Iran Invokes Saddam-Era 'Mass Sacrifice' Rhetoric as Nuclear Deal Talks Intensify

On May 24, 2026, as reports circulated that the United States and Iran were nearing a framework agreement to end months of military conflict, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian posted a message that cut through the diplomatic noise. "Our nation today, just like the people of the undefeated yet brave Khorramshahr who stood for days against the invading army to showcase the power of the Iranian people to the world, remains steadfast," he wrote. "Resistance, self-sacrifice, and repelling aggression are rooted in the culture of this land." [1]

The timing was not incidental. The statement landed on the anniversary of the liberation of Khorramshahr, the southwestern Iranian city that fell to Saddam Hussein's forces in 1980 and was recaptured in a bloody 1982 counteroffensive that cost tens of thousands of lives. For Iranians, Khorramshahr occupies a position roughly analogous to Stalingrad in Russian memory — a place where civilian sacrifice and military defiance fused into founding mythology. Analysts described Pezeshkian's invocation as a deliberate signal: "one of the Islamic Republic's foundational mythological moments — civilian resistance, mass sacrifice, repelling an 'aggressor army'" [2].

The question is what that signal means — and for whom it is intended.

The Deal on the Table

President Donald Trump declared on May 23 that an agreement with Iran had been "largely negotiated" and that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen [3]. Iran's foreign ministry confirmed only that a memorandum of understanding existed as a first phase, with broader negotiations to follow within 30 to 60 days [4].

The reported terms of the emerging framework include:

• A temporary moratorium on Iranian uranium enrichment lasting at least 12 years — a compromise between Iran's proposed five-year suspension and the U.S. demand of 20 years [5]
• Enrichment capped at 3.67% after the moratorium period, matching the 2015 JCPOA threshold [5]
• Commitments from Iran to not operate underground nuclear facilities and to accept enhanced inspections, including snap inspections by the United Nations [5]
• Removal of Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium — currently 440.9 kg enriched to 60%, enough for approximately 10 weapons if further enriched to 90% weapons-grade [6]
• A phased reopening of maritime trade routes in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz [4]
• Potential release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets, with half potentially disbursed upon announcement [5]

The gaps remain wide. Iran has demanded the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade, withdrawal of U.S. forces from the surrounding region, freedom to sell Iranian oil, and an end to military operations "on all fronts including Lebanon" [7]. Trump, meanwhile, has insisted that Iran must relinquish its highly enriched uranium stockpile — a demand Tehran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani dismissed as a "fantasy" [3]. Iran also disputes Trump's characterization of Hormuz control, insisting the waterway remains under Iranian sovereignty [3].

Compared to the 2015 JCPOA, the emerging terms are stricter in some respects (longer enrichment moratorium, snap inspections, underground facility ban) but are being negotiated under fundamentally different conditions — in the middle of an active military conflict, with Iran's IAEA cooperation terminated and its nuclear infrastructure partially damaged by U.S. and Israeli strikes [8].

Iran's Nuclear Status: What the IAEA Knows and Doesn't Know

Before the February 2026 military strikes, Iran's nuclear program had reached its most advanced state in history. The country held 440.9 kg of 60%-enriched uranium, and its breakout time — the period required to enrich enough material for a single nuclear weapon — had shrunk to an estimated two to four weeks, the shortest of any non-nuclear-weapon state ever recorded [6]. Fabricating a deliverable warhead would require an additional 6 to 18 months beyond the enrichment phase [6].

Source: IAEA Reports / Congressional Research Service

Data as of May 24, 2026CSV

On February 28, 2026, Iran terminated all IAEA access to its nuclear facilities [6]. The agency can no longer verify the extent of strike damage to enrichment infrastructure, the status of enriched material stockpiles, or whether covert enrichment activities continue at undeclared sites [6]. This informational blackout represents a major complication for any deal: verification, the backbone of any nonproliferation agreement, currently has no foundation to build on.

The Arms Control Association has described the Trump administration's nuclear policy toward Iran as "chaotic and reckless," arguing that the military campaign has paradoxically reduced international visibility into a program it was meant to constrain [8].

The Iran-Iraq War and the Politics of Sacrifice

The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War killed an estimated 500,000 people and remains the deadliest conventional war between developing nations' regular armies in modern history [9]. Iran recruited tens of thousands of volunteers, including child soldiers, for frontal assaults against Iraqi positions — operations that produced staggering casualty rates and cemented the concept of martyrdom as a central pillar of the Islamic Republic's identity [9].

A 2021 study published in the journal Memory Studies examined how "the culture of martyrdom" operates across generational lines in Iran, finding that the war's memory is actively curated by the state but received with increasing ambivalence by postwar generations [10]. Roughly 60% of Iran's population is under 40, meaning most citizens were born after the 1979 revolution and lack the direct ideological memory that legitimized clerical rule for their parents and grandparents [11].

Polling data, while limited given the restrictions on independent surveys inside Iran, paints a picture of declining resonance. A survey cited by Iran International found that nearly 70% of Iranians want the government to abandon its "Death to Israel" slogan, 62% favor direct negotiations with the United States, and nearly half want nuclear escalation to end [12]. Only 40% of Iranians now consider faith important in their lives [12]. One presidential adviser reportedly warned that "Gen-Z is against us" [11].

Foreign Policy magazine argued in May 2026 that Iran's survival rhetoric is itself "a sign of defeat," noting a shift from claims of victory to a framing where "to endure is to win" [13]. Whether Pezeshkian's Khorramshahr invocation mobilizes or alienates the population depends heavily on which Iran one is speaking to — the revolutionary generation that remembers the war, or the majority that does not.

A Pattern: War Rhetoric and Nuclear Bargaining

Iran's use of wartime sacrifice language during nuclear negotiations is not new. Research from MIT's International Security journal documented how Iranian decision-makers "regularly invoked the history and lessons of the war to construe their decision-making process and define their bottom lines during nuclear talks" in the lead-up to the 2015 JCPOA [14]. The war shaped Iran's strategic outlook broadly and its nuclear policies specifically, producing a worldview centered on distrust of international institutions and emphasis on self-reliance [14].

During the 2003 negotiations with the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), Iran temporarily suspended enrichment but framed the concession domestically as a strategic pause, not a retreat. In 2013, when the Rouhani government entered serious talks that would produce the JCPOA, hardliners within the IRGC escalated martyrdom rhetoric to signal that any agreement had red lines drawn in the blood of the war's dead. The pattern — rhetorical escalation coinciding with diplomatic flexibility — serves a dual function: it provides domestic cover for concessions while signaling to negotiating partners that Iran's threshold for walking away is low.

Whether that pattern holds in 2026 is uncertain. The current context involves an active war, not merely diplomatic pressure, and the domestic power dynamics have shifted considerably.

The Case for Iran's Defensive Posture

Multiple analysts and governments have argued that Iran's resistance rhetoric, however inflammatory, reflects a rational calculation rooted in recent history. The case rests on three precedents:

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. Iran complied with the deal's terms for a full year after the Trump administration's exit before beginning to breach enrichment limits. The lesson drawn in Tehran: compliance with international agreements provides no guarantee against unilateral American action [15].

The assassination of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. The killing of Iran's most senior military commander via U.S. drone strike in Baghdad reinforced the perception that Washington would use lethal force against Iranian leadership regardless of diplomatic engagement [16].

The Libya precedent. Muammar Gaddafi voluntarily relinquished Libya's nuclear program in 2003 in exchange for diplomatic normalization. Eight years later, a NATO-led intervention toppled his government, and Gaddafi was killed. Supreme Leader Khamenei explicitly cited this outcome, comparing Western encouragement to disarm to "giving a child candy or chocolate" while Libya had "lost everything" [17]. The Stimson Center noted that what was "initially hailed as a model or success story soon turned into a cautionary tale" that reinforced "pro-deterrence narratives" in Tehran [17].

China and Russia have broadly endorsed this framing. Beijing and Moscow view JCPOA revival as a means to challenge what they characterize as American unilateralism, and both have positioned themselves firmly in support of sanctions relief for Iran [18]. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published an analysis in 2024 warning against applying Iraq's 1990s escalation playbook to Iran, arguing that Tehran has drawn sophisticated lessons from its predecessors' failures [19].

The Economic Abyss

Whatever the nuclear outcome, Iran's economy provides the most urgent pressure on all domestic factions. The Iranian rial has lost over 95% of its value since 2018, falling from approximately 42,000 to the dollar to over 1.1 million by January 2026 [20].

Source: MERIP / World Bank

Data as of Jan 15, 2026CSV

Inflation reached 48.6% in October 2025 and the IMF forecast it would hit 69% by April 2026 [20]. Food price inflation peaked at 99% year-over-year in February 2026 [20]. The monthly minimum wage, which stood at 135 million rials (about $180) at the start of 2025, had fallen to roughly $100 in real terms [20]. The World Bank projected negative 2.8% growth for 2026 [20].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Oil prices have surged — WTI crude reached $114.58 per barrel in April 2026, up 75.4% year-over-year — but Iran has been largely unable to capitalize due to sanctions and the naval blockade [21]. The "snapback" provisions that restored UN and EU-level sanctions in late 2025 further constricted Iran's access to global markets [20].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of May 18, 2026CSV

For ordinary Iranians, sanctions relief would translate most directly into currency stabilization, lower import costs for food and medicine, and resumed oil revenue. The $24 billion in frozen assets under discussion would represent the most immediate injection, though its distribution within Iran's political economy would be fiercely contested.

Domestic Factions and Who Wins or Loses

The Soufan Center identified at least five political groupings competing to set Iran's direction in 2026 [22]. The key fault lines:

Reformists around President Pezeshkian favor ending the war and accepting concessions if necessary. His political position is weak relative to hardliners, and his role has been largely limited to humanitarian management of the conflict's domestic impact [22].

IRGC hawks, associated with Commander Ahmad Vahidi and SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, favor continuation of the conflict and view any nuclear concessions as capitulation. They stand to lose economically from sanctions relief, as the IRGC's sprawling business empire has thrived in the sanctions-era gray economy [22].

Pragmatic conservatives, aligned with Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, favor a negotiated settlement but on harder terms than the reformists would accept [22].

Bazaari merchants — the traditional commercial class — have been devastated by hyperinflation and currency collapse. They represent a natural constituency for a deal, as sanctions relief would restore import channels and stabilize the rial [20].

Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee has questioned the value of remaining in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and stressed preserving Iran's nuclear "achievements" — language that aligns with the hardliner position [23]. Iran International reported that hardliners have pushed to permanently ban IAEA inspections, a move that would represent a point of no return for nonproliferation efforts [23].

The International Chessboard

Several external actors hold significant stakes:

Oman has served as the primary mediator, hosting indirect U.S.-Iran talks in Muscat as recently as February 6, 2026 [18].

China and Pakistan published a five-point plan on March 31 emphasizing sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of Iran and Gulf states — a framework Tehran views favorably [18].

Russia and China see JCPOA revival as a vehicle to challenge U.S. unilateralism. Both back sanctions relief and have provided Iran with missile technology following the February strikes, according to Defense Security Monitor [24].

The EU-3 (France, Germany, UK) have pushed hard for a restored deal but have limited leverage given the "snapback" sanctions they themselves reinstated [18]. The UK House of Commons Library published a detailed briefing on the ceasefire and nuclear talks, noting that EU credibility as an honest broker has been damaged by its participation in sanctions escalation [25].

Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, remain skeptical. Riyadh has signaled it will not back any agreement that fails to constrain Iran's missile program alongside its nuclear activities — a demand that goes beyond the current framework's scope [18].

What Happens If Talks Collapse

If the current framework fails, the consequences extend beyond the bilateral relationship. With IAEA access terminated since February 2026, there is no independent verification of Iran's nuclear status [6]. U.S., Israeli, and independent assessments placed the pre-war enrichment breakout time at two to four weeks [6]. Whether the military strikes degraded that capability — or whether Iran has moved material to undeclared sites — is unknown.

The Congressional Research Service noted that Iran has not been confirmed to have begun enriching to 90% (weapons-grade), but acknowledged that "it is unknown whether covert weaponization work is underway" given the IAEA blackout [6]. The gap between enrichment capability and a deliverable weapon — estimated at 6 to 18 months — provides a narrow but real window for diplomacy. That window closes further with each week of zero verification.

Oil markets have already priced in significant risk. The surge from $55 per barrel in December 2025 to over $112 in May 2026 reflects both the physical disruption of the Strait of Hormuz closure and the geopolitical premium attached to an unresolved nuclear standoff [21].

Reading the Signal

Pezeshkian's Khorramshahr rhetoric lands differently depending on the audience. For Iran's revolutionary generation, it evokes the deepest well of national identity — a war in which millions served and hundreds of thousands died, largely abandoned by the international community. For younger Iranians, polling suggests it rings increasingly hollow. For Washington, it can be read as either a hardening signal that presages a walkout or the domestic positioning necessary to sell an eventual compromise.

The historical pattern suggests the latter is more likely. Iran has consistently paired sacrifice rhetoric with diplomatic engagement, using the language of resistance to create space for pragmatic concession. But 2026 is not 2015. The war, the IAEA expulsion, the internal fractures, and the economic collapse have raised the stakes beyond anything the previous negotiations confronted.

The next 60 days will determine whether the ghost of Khorramshahr is being summoned to fight — or to bless a peace.