Inside Iran's Power Structure: A Breakdown of Khamenei and the Leaders Shaping the Islamic Republic's Future

For 36 years, one man sat atop Iran's sprawling theocratic apparatus: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader whose word was final on matters of war, diplomacy, religion, and governance. His assassination on February 28, 2026, during joint U.S.-Israeli airstrikes, has thrust the Islamic Republic into uncharted territory [1][2]. Iran now faces only the second leadership transition in its post-revolutionary history—and this time, unlike the relatively orderly handoff from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, the country is engulfed in war, economic collapse, and mass civil unrest.

Understanding who holds power in Iran—and who might seize more of it—requires looking beyond any single figure. The Islamic Republic is governed through an intricate web of elected officials, appointed clerics, military commanders, and shadowy advisory bodies, many of which overlap in membership and compete for influence. Here is a breakdown of the key players.

The Supreme Leader: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (1939–2026)

Ali Hosseini Khamenei served as Iran's second supreme leader from 1989 until his death, making him the longest-serving head of state in the Middle East [1]. Born in Mashhad in 1939, Khamenei was a student of Khomeini's revolutionary ideology and served as president of Iran from 1981 to 1989 before being elevated to the supreme leadership following Khomeini's death.

As Supreme Leader, Khamenei held ultimate authority over all branches of government, the judiciary, the armed forces, and Iran's nuclear program [3]. He appointed the heads of the judiciary, half the members of the powerful Guardian Council, and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His foreign policy centered on Shia Islamism, exporting the revolution, and opposition to the United States and Israel [1].

During the 2025–2026 Iranian protests—the largest since the Mahsa Amini uprisings of 2022—Khamenei became the focal point of public rage, with demonstrators chanting "Death to the dictator!" [8]. The crackdown under his authority was devastating: human rights organizations documented at least 7,000 protester deaths, making it the deadliest state response to civil unrest in modern Iranian history [8].

The Interim Leadership Council

Iran's constitution provides for a transitional governance mechanism when the supreme leader dies or is incapacitated. On March 1, 2026, Iran established an Interim Leadership Council composed of three figures [4][5]:

President Masoud Pezeshkian

A 70-year-old former heart surgeon and the ninth president of the Islamic Republic, Pezeshkian took office in July 2024 after winning an election following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash [6]. Considered a reformist by Iranian standards, Pezeshkian entered office hoping to revive the JCPOA nuclear agreement and secure sanctions relief. Those hopes were shattered by the escalation of hostilities with Israel in 2025, including the Twelve-Day War, during which an assassination attempt was made on his life [6].

In Iran's constitutional structure, the president handles day-to-day governance and domestic policy but has historically been subordinate to the supreme leader on foreign policy and security matters [3]. With Khamenei gone, Pezeshkian's role has expanded dramatically—though the extent of his actual authority within the interim council remains contested.

Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei

The 68-year-old ultra-conservative jurist was appointed Chief Justice by Khamenei in 2021 [5]. Mohseni-Ejei is widely considered one of the Islamic Republic's most hardline figures. He has been sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, Canada, and Switzerland for human rights abuses, including his role in overseeing the judiciary's harsh treatment of political prisoners and protesters [5].

Human rights organizations have identified Mohseni-Ejei as a central figure responsible for the violent suppression of the 2025–2026 protests [5]. His presence on the interim council signals that the regime's coercive apparatus remains firmly embedded in any transitional governance structure.

Ayatollah Alireza Arafi

The most theologically credentialed member of the council, Arafi has served on the 12-member Guardian Council since 2019 and as deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts [5][7]. He has also led Friday prayers in the holy city of Qom and overseen Iran's nationwide seminary system, giving him deep influence within the clerical establishment. As the only cleric on the interim council, Arafi is rumored to be positioned as its de facto head [5]. He has publicly stated that a new supreme leader will be chosen soon [7].

The IRGC: Iran's Military-Political Powerhouse

No discussion of Iranian power is complete without the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC operates as a parallel military force, independent of Iran's regular army and answerable only to the supreme leader [9]. But its reach extends far beyond the battlefield—the IRGC controls vast economic enterprises, runs its own intelligence services, and has become what the Council on Foreign Relations has called "the most important organization in the country" [9].

Khamenei spent decades cultivating the IRGC, appointing former commanders to top political posts and ensuring the corps marched in lockstep with his policy positions [9]. Major General Hossein Salami, the IRGC's commander-in-chief, was the most senior military leader killed in Israeli strikes in June 2025, decapitating much of the senior leadership [9][10].

In response, Iran activated a decentralized "mosaic defense" structure, reorganizing the IRGC into 31 largely autonomous provincial units whose commanders can act independently if central leadership is disrupted [9]. Whether this decentralization holds the force together or accelerates fragmentation is one of the central questions facing Iran's future. Analysts consistently point to the IRGC's cohesion as the single most important variable: if it holds, the most likely outcome is not democratic transition but a harder, more openly security-dominated system [2][10].

The Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts

Two institutions will be pivotal in selecting the next supreme leader:

The Guardian Council is a 12-member body—six Islamic clerics appointed by the supreme leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and confirmed by parliament [3]. It holds veto power over legislation passed by parliament and, crucially, approves or disqualifies candidates for all elections, including to the presidency, parliament, and the Assembly of Experts itself [3]. Its longtime secretary, the 99-year-old Ahmad Jannati, also chairs the Assembly of Experts, giving him extraordinary dual influence over the succession process [7].

The Assembly of Experts is the 88-member clerical body constitutionally empowered to select the supreme leader [3]. Its members are formally elected by the public but only after rigorous vetting by the Guardian Council—creating a closed feedback loop that ensures ideological conformity [7]. The Assembly has met only twice in its history to select a leader: in 1989, when it elevated Khamenei, and now.

The Succession Contenders

With no designated heir and no obvious consensus candidate, the succession is deeply uncertain. Several names have emerged [2][10][11]:

Mojtaba Khamenei

The late supreme leader's 56-year-old son is perhaps the most controversial potential successor. Mojtaba wields significant behind-the-scenes influence and maintains strong ties to the IRGC and its Basij paramilitary force [11]. A Bloomberg investigation published in January 2026 linked him to an offshore financial network used to hold and move assets outside Iran [11].

However, Mojtaba faces formidable obstacles. He lacks high clerical rank and holds no official government position. More fundamentally, father-to-son succession is deeply unpopular in a republic born from the overthrow of a monarchy. Khamenei himself reportedly opposed dynastic succession, telling associates he did not want Iran to return to hereditary rule [11].

Ali Larijani

A former Speaker of Parliament (2008–2020) and current Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Larijani comes from one of Iran's most prominent clerical families [12]. He was instrumental in negotiating the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal and is considered a pragmatist within the regime's framework. His brother Sadeq Larijani, a former judiciary chief, serves on both the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts, giving the family significant institutional leverage [12].

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf

The current Speaker of Parliament, Ghalibaf is a former IRGC Aerospace Force commander, former Tehran mayor, and former national police chief [12]. A Principlist hardliner, his combined military and political experience makes him a formidable figure, though the supreme leader position has traditionally gone to senior clerics rather than politicians with military backgrounds.

Hassan Khomeini

The grandson of the Islamic Republic's founder carries a powerful symbolic name. However, he is considered relatively moderate and lacks the institutional backing needed to prevail against hardline candidates with IRGC support [2].

The Broader Context: A Nation in Crisis

The succession is unfolding against the backdrop of Iran's worst compound crisis since the revolution. The economy is in freefall: the rial halved in value between mid-2024 and early 2025, food price inflation exceeded 70%, and the World Bank projects the economy will shrink in both 2025 and 2026 [8][13]. The reimposition of UN sanctions through the "snapback" mechanism in September 2025 froze Iranian assets abroad and further constricted trade [13].

The 2025–2026 protests, sparked by economic grievances in December 2025, escalated into the most extensive unrest since the Mahsa Amini movement [8]. Despite a devastating crackdown, the underlying conditions—youth unemployment, currency collapse, and political alienation—have not been addressed. Security forces remained loyal and no leadership defections were reported, but the scale of public anger represents an existential challenge to the regime's legitimacy [8][13].

What Comes Next

The Assembly of Experts now faces a decision that will shape not only Iran's domestic trajectory but the geopolitics of the entire Middle East. The choice is not merely about personnel—it is about the character of the Islamic Republic itself.

If a hardliner backed by the IRGC prevails, expect continuity or even escalation of Iran's confrontational posture. If a relative pragmatist like Larijani emerges, there may be narrow openings for diplomatic engagement—though the ongoing military conflict with the U.S. and Israel makes any such pivot extraordinarily difficult [10][12].

The wild card is fragmentation. With decentralized IRGC units, a battered economy, and a restive population, there is no guarantee that the transition will be orderly. For the first time since 1979, the fundamental question is not just who will lead Iran, but whether Iran's theocratic system itself will survive in its current form [2][10][13].

The world is watching. The answer will be decided in Tehran, Qom, and the barracks of the Revolutionary Guard—far from the airstrikes that set this transition in motion.