolavirus, one of four orthoebolaviruses known to cause Ebola disease in humans, circulated undetected for several weeks before laboratory confirmation in early May [3].

By May 22, the WHO reported 836 suspected cases and at least 186 deaths in the DRC, with 85 laboratory-confirmed cases across both the DRC and Uganda, including 10 confirmed deaths [3][4]. Two confirmed cases with no apparent epidemiological link to each other appeared in Kampala, Uganda's capital, within 24 hours on May 15 and 16, raising alarm about undetected chains of transmission [4]. South Sudan, which shares a porous border with the DRC's outbreak zone, was added to the CDC's affected-country list as a precaution [6].

Source: WHO / CDC

Data as of May 23, 2026CSV

The Bundibugyo strain carries a historical case fatality rate of 25–50%, lower than the Zaire strain that drove the 2014–2016 West Africa epidemic but still severe [3][8]. Crucially, no approved vaccine exists for the Bundibugyo variant; the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine (Ervebo) and the Johnson & Johnson two-dose regimen were developed for the Zaire strain, and their cross-protection against Bundibugyo is uncertain [8].

Scale in Context: 2026 vs. 2014

The 2014–2016 West Africa epidemic remains the largest Ebola outbreak in history, with 28,616 reported cases and 11,310 deaths across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone [3]. That crisis prompted the original U.S. airport screening program in October 2014, when the CDC and Customs and Border Protection launched enhanced entry screening at five airports: JFK, Newark, Dulles, O'Hare, and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta [9].

Source: WHO / CDC

Data as of May 23, 2026CSV

The current outbreak is far smaller — 836 suspected cases compared to nearly 29,000 — but several features distinguish it. The Bundibugyo strain's vaccine gap means the containment tools available in the 2018–2020 DRC Zaire-strain outbreak (3,481 cases, 2,299 deaths) are less applicable [3]. The appearance of cases in Kampala, a major East African travel hub, elevates the risk of international spread in a way that rural-only outbreaks typically do not [4]. And the WHO's PHEIC declaration — a formal determination that the outbreak poses a risk beyond the affected countries — came relatively early, less than three weeks after the index case death [2].

What Screening Looks Like on the Ground

Under the current protocol, all U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who have been in the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan within 21 days before arrival must enter the country through one of the three designated airports [6][7]. Airlines are required to rebook affected passengers to those airports. Foreign nationals who visited those countries within the same window are barred from entering the United States entirely [7].

At the airport, CDC staff conduct the screening, which takes approximately 5 to 10 minutes per passenger [6]. The process involves a temperature check using handheld thermometers, a brief questionnaire about travel history and symptoms, and visual observation for signs of illness. Travelers who clear screening receive a text message from the CDC describing Ebola symptoms and instructions for self-monitoring and seeking care if symptoms develop [6].

The CDC then notifies state health departments at the traveler's final U.S. destination. Follow-up monitoring varies by assessed risk level. "Some people will be monitored or checked on daily. Some will not require that frequency," Dr. Laurie Forlano, a CDC official, told NPR [6].

Source: FAA / Airport Statistics

Data as of May 23, 2026CSV

Atlanta's Role: Why the World's Busiest Airport Matters

Hartsfield-Jackson handled 106.3 million passengers in 2025, including 14.86 million international travelers, representing roughly 14% of total volume [10][11]. The airport previously conducted enhanced Ebola entry screening during the 2014 outbreak and has "established operational procedures in place," according to the CDC [1].

The addition of Atlanta gives returning travelers from the affected region more routing options. Initially, all such passengers were funneled exclusively through Dulles, which handles about 24.8 million passengers annually [7]. Houston's George Bush Intercontinental, with approximately 45.2 million annual passengers, was added alongside Atlanta [6]. The three airports combined handle roughly 176 million passengers per year, though only a fraction of those travelers originate from or connect through the affected Central and East African countries.

The precise number of travelers from the DRC, Uganda, and South Sudan passing through these airports is not publicly reported by the CDC or Customs and Border Protection. During the 2014 screening program, approximately 12,000 passengers arrived from the three affected West African countries over the first month of screening at five airports [9]. The current volume is likely smaller, given that direct commercial air service from the DRC and Uganda to the United States is limited, with most travelers connecting through European or Middle Eastern hubs.

The Effectiveness Debate

The scientific evidence on airport entry screening for Ebola is extensive — and largely discouraging about its direct detection value.

A 2015 Lancet study modeled the probability of detecting infected travelers. Exit screening in the departure country would catch an estimated 35.6% of infected passengers; adding entry screening after a 24-hour journey increased total detection to 41.5% [12]. But these modeled estimates assume ideal conditions. In practice, the 2014 U.S. screening program screened roughly 12,000 arriving passengers from affected countries over its first month without identifying a single confirmed Ebola case at the point of entry [9].

A peer-reviewed study of Sierra Leone's Freetown airport from September 2014 to February 2016 found that 166,242 people underwent screening, five were denied air travel after secondary evaluation, and none tested positive for Ebola [13]. The incubation period — up to 21 days — is the fundamental limitation: a traveler infected but not yet symptomatic will pass a temperature check and symptom questionnaire without detection [12].

Source: OpenAlex

Data as of Jan 1, 2026CSV

Research interest in airport screening spiked during the COVID-19 pandemic, with 399 papers published on the topic in 2020, many of them examining how screening for respiratory viruses similarly failed to identify asymptomatic carriers at borders. The literature has consistently found that entry screening's primary value is not case detection but rather awareness and deterrence — informing travelers about symptoms and directing them toward medical care if they become ill after arrival [12][13].

The Case For Screening Anyway

Defenders of airport screening argue that its value cannot be measured solely by the number of cases caught at the gate.

The CDC describes entry screening as "one component of a layered public health approach" that also includes overseas exit screening, mandatory airline illness reporting, and post-arrival monitoring [1]. Dr. Marty Cetron, a CDC official, has acknowledged that travel restrictions "rarely work in and of themselves" but maintained that the layered approach, taken together, slows and reduces disease spread [6].

The screening interaction itself serves as a point of contact: travelers receive their temperature check, their contact information is verified for follow-up, and they leave with written instructions about symptom recognition [1]. This information handoff — not the temperature reading — may be the intervention's most consequential output.

There is also a political dimension. During the 2014 outbreak, public and congressional pressure for visible action at U.S. borders was intense. Airport screening was, in part, a response to that pressure. Some public health officials have argued privately that the alternative — doing nothing visible at airports while investing more in source-country containment — is politically untenable even if it would be more epidemiologically efficient [14].

The Case Against: Resources and Opportunity Cost

Critics of the expansion point to the same evidence base and reach different conclusions.

Arthur Reingold, professor and head of epidemiology at UC Berkeley's School of Public Health, has compared fever screening for Ebola to the SARS experience, calling it "pretty worthless" as a detection tool [14]. Temperature screening misses travelers taking over-the-counter fever reducers, and the incubation period means many infected individuals are genuinely asymptomatic at the time of screening [14].

The operational costs of airport screening are not publicly itemized by the CDC, but the agency deployed at least 10 staff members to Dulles alone when screening launched there [7]. Scaling that to three airports, maintaining 24/7 coverage, and accounting for training, equipment, and coordination with state health departments represents a non-trivial allocation of CDC field resources — resources that some experts argue would produce greater returns if invested in contact tracing and outbreak response in the DRC and Uganda [14].

A 2015 analysis in the journal BMJ posed the question directly: "Does screening keep Ebola out of the USA?" Its conclusion was that the resources consumed by entry screening programs are disproportionate to their detection yield, and that reinforcing exit screening and containment efforts in source countries would more effectively reduce the probability of an imported case [15].

Quarantine Authority and Isolation Protocols

If a traveler at one of the three designated airports presents with symptoms consistent with Ebola, the CDC has authority under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 265, 268) to implement targeted public health measures, including isolation and quarantine [16]. The CDC has also invoked Title 42 authority to restrict entry for non-citizens from the affected countries [16].

The specifics of what happens next depend on a coordination between federal and state authorities. The CDC can isolate a symptomatic traveler and arrange transport to a designated treatment facility, but quarantine enforcement for asymptomatic contacts varies by state law and local health department capacity.

In the Atlanta metro area, the infrastructure for treating confirmed Ebola cases is among the strongest in the country. Emory University Hospital — which gained international recognition for treating American Ebola patients evacuated during the 2014 crisis — is designated as a Regional Emerging Special Pathogen Treatment Center (RESPTC) [17]. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta at Egleston holds the same designation for pediatric cases [17].

Georgia's Infectious Disease Network currently includes two RESPTCs (one adult, one pediatric), two additional Special Pathogen Treatment Centers, and five Assessment Centers [17]. Designated treatment centers are required to accept patients within eight hours of notification, maintain negative pressure isolation capacity for at least 10 patients, and receive annual readiness assessments from the National Ebola Training and Education Center [17][18].

Whether that capacity has been stress-tested since the last major outbreak response is a question several public health preparedness experts have raised. The annual readiness assessments are conducted, but a full-scale exercise simulating a confirmed case arriving at Hartsfield-Jackson and triggering the isolation-to-treatment pipeline has not been publicly reported in recent years [18].

The Diverted Flight and Public Anxiety

The stakes of the screening debate became tangible on May 22, when a domestic flight bound for Detroit was diverted to Canada over Ebola exposure concerns [8]. The incident underscored how even the perception of risk — absent a confirmed case on U.S. soil — can disrupt air travel and amplify public anxiety.

No suspected, probable, or confirmed cases of Ebola have been reported in the United States as of May 23, and the CDC has consistently assessed the domestic risk as low [1][6]. The single confirmed American case involved a health worker in the DRC who was transported to Germany for treatment, along with six other Americans identified as high-risk contacts [7].

What Comes Next

The current 30-day travel restriction on foreign nationals from the DRC, Uganda, and South Sudan is set to expire in mid-June unless renewed [7]. The screening program at the three airports has no announced end date and will presumably continue as long as the outbreak remains active and the WHO PHEIC designation stands.

The outbreak's trajectory will depend heavily on factors outside U.S. control: the effectiveness of containment efforts in Ituri Province, whether the virus continues spreading through urban centers like Kampala, and whether a Bundibugyo-specific vaccine candidate can be fast-tracked into emergency use. The WHO upgraded its risk assessment for the DRC to "very high" on May 22, while maintaining a "low" global risk classification [4].

For the travelers passing through Atlanta, Dulles, and Houston, the five-to-ten-minute screening encounter represents the visible edge of a much larger public health apparatus — one whose real work happens in the days and weeks after arrival, through monitoring phone calls and coordination between federal and state health departments. Whether that apparatus is sufficient, efficient, or merely reassuring remains a question that the evidence, so far, has not conclusively answered.